Thanks to Armchair Generalist on highlighting the Thomas Ricks paragraph in the WashingtonPost
and providing some of the memo Ricks wrote about. What in the world you say? Ricks, as AG describes it, highlighted a recent email (dated July 18) circulated to all Army general officers. Written by Command Sergeant Major Daniel Wood about Army personnel standards of conduct in Afghanistan, Wood nails the application of public diplomacy in counter-insurgency. 

First, the memo. AG abbreviated the memo but I feel the entirety (cribbed from Political Opinions) is useful for my purpose. Emphasis added by me.

""All:

Wanted to ensure widest dissemination throughout the force. As
many of you may or may not have seen and heard over the last week, we
(American Military) have taken a beating in the press (US, Afghan and
International) and it is not altogether undeserved. Our warriors
are described as unconcerned for safety, negligent, offensive, rude,
callous, occupiers, hostile, disrespectful… you get the point.
These terms have been used in reference to our driving techniques,
convoy procedures, verbal and hand gestures from the vehicles, TTP of
throwing water bottles and or rocks at Afghan Civilians and pointing
crew served weapons at non threatening drivers and vehicles. Let me be
clear when I say that the actions of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airman and
Marines are a direct reflection on the Non-Commissioned Officers of the
services. NCOs are the trainers of our force as well as the standard
setters and enforcers. We collectively are allowing this to occur.

You may not have broken the code yet and if you have, bear with
me. We have a relevant and capable force and our leaders are
innovative, adaptive and confident. We have been trained to confront
uncertainty and to solve complex problems. We are currently engaged
with an enemy that attempts to win battles in the press where the tide
of public opinion is the ammunition and make no mistake… this
ammunition is effective, especially when it has credibility. The effective engagement of the "middle ground" or the people of the rural communities and villages of this country is where the long war will be won. EVERY TIME you move down a road in this country, you are affecting this middle ground either positively or negatively.

If
your convoy or vehicle cuts off local vehicles, forces them off the
road or out of a lane, leaves adults and children in a big cloud of
dust, does not allow pedestrians to cross the road or makes people jump
out of the way, you are effectively giving ammunition to the enemy. When
a driver, TC or Gunner flips someone off or gives some other negative
hand gesture or yells at people in a offensive way or throws things at
pedestrians, you have just set back the efforts of those who have gone
before you and possibly given an Afghan citizen a reason to follow
anybody but the "arrogant westerner" and the Government that they back.

The
disciplined use of weapons, in part means that you know when and where
to point your weapon. If the gunners in your convoys do not understand
this concept, I need you to get into the process and explain what
constitutes a threat. It is imperative that our warriors know how to
operate in a non-threatening situation as well as a threatening
situation and most of all to be able to tell the difference. The last
few years has taught us that we must be able to change focus from
waving and smiling to engaging the enemy with extreme prejudice in a
matter of seconds… it is the nature of this war. We need to ensure
that we are not creating a more hostile environment based on our
behavior.

We must never lose sight of humanity as we wage this war. We
have the Law of War and the Rules of Engagement that guide our actions
and conduct. We are a values based Military and we cannot afford to
lose the moral high ground. The enemy thrives on weaving a web of lies
about our society and our Armed Forces. It is critical that we prove
their lies to be just that… lies. The people of Afghanistan are
developing a more educated outlook concerning the American military
every day. Your warriors are painting that picture or writing a chapter
in that book whenever they travel the road of this land.

I need every Non-Commissioned Officer in the CJOA to get after
this. Cover it in your convoy briefs, hold NCOPD classes and speak with
your warriors about the necessity of winning this type of battle. We
cannot give the enemy this type of advantage. Help your people make the
connection between their actions on the roads and in the local
communities and the success of our mission to build credibility and confidence in the Government of Afghanistan.
We have got to turn this tide now and I know that we can through your
efforts. Ensure that there are consequences for those who choose to
treat the people of this country with less respect than is due them. Do
what NCOs do; make corrections, enforce standards, lead by example and
train your warriors. Senior Enlisted Leaders from all services;
implement a plan that will Educate, Enable and Encourage your people to
be culturally aware and safe.

We are at war and this land is inherently dangerous due to the
type of enemy that we fight. Nothing said above was meant to say that
anyone should be less aware or battle focused. I know that you operate
daily in a potentially deadly environment and every warrior needs to
remain sharp. Take a moment to read the note below from the Army Chief
of Staff, General Schoomaker. Although directed to soldiers, I am sure
that you will find it applicable across the services. Thank you for
what each one of you do every day in service to our Nation and for the
people of Afghanistan. We will win this.CSM Daniel R. Wood, CSM, United States Army, Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan

AG’s comments are (as always) worth reading
and focus on the quality of the NCOs to lead the troops. This is true
and today’s recruits are tomorrow’s NCOs. Leading me to question the
ability of too many of today’s recruits to follow Wood’s
recommendation. We should be concerned that the quality of the Army
inductee continues to drop as we lower the requirements to entry,
including bending and breaking rules to achieve recruiting targets, but
that’s another post.

Personally, I find the importance Wood places on perception of
the civilians to be significant and welcoming. Significant in that he
recognizes the importance of winning over the population, something
many both in and outside of the military do not get. John Nagl in the JHU Rethinking seminar just a couple of weeks back (something you should watch) and in his book, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife,
emphasizes the reality of getting the population on your side. Notable
is the emphasis on SWET: sewage, water, electricity, and trash. By
focusing on SWET in the AOR, there was a clear decrease in insurgent
attacks that correlated directly to the SWET program (which included
picking up trash twice weekly). If you think about it, this is the same
as the theory of addressing Broken Windows by American metropolitan
police departments: start small and the community helps.

The moral high ground argument also echoes back to the recent
appearance of the JAGs on Capitol Hills. When asked about whether we
can win the “War on Terror” if we do not follow the Geneva Conventions,
one of the JAGs said we cannot win if we do not.

Connecting action with deed and purpose does build
credibility. The ammunition, as Wood aptly describes it, is based on
perception. Perception of the occupier as displayed by their actions.

Robert Pape, in his book Dying to Win emphasizes this very same thing through levers and propaganda against occupiers.

Does sacrificing a little credibility matter? Yes. USMA’s Department of Military Instruction
has a ‘case study’ of the inexpensive means insurgents can lever allies
away in the unattributed Sowing Dissension in Insurgencies. In this case, the 3rd party operatives mounted cheap InfoOps that, along with a hit and run under disguise, redirected SF operations and broke alliances. Mounting the operation wasn’t difficult nor was it expensive, as the enemy demonstrated.

Wood’s memo is excellent and should be read by all in the military and
civilian sectors in Afghanistan, Iraq, and everywhere else (even TSA
agents in the US… ). This includes everybody from Embassy personal to the combatant and non-combatant allies of ours in various theaters around the globe:  notably private military contractors. Consider that in the movie Shadow Company the interview with a security  contractor laughing off a
complaining Iraqi with the explanation of “so what if my warning ricochet hit your
car?”

Woods realizes that perceptions do matter. Videos laughing off
killings (say, in Haditha for example… I ask that you read the discussion of Haditha on the previous link)
we give ammunition to the enemy. To reject this is to fail to
understand the nuances of insurgency, their support systems, and
distinctions between goals and methods. More importantly, to reject this rejects real hetergeniuty of the "enemy" and their support.

Just some quick thoughts on this very important memo that understands the foundation, as proven through history, of winning wars.

The world is complex as are the solutions, but sometimes it
can be so easy. Act like professionals, all of us, and we will deny the
easy ammunition (the low hanging fruit as it were) to the enemy.