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July 5, 1945

MEMORANDUM

on

The Postwar International Information
Program of the United States



Prepared by
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Consultant on Administration
in cooperation with
The Office of Public Affairs

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TABLE OF CONTENTS



Letter of Transmittal

SUMMARY OF MEMORANDUM

PART I - INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS	1
Need for Information Program	3
The Government's Role	6
"Information" and "Cultural Relations"	9
PART II - THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON FREEDOM OF INFORMATION	10
Soviet View	11
Views of Congress & Political Parties	12
Views of U.S. Editors	14
Mexico City Resolution	15
Effect of San Francisco Charter	16
Agreements on Collection and Transmission of Information	18
The Problem of Standards of Behavior for Governmental Information Agencies Seeking to Disseminate Information in Other Countries	21
Self-Imposed Private Standards	23
Conclusions	24
PART III - PRESS COMMUNICATIONS	25
News Agencies and Their Competitive Position	25
Reuters	28
Press Communication Rates	31
Press Communication Facilities Needed	34
Alternatives of Communications Merger	35
State Department's Position on Merger	37
Arguments for Merger	39
Reply to these Arguments	42
Exclusion of Broadcasting from Merger	44
Exclusion of Radio Telephony	45
Separate Press Facilities and the Future of Press Wireless, Inc.	47
Brief History of Press Wireless, Inc.	50
Volume of Press Traffic	52
Press Wireless' Statement of its Needs	55
Radio Superior to Cables	58
Importance of Multiple Address	59
Fears of Government Regulation	60
Technical Superiority of Separate Press Entity	62
Radiophoto Service	63
Press Wireless as a Chosen Instrument	65
Conclusions	66

PART IV - INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING	68
The Case For and Against Retaining		
Direct International Broadcasting	72
IRAC Report	73
Reaction to IRAC Report	75
Short-Wave vs. Medium-Wave	78
Size of Short-Wave Audience	80
Adequate Future Facilities for		
Short-Wave Broadcasting Recommended	83
Revised Frequency Requirements	84
Sharing of Frequencies	86
Economy of Frequencies through		
"Carrier Shift"	89
Requirements of Broadcasting Entity	94
Views of American Licensees	95
The Question of Financial Support	98
Alternative Forms of Ownership and		
Operation	102
Government Operated Broadcasting	104
Mixed Government-Private Operation	107
Split Private Ownership	111
Program Content	111
Recommendations	118
PART V - MOTION PICTURES	120
Export Stake of the Motion Picture		
Industry	121
Obstacles Imposed by Other Governments	123
Content of Exported Commercial Films	124
Proposed Motion Picture Export Assn.	127
Government-Industry Cooperation	131
Role of Non-Fiction Films	134
Mr. Riskin's Proposal	135
Hemisphere Films, Inc., a Proposal	136
Possible Government Film Center	138
International Exchange of Films	140
American Distribution Methods	141
Newsreels	143
Film Strips	145
PART VI - BOOKS AND MAGAZINES	147
The Export of Books - Limiting Factors	147
British Export Methods	150
U.S. Cooperation in Wartime Book Supply	152
U.S. International Book Assn., Inc.	153
Translations	156
Opposition to U.S. Exports in		
Translation	158
Magazines	160
Government Published Magazines	163



PART VII - THE SCOPE OF SUPPLEMENTARY AND FACILITATIVE		
GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES	166
Classification of Services Needed	167
Supplementary Fast News Service	167
Supplementary Background News	172
Non-Competitive Photographic Services	175
Services to Foreign Journalists	178
Activities in Connection with		
Foreign Visitors Generally	179
Servicing Overseas Libraries	180
Books and Pamphlets	181
Government Magazines	183
Motion Pictures	184
Radio Broadcasting	185
Radio Monitoring	187
Personnel Estimates Probably too		
Conservative	188
PART VIII- HOME ORGANIZATION	189
Alternatives	190
Integration in State Department		
Recommended	192
Advantages of the Recommended Form	193
Implications of the Choice from the		
Standpoint of State Department		
Internal Structure	196
Suggestions as to the Outlines of		
Future Organization	199
Relations to a Possible Government		
Wide Information Office	201
The Possibility of National Bodies		
Linked to International Organization.....		203
PART IX - FIELD ORGANIZATION	206
Alternatives of Organization	206
Grounds of Choice	208
Physical Separation	212
Experience with Coordination		
Committee in Latin America	213
Field Activities and Foreign		
Service Specialization	216
PART X - TRANSITIONAL TIMING	225
OWI Requirements for Fiscal Year 1946	225
OIAA Requirements for 1946	229
Servicing Occupational Government	229
Question of Incidental Service to		
Other Areas	232
Questions of Timing	236

To Mr. Archibald MacLeish
Assistant Secretary of State

July 5, 1945

From Mr. John S. Dickey
Director, Office of Public Affairs



I am transmitting herewith the Memorandum on the Post-War International Information Program of the United States which has been prepared by Dr. Arthur W. Macmahon, Consultant on Administration to the Department.

1. This Memorandum was undertaken by Dr. Macmahon, with the assistance of Haldore Hanson, at the joint instance of the Office of Public Affairs and the Office of Departmental Administration, and with the approval of the Secretary of State.
2. In the preparation of the Memorandum Dr. Macmahon and his associates conferred extensively with officers of the Office of War Information, the Office of Inter-American Affairs, and other government departments and agencies as well as other divisions of the Department of State and many private persons. Dr. Macmahon felt handicapped by lack of first-hand contact with the field, but he has drawn heavily on despatches from the missions, reports from the field personnel of the wartime information agencies and consultations with persons back from the field.
3. This Memorandum is by intention a working paper which offers a canvas of viewpoint, recommendation of broad choices, and a starting point for detailed planning; it does not offer blueprint details or a budget. As is frequently the case where study is carried on in close association with operations, the collaborative process of preparing the Memorandum has itself influenced operating decisions and many of our current attitudes on these matters. In this sense few of us will find any new rabbits in the Memorandum. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the Memorandum is not a statement of Departmental or Office policy; it is simply a working paper to assist in taking decisions and if on further consideration the weight of the argument is against any position taken in the Memorandum that position should be changed.
4. I recommend that this Memorandum immediately be transmitted informally to the Office of War Information, the Office of Inter-American Affairs, the Federal Communications Commission, the Bureau of the Budget, all Offices of the Department and to the Chiefs of Mission in the field; that it be so transmitted for their confidential information and any comments they may care to make prior to September 1, 1945, when definitive positions should be formulated.

SUMMARY



The adequacy with which the United States as a society is portrayed to the other peoples of the world is a matter of concern to the American people and their government. Specifically it concerns the Department of State. Modern international relations lie between peoples, not merely governments. Statements on foreign policy are intelligible abroad in the spirit in which they are intended only when other peoples understand the context of national tradition and character which is essential to the meaning of any statement. This is especially true of a collaborative foreign policy which by nature must be open and popular, understood and accepted at home and abroad.

International information activities are integral to the conduct of foreign policy. The object of such activities is, first, to see that the context of knowledge among other peoples about the United States is full and fair, not meager and distorted and, second, to see that the policies which directly affect other peoples are presented abroad with enough detail as well as background to make them understandable.

The emphasis in this memorandum is upon international information activities in a narrower sense (the mass media) than the application of the term which includes intercultural relations. (For example, the exchanges of students and professors).

FACILITATIVE



FACILITATIVE AND SUPPLEMENTARY
NATURE OF GOVERNMENTAL INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

(1) The portrayal of the United States must be accomplished substantially by the normal currents of private interchange through the media of the printing press, radio, camera and screen, and others, and the complex institutions that rise spontaneously about them.

(2) The role of the government is important but it is facilitative and supplementary. Some of the elements are facilitative, like governmental policies which may promote the cheapness, equality, speed, and universality of press communications. Some of the elements are supplementary in the sense that they must be conducted by the government, or with its support, if they are to be conducted at all (for example, fast transmission abroad of full texts of important American speeches). A common spirit runs through both the facilitative and the supplementary types of action: the government's role is seen as positive but limited and essentially residual.

(3) The scope of the governmental action is thus defined by surveying the active and potential international flow of information accomplished through the several media and the non-governmental institutions based upon them. Such a survey indicates various private or intermediate forms of enterprise which may advance the international flow of information and, particularly,

a fuller

PART X

TRANSITIONAL TIMING

An early decision and announcement about the nature of the post war information program are more important than its immediate installation. A transitional stage will be required by (1) the existence of a second fighting theatre, (2) the needs of occupational government on one and then on two continents for the defeated enemy countries, and (3) continued emergency requirements in liberated and other areas. Many still uncertain factors will influence the timing. So far as possible and as soon as possible, of course, the timing schedule should be reduced to itemized activities, personnel, money, and approximate dates. Day to day decisions of a transitional character are already being made. These decisions have been and should in the future increasingly be in harmony with the "post-war" policies recommended herein or hereafter determined.



OWI REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1946

The OWI must continue to service a fighting war in the Pacific. This necessity in itself entails the maintenance of a considerable part of the wartime organization. Much of the production activities of the OWI up to 1945 served both the Atlantic and the Pacific theatres.

After

After the German collapse in the spring of 1945, a revised OWI estimate for the fiscal year 1946 was submitted on May 2. It proposed to cut the total expenditure in fiscal 1946 from \$54,000,000 to \$42,000,000 - a reduction of \$12,000,000, about 22 per cent of the original estimate which the Budget Bureau had submitted after relatively little pruning.

The general breakdown for 1946 foreseen by OWI was indicated by Elmer Davis before the Senate Sub-committee on June 14 in explaining the requested \$42,000,000.¹ Apart from \$2,000,000 for liquidation of certain activities, \$1,557,000 for the Domestic Branch, and \$3,000,000 for headquarters administration and other general expenses, the \$42,000,000 was intended to be used about as follows:

\$16,500,000 - for operations in the Pacific against the Japanese.

\$4,000,000 - for services to the Army in Europe of which about \$3,000,000 would be for Germany and Austria.²

\$8,800,000 - for work in the liberated areas in Europe.

\$4,000,000 - for expenditure in Allied countries.

\$1,400,000 - in neutral countries

In the

1. Hearings before the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 79th Congress, on HR 3368, June 15, 1945, pp. 71-72.

2. Elmer Davis explained in the Senate hearings about OWI services to the Army in Europe: "This work is of two kinds - operation as part of the Army Information Service in the occupied countries, Germany and Austria; and handling the public relations of the Army with the local population in the communications and redeployment zones in France, Belgium, and possibly the Netherlands."



In the revised 1946 estimate (\$42,000,000), the total number of positions asked for was cut from 11,281 (10,072 man-years) to 7,972 (7,926 man-years), the reduction in personnel being about 29 per cent of the original estimate. The proposed positions in the foreign outposts were cut 36 per cent, from 6,758 (of whom 2,011 were Americans and 4,747 local residents) to 4,293 (1,489 Americans). For the Atlantic theatre, the cut was from 4,855 to 2,562; for the Pacific theatre, from 1,903 to 1,731. Inserted freshly was a figure of 200 for Germany, whereas the original 1946 estimate, submitted while fighting was still on, had contained no item for personnel within Germany. For purposes of comparison, it may be added that on April 30, 1945, the OWI outpost personnel throughout the world totaled 5,337, of whom 1,636 were Americans.

In Congress this OWI budget was the center of a sharp political fight. The House Appropriations Committee cut the budget from \$42,000,000 to \$35,000,000. In a concerted effort led by Republicans on the floor of the House the proposed appropriation was reduced to \$18,000,000 for use primarily in the Pacific war. Strong support for OWI was then voiced by the President, the War and State Departments, and by the press, resulting in the decision of the Senate Appropriations Committee to raise the OWI budget to \$39,670,215 (S. Report No. 380, June 20, 1945). The Senate approved this amount on the floor, and the Conference Committee agreed upon \$

. This political fight seems to suggest that OWI could not obtain a budget for 1947 without the full concurrence and active support of the War and State Departments and the President. During the Congressional debates the statement was frequently

frequently made both by Republicans and Democrats that this information program belonged in the State Department.

It is significant to note the emphasis on broadcasting in these budgets. If all costs are considered, it is likely that almost half of the 1945 expenditures of the OWI may be ascribed to radio. The term is taken broadly here and embraces many news and other vital wartime activities which contributed to broadcasting. Drastic curtailment of the OWI outlay for radio in the near future may be embarrassed by the fact that it is not easy to part with the leased stations piecemeal. The contracts provide in effect that when any of the private stations are returned to their owners, all of the leased stations shall be returned. The revised OWI fiscal 1946 estimate justification stated: "It is planned to reduce the production of short-wave programs directed toward Europe 50 per cent following V-E day." Elsewhere it was pointed out that the reduction in time does not lower the operational costs proportionately. Meanwhile the West Coast stations must be continued on a full war basis. The underlying contractual requirement for equality of treatment of the owners of the private stations is one of the factors which makes it imperative to seek an early definition of policy regarding the long-run conduct of direct international broadcasting by short-wave. Part IV of this memorandum has indicated the ramifications of the problem but has shown the essentially separable nature of the problem of arranging for the future of short-wave broadcasting.



OIAA REQUIREMENTS FOR 1946

The fiscal 1946 estimate for the OIAA asked for about the same amount for its informational program in 1946 as in 1945 (disregarding the grant to the Inter-American Education Foundation made in 1945). Taking the OIAA as a whole, its actual expenditures in fiscal 1944 had been \$30,735,000; its estimated obligations for fiscal 1945, \$18,000,000; and its overall estimate for fiscal 1946, \$15,880,000. The estimates for its several informational activities were:

	<u>Fiscal 1945</u>	<u>Fiscal 1946</u>
Department of Information		
Motion Picture Division	\$1,573,616	\$1,706,000
Radio Division	4,639,955	4,643,433
Regional Division	800,000	800,000
Guidance and Reference Division	256,680	168,790
Department of Press & Publications	3,250,131	3,086,246
Total	<u>\$10,520,382</u>	<u>\$10,404,469</u>

The 1946 budget for OIAA was passed by the House without change, although several Republicans attempted to make drastic cuts. In the Senate Appropriations Committee the amount was reduced to \$10,000,000, but raised to \$12,000,000 on the floor of the Senate. The Conference Committee agreed upon \$

SERVICING OCCUPATIONAL GOVERNMENT

It is necessary to understand the nature of the informational phases of occupational administration in Germany and Japan and to estimate the scale, duration, and structural responsibility for the servicing, at home and abroad, which such informational activities will require.

It is



It is realistic to assume (1) that occupational government, first in Germany and then in both Germany and Japan, will have to be supported on the informational side by a civilian productive informational organization that will concentrate on the problems of defeated enemy countries, and (2) that such servicing must be provided by a modified OWI. The alternative, as General Eisenhower put it in a cable on June 12, 1945 is that it would "be necessary for War Department to supply approximately equivalent personnel, and funds in addition to Army personnel".¹



It is assumed that, after a period of drastic control and reconnaissance, German newspapers and other informational organs will be managed by Germans who have been carefully screened and who remain subject to careful supervision. The first German newspaper was opened in Aachen under these conditions on June 22, 1945.

Many uncertainties remain, naturally, as to the scope of the servicing from outside which will be provided, respectively, by commercial facilities or by Allied governmental agencies. The question of the in-going news files is an outstanding example. The present memorandum need not concern itself with the question of freedom as to outgoing news in the several zones of Germany. General Eisenhower (in a message sent by Robert Murphy on May 18, 1945) has made known his general view that "the free flow of information and ideas ought to prevail in Germany consistent with military

¹ General Eisenhower's cable was inserted in the report of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, along with Chief of Staff Marshall's covering letter, which said: "The necessary OWI services in the European theatre of operations could be assumed by the Army, but the War Department would prefer not to undertake the organization of a new service for this purpose". S.Rept.380, 79th Congress, 1st Session.

military security and occupying power needs." But if the regular news agencies of the Allied countries are permitted to supply their files directly to German newspapers, there will remain need for a considerable body of complementary material and activities selected with a view to things that Germans should know. An OWI draft memorandum of May 4, 1945 remarked:

"Regardless of what other news agencies are going into Germany, there will remain an urgent need for an official U.S. Government news file to assure an understanding of American war and peace aims by the German people.

"It is assumed that London will carry the main burden of delivering news to Germany during the earliest PW-combat stages. It is anticipated that at some time thereafter this will be supplemented and eventually replaced by a file direct from the United States. Plans are already under way for providing the facilities necessary to transmit news and news-features to Germany.

"On the basis of Cable-Wireless experience with other major outlets, it is estimated that Germany will require from the Division an around-the-clock spot news file of about 20,000 words plus 10,000 words a day of specially angled news features."

It was assumed that the news would be "written largely, if not entirely, in journalistic German, adaptable with a minimum of reprocessing." As for features (in addition to items already stockpiled for Germany) the memorandum forecast that:

"When operations are established inside Germany, features, like the news file, will be written to the specifications of the field men. It is to be expected that there will be a heavy demand for factual articles on economics, science, culture, the Pacific War, and the European War, in addition to round-ups of what has been going on generally in the world outside Germany since 1933."



It is

It is conceded that the pressure of private agencies of all kinds to enter Germany will naturally be great. Its leverage may be increased by competitive conditions among the several zones of occupation. Suffice it that, even if Allied governmental services are to be essentially supplementary, the supporting productive activity required will be considerable.

THE QUESTION OF INCIDENTAL SERVICE
TO OTHER AREAS



A related consideration in planning the early stages of transition to a permanent international information organization for the United States is the question whether the servicing needs in Germany will be so special in content and emphasis that the organization which supplies it will not be able to provide information materials at least in part to other areas during a transitional period. Much can be said for the view that the task in defeated Germany will be so distinctive that materials prepared for Germany can hardly be adapted for use beyond her borders. Along the same line, it can be argued that it would handicap the producing organization to ask it to think in any other terms than the types of activities and materials appropriate to the defeated enemy's territory. The same arguments can be projected ahead for Japanese occupation. They would be especially strong if the producing organization were a new one set up just for this purpose. But if the organization is the OWI which was set up for the other purpose and is merely engaged in gradually liquidating that other purpose, the argument is not conclusive.

not conclusive. However far these viewpoints are sound, they may minimize the future role that OWI can play as to countries other than Germany and, in due course, Japan.

Even so, important qualifications must be attached. First, it is hardly possible to insulate Germany from the informational influences at work in the adjacent liberated areas and in Europe generally. Second, the emphasis proposed for Germany seems suited in many respects for the liberated areas in the near future. For the OWI planning has been urging a coldly factual tone in the treatment of information in Germany. Stress will be given to lifting the blackout, for example, from the facts about the origins and conduct of the war, the treatment of occupied areas, and its present consequences, and the progress and necessities of the war in the Pacific, with its reaction upon the situation in the rest of the world. The blackout of knowledge of such matters fell upon the now liberated areas of Europe while the German occupation continued. There are gaps of history to be filled, for which informational matter must be prepared. The liberated areas must not mistake the cause of their continued hardships. The coldly factual type of account is suited here as well as in Germany. In any event neither the information going into Germany nor into the other areas can be kept from moving from one to the other. Accordingly, in so far as this information is U.S. Government information, there is the most imperative need for the closest coordination and avoidance of divergencies.



To illustrate the tone proposed for informational programs in Germany, passages may be quoted from a tentative "proposed guide
for Germany"

for Germany" prepared in the OWI under the date of May 4, 1945. "One of our main tasks," it was said, "consists of giving an objective, instructive, and authoritative account of the history of the war in Europe." In the same vein it was said: "We must count on a profound distrust of any kind of propaganda which uses generalities and indulges in idealistic appeals. What we say will be judged in the light of what we do."

The tenor of these statements may be illustrated more specifically by citing fragments of the "objectives" in Germany as given in another OWI statement of the problem and proposed action:

Reporting factually punishment of German war criminals; nature, evidence, procedure, sentence.....

Get Germans to accept hardships of life in post-war Germany by pointing out

- (1) continuing hardships in other European countries in aftermath of German exploitation,
- (2) reporting fully and concretely authoritative accounts of the damage inflicted and the exploitation done by the Germans and Austrians¹ in countries temporarily subjugated by them....



To stimulate awareness that the global war has not come to an end with Germany's defeat

- (1) reporting news from the Far Eastern theatre
 - (a) reporting reverses frankly
 - (b) giving U.S. casualties
 - (c) giving due credit to other nations
- (2) stressing the transport problems in the Far East
- (3) relating these factors to economic conditions in Europe.

Make it clear that German hope in Allied disunity is in vain

- (1) report United Nations conference
- (2) show constructive diplomatic activities of the U.S.
- (3) report intelligent support and responsible criticisms of American official foreign policy.

¹ In the present brief discussion, no attempt has been made to consider the question of the informational policy and administration in Austria, as such.

The fragments that have just been paraphrased have been taken out of context, not as a definition of settled policy, but merely as examples of what is likely to be the aim and tone of some of the informational work in Germany. The items mentioned and the tone proposed for their presentation would often be suited to the task of filling the gaps which German occupation left in the informational backgrounds of the peoples of certain liberated areas.

Illustrating the similar informational needs in other areas, it is pertinent to cite the messages which flowed in to the Department from the American missions when Congress threatened to cut severely the OWI budget for 1946. The following are paraphrased excerpts:

From Rome, "The United States Information Service's program for Italy is just beginning and is being developed in order to give to the Italians an accurate picture of the way of life in the United States. The operations of this service are particularly valuable at this point of development of Italian opinion when the foundation must be laid for a vigorous democratic concept and the mistakes of the past rectified." (Rome, 1605, June 14, 1945).



From Oslo, "Reports received here that OWI mission may be terminated because of slashes in appropriations are very disturbing. The American war effort is not adequately known here. The great eagerness for news of all sorts regarding outside world developments over the five years just passed will be answered by others, if not by the United States." (Oslo, 137, June 14, 1945).

From Cairo, "I recommend that the Department support continuance of such OWI activities as are of permanent usefulness until the Legation can take them over. Such activities would include the information center, the library of the center, the educational aspects of the film program, and a news section which can supply adequate coverage of economic information regarding the United States and the Pacific war." (Cairo, 1256, June 13, 1945).

Accordingly

Accordingly, the same workshop that prepares materials for Germany over a longer period might incidentally help over a shorter period to furnish historical and contemporary background materials for use in other areas. This will go on while the OWI outposts there yield to, and part evolve into, the informational elements attached permanently to the diplomatic establishments and while the home organization in the State Department prepares to supply them.

QUESTIONS OF TIMING

It is impossible to forecast the duration of the fighting war in the Pacific. Likewise it is impossible to state how long a contracted version of the OWI must continue, on a modified war basis, to act as the servicing workshop for the informational phases of occupational government in both enemy countries. For the latter purpose, a number of years may be necessary. During the first part of the period - notably in the fiscal year 1946 - the same organization will help to supply materials for use in the recently liberated areas and elsewhere.

Any effort wholly to assimilate OWI and OIAA information activities into the Department during the 1946 fiscal year would be seriously handicapped by the following considerations:

(1) Very practical problems are created by the fact that the enabling legislation for carrying on "cultural cooperation" programs in the OWI has not yet been introduced in Congress. It is highly improbable that it will be acted upon in time to permit

a State



a State Department appropriation for these activities to be prepared and passed before OWI has to make final decisions about its 1947 budget requests, if any. What separate enabling legislation might be necessary for "information" activities is still undetermined.¹

(2) The Foreign Service legislation is still unsettled, and no security can be offered in the recruitment of mature informational officers. This is a key factor in setting up a permanent organization based upon top-notch personnel. A precipitate absorption of information activities into the Department - as distinguished from an early decision about policy - would have unfavorable effects upon personnel recruitment. Good men would doubtless be lost from the war agencies by delaying a decision about the nature of the future machinery. But mediocre recruiting would result from an attempt to give effect to the decision all at once, especially under existing circumstances which make it largely impossible



1. In the hearing before the House sub-committee on Appropriations on the State Department Appropriation Bill for 1946, Assistant Secretary MacLeish said of the understanding already reached with OWI as to "cultural" phases that "when the enabling legislation is passed, we will send out cultural attachés to our missions, and we will arrange to take over at a naturally convenient time whatever cultural work they (OWI) are doing in that area and we will supply the additional programs that we think might be carried on." (p. 303) On the "informational" work under the diplomatic missions, it could be argued that it is so essential to their inherent responsibilities that no authorization is needed apart from budgetary and Congressional consideration in connection with the appropriation itself.

impossible for State to offer the best men even reasonably attractive security.

(3) In establishing a home work-shop for information materials, considerable delay may be anticipated in a relatively novel situation in meeting the problems of personnel ceilings, Civil Service classification, and the investigation of prospective employees.

(4) Even as late as June 1945 the U.S. diplomatic missions had not taken up their work in many countries in Europe. It is true that in most, if not all, of these places the OWI does not send in its personnel until the mission is established. However, a going concern like OWI which has had organizational and operating experience in meeting such emergency conditions is in a superior position to begin and carry on informational work than would be a diplomatic mission under such conditions. Moreover, should informational activities be impossible in these areas, for any extended time, the OWI as a going concern would have greater flexibility in holding and utilizing personnel elsewhere than would the Department of State at the very outset of taking on these responsibilities.

(5) The solution of such problems as the handling of post-war short-wave radio will in all probability require legislation, protracted negotiations, and administrative adjustments. Once the OWI ceases operation it will be difficult, perhaps impossible, to deal with this and other somewhat similar situations in an orderly fashion.

It must





It must be recognized that in spite of these and other unstated considerations, events - for example, action by Congress - may well force the Department of State, if it is to undertake an information program at all, to take it over fully at the beginning of the fiscal year 1947.¹ Certainly everything possible must be done during the next year to prepare for such a possibility.

However, the immediate issue is what ought to be done in the best interest of the government and what position the Department of State advocates now and to the Budget Bureau in the fall and later to Congress. The Department does not play a passive role in this matter.

1. The possibility that Congress might be disposed to urge the transfer of the permanent international activities of the OWI to the State Department in July 1946 is indicated in the report of the House Appropriations Committee in June 1945 (House Report 653) which reads in part: "There have been suggestions from time to time that certain of the programs undertaken as defense and wartime measures - notably such activities as the Office of Inter-American Affairs - may be required for a period of time after the cessation of hostilities. Wherever that is true, immediate steps should be taken looking to the enactment of the necessary legislation to authorize their continuance, preferably as a part of regular agencies of the Government, for such period as may be determined to be necessary. The Committee on Appropriations has been willing to present such items to the House without authority of law only because of their war emergency nature and will not propose to the Congress the appropriation of funds for such activities for any period after war necessity ceases, unless authorized by law."

No attempt has been made in this memorandum to consider the various phases of the work of the Domestic Branch of the OWI. The OWI justification for its revised post-V-E estimate for the fiscal year 1946 said of the Bureau of Special Service (part of the Domestic Branch), for which slightly under \$400,000 was asked: "It should be noted that this Bureau was in existence before the war, and that its functions are such that they should be continued in the post-war period. Accordingly, it has been requested before, and is suggested again, that consideration be given to some more permanent status for this Bureau, exclusive of a portion of the research division which works closely with other phases of OWI operation."

matter. Its recommendation, particularly if supported by the President and the War Department, may well be the decisive factor in the timing. It should certainly be given great weight.

Broadly, the Department must choose between two positions:

(1) On the one hand, the Department might throw its weight in favor of the termination in June 1946 of OWI appropriations for Europe and the Middle East except for a liquidation appropriation and provision of some aid to the Army in Germany itself. The Department should then be prepared to commit itself - assuming the policy was approved - to provide a fairly full program at the beginning of the fiscal year 1947.¹

(2) On the other hand the Department might take the position, and seek the support of the President and War Department for it,

that



¹ It is assumed here that OIAA - already reduced mainly to an informational organization - will be continued as an entity until V-J, or until OWI is disbanded as a general information agency. OIAA would then presumably be terminated as a separate regional organization. Some of its elements will be absorbed in ad hoc bodies; its main information task, on a reduced scale, would merge in the permanent home and field organization recommended in this memorandum. It is assumed that if Congress forced the termination of OWI as of July 1, 1946 and transferred its information functions to the Department of State, there would be a strong likelihood that the course would be followed with OIAA. In view of the latter's interest in the Japanese war, if that were still on and the OWI's Pacific activities were continued, it might be that OIAA would not be forced into the Department of State at that time even though the non-Pacific OWI activities were terminated and transferred. However, the political tides of the moment seem to be running against the continuance of an independent information office outside the State Department and if these bring the OWI functions into the Department there seems little reason to believe that Congress for long would permit the separate independent existence of a "regional" international information office.



that such a step would be premature and prejudicial to the best interests of this Government. It might state in this connection that during the current fiscal year (1946) the Department was engaged in building up its staff both at home and abroad to handle information activities; that it would continue to do this at an accelerated pace wherever feasible, but that in the Department's judgment it would be a very serious mistake in timing to try to make this transfer substantially complete by July 1, 1946. The Department might ask for the continuance of a considerable part of the OWI activity in fiscal 1947, even if the fighting stage of the Pacific war were to be over, on the understanding that during fiscal 1947 the transition would be substantially completed. Such a 1947 OWI appropriation might well expressly authorize transfer of funds, activities and personnel to the State Department through the course of that year.

For the reasons set forth above it is believed that the second position is the more realistic and efficient view of the timing. It is recommended that this be the position of the Department and that, if after consultation with OWI and OIAA it be adopted, the Department take immediate steps to confer in a preliminary way with the Bureau of the Budget, the War Department, the President, and possibly Congressional leaders to explain the Department's view and the basis on which its tentative planning will proceed.

In any case, the Department's broad policy on the future of international information must be defined before September 15, 1945, when the matter must be discussed with the Bureau of the Budget.