It is generally difficult to take a democracy to war. Churchill once warned about doing so, because once a democracy gets moving it's hard to stop. Mostly this is because of the engine behind the push to war: emotions. The emotion of defending the nation was a key feature in the move away from mercenary armies in the nineteenth century. It was called nationalism.
This was made clear in an 1854 debate in the English House of Commons, an incident my colleague Sarah Percy pointed out to me. While debating whether or not to hire mercenaries to fit in the Crimea, it was argued that Great Powers can mobilize their own people to fight. If they cannot do so, they are not a Great Power.
Today, the US military is full of passionate, dedicated, and skilled Marines, soldiers, sailors, and aviators. Today, the US military also draws from an increasing small pool, a trend is highlighted by the major increases in recruiting costs, as well as the lowering of standards and accelerated promotions, as filling the ranks has gotten harder.
Soon after 9/11, and repeated again after the invasion of Iraq, the Administration wanted the public to be emotionally involved in the war effort, but only to a point. The Administration's effective efforts to hid the flag-draped coffins coming into Dover, as well as not attending military funerals are just two examples of keeping the images of a "real" war away from the public, as well as the other more obvious examples dealing with the media and passing laws.
After the invasion of Iraq, Thomas Friedman captured the calculus of the Bush Administration's strategy for maintaining domestic support of the war:
"You all just go about your business of being Americans, pursuing happiness, spending your tax cuts, enjoying the Super Bowl halftime show, buying a new Hummer, and leave this war to our volunteer Army. No sacrifices required, no new taxes to pay for this long-term endeavor, and no need to reduce our gasoline consumption, even though doing so would help take money away from the forces of Islamist intolerance that are killing our soldiers. No, we are so rich and so strong and so right, we can win this war without anyone other than the armed forces paying any price or bearing any burden."
He went on:
This outlook is morally and strategically bankrupt. It is morally bankrupt because 1 percent of America is carrying the whole burden of this war. After the Super Bowl, I went to Tampa to visit Centcom headquarters and Gen. John Abizaid and his staff. They run the war in Iraq. I met many soldiers there, from the women serving as analysts in the intelligence center to the strategic planners just back from Baghdad, who had been separated for months from their families or knew comrades killed or wounded in Iraq.
In the current issue of Foreign Policy there is a small article that hammers home the depth of the war's impact. Sociologist James Moody reminds us of the importance of deeds or promises, or actions over words, in his figuring of the breadth of the immediate impact of war.
In November 2005, James Moody was listening to National Public Radio when he heard a listener remark that it’s impossible to calculate how many Americans know someone killed in Iraq. The Duke University sociologist begged to differ. We could know [that number], he thought.
Using established estimates for the size of social networks—extended family, friends, and acquaintances—Moody created an online calculator that measures the social reach of the war on terror. He estimates that between 5.4 and 8.2 million Americans know someone killed or wounded in Iraq or Afghanistan as of late March 2007. He also estimates that between 9.3 and 12.7 million Iraqis know someone killed by U.S. forces or insurgents since 2003.
“We tend to think of these [deaths and injuries] as singular events,” says Moody. “But each person is connected to other people, so a ripple effect spreads through society.” That can influence whether American support for military action continues to plummet, or whether Iraqis and Afghans are drawn to resistance movements in greater numbers.
And it may explain the lack of widespread war protests in the United States. Because, for all the talk of quagmires, Iraq and Afghanistan are hardly taking on Vietnam-level proportions in their social reach. Moody’s estimates suggest nearly 25 percent of Americans in 1975 knew someone killed or seriously wounded in the Vietnam War. To reach that scale today, at least 250,000 more U.S. troops would have to die or be wounded. And that is a calculation Americans may find impossible to accept.
Let me add context to the numbers with data from the CIA World Factbook.
IRAQ
Population: 27,499,638 (July 2007 est.)
First Hand Knowledge of War: 9,300,000 - 12,700,000
Percentage of population: 34% - 46%
UNITED STATES
Population: 301,139,947 (July 2007 est.)
First Hand Knowledge of War: 5,400,000 - 8,200,000
Percentage of population: 2% - 3%
This is a reality often found in this blog in posts on security strategy, privatization of force, and recruiting for the armed services. What is unfortunate is the political leadership, Executive and Legislative, is very likely too similar to the the percentages above, save some distant contacts for political purposes.
There is a point to this post, one that I highlighted above in Moody's comments on the numbers. We need to take into account that one-third to nearly one-half of the Iraqi population has been directly and personally affected by the war. Our actions and our words must take that into consideration.
We must communicate openly and effectively, using culturally-specific language in anticipation of negative perceptions that go beyond the poor track record we have established with incidents like Abu Ghraib and Haditha that actually impacted a relative few. That's called information operations, but it is also called public diplomacy.
Thoughts?

"While debating whether or not to hire mercenaries to fit in the Crimea, it was argued that Great Powers can mobilize their own people to fight. If they cannot do so, they are not a Great Power."
An interesting observation, especially economically.
If we find that we are a labor-rich society, then we are a great power. If instead we find the cost of capital to be particularly low, then we are not a great power..
How odd!