The recent tours by President Obama and Secretary Clinton showed they are leagues ahead of their predecessors in individually understanding the power of their personal interaction and engagement abroad. They have been successful in a very short time in getting the vast majority of the world's opinion leaders to be open to taking a new look at America. However, the "magic" of their personalities does not replace the need for dedicated leadership to maintain and build ongoing and persistent outreach and engagement.
The coordination for both the President's and the Secretary's trips likely came from the National Security Council. If this is true it could set a troubling precedent that discounts the true purpose and value of public diplomacy as a facilitator of ongoing proactive engagement that includes both direct and indirect means in favor of a global engagement strategy that is trip and policy specific. This jeopardizes more than the development and motivation of trained personnel, it raises questions about who will be the champion for and provide the necessary and continuous leadership and support for public diplomacy in all its forms.
At a point in time, the President may be 90% of public diplomacy, but over time the President cannot overcome the lack of engagement or synchronization between words and deeds. The same is true of the Secretary of State. There is something in the truth that the Secretary of Defense has more impact on America's global image than the Secretary of State, and possibly even more than the President. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had a greater negative impact across the board on America's image than President Bush. On the flipside, Secretary Gates has a greater potential of improving America's image than the President. Simply put: American public diplomacy continues to wear combat boots when the Secretary of Defense has a greater impact on public diplomacy than the President as the President's not on tour. So let's just agree that while the President marshals global opinion, he does so periodically and in fits and thus he relies on the Government to conduct the day to day and year to year engagement to foster an environment that can receive and relay his message, encouragement, and hope.
The tours were not as successful as they could have been because they were apparently one-offs that lacked deep synchronization. The critical link between words and deeds are based on 'hope' as they hope the enterprise, akin to herd of cats, gets together and headed in generally the right direction.
It seems there is a belief that events can be orchestrated on demand without regard to underlying substructure necessary to the success of the event is naïve and dangerous. The current fragmentation and dispersal of the Government's public diplomacy apparatus, whether active or incidental, suggests that either the need for a central apparatus to engage the world is unnecessary because the skills required are or will be common across the Government. Of course we know the skills are not endemic so we must do everything we can to educate, equip, empower, and encourage everyone from top to bottom to engage locally and globally. This cannot be done overnight nor can it be done without a leadership and guidance.
At the State Department there is a complete standstill (which, by the way, makes now a good time to schedule meetings with the Under Secretary's office as they have little to nothing to do right now except look at their half-packed offices and wonder where, when, and if they'll move and what they will do when they get there). At the Defense Department, the Support for Public Diplomacy office was dismantled to streamline the bureaucracy with the hope that integration with the State Department, the rest of Government, and the private sector here and abroad will improve (because the status quo is inadequate) organically without promotion or development from a dedicated senior leader. Apparently knowledge and contact information flows freely in the five-sided building and out in the field so a coordinating hub is not necessary.
One of the challenges today is remembering that the public diplomacy that the United States Information Agency, that entity some (not me) would like to see resurrected in some form, was not on the public diplomacy of the 1980's or later. To be clear, I am not talking about reinvigorating the public diplomacy most people think about. Forget about previous Under Secretaries like Charlotte Beers and Karen Hughes. They are not exemplary of what is needed as both approached public diplomacy as a limited (and dysfunctional) exercise in branding. Lost under their leadership was the need to understand the audiences and realize the struggle for minds and wills is about both what we do and the local struggles of ideology and survival that are feed and supported by global actors. Simply put, the Beers & Hughes models are to be avoided so let's move on.
Public diplomacy, back when it was simply called public affairs (long before public affairs took on today's sterility of informing by press release and fear of informing to influence - a generalization but not an over-generalization), is the full spectrum psychological struggle of the early Cold War and not the hearts and minds campaigns of Beers and Hughes. Public diplomacy must be re-framed as direct or indirect engagement of foreign audiences to further America's national security. Former Under Secretary Jim Glassman was on this path. Our ability to engage foreign audiences requires engagement at home and abroad through more than cultural and educational exchanges and providing news. It includes creating capacity for self-governance and humanitarian aid. It includes defense against 'bad' ideology and lies just as much as against disease. It's about fostering opportunities to engage and a lack of human security not only prevents or inhibits engagement but makes people susceptible to extreme ideas and actions.
We need a charismatic and able President and Secretary. We have both. However, they need support and to suggest none is needed is to suggest USIA was needed just because President Eisenhower didn't have the necessary charisma. The fact is both the Smith-Mundt Act and USIA and that resourced and supported talented individuals were needed to support smart foreign policies because policies themselves could not overcome ignorance and adversarial propaganda.
My point is this: we need an Under Secretary, or a facsimile with equivalent rank, that has the full and unabashed support of the Secretary to marshal resources and get the attention of the State Department bureaucracy, Congress, the Defense Department, and Combatant Commanders. This person must be given the support to grab the ear of and encourage action from (or in other words, win the struggle for minds to influence the will to act) actors across the government. Somebody in the National Security Council, regardless of title, will have neither the attention to focus on the daily activities necessary to make sure a surge capacity is available when America needs it nor the staff or budget to support the mission of persistent global engagement. It requires the development of a cadre of professionals who support the enterprise to scale coordination to, among other requirements, be proactive to build up goodwill and head off adversarial activities (whether propaganda or more subtle) around the world in areas that are below the radar.
All the "magic" in the world will not prevent the chasm between words and deeds. Distributing responsibilities for public diplomacy will not result in a rising tide that lifts all boats but a distribution of redundant and poorly coordinated activities.
This post is adapted from an offline discussion stemming from this post. Hopefully some of the discussants will jump in and comment publically below. In the near future, such discussions (posts generate far more offline remarks and email than online comments) will be possible at the soon-to-be-launched Global Engagement Network website. Details will be forthcoming.
See also:
- Is this public diplomacy? Close but not quite
- The Future of Public Diplomacy
- What Does the New Tech Guru at the State Department Mean for Public Diplomacy?
- Whither Public Diplomacy? Sixty-six days (and counting) without an Under Secretary
- Still Wanted (?): An Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy
- Leadership Changes at the Combatant Commands and more thoughts on Realigning the State Department
Send an Email
It's good to hear from someone who understands the real importnace and value of public diplomacy. Your points are well made and for the most part entirely valid, although the comment 'Public diplomacy must be re-framed as direct or indirect engagement of foreign audiences to further America’s national security' seems to back up a DoD-centric view. This may be mere semantics but security can be a loaded word and PD operates across a policy spectrum - albeit all conributing to security.
The phenomena of ultimately leaving much foreign policy communicative effort to the military, who at least have the resources (but not necessarily the expertise), appears to be common, not only in the US but also, maybe to a slightly lesser degree, in the UK. NATO and the EU (within ESDP civ-mil operations) are also not immune to this.
Further, the narrowing of the word-deed gap is critical to the success of PD, which requires it to be deeply ingrained in policy-making (as Murrow appreciated). The corporate world has taken this on board but political institutions, even in the most developed nations on the planet, still don't fully appreciate this fact, despite the rcognition of the monumental societal changes being braought about by the information age. The Obama administration is good on the word but still has to follow upon the deed (good intentions lead the way to hell etc).
The US is now in a good position to make good on the Obama effect and take PD seriously, but I fear that political infighting is taking its toll. State needs to take a stand if the US is to capitalise on this window of opportunity.