Reading Arms and Influence’s smart post on studying the root-causes of failure requires watching the video of Wolf Blitzer’s interview with neocons Ken Adelman, David Frum, and Michael Rubin to get the full effect.
Ken Adelman recited the growing literature documenting American failures and self-inflicted wounds in Project Iraq.
David Frum is simply naive in thinking if a speechwriter could get the President to say something perhaps the President would come to believe in it.
But is is Michael Rubin that comes out swinging and states a major root cause of our failure: then-NSA Condoleeza Rice and her deputy Stephen Hadley.
BLITZER: A lot of people would say, that [military occupation, with Pro-Consul and CPA, and not an Iraqi provisional government] was, Michael Rubin, a huge blunder. You were there. You worked for Paul Bremer. Who came up with that idea of a U.S. military occupation as opposed to trying to let the Iraqis take charge?
RUBIN: Well, I’d second what David said, that that decision, Paul Bremer was the result of that decision. What there was was a debate within the administration about, you have the Iraqi opposition. You had, I believe it was seven key figures. And the question was whether to allow them to become a provisional government. They had already been self-selected through a number of conferences. Or whether there would be some sort of American presence first.
The real debate in Washington was whether we would have more influence before liberation or after liberation. And ultimately, it was the National Security Council, the national security adviser which made the decision to go with an American occupation presence.
BLITZER: That was Condoleeza Rice?
RUBIN: That was Condoleezza Rice and Stephen Hadley.
BLITZER: The deputy national security adviser…
RUBIN: At the time, yes.
BLITZER: … who’s now the national security adviser. And Condoleezza Rice, of course, is the secretary of state now.
RUBIN: That was the compromise that came out of interagency debate, when again, as David said, the State Department, the Pentagon and the others fought themselves to a standstill.
BLITZER: And you think that was a blunder?
RUBIN: I do believe it is one the greatest blunders we have made. The Coalition Provisional Authority and Paul Bremer did a lot of good, but nothing they accomplished which was good couldn’t have been accomplished without an immediate transfer of sovereignty. And the fact that we labeled ourselves an occupying power, unlike in Bosnia, unlike in Kosovo and elsewhere, really put — it justified all the insurgent rhetoric against us. And it turned our allies from those creating a democracy into collaborators.
It’s good to see a real understanding of cause and effect when Rubin says our actions “justified all the insurgent rhetoric” and “turned our allies…into collaborators”.
On a side note, earlier in the interview Rubin also says Edward Djerejian, of the Baker Institute, said it would take “2 – 3 months to put Iraq back online” after the invasion. (It’s worth noting Edward Djerejian’s son, Greg D. of Belgravia Dispatch, and Rubin . have some disagreements themselves.)