A must read for soft and hard power advocates (as well as Smart Power advocates for that matter) at the Los Angeles Times this week: Warriors at the Limit. All week Phil Carter and Austin Bay debate sizing and shaping the force and its use.
Monthly Archives: April 2007
Problems on the Horizon
Briefly, Douglas Farah of the Counterterrorism Blog writes about a few topics frequented here on MountainRunner. While I disagree with his shifting blame from resting squarely on the Administration’s shoulders, I agree with most everything else.
Monday Mash-up
- Listened to General David H. Petraeus on NPR this morning. Good interview as part of the overdue public affairs campaign that the Administration itself is probably wise to stay out of. (includes good awareness building of the complexity of the operation, that includes attributes of COIN, CT, and counter-gang/crime operations)
- Dance Dance Revolution for Middle School fitness? (free sub req’d) Pathetic. Where’s the range of motion? Stability exercises? Upper body fitness? Endurance? Get them outside… argh.
- Opinio Juris finds SCOTUS’s ruling in Hamdan v Rumsfeld case to be flawed:
The Court’s holding and reasoning in Hamdan are unclear on one crucial issue: whether the United States is legally engaged in an armed conflict with the al Qaeda terrorist organization. Why is this issue so important? Well, the entire legal strategy of the Bush administration depends on it, both internationally and domestically, as vastly different rules of international and constitutional law apply in war and outside of it…
…the Court (1) cites an authority in support of a proposition to which it is actually contrary; (2) quotes that authority selectively; and (3) ‘borrows’ both the citation and the quotation from the Jinks, Goodman and Slaughter amicus brief. The story doesn’t end here, however, as the Justices did not only filch citations from the brief but also relied on it substantively. Yet, as I’ll show in my next post, they did so while failing to distinguish between the several alternative arguments presented in that brief. Instead of opting for one of them, they made an unintelligible mish-mash of all of them, leading to contradictions within the Opinion of the Court itself.
- The United States continues to be self-evident in the eyes of the government. We’re not talking about who we are and what we stand for, but the promotion of the US as a tourist destination. How else do you explain “the U.S. Department of Commerce has budgeted $3.9 million this year for marketing the country to international tourists. Malaysia will spend $117.9 million; Tunisia, $43 million; and Turkey, $80 million”? New York and Las Vegas spend “spend tens of millions” to attract tourists. DoC must think they don’t need to… wrong. I suppose it’s part of a larger strategy as the US continues to make it difficult and uncomfortable for people to get into this country.
- PIPA released a public opinion poll that, among other things, reiterates that the United States is still well regarded and admired for its science and technology. For more discussion on the survey, see Marc Lynch’s post, but you at least go to the PIPA page to see the charts yourself.
There is strong support for enhancing the role of Islam in all of the countries polled, through such measures as the imposition of sharia (Islamic law). This does not mean that they want to isolate their societies from outside influences: Most view globalization positively and favor democracy and freedom of religion
- Eddie shared an excerpt of John McCain on Fox rejecting Tenet’s position on torture. This reminded me of an exchange on this blog last year on Powell letter’s to McCain on morality (more here).
Feeling the War
It is generally difficult to take a democracy to war. Churchill once warned about doing so, because once a democracy gets moving it’s hard to stop. Mostly this is because of the engine behind the push to war: emotions. The emotion of defending the nation was a key feature in the move away from mercenary armies in the nineteenth century. It was called nationalism.
This was made clear in an 1854 debate in the English House of Commons, an incident my colleague Sarah Percy pointed out to me. While debating whether or not to hire mercenaries to fit in the Crimea, it was argued that Great Powers can mobilize their own people to fight. If they cannot do so, they are not a Great Power.
Science Diplomacy
What is “Science Diplomacy”? Science Diplomacy (SD) is the exchange of Science and Technology across borders. A valuable resource and little understood tool of awareness, understanding, and capacity building, its power is not widely known or considered often enough.
A Failure in Generalship
A quote from an earlier interview with the author of the article at the center of the storm, Lt. Col. Paul Yingling:
if I had to condense [my advice] into a pithy little bullet it would be: don’t train on finding the enemy; train on finding your friends and they will help you find your enemy
No time to write on this, but here are some important links on the story:
- Armed Forces Journal article A Failure in Generalship by LTC Paul Yingling
- Army Officer Accuses Generals of ‘Intellectual and Moral Failures’ by Tom Ricks
- Small Wars Council discussion of Yingling’s article
- Combat Studies Institute interview of LTC Yingling (Sept 2006)
An observation from the SWC discussion notes LTC Yingling speaks from inside knowledge:
you have an officer that has been deemed worthy by the very system that he is criticizing (…LTC Yingling does have a masters degree in Political Science from the University of Chicago, so he isn’t the standard mold rewarded by the system).
he’s already served on three operational deployments, with his last one being a major cog in the wheel of the most successful brigade to have conducted counterinsurgency operations in Iraq as deemed by the Army itself.
Another Brick in the Wall, Part II: Response to the Urban Tourniquet
The discussion over “gated communities” continues with David Kilcullen’s description of the “Urban Tourniquet”. Kilcullen’s response to the wide-spread condemnation of the tactic, while clear in its justification, does not fully address the two key issues raised in my own commentary a few days ago: the continued failure to participate in the information campaign and the apparent failure of the wall to integrate multidisciplinary and cross-institutional efforts.
Continue reading “Another Brick in the Wall, Part II: Response to the Urban Tourniquet” »
Give peace a chance
The decision by both houses of Congress to set a time table for withdrawal is worse than anything Senator Harry Reid could say. Implied in the Administration’s suggestion, to put it mildly, that the good Senator (D-NV) himself could “empower terrorists” says he has a louder voice than the President. This acknowledgement confirms the Administration’s realization that, among other failures, we’ve failed to communicate who we are and what democracy is and the Administration’s message is easily lost (Ms. Hughes, wasn’t this a core self-appointed mission of yours? Are our deeds self-evident?). The Congressional plan for a time table is a real signal, however, is a critical blow to General Petraeus’s leverage and capabilities. This vote speaks volumes on how the Administration has failed to manage the war, expectations, and emotional participation. The Administration, in its apparent attempts to keep its hands clean, failed to make sure the public knew that our surge was guaranteed to be met by “their” surge. General Petraeus, the wall notwithstanding, is spot on that success in Iraq is not possible without a deep commitment to the mission.
Give peace a chance by giving General Petraeus and his team a chance to operate and use their expertise, skill, and multidisciplinary tools without the meddlesome (and possibly fatal) interference of Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz (sub req’d), and others. Pressure on the Iraqis is required and by more than the uniformed representatives of the United States. A full effort by all of the bureaus of the Executive Branch is required for success. Where is State? Forget the strategic level, where are they tactically? Where is the rest of the Administration? Are they shaking the trees? Or will they let our servicemen and women and our civilians die in vain as our global credibility sinks deeper, our national debt subjects us to more non-US financial pressures while limiting domestic choices, while threatening our national military readiness and security?
Book Review: The Just Prince (+ Sulwan al-Muta’ Fi ‘Udwan al-Atba’)
The approach to state-building in Iraq is anchored in Western concepts of governing. Many, myself included, would argue this was an acceptable approach in the Golden Hour after the initial resistance was crushed or crumbled before resistance could organize and the shock wore off. In this power vacuum, the United States was dealing with a largely secular state that had a strong sense of national identity (see Adeed Dawisha’s excellent book Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century for details). However, as the Golden Hour slipped away and the opportunity to rebuild was squandered and religious men, fakers, and criminals stepped into the vacuum, the framework for discourse changed. The Western Machiavellian mindset was being displaced by a retreat into religion and tribalism, neither of which are “accepted” by the Machiavellian power model.
Especially today, four years into the occupation of an Arab country at the cross-roads of Sunni and Shia, Arab and Persian, and West and East, we should reconsider how power is spoken, framed, and understood. Other authors have written on this, some I have reviewed previously, and some I will review in the future.
Continue reading “Book Review: The Just Prince (+ Sulwan al-Muta’ Fi ‘Udwan al-Atba’)” »