Briefly, the President’s speech in a couple of hours sounds like it will really be a New and Improved strategy that’s long overdue. Acknowledging problems with the former strategy, it reverses strategic ideas implemented by both L. Paul Bremer and former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. From a Presidential call to upsize the force to accepting the new counterinsurgency manual, it’s unfortunate this change of course didn’t happen years ago when it could and should have.
Some of my observations of what will be said: (see also the NYT page w/ bullet points I won’t repeat here)
- Baghdad is considered central to the problem & the solution. The sectarian violence gripping the city is seen as the key challenge. Eighty percent of the sectarian violence in Iraq is within 30mi of the capital.
- The plan puts forward a “different & better” concept of operations in Iraq that will be adequately resourced by both the Iraqi and American governments.
- “Clear & Hold” failed because we didn’t hold and never created safe zones.
- New Iraqi Rules of Engagement (ROE) will be instituted for Iraqi forces that will be outside of political and sectarian influence. The Iraqi commanders will be required to act against anyone operating outside of the law.
- Iraqi forces will operate from police stations, going into the community and reinforcing their presence and building confidence in the local populations. They will go door to door (specifically not knocking down doors) and making it clear to residents that Iraqi, not American or militia, units are providing security now.
- US forces will support Iraqi forces with better embedding
- US forces will embed at the company level, working on basics including fitness and professionalism, counseling, helping across the board.
- A “much more determined” effort will be made by the US to train and provide the skills and equipment for Iraqi-based / owned logistics, communications, and intelligence. Expanding the Iraqi Army.
- In the 9 districts of Baghdad, 1 USA battalion will be placed in each district (400-600 men)
- Acknowledgement that reconciliation, a key requirement to stabilization and security, requires control of the violence now.
- Acknowledgement of sectarian concerns.
- In a reversal of Bremer, stand firm on Iraqi changing of the oil law (distribution of profits), relaxing de-Baathification (“narrowing limitations”), and holding provincial elections.
- PRT expansion, to be announced in detail by SecState, will focus on building Iraqi government and civil society from the bottom up. There will be an emphasis on local economic assistance projects.
- In a reversal of former SecDef Rumsfeld, a permanent upsizing of the Army & Marines [allowed under US law now, but held to a lower level, see my post here on this], “strengthen the ability to fight the Long War”, and expanded emphasis on post-conflict roles, including building the “infrastructure of democracy”: police, court system, administration.
- Work on and improve Congressional-Executive relations.
- Accept COIN doctrine. Anbar will be cited as an example. The AQ base in Iraq, leveraging local Sunni rejection of AQ will be done w/ +4k troops in the area. Acceptance that COIN isn’t just military operations, but of building confidence and building capacity for businesses and schools to operate safely and effectively.
Of course, this is a mucher smarter set of bullet points that can be found in my rough 11 Steps to Success in Iraq that was to be alternatively titled “11 (missing) Steps to Success in Iraq” after a revision that was to happen after the speech. That’s all for now.