The Smith-Mundt Act: A Legislative History

BY BURTON PAULU*

The issues encountered when Congress passed the Smith-Mundt Act have their parallels in current Washington debates. Dr. Paulu, manager of Radio Station KUOM in Minneapolis, was an overseas OWI employee during the war. He will go to London this fall as a Fulbright scholar to study the BBC.

THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION and Education Exchange Act of 1948 authorized our government for the first time in its history to conduct international information and educational exchange activities on a permanent basis.[1] The United States had developed international information services on a limited scale in World War I, and on a global scale during World War II, justifying both operations as war measures. In peacetime, however, we had always opposed government information services, although we had officially sanctioned some cultural and educational exchange activities. The passage of this legislation, therefore, marked a significant departure from traditional American policy.

With only a few exceptions all present United States Government international information and educational exchange activities are carried on under this act. Our information services include the widely publicized Voice of America broadcasts, the news bulletins distributed abroad by the Department of State and a comprehensive motion picture program. The cultural and educational exchange work consists mainly of the operation of American reference libraries abroad, the interchange of teachers, students and specialists, and the extension of financial aid to American-sponsored schools in other countries.[2]

Although there is now general agreement as to the need for such activities, that was not the case in the years immediately following World War II. Accordingly the Smith-Mundt Act was passed only after extended discussions both in and out of Congress.

WAR-STIMULATED PROGRAMS

The Committee on Public Information headed by George Creel directed this country's first comprehensive international information service during World War I. This unit was disbanded in 1919, however, and had no peacetime successor until the late 1930's when the United States gradually and reluctantly began to reply to the damaging anti-American propaganda being disseminated by Germany and Italy.

There were several reasons for our delay in developing government international information services. Fundamentally, we lacked the incentives which had encouraged such activities by other countries. We were not politically isolated—as was Russia after World War I. We had no aggressive designs on our neighbors—as did Italy and Germany. We had no system of colonies or dominions to bind together—as did the Netherlands and Great Britain. Furthermore, we had a strong tradition against "government in business," and an intense dislike of all sorts of government propaganda operations. And our well-organized, privately owned radio industry was strongly opposed to any sort of government broadcasting.

When we finally did enter the field, it was because we were concerned in general about the state of international politics, and in particular about the success of the Axis propaganda campaign against us. One of our first steps was to create in 1938 an Inter-departmental Committee for Scientific and Cultural Cooperation. In the same year the Department of State set up a Division of Cultural Cooperation. By 1941 we had a Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, a Coordinator of Information and a Foreign Information Service. The Office of War Information was created in 1942. Together these war agencies developed an information service of enormous proportions: through radio, press and film they brought the American story to the whole world. The war over, President Truman, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and Assistant Secretary William Benton decided to ask Congress for authorization and funds to continue international information activities on a permanent peacetime basis.

THE BLOOM BILL

The first such bill was introduced into Congress on October 15, 1945, by Representative Sol Bloom (D) of New York, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. As reported to the House its second section stated: "The Secretary is authorized . . . to provide for the . . . dissemination abroad, of information about the United States, its people and its policies, through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information media, and through information centers. . . ." The Secretary was also authorized to provide for the interchange of students, teachers and specialists, and to grant funds for the support of American-sponsored schools abroad.

Although the bill was reported out of committee on December 19, 1945, its consideration was delayed while the Department of State carried on a controversy with the Associated Press and the United Press as to whether or not the wire services should sell news to the government for its international information activities.[3] It also was held up while Congress debated the Department of State Appropriation Bill for 1947. Finally, after a special Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on the news agency dispute, the Bloom Bill was reported to

*This article is based on the author's New York University Ph.D. dissertation: *Factors in the Attempts to Establish a Permanent Instrumentality for the Administration of the International Broadcasting Services of the United States* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1950). No attempt has been made to present here the detailed documentation supplied by the footnotes of the original thesis.

[1] This is also cited as Public Law 402 of the 80th Congress, and as the Smith-Mundt Act, after its sponsors, Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey and Representative Karl E. Mundt of South Dakota.

[2] The Fulbright program was authorized by Public Law 584 (the Fulbright Act) of the 79th Congress rather than by the Smith-Mundt Act, although the Department of State is concerned with its administration.

[3] Although the issues involved were discussed at great length, the dispute has yet to be resolved: the AP and UP still do not sell news to the government. However, the Department of State found it could get along without their services better than it had expected. (Burton Paulu, "The Voice of America and Wire Service News," *Quarterly of Film, Radio and Television*, VI:30–36 (Fall 1951).

the House of Representatives in July 1946 with an amendment introduced by Representative Vorys (R) of Ohio designed to meet some of the principal objections to government information activities. This provided that such activities should be carried on only when needed to supplement international information dissemination by private agencies, that the State Department was not to acquire a monopoly of broadcasting or any other international information medium, and that outstanding private leaders should be invited to review and advise the Department in this work.

Thus amended the bill passed the House by a two-thirds vote on July 20, 1946, after a hurried and perfunctory discussion and was placed on the Senate calendar. On August 2, the last day of the session, Tom Connally (D) of Texas, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, tried to get it to the floor, but Senator Taft blocked the proposal and the bill died with the adjournment.

THE 1947 APPROPRIATION

Even though the Bloom Bill did not become law the continuance of international information and educational exchange activities was assured when the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce and the Judiciary Appropriation Bill for 1947 provided temporary authorization and funds for such services. Since the appropriation bill was passed before the House of Representatives took up the Bloom Bill, it therefore gave Congress its first real opportunity to debate the decision of the executive branch to continue permanently the international information activities begun during the war. The points of view revealed during these discussions presaged the debates on the 1948 appropriation bill and the Smith-Mundt Bill of the following year.

The Department of State requested $19,284,778 for the support of its information and cultural program during the fiscal year 1947, but the House of Representatives reduced this to $10,000,000. In explaining this cut the appropriations committee stated that although it was "in accord with the philosophy of the program in that the retention of peace . . . must be based on more extensive understanding between the peoples of the world," it disagreed on the details of procedure. Thus the committee advocated more educational exchange activities, expressed disapproval of the "ideologies and philosophies" of some of the books being distributed, and thought the Department was not leaving enough of the motion picture and publication work to private services.[4]

Although the amount requested for the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC) for 1947 was only a small part of this $415,000,000 omnibus appropriation bill, a large portion of the House hearings and debates was devoted to the OIC, because of its newness and because it represented a departure from traditional United States Government operations. Only a few recorded votes bore on the OIC program, however, the most important of these being on the resolution to waive points of order against the item, an action necessary in the absence of legislation authorizing such activities. On this the division was 141 in favor to 133 against; 138 of the "yeas" were cast by Democrats, and 132 of the "nays" by Republicans.[5] When the bill reached the Senate the Department of State made a strenuous effort to have the cut restored, stating that otherwise the whole broadcasting operation would have to be eliminated. The Senate granted this request, the House later concurring. The continuation of the OIC on an interim basis was therefore assured until June 30, 1947.

[4] *House Report 1890* (79th Cong., 2nd sess.), pp. 7-8.
[5] *Congressional Record:* 92:4, pp. 4351-52.

The discussions and debates of this year did not settle any of the problems with which they dealt, but they did reveal several important trends which persisted—and in some cases were intensified—during the debates of the following year. The majority in Congress favored government information and educational exchange activities: generally speaking the Democrats supported the program while the Republicans opposed it. The opposition from both parties was often concerned with the basic problems of government-industry relationships which underlay so many discussions of the post-war period. Specifically there was doubt as to the propriety of a government international information service, and concern lest the government supplant rather than supplement the work of private agencies. Congress also questioned the State Department's ability to conduct international information activities, and had grave doubts about the loyalty of some of its employees.

THE 1948 APPROPRIATION

The intensification of the cold war provided the background for congressional consideration of international information activities during the following year. One of its results was the expansion of international broadcasting: the total short-wave output for all countries rose from 3,229 program hours per week in April 1946 to 4,275 hours in December 1946. In the spring of 1947 the Voice of America broadcast 292 hours per week in 22 languages to Europe, Latin America and the Far East. These programs were rebroadcast by local networks in 25 countries. A special effort was made to get Voice of America broadcasts through the Iron Curtain. On December 15, 1946, a relay was opened at Munich to strengthen our signal to Central Europe and the Balkans. Programs for Russia were begun February 17, 1947, and broadcasts to Greece on May 13, 1947.[6]

The Departments of State, Justice, Commerce and the Judiciary Appropriation Bill of 1948 included the State Department's request for $31,381,200 to continue international information and educational exchange activities until authorizing legislation could put the operation on a permanent basis. The Department of State and its supporters based their case for these funds on two grounds: the cause of world peace would be advanced through the operation of a United States information service; and, prestige and security factors required the United States to reply to Russian propaganda attacks.

Secretary of State Marshall told the Senate appropriations subcommittee that "one effective way to promote peace is to dispel misunderstanding, fear, and ignorance. Foreign peoples should know the nature and objectives of our policy. They should have a true understanding of American life. We should broadcast the truth to the world through all the media of communication."[7] These arguments were carried further by John W. McCormack of Massachusetts, the Democratic whip,

[6] United States Department of State, Office of Public Affairs, *Foreign Affairs Background Summary—International Broadcasting. An Instrument for Understanding* (Washington, 1947), pp. 1–14; United States Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations, *Departments of State, Justice, Commerce and the Judiciary Appropriation Bill for 1948. Hearings . . .* (80th Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 793–98, 939. (Hereafter cited as *Senate 1948 Hearings.*)
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 635.

who told the House: "It is a well-known fact that adherence, even a limited adherence, to the truth in its propaganda activities, is not one of the elements of the Soviet Union's policy."[8] One of the bill's few Republican supporters said: ". . . today we are facing a war of ideas, a war between the totalitarianism of communism and the freedom of a constitutional representative Republic. Through the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs the Department of State provides a vehicle for presenting democratic ideas overseas and combatting the misrepresentations of the United States so prevalent abroad."[9]

FIVE TYPES OF ARGUMENTS WERE brought up against the OIC appropriation: (1) international information services were not a proper government activity; (2) the OIC should be eliminated to save money; (3) funds should not be appropriated in the absence of authorizing legislation; (4) the OIC was inefficiently administered; and, (5) if international information activities did have to be supported by the government, the operations themselves should be turned over to private agencies. (The question of whether or not the OIC was achieving any results was not an important issue during this debate.)

The main opposition argument was that the OIC was inefficiently administered: important here were charges that the State Department had many disloyal employees.[10] For example, Representative Busbey (R) of Illinois introduced into the *Congressional Record* a 12-column report by Robert E. Stripling, chief investigator for the House Committee on Un-American Activities, charging that some of the artists whose pictures were being circulated abroad by the State Department's art exhibit had Communist affiliations.[11] Busbey also charged that William T. Stone, Director of the OIC, Haldore E. Hanson, Executive Assistant to Benton, and Charles A. Thomson, of the UNESCO relations staff, were—or had been—Communists or Communist sympathizers.[12]

Other Congressmen also held such beliefs. Stefan described the OIC as "a nest of alien-minded radicals."[13] Even Cox of Georgia, the Democrat who had done so much to get the OIC appropriation through Congress the year before when loyalty had been one of the main issues, now declared that the State Department "will not get a dime" until Congress is convinced that "only Americans will be used to administer the program."[14] Later the Senate Appropriations Committee showed its concern too by asking Secretary Marshall for reassurance on this point.

In due course Benton furnished the House with a memorandum compiled by Howland Sargeant of his office replying in detail to Busbey's charges

[8] *Cong. Rec.:* 93:4, p. 5282.

[9] *Ibid.:* Short, Mo., 93:4, p. 5289.

[10] Benton informed the Senate Committee that many members of Congress told him this charge was the most serious of all, and that if it were met, many of the other objections would disappear. *Senate 1948 Hearings,* pp. 646, 983; United States Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, *United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1947. Hearings . . . on H.R. 3342,* pp. 74-75. (Hereafter cited as *Mundt House Hearings.*)

[11] Busbey was one of the representatives who did not oppose the idea behind the OIC, but did object to its administration. As he brought up these Communist charges, he declared: "I believe there should be in the State Department an Office of Information and Cultural Affairs, but it should be free of communistic, fascistic, and other alien influences. There is need for facilities to answer lies against our country by propagandists of other countries, notably the Moscow radio." He later voted in favor of the Mundt Bill. (*Cong. Rec.:* 93:4, pp. 5221–5; 93:6, p. 7617.)

[12] *Ibid.,* 93:4, pp. 5296-97.

[13] *Newsweek,* May 19, 1947, p. 32.

[14] *Cong. Rec.:* 93:4, p. 5287.

against Stone, Hanson and Thomson. Busbey had held Stone personally responsible for some articles critical of American foreign policy appearing in the magazine *Amerasia* because Stone had been a member of the magazine's editorial board. Sargeant pointed out that the contributors included many nationally known writers representing widely divergent points of view, that the members of the editorial board were not individually responsible for the articles by those writers, and that a "critical review of Mr. Stone's [own] writings reveals no trace of Communistic leanings. . . ."

Famous among the incidents affecting State Department-Congressional relations at the time was the broadcast on April 24, 1947, of a review of Russell Lord's book, *The Wallaces of Iowa.* This occurred when Congress was predisposed to find fault with anything related to Henry Wallace. The former Vice-President and Secretary of Commerce had been unpopular with many congressmen for some time, and his recent stand on U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations had done nothing to return him to their favor. When this program was aired, Wallace was in Europe making speeches criticizing American foreign policy.

This book review, which was broadcast just once, and then only in German to Germany, had been recorded for delayed broadcast several weeks before Wallace's campaign against the bi-partisan foreign policy reached its peak. If examined objectively, it should have offended only the Wallaces—and not their critics! Most of it dealt dispassionately with the publishing and agricultural activities of the Wallace family. Insofar as it appraised their output, the program was critical. Thus it said: "Whenever the members of this family turned to agriculture and its problems, the success was dubious."[15]

Nevertheless a storm broke on April 25 when Senator Walter F. George (D) of Georgia read the Senate an excerpt from a letter which described this broadcast as "a laudatory account of Wallace." Although George had neither heard the program nor seen the script, he went on to say: "I rise to ask . . . whether the right hand of our State Department knows what its left hand is doing. I submit that no more untimely broadcast could have been made by our State Department . . . at a time when Mr. Wallace, in Europe, was trying to divide at least the sympathies of the British and French people from our own people. . . ."[16]

Congressional response in general was almost violent, although most of the critics made no attempt then or later to find out just what the program had said. One representative remarked that the review held out Wallace "as the great American of all times . . . at the very moment he was in Europe attempting to sabotage the President's so-called foreign policy program," and other congressmen hastened to add fuel to the fire.[17] Representative Taber, overlooking the fact that the program had been in German for Germany, remarked: "Are we going to have one end of the State Department running in one direction and the other in another, as witness the broadcast to Russia glorifying Henry Wallace on April 23?"[18]

In due course Benton explained that while the program may have been "stupid," it definitely was not sabotage—as some critics had implied.[19] Unfortunate-

[15] The entire text of the broadcast is given in the New York *Herald Tribune,* April 26, 1947, p. 6, cols. 1–3.

[16] *Cong. Rec.:* 93:3, p. 4027.

[17] *Cong. Rec.:* Brown (R) Ohio, 93:4, p. 5283.

[18] New York *Times,* May 6, 1947, p. 5, col. 1.

[19] *Mundt House Hearings,* pp. 23-24, 75; United States Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign

ly, most of the people who complained had neither heard nor read the program, which fact led one OIC supporter to quote a line from the broadcast—"When they [the Wallace family] turned to other problems [than agriculture] the success was dubious," and then to challenge "anyone in this House" to point out any place in the broadcast where Henry Wallace was praised.[20]

THERE WAS ALSO MUCH DISCUSSION of the State Department's traveling art exhibits. In 1946 the OIC spent $49,000 to purchase 79 canvases by 48 American artists which it used, together with some privately owned pictures, in seven travelling exhibits.[21] When these paintings were displayed at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City in October 1946 the New York *Times* art critic wrote that most of them represented "radical developments," and that they were not "a rounded report on contemporary painting in America."[22]

The *Herald Tribune* found the exhibit "an interesting display," and felt that the State Department's plan to circulate these modern canvases was "a significant development in the spreading of knowledge of American painting. . . ."[23] The magazine *Art News* devoted the lead article in its October 1946 issue to the State Department's new art venture, reproducing 23 of the pictures. It too noted the preponderance of modernistic canvases, but described the artists as "able to stand on their own feet in any country today."[24]

But criticism was soon forthcoming from conservative artists—and from conservative politicians! The Hearst newspapers, deciding to mix art with politics, began a nation-wide campaign against the exhibit, describing it in such terms as: "The collection concentrates with biased frenzy on what is incomprehensible, ugly, and absurd. . . . Double talk in art . . . junk . . . lunatic delight."[25] Then the February 18, 1947, issue of the popular picture magazine *Look* reproduced seven of the pictures with the caption: "Your Money Bought These Paintings. They Are Part of a Collection of Modern American Art purchased by the State Department for Exhibition Abroad."[26] More newspapers picked up the story, and many Americans, assuming the role of art critics, found modern art not to their liking, and decided to write to their congressmen—or to the Secretary of State—about it. The portrayal of a plump "Circus Girl Resting" by the Japanese-born artist, Yasuo Kuniyoshi, was singled out for special complaint.

On March 3, 1947, at the opening of the House hearings on the appropriation bill, Secretary Marshall told the committee that he had "already had some 50 to 100 letters on the subject, with some oral discussions back and forth, from the President all the way down." At this stage, the Secretary was already willing to call it enough: ". . . so far as future Circus Ladies go, that is a closed shop." But the chairman of the committee did not consider the matter closed at all, and later during the hearings confronted Benton with reproductions of some of the paintings, challenging him to identify their contents.[27]

Relations, *United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1947. Hearings . . . on H.R. 3342* (80th Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 102, 107. (Hereafter cited as *Mundt Senate Hearings.*)

[20] *Cong. Rec.:* Gary (D) Va., 93:4, p. 5292.

[21] A complete list of the artists, pictures and prices is given in the *Cong. Rec.:* 93:4, p. 5225.

[22] Oct. 3, 1946, p. 25, col. 6.

[23] Oct. 6, 1946.

[24] XLV:21 (October 1946).

[25] *Art Digest,* XXI:25 (Dec. 15, 1946).

[26] XI:80-81.

[27] United States Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations, *Department of State Appropriations Bill for 1948. Hearings . . .* (80th Cong., 1st sess.), p. 28. (Hereafter cited as *House 1948 Hearings.*)

When the art project was discussed by the House, a riotous session took place, described by one member as "a lot of horseplay," the pictures being passed around "in a manner suggestive of the barker at a street fair."[28] In this case the chief barker was Representative Brown (R) of Ohio, who said in part: "This picture, I think, represents sleepy-eyed potatoes in spring time. I am sure that from it some of you may be able to understand what a great contribution we are making to peace abroad." Then with righteous indignation he declared:

> . . . if there is a single individual in this Congress who believes this kind of tripe is doing any good . . . then he should be sent to the same nut house from which the people who drew this stuff originally came. Why, it is simply ridiculous that we put up with this kind of waste of the taxpayers' money for one moment.[29]

Representative Cox (D) of Georgia, remarked: "I cannot think it reasonable that a sane person drew them or that a man with any common sense at all would have distributed them." Representative Taber quoted with approval a description of "Circus Girl Resting" from the Washington *Post* which described the picture as looking like "something between Primo Carnera taking an enforced siesta and the product of an early Easter Islander after a bad night." And Representative Rankin (D) of Mississippi explained it all by saying: "They are Communist caricatures that are sent out to mislead the rest of the world as to what America is like."[30] Despite the excitement in the House, there was very little reference to the art project during the Senate hearings or debate.

In answer to all of this, Benton, himself an art collector, explained that the exhibits were intended to serve two purposes: refute the conception held abroad "that Americans are . . . a materialistic, money-mad race, without interest in art and without appreciation of artists or music"; and to attract visitors to our cultural centers. He admitted that the Department had been in error in letting just one of its employees select all the pictures, and regretted the unrepresentative character of the canvases chosen. He also produced evidence to show that the exhibits were achieving their intended effect.[31] But the tide of criticism was too strong, and the State Department cancelled all showings of the disputed 79 paintings.

The House Committee also was concerned over some of the books selected for OIC libraries abroad, especially Edmund Wilson's *Memoirs of Hecate County,* which Chairman Stefan described as "obscene, lewd, and lascivious." Actually the book had never been distributed, but reports that it had been disturbed the committee greatly. In the May 14 debate in the House of Representatives one OIC defendant remarked:

> May I say that if the information and cultural program is one-tenth as effective abroad as it has been in this country, it is worth ten times the amount that we spent or will spend for it. In this country it has the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Taber] chasing the Circus Lady, and the

[28] *Mundt House Hearings,* p. 125.

[29] Like Busbey, who had led the attack on the OIC as a Communist organization, Brown supplemented his criticisms by saying he would support "the right kind of [information] program," (*Cong. Rec.:* 93:4, p. 5287) but unlike his colleague, Brown voted against the Mundt Bill. (*Ibid.:* 93:6, p. 7617.)

[30] *Ibid.:* 93:4, pp. 5217, 5286–89.

[31] *House 1948 Hearings,* pp. 417-18; *Mundt House Hearings,* pp. 77–80; *Mundt Senate Hearings,* pp. 89-90; *Cong. Rec.:* Busbey (R) Ill., 93:4, p. 5221.

sedate Chairman of our subcommittee [Mr. Stefan] reading the *Memoirs of Hecate County*.[32]

SOME MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES believed that if there had to be government financial support for international information and educational exchange activities, at least the operations themselves should be turned over to private agencies. Therefore, when the House Committee eliminated all OIC funds, it suggested as an alternative that "private enterprise" be encouraged "to a greater international activity," and that there be more cooperation between the Department of State and the private media of information.[33] Some Republican House Appropriations Committee members thought that broadcasting could be done not only better but also more cheaply by private licensees. This was very much the opinion of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee chairman, Senator Ball (R) of Minnesota. He and the other majority members of the committee would have turned the whole operation over to NBC and CBS within a few weeks had the latter been willing to take it.

To all of this Benton and Kenneth Fry, chief of the State Department's International Broadcasting Division, replied that the type of programming done by the government differed from that done by the network shortwave departments. Much of the NBC and CBS output consisted of recordings and transcriptions, often drawn from domestic shows, whereas the IBD output was made up mainly of original productions; therefore, the government's operation was proportionately no more expensive than that of NBC and CBS.

The hearings and debates on this bill become more meaningful if regarded as extensions of those of the previous year and as preliminary to the Smith-Mundt Act debates which were to follow. As introduced into Congress the Department of State Appropriation Bill for 1948 requested $31,381,200 for OIC activities. The House Appropriations Committee recommended the elimination of the entire item, and the House acted accordingly. The State Department then asked the Senate Appropriations Committee to restore these funds. This committee was willing to replace $13,000,000 of the amount requested, but only on condition that as much as possible of the broadcasting be done by private broadcasters rather than the Department of State. After the bill was passed by the Senate, the differences between the two versions were resolved by a conference committee. Here the OIC was a major issue, but agreement was reached on a final figure of $12,400,000 which was accepted by both houses.

However, the 1948 appropriation bill provided only temporarily for United States international information activities: funds were granted for just one year; and furthermore, the basic question of authorization for a permanent program was not settled. This was the purpose of the Smith-Mundt Bill which had already been introduced into Congress.

THE SMITH-MUNDT BILL

The Smith-Mundt Bill—H. R. 3342—was developed by Representative Karl E. Mundt (R) of South Dakota, in conference with representatives of the Department of State, from a draft sent by the State Department to both houses of Congress on March 21, 1947.[34] Like the Bloom Bill, from which it drew many of its provisions, it was intended to supply basic authorization for all types of international information and cultural activities.

As formally introduced into Congress on May 6, 1947, this bill authorized the Secretary of State—or any officers of the government to whom he might delegate this authority—to provide for the interchange of persons, knowledge and skills between the United States and other countries: he could arrange the interchange of students and teachers; he could provide financial or other assistance to foreign schools sponsored by American citizens; and under certain conditions he could assign United States Government employees for work with foreign governments.

Section 501, repeating the phraseology of Section 2 of the Bloom Bill, stated:

> The Secretary is authorized, when he finds it appropriate, to provide for the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the United States, its people, and its policies, through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information media, and through information centers abroad.

The bill also placed several limitations on the State Department's implementation of these powers. Thus, under the heading of "Policies Governing Information Activities," there was repeated verbatim the section of the Bloom Bill requiring that maximum use be made of private facilities. Provision was also made for a loyalty check of all personnel.[35]

A special subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held hearings on H.R. 3342 in May of 1947. Its four Republican and three Democratic members were all enthusiastic supporters of the bill.[36] Six State Department witnesses appeared,[37] and additional testimony was received from General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Secretary of Commerce W. A. Harriman and Representative John Taber. No one spoke against the bill, although the committee publicly invited opponents and critics to appear.[38]

The committee reported unanimously in favor of H.R. 3342 on May 21. Most of the report pertained to the many safeguards and controls imposed by the bill on the administration of the international information program. Provisions for loyalty checks were especially emphasized: all employees engaged in information and educational exchange work, except those appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, would have to undergo an FBI investigation. In addition, provision was made for semi-annual reports to Congress; Congress could at any time terminate the entire operation by concur-

[32] *Ibid.*: Gary (D) Va., 93:4, p. 5292.

[33] *House Report 335* (80th Cong., 1st sess.), p. 7.

[34] Interview of author with Senator Mundt, Feb. 9, 1949.

[35] This was one of Mundt's additions to the State Department draft.

[36] The Republican members were: Karl E. Mundt, S.D., Chairman; Walter H. Judd, Minn.; John Davis Lodge, Conn.; and Donald L. Jackson, Calif. The Democratic members were: James P. Richards, S.C.; Pete Jarman, Ala.; and Mike Mansfield, Mont.

[37] These were: George C. Marshall, Secretary of State; Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State; William Benton, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs; Olcott Deming, Executive Secretary, Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation; Haldore Hanson, Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs; and Walter Bedell Smith, Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.

[38] On May 17, while the hearings were in progress, the Special Committee on World Press Freedom of the professional journalism fraternity, Sigma Delta Chi, issued a statement opposing the bill "insofar as it legalized the dissemination of news by government in any and all media abroad." The five-member committee signing this statement included three men prominent during the State Department's controversy with the news agencies of the previous year—Hugh Baillie, president of the UP; Kent Cooper, executive director of the AP, and John S. Knight, President of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. (*Editor & Publisher*, May 17, 1947, p. 50.) *Editor & Publisher* approved this resolution editorially with the qualification that it favored the broadcasting portion of the bill. (*Ibid.*, p. 30.)

rent resolution; and the interchange of students and teachers was to be on a strictly reciprocal basis. The report concluded: "It is our conviction that worldwide understanding of the real America will provide an environment which will contribute definitely to the maintenance of permanent peace. . . ."[39]

Despite the unanimous recommendation of the bill by both Republicans and Democrats on the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Rules Committee approved it for floor discussion only after a hard three-day fight, and then narrowly by a seven to five vote. Opposition came partly from members who did not accept government international information activities in principle, and partly from some who doubted the desirability or value of international broadcasting. As the bill headed for House debate, Mundt predicted "tough sledding" although he forecast eventual victory by a "gratifying majority."[40]

THE CASE FOR THE MUNDT BILL WAS fundamentally that which Secretaries Byrnes and Marshall, and Assistant Secretary Benton, had presented earlier in connection with the Bloom Bill, and the 1947 and 1948 appropriation bills. It was said again that wide dissemination of information about ourselves, our true ambitions, our strength, and our policies would contribute to world understanding and peace, although much more emphasis than before was placed on the need for an international information program to reply to Russian propaganda attacks. Early enactment was urged on the ground that unless provision were made immediately to continue our international broadcasting after June 30, the United States might lose its short-wave frequencies to other countries.

Four basic arguments were advanced against the bill: (1) United States Government participation in international information and educational exchange activities was undesirable in theory; (2) there was no need for such activities; (3) the State Department was doing a poor job of administering the international information program; and (4) the personal interchange feature of the bill would bring into the United States dangerous proselytizing Communist teachers and students.[41] Congressional discussion of the first two of these points did not add much to what had been said previously during consideration of the Bloom Bill and the 1947 and 1948 appropriation bills, but in view of the extreme concern shown both then and later over alleged State Department inefficiency and the Communist peril, items three and four should be further reviewed.

There was much opposition to the personal interchange feature of the bill for fear it would let many Communist teachers and students into the country either to convert American students to Communism or to serve as Russian spies. Representative Rankin (D) of Mississippi was the most extreme advocate of this view: ". . . communism is being spread in the educational institutions of America largely by those foreign immigrant professors who come in here for that purpose."[42] Representative Hoffman (R) of Michigan also spoke on this subject: ". . . the height of absurdity is reached here today. . . ." We are appropriating money on the one hand to "stop communism in Greece and Italy, and now . . . we are asked to authorize the expenditure of other millions to bring teachers of communism here where . . . they can, and they will, advocate the acceptance of communism."[43] Here, as during the debate on the 1948 appropriation bill, some Republicans objected to setting up any program at all because they believed the State Department was doing a poor job of administering international information activities. The big issue was disloyalty: it was claimed that the Department had failed to get rid of its many "leftists," and that this bill would give them permanent status.

Representative Mundt and his colleagues from the Foreign Affairs Committee presented a well organized reply to these arguments. Relative to the admission of Communist teachers and students, Mundt pointed out that all interchange was to be on a reciprocal basis: unless our nationals were admitted to Russia and other Iron Curtain countries, their teachers and students would be denied visas to come here. Furthermore, Section 201 of the bill provided that any foreigner entering the United States under the provisions of this act who engaged in activities not consistent with the security of the country was to be deported.[44] As to disloyal State Department employees, Mundt explained that all employees, new or old, would have to undergo an FBI loyalty check even more stringent than the one given to people working on the atomic bomb during the war. And aliens would be employed under the act only as translators.

Mundt pointed to the Dirksen Amendment as evidence that the State Department would never again develop such disapproved activities as the art program. This provided for an 11-member advisory control board to advise the Department in developing international information activities. He also reminded the House that the bill, in addition to requiring semi-annual reports to Congress on the entire international information and educational exchange program, also provided that Congress at any time by concurrent resolution could terminate the authority granted under the Act. Finally, in the hope of counteracting any movement which might develop to eliminate from the bill everything except broadcasting, Mundt reminded the members that Secretary Marshall had repeatedly said that radio alone was not enough: both he and Eisenhower had so testified before the committee, and Marshall had announced his views again at a press conference and in a letter to Congress.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DEbated the Mundt Bill on June 5, 6, 10, 13, 20 and 24, 1947. Discussion was heated and prolonged, and the bill's opponents resorted to many parliamentary devices in attempts to defeat it. Mundt became so impatient at these tactics, as well as at the misconceptions about the bill held by some members, that at the conclusion of the debate on June 10 he

[39] *House Report 416* (80th Cong., 1st sess.)

[40] Mundt and his colleagues privately estimated they would have 125 votes against them, although the final vote was 273 to 97. (Interview of author with Senator Mundt, Feb. 9, 1949; New York *Times*, May 29, 1947, p. 3, col. 7.)

[41] During the six-day debate only four members asked for evidence of the results obtained from international information and educational exchange activities, a remarkable fact in view of the limited and unsatisfactory state of knowledge available on this subject.

[42] At the same time that he showed no enthusiasm for the importation of teachers from abroad, Rankin also remarked that "if we could send out of this country a boatload of [American] professors once a month for a while, we might be doing this country a great deal of good." (*Cong. Rec.*: 93:5, pp. 6540, 6570.)

[43] *Ibid.*: 93:5, p. 6566.

[44] *Ibid.*: 93.5, p. 6547. Only once did a representative reply to this argument by asking why the members of Congress did not have more faith in American democracy: ". . . have we anything to be afraid of in allowing these people to come over here? . . . I have more faith in the fundamental strength of the principles of democracy and the standard of living in our country. . . . I wager you, if anything, the conversion will be on the other side of the fence . . ." (Holifield [D] Calif., *Ibid.*, 93:5, p. 6749.)

expressed the hope that, before the bill next came up for discussion, the members would "do themselves the justice to read the hearings. Never since I have been in Congress have I heard such a disorganized collection of misinformation circulated about any one piece of legislation as about this legislation."[45]

At this point an unofficial canvass indicated that the bill might be defeated, largely due to dissatisfaction with the State Department's past administration of the OIC program.[46] The forecasts proved to be well founded. On June 13 the House devoted a seven-hour session to a turbulent discussion of the bill. Seventeen amendments were offered from the floor, some with the obvious purpose of delaying action. The subjects of some of the amendments indicated the nature of Congressional apprehension: the requirement that all student and teacher exchange be on a reciprocal basis; the deportation of Communist agitators; the possibility that American citizens serving abroad might take an oath of allegiance to a foreign government; and the furnishing of copies of OIC releases and radio scripts to American newspapers and radio stations, and to members of Congress. In addition to dealing with these amendments, the House rejected one motion and two amendments which would have had the effect of killing the bill.

The bill passed the House of Representatives on June 24. The vote was 172 to 52 on a division. When repeated for the record, it was 273 to 97, with 1 member voting present, and 58 not voting. There were 28 pairs. Voting for the bill were 121 Republicans, 151 Democrats and 1 American Laborite. Opposed were 90 Republicans and 7 Democrats. The 97 opponents included 59 from the Midwest, 22 from the East, 9 from the Far West, and 7 from the South. The opposing Republican votes were largely from Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, Iowa and Nebraska. All 7 Democratic opposing votes were from the South. Majority leader Halleck of Indiana, majority whip Arends of Illinois, minority leader Rayburn of Texas, and minority whip McCormack of Massachusetts all voted for the bill. Busbey (R) of Illinois, who led the assaults against the 1948 appropriation on the grounds that the State Department had many disloyal employees, also voted for it. Brown (R) of Ohio, who had led the onslaught against the art program, voted against it, as did several other highly vocal 1948 OIC appropriation foes, including Stefan (R) of Nebraska, Taber (R) of New York and Rankin (D) of Mississippi.[47]

BEFORE A FRIENDLY COMMITTEE IN the Senate, State Department spokesmen made the usual statements about the need for government international information and educational exchange activities to counteract Russian propaganda attacks against the United States, and their appeals were supplemented by written communications from General Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles. The committee's report, after reviewing the act's many controls and safeguards, suggested only one significant change in the bill: in place of the advisory committee set up by the Dirksen amendment, it recommended a "joint Congressional committee . . . to make a full and complete study of the Government's information program, including the policies and methods employed, the quality of personnel engaged in such activity, the cost, and the proper role of private organizations in the program." The report concluded with a strong plea for Senate passage of the bill "at an early date."[48]

In forecasting the course of the bill on the Senate floor, Senator Smith remarked: "I think we are going to find a great deal of sympathy with this idea of continuing the broadcasts. There is going to be some resistance to other phases of your program [however]. . . ."[49] A current newspaper report, though, put the bill's chances somewhat less optimistically: "It was predicted at key points in the Senate . . . that the House measure's chances for enactment were 'practically nil'."[50] While discussing the disloyalty charges and the Wallace book review, Benton remarked that Senator Vandenberg had quoted an unnamed "very important Senator" as saying that "it would be a good thing to put this whole operation out of business for 90 days . . . because you could then fire everybody, getting rid of this tainted personnel, and 90 days later could then hire a better kind of personnel." To this Senator Smith replied: "Frankly, that is the view of a good many Senators right now."[51]

Despite the almost unanimous vote of the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee in reporting out H.R. 3342, efforts to get it up for debate before the close of the session were unsuccessful, although the Senate did pass a resolution authorizing the appointment of a joint investigating committee. A few days before, the House had passed a similar resolution, so the ground was laid for the House-Senate investigation of the United States Information Service in Europe. This joint investigating committee of five senators, seven representatives, and their staff visited 22 European countries during September and October 1947. Their visits to Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Poland coincided with dramatic developments in those countries. Their report referred to these experiences as "successive nightmares," and noted the accompanying "incessant falsification of our country's motives" by Communist propagandists.[52]

When Congress reconvened, the Smith-Mundt Bill was sent back to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for further amendments. The only important change recommended by the committee, however, was the separation of informational from educational exchange activities. To this end it proposed setting up two advisory commissions instead of one—a United States Advisory Commission on Information, and a United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange.[53] The report, made on January 7, 1948, reiterated "ever more strongly the conviction that enactment is urgent and vital."

The Senate took up the bill on January 16. Senator Smith, speaking for the

[45] *Cong. Rec.*: 93:5, p. 6754.

[46] New York *Times*, June 13, 1947, p. 8, col. 3. Representative Cox (D) Ga., a supporter, declared during the June 13 debate: "The opposition to the bill that still prevails here in the House is grounded upon a lack of confidence in the State Department to administer the measure in an Americanlike way." (*Cong. Rec.*: 93:5, p. 6974.)

[47] *Ibid.*: 93.6, p. 7617.

[48] *Senate Report 573* (80th Cong., 1st sess.)

[49] *Mundt Senate Hearings*, p. 84.

[50] New York *Times*, June 25, 1947, p. 20, col. 2.

[51] *Mundt Senate Hearings*, pp. 102-103. Mundt had received such suggestions from some representatives too. (Interview with author, Feb. 9, 1949.)

[52] *Senate Report 855* (80th Cong., 2nd sess.), p. 2. The appendix is a 227-page report of the committee's observations.

[53] *Senate Report 811* (80th Cong., 2nd sess.), p. 4. This separation had been recommended by Ben Cherrington, president of the University of Denver, and first chief of the State Department's Cultural Relations Division, during the House debate, but his suggestion had not then been acted upon. During the Senate debate Cherrington was again quoted, and his proposal was also supported by Presidents Conant of Harvard and Dodds of Princeton.

majority, told how the European trip had impressed the committee with the need for an information program to reply to Russian propaganda against the United States. He also reviewed the safeguards which had been provided to "prevent the possibility of any abuse of powers granted by the bill. . . ." The Senate gave its unanimous approval to H.R. 3342 after a discussion during which no one spoke against the bill, and there were no divisions or record votes. Several days later the House concurred in the Senate amendments, and the bill was signed by the President on January 27.

THE SMITH-MUNDT BILL WAS PASSED mainly because the progress of the cold war convinced Congress that the United States Government needed to engage in international information and educational exchange activities on a global scale. The elaborate controls imposed on the State Department by the Smith-Mundt Act were another reason Congress passed this bill so decisively only a short time after having almost eliminated all OIC funds from the 1948 appropriation. At the outset Mundt and his colleagues expected to have 125 votes against them in the House, but passage came with a vote of 273 to 97. In June there were forecasts of a struggle in the Senate, but after their European trips the senators approved the bill unanimously.

The bill's proponents in the House had to meet the consistent opposition of some northern Republicans and conservative southern Democrats who had also opposed the 1948 OIC appropriation, and who generally have taken conservative positions in Congress year after year. Fortunately, however, the vote cut across party lines; otherwise the bill would not have passed since the Republicans had a clear majority in both houses. This is not to say that the leadership of the Republican party was against the bill. Mundt was a Republican, and the Republican as well as the Democratic leaders in the House supported this legislation. Nevertheless, it was more a Democratic than a Republican measure—a fact recognized by Mundt when he requested some prominent Democrats not to speak too often in its favor lest some Republicans for that very reason vote against it! By the time the bill came up for a vote in the Senate, the turn of world events assured unanimous approval, but during the earlier stages there, too, Democrats rather than Republicans were the bill's main supporters.

It is impossible to review these events without noticing parallels between them and many current developments. Some of the basic issues are still being debated: the loyalty of State Department advisers and officials; the efficiency of State Department operations; and the question of whether it is safe to expose the American people to uncensored radical opinions, especially those from abroad. Many of the congressmen of those days are still on the scene, maintaining the same basic points of view: Busbey of Illinois; Brown of Ohio; Dirksen of Illinois; Judd of Minnesota; Mundt of South Dakota; Smith of New Jersey; and Taber of New York. (In retrospect it is a little amusing to find Acheson, Dulles and Eisenhower working together in support of the Truman Administration's international information services!) But most notable of all are the parallels between the fears of some congressmen then and now over the extent of Communist influence on government and education: reports of many 1946 and 1947 congressional hearings and debates read like headline stories from today's news.

Surveys of Reader Attitudes Toward Newspaper Combinations

BY RAYMOND F. STEWART

Although audiences differ, the views held by readers about local newspaper combinations in four cities show marked similarities. The author, a former research associate and assistant professor of journalism at Emory University, now heads his own research organization in Atlanta.

HOW DO READERS IN CITIES HAVING two daily newspapers under the same ownership feel about them? What are their predispositions and attitudes toward these newspapers?

The following report is a compilation of results of four research studies conducted in cities where such newspaper combinations exist.

Studies in Louisville, Des Moines and Minneapolis were conducted from May 12 to 23, 1949. The Atlanta study was done in January and February 1951.

The 1949 researches in Louisville, Des Moines and Minneapolis were undertaken by the newspapers themselves. Similar questionnaires were used, so that findings in the three cities could be compared. The Atlanta study, employing some questions from the 1949 studies, was conducted 20 months later by the Research Bureau of the Emory University Division of Journalism, because of the interest of Prof. Raymond B. Nixon in this subect.[1] In each case, tabulations were made independently.

In the 1949 studies, single questions generally referred to the combined papers as units, i.e., *Times* and *Courier, Register* and *Tribune* and *Star* and *Tribune*. Interviewing time was approximately 20 minutes. Samples ranged in size from 624 to 1,020.

In the Atlanta study, however, single questions usually mentioned the name of only one of the two papers. When both the *Journal* and the *Constitution* were read by a respondent, each question was asked twice. A few questions pertaining to the papers jointly were included near the end of the survey. (Results have been combined to present for comparison a one-figure Atlanta "situation.") Since the Atlanta questions were asked as part of a comprehensive survey of communications habits, interviewing time was longer—from 30 to 80 minutes. The sample was 300.

The comparison shows that even though the audiences differ (and even with a time lapse of nearly two years in one case), views held by readers about their hometown newspapers have marked similarities.

Of concern here are general data regarding newspaper combinations, rather

[1]The writer is indebted to newspapers in the four cities, as well as to Professor Nixon, for permission to use this material. He also acknowledges the assistance of Richard Robertson.

JOURNALISM QUARTERLY

Financial Report for 1952

RECEIPTS

Balance on hand December 31, 1951		$1,081.63
AEJ subscriptions	$2,346.50	
Kappa Tau Alpha subscriptions	614.50	
Non-member subscriptions	2,279.52	
AASDJ appropriation	400.00	
Single copy sales	345.89	
Advertising	827.77	
Reprints	260.04	
Miscellaneous	20.50	
Gross Receipts		$7,094.72

EXPENDITURES

Printing and Mailing	$5,666.60	
Postage	324.33	
Reprints	221.89	
Stationery and Office Supplies	246.22	
Honoraria and commissions to Business Managers	237.89	
Honoraria to Assistant Editors	150.00	
Back copies	29.25	
Copyright fees	16.00	
Refunds	4.00	
Long distance calls	17.32	
Bank charges—checks returned	3.00	
Freight and express	48.02	
Promotion	2.32	
Subscriptions and dues	20.75	
Clerical and art work	151.50	
Total Expenditures		$7,139.09
Net Loss		44.37
Balance on hand at close of books for 1952		$1,037.26

AEJ Account with JOURNALISM QUARTERLY, 1952

Balance due JOURNALISM QUARTERLY at close of year, 1951		$ 638.00
JOURNALISM QUARTERLY share of:		
37 — 1951 Regular dues collected in 1952 @ $7.50	$ 148.00	
1 — 1951 Associate dues collected in 1952 @ $3.50	2.50	
10 — 1951 "Special" dues collected in 1952 @ $3.50	10.00	
361 — 1952 Regular dues collected in 1952 @ $7.50	1,444.00	
20 — 1952 Regular dues collected in 1952 @ $4.00	40.00	
4 — 1952 Senior Associate dues collected in 1952 @ $7.50	16.00	
4 — 1952 Senior Associate dues collected in 1952 @ $4.00	8.00	
16 — 1952 Junior Associate dues collected in 1952 @ $3.50	40.00	
183 — 1953 Regular dues collected in 1952 @ $7.50	732.00	
4 — 1953 Senior Associate dues collected in 1952 @ $7.50	16.00	
9 — 1953 Junior Associate dues collected in 1952 @ $3.50	22.50	2,479.00
Total		$3,117.00
Total paid to JOURNALISM QUARTERLY in 1952		2,346.50
Balance due JOURNALISM QUARTERLY at close of year, 1952		$ 770.50

Journalism Quarterly

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RESEARCH STUDIES

IN THE FIELD OF

MASS COMMUNICATIONS

Summer 1953