Big CBRN or Little CBRN?

Briefly, a post from the Armchair Generalist: Changing Views on CB Warfare worth reading:

The really interesting part of the article isn’t that the Canadians have a prototype lightweight CB protective ensemble that doubles as a combat uniform. It’s that they have consciously recognized that the terrorist use of CBRN hazards represents a smaller level of exposure and lesser risk than what adversarial nations could cause with NBC weapons. The U.S. military has not come to this recognition yet, primarily because they’ve been forced to accept this philosophy from the Bush administration’s NSC that nations are giving terrorists WMDs and that the threat from terrorists and nation states are equivalent. Read the National Strategy to Combat WMD and the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD and tell me I’m wrong.

If we are to accept the smaller threats, "Little CBRN", as more likely, how would that change our strategy? Would it change the domestic message as describing the Bad Wolf requires more education of the public (when half the people still believe WMD’s were actually found in Iraq)? Clearly. Does this education open up other holes in the national strategy? Likely.

"Big CBRN" just creates a neater package of threats and justifies Iraq and helps with the rhetoric on Iran and N Korea (but let’s not mention potential subversion in India or Pakistan). But the reality of today’s news of inert liquids to be mixed on airplanes amplifies the reality of home chemists getting involved in future of irregular war.

What do we do? Do spiral and incremental developments instead of huge ass projects that solve everything. Just a thought.

Posted in War