A must read for soft and hard power advocates (as well as Smart Power advocates for that matter) at the Los Angeles Times this week: Warriors at the Limit. All week Phil Carter and Austin Bay debate sizing and shaping the force and its use.
Briefly, Douglas Farah of the Counterterrorism Blog writes about a few topics frequented here on MountainRunner. While I disagree with his shifting blame from resting squarely on the Administration's shoulders, I agree with most everything else.
The Court’s holding and reasoning in Hamdan are unclear on one crucial issue: whether the United States is legally engaged in an armed conflict with the al Qaeda terrorist organization. Why is this issue so important? Well, the entire legal strategy of the Bush administration depends on it, both internationally and domestically, as vastly different rules of international and constitutional law apply in war and outside of it...
...the Court (1) cites an authority in support of a proposition to which it is actually contrary; (2) quotes that authority selectively; and (3) ‘borrows’ both the citation and the quotation from the Jinks, Goodman and Slaughter amicus brief. The story doesn’t end here, however, as the Justices did not only filch citations from the brief but also relied on it substantively. Yet, as I’ll show in my next post, they did so while failing to distinguish between the several alternative arguments presented in that brief. Instead of opting for one of them, they made an unintelligible mish-mash of all of them, leading to contradictions within the Opinion of the Court itself.
There is strong support for enhancing the role of Islam in all of the countries polled, through such measures as the imposition of sharia (Islamic law). This does not mean that they want to isolate their societies from outside influences: Most view globalization positively and favor democracy and freedom of religion
It is generally difficult to take a democracy to war. Churchill once warned about doing so, because once a democracy gets moving it's hard to stop. Mostly this is because of the engine behind the push to war: emotions. The emotion of defending the nation was a key feature in the move away from mercenary armies in the nineteenth century. It was called nationalism.
This was made clear in an 1854 debate in the English House of Commons, an incident my colleague Sarah Percy pointed out to me. While debating whether or not to hire mercenaries to fit in the Crimea, it was argued that Great Powers can mobilize their own people to fight. If they cannot do so, they are not a Great Power.
What is "Science Diplomacy"? Science Diplomacy (SD) is the exchange of Science and Technology across borders. A valuable resource and little understood tool of awareness, understanding, and capacity building, its power is not widely known or considered often enough.
A quote from an earlier interview with the author of the article at the center of the storm, Lt. Col. Paul Yingling:
if I had to condense [my advice] into a pithy little bullet it would be: don’t train on finding the enemy; train on finding your friends and they will help you find your enemy
No time to write on this, but here are some important links on the story:
An observation from the SWC discussion notes LTC Yingling speaks from inside knowledge:
you have an officer that has been deemed worthy by the very system that he is criticizing (...LTC Yingling does have a masters degree in Political Science from the University of Chicago, so he isn't the standard mold rewarded by the system).
he's already served on three operational deployments, with his last one being a major cog in the wheel of the most successful brigade to have conducted counterinsurgency operations in Iraq as deemed by the Army itself.
The discussion over "gated communities" continues with David Kilcullen's description of the "Urban Tourniquet". Kilcullen's response to the wide-spread condemnation of the tactic, while clear in its justification, does not fully address the two key issues raised in my own commentary a few days ago: the continued failure to participate in the information campaign and the apparent failure of the wall to integrate multidisciplinary and cross-institutional efforts.
The decision by both houses of Congress to set a time table for withdrawal is worse than anything Senator Harry Reid could say. Implied in the Administration's suggestion, to put it mildly, that the good Senator (D-NV) himself could "empower terrorists" says he has a louder voice than the President. This acknowledgement confirms the Administration's realization that, among other failures, we've failed to communicate who we are and what democracy is and the Administration's message is easily lost (Ms. Hughes, wasn't this a core self-appointed mission of yours? Are our deeds self-evident?). The Congressional plan for a time table is a real signal, however, is a critical blow to General Petraeus's leverage and capabilities. This vote speaks volumes on how the Administration has failed to manage the war, expectations, and emotional participation. The Administration, in its apparent attempts to keep its hands clean, failed to make sure the public knew that our surge was guaranteed to be met by "their" surge. General Petraeus, the wall notwithstanding, is spot on that success in Iraq is not possible without a deep commitment to the mission.
Give peace a chance by giving General Petraeus and his team a chance to operate and use their expertise, skill, and multidisciplinary tools without the meddlesome (and possibly fatal) interference of Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz (sub req'd), and others. Pressure on the Iraqis is required and by more than the uniformed representatives of the United States. A full effort by all of the bureaus of the Executive Branch is required for success. Where is State? Forget the strategic level, where are they tactically? Where is the rest of the Administration? Are they shaking the trees? Or will they let our servicemen and women and our civilians die in vain as our global credibility sinks deeper, our national debt subjects us to more non-US financial pressures while limiting domestic choices, while threatening our national military readiness and security?
The approach to state-building in Iraq is anchored in Western concepts of governing. Many, myself included, would argue this was an acceptable approach in the Golden Hour after the initial resistance was crushed or crumbled before resistance could organize and the shock wore off. In this power vacuum, the United States was dealing with a largely secular state that had a strong sense of national identity (see Adeed Dawisha's excellent book Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century for details). However, as the Golden Hour slipped away and the opportunity to rebuild was squandered and religious men, fakers, and criminals stepped into the vacuum, the framework for discourse changed. The Western Machiavellian mindset was being displaced by a retreat into religion and tribalism, neither of which are "accepted" by the Machiavellian power model.
Especially today, four years into the occupation of an Arab country at the cross-roads of Sunni and Shia, Arab and Persian, and West and East, we should reconsider how power is spoken, framed, and understood. Other authors have written on this, some I have reviewed previously, and some I will review in the future.
Quickly, Draconian Observations blogs on the NYT article of the "re-christening" of the war, er, struggle:
Some bits on China for your Tuesday.
Can the tactical mistakes get any worse? Building a wall around Baghdad's communities, starting with Al a'zamiyah, or Adhamiya? The prime contractor may as well have been Arbeit Macht Der-Frei Gmbh as the idea of partitioning any part of the city devastates any chance for peace, or "victory" if you prefer. This is another brick in a different kind of wall, the wall of moral legitimacy and strategic appreciation of the requirements to succeed. Neither political nor military doctrine or logic can justify this folly.
Jeremy's Scahill's new book Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army has seemingly reinvigorated discussion on private security companies. Personally, I have not read his book but I've received a lot of email asking about it and asking if I listened to his appearances on various NPR shows and elsewhere. I have to say that on each listening and reading of a review, it becomes more apparent Scahill completely misses the mark and does a poor job doing so to boot. I think there's something to be said that even Jon Stewart, who I watch nearly religiously (thank God for TiVO), wasn't accepting Scahill's sky-is-falling framework (I also don't remember the last time Jon losing a book of his desk). Based on the interviews on the Daily Show and elsewhere, it's apparent Scahill's arguments are weak and when he's not quoting somebody else his evidence lacks contextual reality. I wonder, if Erik Prince threatened Robert Young Pelton with a lawsuit, what will Scahill be threatened with?
On the evolution of Robocop, see Danger Room:
Eddie at Hidden Unities has a thoughtful series (Part I, Part II, and Part III) on P.W. Singer's Children at War which I urge you to read.
From Part I:
“We have young boys that are more familiar with a gun than with school.” -- Afghan warlord
A copious, systematic look at the alarming combination that rips societies, nations and even regions apart, P.W. Singer’s “Children At War” makes a serious contribution to the layman’s understanding of the emergent child soldier doctrine. Not only is it “probably the worst unrecognized form of child abuse” but the utilization of child soldiers endangers international stability like few other developments in warfare. Singer lays out the facts of child soldiers in serious detail (its global in scope (across the developing world) and massive in number (somewhere between 3-4 million children serve with militias, insurgents and government security forces), skillfully probes the roots and results of the doctrine’s development and then offers a round of thoughtful suggestions, ideas and observations for how to respond to its terrible consequences (the focus of the second post about this book).
From Part II:
P.W. Singer offers a range of options for addressing the ominous spread of the child soldier doctrine...
- advocates for child soldier rehabilitation should link their calls to action to the broader security concerns yielded by child soldiers
- Local NGO’s and religious and community leaders, who can make appeals against the practice on the basis of local values and customs must be supported if lasting change is going to take effect on the ground.
- Foster “smart & judicial” efforts that focus on the worst abuses...Shrewd use of the limited political capital and media attention
- Criminalizing the doctrine...Focus on the doctrine itself rather than the abuses that result, lowering the bar for prosecution.
- Activists could focus their efforts upon the weak link in the enabling of the child soldier doctrine, the child soldier group leaders’ trading partners
- an additive of deterrence is required as the cost/benefit calculation by groups must change
Part III of Eddie's review and analysis will be on Western vulnerability to the child soldier doctrine. I can't wait. Eddie's analysis motivated me to buy the book.
By the way, Pete Singer, for those thinking his name is familiar made his mark with the de facto read on private military companies (Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry) and is now working on robotics and 21st Century conflict.
News on China's version of the Future Combat System? Not quite, but they seem proud of their progress of equipping their troops with "digital technology". It's not the Fourth ID, but it's a start.
In recent years, the PLA armored forces have made great efforts to improve their ability to attack air and ground targets. It has endeavored to improve its long-distance mobility, rapid assault strength and information collecting and analysis ability. It has also made notable achievements in the development of information technology. It is reported that a number of digital equipments have been applied in the military forces. A light armored and mechanized unit and a digitalized armored unit have been set up.
The officer in charge of the military training department of the PLA Headquarters of the Central Staff said that the PLA has basically replaced first-generation equipment with second-generation or third-generation equipment. Some of their facilities and technologies are world standard. The structure of armored and mechanized units also has been improved.
I don't know about you, but the last paragraph was almost quaint.
Thanks to Mark at Zenpundit, I'm not getting back to what I need to... why? Because I just read his post suggesting a read of Shloky's Private Militaries and Market States. A few brief comments... I apologize in advance for any rambling likely to appear...
Quickly as I'm out of time to post and or to add my own comments, but here are two recommendations: the first is something to read (or a series of reading if you're industrious) and the second is something to listen to. Both of these are on counterinsurgency today.
First is Dave Kilcullen's response on the Small Wars Journal Blog to Edward Luttwak's Dead End: Counter-Insurgency as Military Malpractice. (For more discussion, see the thread on the Small Wars Council discussion board.)
The second item of note is to be listened to. It's an audio program (transcript to appear soon) by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation: Background Briefing with Stan Correy. By the way, on the topic of the Small Wars Journal and Council, the founders can be heard around 27 1/2 minutes in.
The BBC has a decent article on how UN Peacekeeping operations are "born" and staffed. This is a good read, but two comments:
Useful:
Current monthly rates paid by the UN per peacekeeper include:
- $1,028 for pay and allowances
- $303 supplementary pay for specialists
- $68 for personal clothing, gear and equipment
- $5 for personal weaponry
(H/T AMPList)
Briefly, from the UN News Centre: More Chinese police arrive to serve with UN Mission in Haiti.
The United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH) today announced the arrival of nearly 100 Chinese officers, including seven women, who are serving with a Formed Police Unit (FPU) in the Caribbean country.
The 95 new police, who joined a group of 30 FPU members of the same contingent that arrived last week on 4 April, brings the total number of Chinese officers in Haiti to 125.
China has contributed more than 1,000 officers in Formed Police Units since the Mission was established in October 2004 after an insurgency forced then President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to go into exile.
The latest contingent, replacing one which has rotated out, comes from Guandong Province. Prior to their deployment to Haiti, its members underwent a five-month training course covering language, shooting, driving and combat/defensive tactics.
Good for them. See my previous posts highlighting Chinese public diplomacy vis a vis peacekeeping in general, including Sept 2006 news of China upping it's UNIFIL (Lebanon) numbers for the same reason (although they seem to only doubled their contribution to 343 as of February 07).
The Council on Foreign Relations issued a backgrounder on American civil-military relations. No, I'm sorry, that's not what the backgrounder purports to be about, although it should. Robert McMahon wrote on the "different responsibilities" Congress and the President (it should still be an upper case "P" people) have in waging war but completely ignores some of the most important oversight powers of Congress.
Back in January I posted the Washington Times book review of reviews Losing Hearts and Minds?: Public Diplomacy and Strategic Influence in the Age of Terror. However, after reading the book myself, I found Josh Sinai's review incomplete (although I do recommend reading his review as well as mine below).
Carnes Lord, a professor at the Navy War College, takes on the question of how to win the "hearts and minds" in, just as Foreign Affairs wrote in their review of the book, a controversial manner. A look at the table of contents, one finds he is taking a rather in-depth look, with chapter titles ranging from Strategic Influence and Soft Power, Public Diplomacy and Psychological-Political Warfare, Problems of Organization, and, Defense Department: Into the Act?. Lord sets out to look at bureaucratic obstacles, friction from domestic politics, and the impact of media.
From the start, I found myself in agreement with "controversial" label from Walter Russell Mead's review in Foreign Affairs, but I don't know if our independent assessment was for the same reason(s). I had trouble with Lord's definition, arguments and positions.
Between hardware problems, travel, and deadlines, posting will be light to non-existent for the next several days.
The recent news an Army general is writing a biweekly column for a US newspaper caused a stir. The column by Major General Rick Lynch is shown as having to contributors, at least one of which is an Army public affairs officer, has raised questions about the division of news and propaganda, or self-promotion. But does it really matter that he's writing at all? Will anybody read it buy it, truthful or not?
A recent Pew Research Poll has some interesting findings:
Four years into the Iraq war, most Americans say they have little or no confidence in the information they receive - from either the military or the media - about how things are going on the ground. Fewer than half (46%) say they have a great deal or fair amount of confidence that the U.S. military is giving the public an accurate picture of the situation, and even fewer (38%) are confident in the press's portrayal of the war...
On the negative side, 21% now say they have no confidence in military reports, while 27% have no confidence in press reports on the war. At the start of the war, virtually nobody expressed such views.
Perhaps has the Georgia paper was on to something: publish military authors to boost the paper's cred.
I suggest you at least glance at the whole Pew Report for comparisons between news interest / coverage over Iraq, Anna Nicole Smith, Brit sailors enjoying some R&R, and the 2008 campaign.
Switching gears...
On now for something completely different...
The rabbit died. Well, actually a dozen died, killed actually and eaten not by starving North Koreans as a new staple but as exotic food by DPRK's leadership. That's one big rabbit... you'd need more than the
Last month I posted a reading list on civil-military relations on the Smart Power Blog that is now cross posted here.
The importance of understanding and establishing "proper" civil-military relations can't be understated both at home and in the troubled regions. The relationship between civilian and military leaderships dictates and is dictated by the freedom of the people. This relationship, in a democracy especially, is special and paramount and yet too many do not understand or get it.
Why post on this? It is important to understand civil-military relations in an age where people:
The list above could go on, but I'll stop and hope you add your own reasons in the comment section.
Below is a brief list of suggested resources to help understand the nature of US civil-military relations:
If you really want to go academic, then the following will round out the essential reading list:
A Georgia newspaper published the first of what is to be a biweekly column by the commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, Major General Rick Lynch, on the first page of the second section. What's interesting is not the message, but that online the column is categorized as "Local News" instead of an opinion piece. (Editor & Publisher wrote that it's labeled as "story", but so are Op-Eds. It's the categorization between the byline and title that counts here.)
What's the big deal? Well, is it really news? Did contributors Lt. Col Randy Martin, Fort Stewart public affairs officer, and 1st Lieutenant Allie Chase ghost-write the piece?
This is how General Lynch opens his piece:
I've asked the Savannah Morning News to allow me to write about Iraq, my personal observations here and your 3rd Infantry Division. So, about every two weeks, I plan to write a column so that you have a better understanding of what is really going on.
From Editor & Publisher:
"I'm on the fence about this, my first reaction is that we need to get this man's view in the paper," Catron admitted. "This is a viewpoint from someone who was there and that is how we looked at it. We will start off and see where it goes. I knew it would be controversial."
There's a difference between getting his view on paper and making it "news". In the print edition it's labeled "commentary" (print circulation: 50,000), but online it's "local news", but perhaps that will change soon.
Catron said Monday that Lynch is not paid for the column, adding that at least three newsroom staffers have complained. "They were objecting to it and there is a valued argument there," she said, noting that one of those who objected was the paper's military reporter, who could not immediately be reached for comment. "Our military reporter is quite concerned, and we are not finished talking about it."
There are many parallels with news stations broadcasting stories passed of as news but made by government agencies and private firms highlighting the benefits of some program or product.
I think it's a good public affairs move for the general to reach out, but does the way the newspaper is positioning harm the intent? What if the general wrote only a small bit or none of the story at all and just signed off on what the PAO(s) wrote?
If the general's article is local news, then shouldn't Frank Rich's column, especially yesterday's damning "Sunday in the Market With McCain" (subscription required), be listed as news as well?
What do you think?
I asked the question a while back about whether Defense should be given control over the creation and execution of US public diplomacy efforts. Here were the results of the poll:
The poll indicates that readers believe Defense should have at most a limited role in America's public diplomacy and an equal number believe Defense should be out of the PD business entirely.
I revisit this poll from many months ago because of an article Eddie forwarded from the Armed Forces Journal, Why the military can'd do it all. You should read the whole article, but here is some of the red meat pertinent to the above survey results (highlights are mine):
...We cannot as a nation or military give way to mission creep because the interagency was shortsighted or underfunded in fulfilling its charter. This is not a question of being inflexible in the face of modern challenges; it's about knowing your own capabilities and core competencies, as well as those of your potential enemies or perceived threats. I am not taking aim directly at State or any other department or agency within the federal government. Instead, I am looking at the individual charters of each organization and correlating their current project resources and budget levels.
For example, the current budget request for the Defense Department is more than $387 billion, while State's is about $9.2 billion and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) requests $8.3 billion. It should be clear that the only organization poised to make an impact with this accounting is the Defense Department. I would argue that providing State and the USAID increases in personnel and resources is necessary to balance the instruments of power and to put the right face on U.S. foreign policy.
Remember, the primary mission of our forces is to provide physical security for the nation by defending national and vital interests, while defeating all enemies, foreign and domestic. This shouldn't change in any context or medium. Relevancy at this basic level is timeless. This fits perfectly within the construct of the instruments of power and the DIMEFIL. It provides the hard power we rely on when absolutely necessary. Unlike the tools used by a mechanic or a surgeon, these so-called "instruments" do not come with owner's manuals or certification processes, although all are embedded with rules and restrictions set forth in the pages of the U.S. Constitution.
As I watched our commander in chief give the latest State of the Union address, I was impressed to see and hear each of our nation's instruments of power was embedded throughout his speech, but I also find it difficult to understand why our civilian and military leadership continues to overemphasize the capabilities of the armed forces as we continue well beyond our core competencies. If we are to create a generalized military force, there are serious debates to be had. This isn't a case of our military forces being incapable or unable to protect our nation and win its wars. It is about our nation's leadership realizing that it must demand all components of the DIMEFIL be used in concert and ensuring the interagency does its fair share to reach national-level objectives that affect our national and vital interests. It is up to the leadership of the Defense Department to realize that we are not always the best tool for every situation and to ensure our leadership is fully aware of the consequences when the military instrument of power is brought to bear against all enemies, foreign or domestic....
In the past year, I have heard much debate on the necessity of legislating a follow-on to the Goldwater-Nichols Act for the interagency and for increasing jointness among the services. I propose a different tack. I recommend using the stand-up of U.S. Africa Command as a platform for integrating the interagency and instruments of power.
This effort should be resourced and led by State. The current situation elevates the combatant commanders to the historical level of viceroy by virtue of structure, budget and resources. I recommend the creation of a civilian counterpart to which the combatant commander is subordinate. Create a leader for each continent of the globe and make no exceptions. Within the continents there would be the equivalent of an interagency joint task force for each country, with the military component subordinate to the civilian ambassador or equivalent. This would assume that the civilian departments of the federal government have trained experts in their professions, and that the USAID is able to fulfill its charter with organic personnel and resources. The Defense Department would provide support and physical security for mission accomplishment as directed by its civilian leaders....
The final structural iteration would provide for all federal departments and agencies to restructure their organizations into this newly formed integrated global entity. So, when federal departments coordinate, the lines of authority and responsibility would be clearly delineated, and each organization would be able to reach its counterparts at the same level and breadth. This is why the stand-up of Africa Command is important to the future of our foreign policy.
Read...
After reading the problems, Jason posts a solution for recruiting shortages.
Returning to the issue of renaming the Global War on Terror to the Long War or something else, I thought I'd pull out my suggestion for a replacement name buried at the end of an earlier post.
How about "War Against Child Killers And Militants Organized as Loose Entities"? It pulls on the emotions and includes the idea of a networked enemy of various types. Seems like a good fit to me. In addition to being descriptive of the enemy, it makes for a nice acronym that also jives with our tactics: WACK-A-MOLE.
This applies only to a couple dozen readers: when I changed from TypePad to MovableType a while back, I allowed the original feed path (http://feeds.feedburner.com/typepad/ezzp) to continue. This is a heads up that if you're one of the few on this old RSS, you should see a note to convert to the primary, and soon only, RSS path the bulk of you are on: http://feeds.feedburner.com/Mountainrunner. That's it.
Ok, perhaps I'll get the 7 thematic days or perhaps my title is simply lazy, either way, a collection of interesting and useful links on China:
CAS academician Wu Xinzhi said the new findings show that the archaic humans of China were not totally replaced by the modern humans from Africa. Other scientists also disagree with the "out of Africa" theory. They insist on a multi-regional evolution model which holds that modern man descended from several indigenous archaic human populations in the Old World.
REQUEST: This is not on China but on Indonesia, Barnett commented on a WSJ article about FDI in Aceh. I am doing a project on FDI in Aceh, if anyone has sources they'd recommend on this, I'd appreciate any information you could offer or direct me to. Email or post as comment please.
What's in a name? Plenty, especially if you're rallying the democracy around your cause. Declaring a war on something is an American political tradition in that vein. I won't even get into how many Wars we have inside the US (on Drugs, on Poverty, on Homelessness, on High Prices...), can we have a war on "terror"? No, not really but that hasn't stopped the its mainstream use.
Finally, there seems to be traction to correct the misleading notion that we can have a Global War on Terror. Zbigniew Brzezinksi says why far better than I, he emphasizes the exercise of fear on the population.
While truth may actually require protection through a blanket of lies (the classic example being the deception around Operation Overlord), employing "war" when it's not appropriate isn't the same and will only lead to bad things, as Brzezinkski notes.
As CSIS's PCR blog notes, WaPo's Peter Beinart continues the discussion on "terror" and "war". However, Beinart falls short when he considers alternatives to "terror":
Other alternatives have their own problems. Replacing "terror" with "jihadism" would offend many Muslims, since jihad has positive, nonviolent connotations. "Jihadi-salafi," a term used by some scholars, is less offensive and more accurate but unlikely to play in Peoria. "Al-Qaeda" is logical, but experts now consider it more an inspiration than a mass organization. And al-Qaeda-ism doesn't exactly roll off the tongue.
Al-Qaeda isn't the only enemy and Salafism isn't the only ideology in opposition to the US. How about "War Against Child Killers And Militants Organized as Loose Entities"? It gives a nice acronym: WACK-A-MOLE.
CSIS's PCR blog has an update on the Civilian Response Corps (see my previous on CRC here). More notable is a comment posted to their post today:
Among other factors, the creation of a bona fide US civilian response corps requires addressing two institutional impediments within the State Department. One of these is the lack of promotional incentives provided to foreign service officers (FSOs) who venture into harm’s way to engage in stabilization and reconstruction activities. Career FSOs usually move through the ranks by fostering key foreign contacts at embassies–not by taking the risks involved in embedding in remote areas of war torn countries to administer US reconstruction programs. As such, exactly the sort of FSOs and other civilians the US needs to create a viable civilian response corps are not being offered the proper incentives for their actions.
The newly introduced legislation (S. 613) seems to address this institutional problem in Section 9 on “Service Related to Stabilization and Reconstruction.” Part (a) states that “Service in stabilization and reconstruction operations overseas, membership in the Response Readiness Corps…and education and training in the stabilization and reconstruction curriculum…should be considered among the favorable factors for the promotion of employees of Executive agencies.” Parts (b) and (c) provide further incentives for FSOs and USAID personnel to participate in a civilian response corps.
However, the new legislation does not address a more fundamental problem that directly impacts the first. Members of a civilian response corps cannot take the requisite risks to do their jobs if US security officers, with the support of ambassadors, severely restrict their movements. Security officers and ambassadors stand to lose their positions and professional standing when, on their watches, US personnel are injured or killed while doing their jobs. As such, security concerns tend to trump all else, and US political objectives suffer as a result. It is for this reason that US embassies and consulates around the world have become veritable fortresses that are disconnected from the popular mood of their respective countries. In Iraq, for example, US officials have gone out of their way to cordon off US personnel from all that is Iraqi.
Thus while S. 613 is moving in the right direction to provide for future US nation building efforts, it does not address a more fundamental policy problem in the State Department. The whole point of creating a civilian response corps is to recruit civilians who are willing to put themselves in harm’s way to further US policy objectives. At some point, the potential for civilian casualties associated with engaging native populations must be factored into the cost of doing business.
For Monday's Mash-up, I offer the following for consumption.
From the British media we have:
While we're on the private military industry...
On the wiki front:
On US military readiness and breaking the force (see my posts on Readiness and Recruiting):
Eddie returns from a slumber and comments on the Iranian hostage taking and civil-military relations, ending with:
A similar attitude may be hard to envision in America, but the lack of faith in public officials and the nation as a whole is alarming, to a degree that it could be reasonable to compare it only slightly favorably to the Vietnam debacle and the “malaise” diagnosis of Jimmy Carter. Adam Elkus notes that 1/3 of Americans suspect ulterior motives behind 9/11, prominently USG support and/or acquiescence. Scandal after scandal in Washington from the compounding disgrace of Katrina to pressuring US attorneys to pursue partisan political charges against the opposition only make this “crisis of confidence” more acute. Again, like the British, Americans are not innocent here; much of this has gone on with their rudimentary knowledge (from torture to flawed intelligence) and they can no longer reasonably claim to have been “misled.”
Yet in spite of all this, the prospect of military personnel held hostage by a foreign power raises the reasonable specter of enraged Americans across the partisan divide demanding action (even some of those who don’t buy the official line on 9/11).
Unless…. The military’s halo of truth, honor and courage is long due to be removed regardless. Public worship of the military is incorrectly placed and certainly emboldens the political and institutional failure to punish disastrously poor leadership from the likes of General Tommy Franks, Ricardo Sanchez, Peter Pace, George Casey and others. It prevents hard questions about tactics, direction and accountability to be asked in any meaningful fashion.
The continuing use of abuse and torture by US forces or their private proxies, the fatalistic acceptance of ethnic cleansing in Iraq, the constant lying to the American people for the past 4 years (marching up to Capitol Hill and other public platforms on a routine basis and claiming ”we’re winning”) and the propensity to “support the troops at any costs” are helping to rot the core of the US Army, just as much as extended, repeated deployments.
In due time, it is likely that political operatives will begin to use military leaders and by extension, the military itself, as scapegoats for the failing wars in Iraq & Afghanistan. That’s strike one. Strike Two will be drastic public disillusionment after the likely failure of the “Surge”. Strike Three is a nightmare in itself; the kidnap, torture and execution of American soldiers in Iraq. Insurgents have been trying this for years now, but their chances for success have to be increasing with the vulnerability of lightly manned outposts emphasized by the military in Baghdad. The propaganda effects of such a tragedy are almost too terrible to imagine, but its reasonable to expect that after years of failure the American people will turn even further against the war. Even if Strike Three were not to unfold, the negative light fostered by Strike One & the disgrace of Strike Two are alone enough to scuttle the love affair with the military. If and when American troops are captured by Iranians or another nation, it is thus likely a casual indifference like in Britain could ensue or worse, a desperate public push to “bring them home” at whatever costs.
Fixing the frayed bonds between society, the military and the government will require a full, honest effort from all sides. Nothing less than the continued ability to pursue national policies and goals on a sustainable level abroad and at home is at stake.
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