The approach to state-building in Iraq is anchored in Western concepts of governing. Many, myself included, would argue this was an acceptable approach in the Golden Hour after the initial resistance was crushed or crumbled before resistance could organize and the shock wore off. In this power vacuum, the United States was dealing with a largely secular state that had a strong sense of national identity (see Adeed Dawisha’s excellent book Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century for details). However, as the Golden Hour slipped away and the opportunity to rebuild was squandered and religious men, fakers, and criminals stepped into the vacuum, the framework for discourse changed. The Western Machiavellian mindset was being displaced by a retreat into religion and tribalism, neither of which are “accepted” by the Machiavellian power model.

Especially today, four years into the occupation of an Arab country at the cross-roads of Sunni and Shia, Arab and Persian, and West and East, we should reconsider how power is spoken, framed, and understood. Other authors have written on this, some I have reviewed previously, and some I will review in the future.

A Sicilian Arab, Muhammad ibn Zafar al-Siqilli, wrote a handbook for a prince 350 years before Machiavelli: Sulwan al-Muta’ Fi ‘Udwan al-Atba’ (Consolation for the Ruler During the Hostility of Subjects). Joseph A. Kechichian and R. Hrair Dekmejian’s book, The Just Prince: A Manual of Leadership, analyzes the ibn Zafar’s suggestions and compares ibn Zafar’s ideas with Machiavelli’s. 

In crafting a communications strategy in Iraq, and the larger Muslim world, it should be valuable to consider the Arab Machiavelli’s recommendations which stem from a Muslim view of legitimacy deeply rooted in tribal customs and a Prophet-inspired just public order. This awareness shaped his vision of power and virtue.

Ibn Zafar identified five standards for his prince who was “expected to establish not only an orderly polity, but one based on justice”:

1. Trust in God (Tawfid)
2. Fortitude (Ta’assi)
3. Patience (Sabr)
4. Contentment (Rida)
5. Self-denial (Zuhd)

For the sake of this review, here are two examples of the differences between Machiavelli and ibn Zafar the authors highlight. The first is on advisors, the importance of which both Machiavelli and ibn Zafar agree on. They both also agree on the need for the advisor to uphold the ruler’s interests above the advisor’s own. The tie that binds the advisor to the prince is where things change. The Machiavellian heaps “honors on [his advisor], enriching him, placing him in his debt…so that he sees that he cannot do better without him.” Essentially, buying the advisor.

Ibn Zafar, in contrast, creates a different indebtedness:

Amongst faithful and far-sighted counselors, he is most deserving of attention whose prosperity depends on your own, and whose safety is tied to yours. He who stands in such a position, exerting himself for your interests, will likewise serve and defend himself while fighting for you.

Superficially understood as winning the “hearts and minds”, there is a deeper association between prince and advisor. A small example of this in practice was the soccer ball give-away program in Iraq. Initially, American soldiers gave the soccer balls directly to the children, but this had the adverse effect of demonstrating their fathers could not provide for them. The program was revised so that Iraqi Police gave the soccer balls to the fathers, who in turn gave them to the children and also began to assist the IP.

The second example I will give here is the importance of qualities held by the prince. To Machiavelli, the prince need only to appear to have positive qualities such as sympathy, religiosity, trustworthiness, honesty, and compassion. However, these may be tossed aside with cruelty and inhumanity it serves the interests. The ends always justifies the means. Ibn Zafar recommended “artifice, ruse, and falsehood” for the “good of the state”, but the prince must be good, Godly, and humane. The means must correspond to the desire ends, except in cases of extreme crisis.

Understanding the framework of power of friend and foe alike is essential. Achieving moral legitimacy is one thing but if our language and actions are inherently counter to local understanding, then the chance of success diminishes and will increasingly rely on luck, not skill. Ibn Zafar informs us of nuances we otherwise are not aware of and my trample upon.

We have unintentionally permitted the strengthening of tribal and sectarian divisions that creates lines of power we have difficulty understanding and difficulty speaking to. The Just Prince provides guidance and language on the operations of Islamic groups just as Machiavelli provides guidance and language on the operations of Western groups.

If you think Machiavelli is relevant today, then you should read this book. Although it is an expensive book priced for the academic market, it is a valuable and informative read. If you think the $25 for a used copy is high, buy it with friends, expense it, or simply suck it up and buy it (The “new” price at $59.50 is just way too much).

In closing, two quotes that may have served some value three years ago:

“There are three species of creatures, who, if you do not lodge and nourish them as befits their worth, will immediately turn their backs and break with you: these are kings, men of letters and benefactors.”

“The king who believes that the minds of princes are superior to those of counselors has fallen into great error. If he acquires the bad habit of contradicting a wise and faithful counselor — without manifest reason — it is certain that he will never prosper.”