Here are eleven steps that are surely to be absent in the soon to be announced New and Improved strategy for “Victory in Iraq”. Simple yet difficult to implement, they pretty much all require a strong & charismatic leader to champion and implement. I just don’t see how success, a far better word than victory, can be achieved unless these steps are addressed in some manner. These steps are largely ignored in the larger public debate but touched by various groups independently. I apologize in advance for typos.

1. Stop participating in the debate on troop numbers and shift to strategy & tactics. It is not about the numbers of men and women, and where they come from, it is about the plan. This point is primarily aimed at the US domestic audience and emphasizes the end and not the size of the force. The focus on numbers will wane as media and public attention settles on the other steps below.
2. Admit reconstruction failures & commit to right the wrongs. This multi-layer step is aimed at both US domestic and Iraqi domestic audiences. US public and US media will focus on question of overcharges, underperformance, and possibly criminal actions by, largely, contractors. Waxman and other Democrats will love this and Iraqis will hear the beginning real commitment to rebuilding their society, which begins with acknowledging the failures, and lost time, of the last three plus years. Apologies matter and are necessary here. One aspect of this step is the very public and aggressive pursuit of mismanagement of the reconstruction, including the CPA, to demonstrate a commitment to change.
3. Lengthen troop rotation schedules. This is one of the hardest steps to implement, the apologies and admissions are constrained to relatively small populations of decision makers, especially nearly four years into Iraq and over five in the ‘Long War’. The rotations give little time to develop and institutionalize area and cultural knowledge. Frequency of rotations, as is the case now, does not make up for longevity. Soldiers, Marines, and officers need to connect with and know the people for successful counterinsurgency. This will clearly impact recruiting and training, and increase recruiting costs, but these are, in large measure, overdue increases as our fighting force deserves to be paid more. Arguments on increased expenditures need to be rebutted with collecting overpayments to contractors and acceptance that this is part of a viable solution. Training and knowledge acquisition can be more clearly and smartly done in the natural downtime of military life. Long duration unit rotations back to the states need to be made unnecessary (part of the difficulty of implementation, especially in an All-Volunteer Force), so some form of compensation is necessary for family and unit cohesion. Establish local, not in Muslim countries but in southern Europe, training locations if necessary.
4. Actually Use the Contractors. The big neon pink elephant in the room is the contractors, especially the security contractors. From 20,000+/- around the time Bush donned his flight suit to around or over 100,000 today, security contractors are America’s agents in the Iraq project whether we acknowledge it or like it and regardless of what the Under Secretary of the Army might say. While the size of the contractor ‘force’ has increased five fold, the absolute number of US/UK former military personnel in the mix has decreased substantially, suggesting there are men available to redeploy to Iraq. Incorporating this 100-150k ‘private army’ is essential and not far out there unless you haven’t been paying attention. These men need to be ‘deputized’ and brought inside of the project to achieve success. They need to be integrated into the command structure to work with and not ‘coincidently near’ counterinsurgency and reconstruction efforts as a whole. Their accountability to the mission, not the law, is essential. Further changing UCMJ and MEJA are unnecessary. These firms are there on the US’s dime and command officers and down need to work closely with contract officers to make sure adherence to the mission is firm and bad behavior punishes the firm. If this Administration believes it can open mail and listen to phone calls it can enforce contracts in Iraq. Contractors must adhere to and follow revised ROE that are more expansive than when to shoot but include how to engage and interact with the population. Aegis ‘Trophy Video’ and alleged shootings of Vice Presidential guards in the IZ must be met with visible and swift punitive action, legal and financial and public, as a demonstration to the Iraqi people and the US public of the resolve and commitment of the United States. Flooding Iraq with contractors, security and civil and everything else, who will work with Iraqis is essential to garner Iraqi buy-in, establish their own stake in the venture, and build an Iraqi desire to succeed. This desire cannot be imposed and it cannot be assumed.
5. Eliminate Little Americas. Bringing the comforts of home insulates and isolates our civilians and military from the mission, people, and problems. It is also detrimental to the mission as it demonstrates to the local population that our needs come first. This feeds into enemy propaganda. Twenty-four hour electricity is noticed outside the IZ. New rules of ‘forage’ must be implemented to pump money into local (including and beyond Iraq) economies, a key component of the Marshall Plan that is always skipped. Worries over food security has solutions, including USDA-style comprehensive testing, certification, and swift & legitimate & public punitive measures for failures. Diverse suppliers, including Afghani farmers and even Iranian farmers, spreads the wealth and shows a commitment to the region economically.
6. Clearly state and demonstrate the intent to leave. Aimed at both US audiences and Iraqi audiences, this step, among other things, is necessary to counter enemy information operations on the perception of an American long term residency. The bases and the massive embassy compound run counter to the core message we’re trying to communicate: we’re trying to help the good Iraqis get back on their feet. The window of opportunity, if there was one, to establish a fortress like the US embassy under construction, was closed long ago.
7. Sincerely engage interested parties, such as Syria & Iran, Egypt, Lebanon, the Arab League, Europe / OSCE / EU. Engage through dialogue, partnering, and buyer agreements. This last point should emphasize Arab countries to reinforce their financial stake in a successful Iraq and the other points to diffuse responsibility and bring more resources to bear to solve the problem and again, counter enemy IO. Do quid pro quo behind the scenes as necessary because failure is not an option. Potentially an option to short-circuit Ahmadinejad’s propaganda through direct trade agreements will help remind people, including Iranians, of the failing economy that was the real reason Ahmadinejad was elected.
8. Change & reward the leadership that understands the fight. Putting General Petraeus in charge is an excellent move. Reward and train the fighters with the right ideas. Officers like Nathan Fick get it. Halt the false promotions and keep the officers with experience. Listen to and expand research and reach of the military’s centers of excellence as key training hubs and should ultimately be the provider of training services, not contracted companies.
9. Practice smart counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency is incredibly easy to ignore and screw up. Most of the steps listed feed into and support a smart strategy that is simultaneously local, regional, and global to counter information options, support domestic (US and other) audience participation and democratic support. All of this requires a smart strategy of engagement in the last three feet of contact with the Iraqi public.
10. Publicize these steps. The light of day needs to be on what we are doing to reinforce each of the steps above, informing the Iraqi public, our allies, and the US public. It also holds our implementation accountable.
11. Building a democracy. The so-called export of democracy requires basic participation of the locals and cannot be imposed, especially by force. Besides reconstituting and supporting and building confidence and trust in who will be in charge in a year or two or three, is the need to rebuild an Iraqi identity. Fortunately, Iraqi nationalism, essentially created and defined by al-Husri, is based on German concepts of cultural nationalism linking history and language over other elements (similar to the later concept of Pan-Arabism). Like Iraq today, Fichte (and Herder and Arendt) were working with a land of city-states and small kingdoms. We need to revisit these lessons, this knowledge that had created Iraqi nationalism eighty years ago, and emphasize this identity and not “democracy”. Democracy will come. Maslow’s Hierarchy shows us certain things must come before and an identity is one part, along with security.

More to come later. I welcome comments.