

Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy “Quotables” and “Seen on the Web” (#50)

January 24, 2017

Quotable 533-537, Seen on the Web 963-1091

This newsletter provides a compilation of news, articles, essays, and reports of interest to practitioners and scholars of strategic communications, Public Diplomacy, public affairs, U.S. government international broadcasting, and information operations. "Quotables" are gists of articles and reports available on the website of the Public Diplomacy Council. "Seen on the Web" entries provide key quotes and links. They:

- bring to busy overseas practitioners some of the academic and policy ferment in Public Diplomacy and related fields.
- from long speeches, testimonies, and articles, flag the portions that bear on Public Diplomacy.
- provide a window on armed forces thinking on the fields that neighbor Public Diplomacy--military public affairs, strategic communication, information operations, inform-influence-engage, and cultural learning, for instance.
- introduce the long history of Public Diplomacy by citing some of the older books, articles, reports, and documents that are not available on the internet. These are labeled "Classic Quotables."

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. THE U.S. ELECTION	18. EXCHANGES
2. THE NEW ADMINISTRATION	19. WORLD WAR II
3. STATE & DEFENSE	20. IMAGEFARE
4. FAKE NEWS ▪ DISINFORMATION	21. GASTRODIPLOMACY
5. MEDIA SAAVY ▪ EDUCATION ▪ JUDGMENT	22. IDEAS, CONCEPTS, DOCTRINE
6. HYBRID WARFARE ▪ POLITICAL WARFARE	23. PROPAGANDA
7. RUSSIA	24. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER
8. ISLAMISM	25. INFORMATION WARFARE
9. CHINA	26. SPORTS DIPLOMACY
10. CHINA & PAKISTAN	27. INFORMATION OPERATIONS
11. EAST ASIA	28. NATIONAL HISTORY NARRATIVES
12. NATO	29. CONSPIRACY THEORIES
13. SOFT POWER	30. NARRATIVE
14. PUBLIC AFFAIRS	31. INTERNET
15. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY	32. SPEECHWRITING
16. BROADCASTING	33. USIA “ON STEROIDS”

17. [SOCIAL MEDIA](#)

34. [STUDY IN THE U.S. ▪ INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS](#)

1. THE U.S. ELECTION

- Did Russian hacking influence the 2016 elections? If so, what motivated it? Those two questions have sparked the biggest political debate since Donald Trump was elected president in November, and as a new session of Congress starts and Trump takes offices in just a few weeks, the questions still linger. The president-elect, intelligence agencies, high-ranking officials in both parties, and even Julian Assange have all been embroiled in the debate.

[What Did the Senate Hearing Reveal About Russian Hacking?](#)

Vann R. Newkirk II, The Atlantic, January 5, 2017

- In an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of Trump’s win, his detractors are going into overdrive to exploit Russian shenanigans and to create a climate of hysteria. It is obvious that Russia attempted to interfere in the election. We fully support investigating what occurred in recent months. Nevertheless, we take issue with the rush to judgment by the media, Congress and, not least, President Obama and his political appointees.

[Barack Obama: Stop Insulting Our Intelligence on Hacking](#)

Editorial, The National Interest, January 6, 2017

- Trump’s seeming inability to take himself out of the equation and assess events, people and policies on their own merits remains the most frightening aspect of his impending presidency. *He’d rather ignore a direct attack on American democracy than admit that Russia put its thumb on the scale in his election victory.* His psychological need for affirmation, for love even, takes precedence over reality and the needs of the country.

[More signs that Trump is out of touch with reality](#)

Jennifer Rubin, The Washington Post, December 28, 2016

- . . . limiting the scope of “Russian subversion” to the 2016 campaign is a trap. Trump must raise the ante. He must broaden any investigation to cover *all* foreign subversion of American politics and policies. It’s time to drain the fetid swamp of foreign espionage, subversion and corruption aimed at compromising decision-makers in Washington.

[Trump Must Up The Ante On Russian Subversion In America](#)

J. Michael Waller, Forbes, January 4, 2017.

- It’s not that unusual for a public figure to go from hero to villain. But going from villainy to heroism? That’s a tougher road to traverse. Julian Assange . . . has managed to do both over the last few months, culminating in a remarkable embrace by the president-elect and two longtime critics on the American right, Sean Hannity and Sarah Palin. Over the same time, some of Assange’s erstwhile champions on the American left have drifted away, disillusioned by the way WikiLeaks attacked Hillary Clinton during the presidential election.

[The Astonishing Transformation of Julian Assange](#)

David A. Graham, The Atlantic, January 5, 2017

[Return to the Table of Contents](#)

- Top American intelligence officials reaffirmed and broadened their accusations of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election at a Senate hearing Thursday, rejecting President-elect Donald Trump’s suggestions that their conclusions on the matter could be faulty or false.

[Intelligence Chief Defends Finding Russia Meddled in Election](#)

Shane Harris and Paul Sonne, The Wall Street Journal, January 6, 2017

- {Senator James] Lankford's public break with Trump on the question of Russia's involvement in U.S. campaign email hacking is consistent with remarks of other congressional Republicans. "I think there's no question that Russia was involved," senator John Thune, the chair of the Senate GOP conference, said on CNN Thursday.

[Congressional Republicans Break with Trump on Russia Hacking, Julian Assange](#)

John McCormack, The Weekly Standard, January 6, 2017

- So here are six questions the IC might consider answering in the days ahead: 1) When did the Russian hacking campaign begin? * * * 2) Was the Russian campaign intended more to help candidate [Donald Trump](#) or to undermine President [Hillary Clinton](#)? * * * 3) How much of the Russian campaign was garden-variety propaganda? * * * 4) How and when did Russia transmit the hacked information to WikiLeaks? * * * 5) Just what did the Russians do to target Republicans? * * * 6) Why can't the IC release more? Intelligence officials have already leaked classified parts of the report.

[Byron York: Six questions about the Russia hacking report](#)

Byron York, The Washington Examiner, January 7, 2017

- As the dust settles on Russian interference in the United States election, journalists are confronting an aspect that has received less scrutiny than [the hacking itself](#) but poses its own thorny questions: Moscow’s ability to steer Western media coverage by doling out hacked documents.

[Russian Hackers Find Ready Bullhorns in the Media](#)

Max Fisher, The New York Times, January 8, 2017

- What a spectacle. Two weeks before a peaceful democratic transition of power, Democrats are using Russian cyber hacks as an excuse to explain their defeat, and Donald Trump is playing into their hands by refusing to acknowledge that Vladimir Putin is no friend of America. The only winner here is Mr. Putin, who must be laughing at his success in causing Americans to mistrust their own democratic system.

[Bonfire of the Intelligence Vanities](#)

Review & Outlook, The Wall Street Journal, January 8, 2018

[Return to the Table of Contents](#)

- The head of the Kremlin-financed news channel RT dismissed an American intelligence assessment released Friday on the country’s alleged role in influencing the U.S. presidential election, calling it “the comedy hit of the year.”

[Russian Media Chief Dismisses U.S. Report on Propaganda Efforts](#)

Thomas Grove, The Wall Street Journal, January 9, 2017

- What Russia did is not new. Espionage, propaganda and disinformation have been around for a while now. We know that [other countries had hacked U.S. campaigns in prior election cycles](#), but with little effect. What was different about Russia’s efforts in 2016 wasn’t the daring or the sophistication — it was that the discovery of such efforts didn’t lead to bipartisan condemnation of Russian interference. . . . Sure, it seems very likely that Russia pushed on the door to encroach upon American democracy. The truly disconcerting thing is that, by 2016, the door was unguarded and waiting to be opened.

[My big question about Russian interference in the 2016 election: Why didn't Russian interference in domestic American affairs backfire on Russia?](#)

Daniel W. Drezner, The Washington Post, January 9, 2017

- “We assess Moscow will apply lessons learned from its campaign aimed at the U.S. presidential election to future influence efforts in the United States,” says the U.S. intelligence community in the most important sentence in its dismayingly evidence-free [report](#) on Russian activities in the presidential election. But how is the United States going to check these future influence efforts?

[Contrarian Thoughts on Russia and the Presidential Election](#)

Jack Goldsmith, Lawfare, January 10, 2017

- On 10 January, the Senate introduced legislation, with bipartisan support, to increase sanctions against Russia for its alleged interference in November’s U.S. presidential election.

[US Senators Unveil Bipartisan Bill to Boost Sanctions Against Russia](#)

Wayne Lee, Voice of America, January 10, 2016

- Putin knew that Obama would not have the stomach to impose consequences on Russia for attempting to interfere in our elections. So on Obama’s watch he undertook the most audacious covert influence campaign focused on a U.S. election in Russo-Soviet history.

[The Russia hacking report is an indictment of Obama, not Trump](#)

Mark Thiessen, The Washington Post, January 10, 2016

- . . . the two main Soviet intelligence and security agencies — the KGB and GRU (military intelligence) — kept up a vigorous campaign to meddle in U.S. politics and discredit the United States. The “active measures” used by the KGB and GRU during the Cold War were remarkably similar to the tactics and goals of Russian intelligence agencies in 2016. The basic methods were simply adapted for the cyber age.

[The Deep Soviet Roots Of The Russian Election-Hacking Campaign](#)

Mark Kramer, Cognoscenti, January 10, 2017

[Return to the Table of Contents](#)

- You hardly need a clandestine “Source A” to know that RT, the Kremlin’s global media network, has consistently apologized for Trump. Nor is there much doubt that the Putin regime hacked Democratic Party documents harmful to Hillary Clinton’s candidacy, and used WikiLeaks as a front for their release, as even Trump fleetingly and grudgingly conceded Wednesday.

[The Trump dossier is silly — except for one thing](#)

Charles Lane, The Washington Post, January 11, 2017

- We do know that our intelligence community concluded that Russia hacked the DNC, and Trump finally accepted this last week. To concede that Russia was behind the hacking (rather than a 400-pound person sitting on a bed somewhere, as Trump at one point theorized) was, presumably, to admit that Russia helped him win. Well, didn’t it? Didn’t Trump loudly call upon Russia to hack Clinton’s emails?

[Did we really elect Donald Trump?](#)

Kathleen Parker, The Washington Post, January 13, 2017

- . . . Russia hacked material from the Clinton campaign, fed it to WikiLeaks and passed it on through their bot and troll network, which transformed it into hysterical slogans. Eventually, our intelligence agencies may learn more about that process, but at this point it doesn’t matter. Information doesn’t have to be secret to be shocking.

[Stop obsessing over ‘secrets’ about Trump and Russia. What we already know is bad enough.](#)

Anne Applebaum, The Washington Post, January 13, 2017

- As Stanford’s Amy Zegart notes, all intelligence is information, but not all information is intelligence. So what information qualifies? And how does the intelligence community process or try to verify alleged information like what’s in the Trump dossier?

[The 'Trump Dossier' and the Making of Intelligence](#)

Kathy Gilsinan, The Atlantic, 13 January, 2017

- During his presidential campaign, Donald Trump frequently pointed to the press corps covering his rallies and implored them to pan the audience to show the size of the crowds he was drawing. When the cameras remained fixed on him, Trump labeled the news media “dishonest.” One camera, however, dutifully began to pan the audience...belonging to Right Side Broadcasting Network (RSBN), a year-old conservative media startup based in Alabama...

[Pro-Trump TV Network Has Big-League Dreams](#)

Alfred Miller, Politico, 14 January, 2017

- “Number one, the Russians sought to interfere with the election process -- that the cyber hacking that took place by the Russians was part of that campaign, and that they had a clear preference in terms of outcomes.”

[Quotable: President Obama on Russian interference in the U.S. election](#)

Public Diplomacy Council, January 15, 2017

[Return to the Table of Contents](#)

- There have been a lot of commentaries, written both before and after the election, about how hard it will be for U.S. diplomats to explain Donald Trump to the rest of the world. In fact, I think they’ll find that Trump will not only be much easier to explain than a Hillary Clinton victory would have been, but that his story will make an excellent talking point for how a free democratic system works.

[You're the PolOff. They attack your president. What do you say?](#)

David Jackson, Public Diplomacy Council Commentary, January 16, 2017

- Notwithstanding that Putin’s regime did not tamper with the actual voting process and that the embarrassing information released by WikiLeaks (mostly e-mails from the DNC and Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta) was true, Democrats are determined to depict President Trump not as elected fair-and-square by Americans but as maneuvered into the White House by Russian “cyber-espionage.”

[The ‘Russia Hacked the Election’ Narrative Battle Continues—Are Republicans Paying Attention?](#)

Andrew McCarthy, National Review, January 18, 2017

2. THE NEW ADMINISTRATION

- Once confirmed, how might a new secretary reconfigure the vital but unwieldy federal department? Here are five priorities: • Public diplomacy: We need to get public diplomacy right. Recently we have spun our wheels. Lessons from postwar and peacetime periods, World War II through the Cold War, Bill Donovan and Bill Casey through John Kennedy, John Foster Dulles, Ronald Reagan, George Schultz and Colin Powell offer guidance. There is a need for fresh, creative, anticipatory, non-linear, over-the-horizon communication with nations of the world. We must go to them, helping them to understand America’s real heart, identity, ideals, priorities, sacrifices and vision for a stable, democratic, prosperous world. We need to create buy-in.

[An urgent State Department makeover](#)

Robert Charles, The Washington Times, January

- “I think that there’s a perception that a lot of the stuff that State does, like promoting the arts and minority groups, the sense is that a lot of that stuff is just pandering to Democratic Party domestic constituencies in the United States,” the person familiar with the deliberations said. “It’s not about serving any identifiable American interest.” Another source said: "It's going to be more about terrorism and less about climate change."

[Trump’s team weighs retooling State to focus on terror](#)

Nahal Toosi and Josh Dawsey, Politico, January 18, 2017

[Return to the Table of Contents](#)

3. STATE & DEFENSE

- Despite its impressive, hard-working people, the State Department in Washington no longer leads assertively with its analysis, understanding, access, and relationships in conflict situations; its officers alternate between resignation, mournful defeatism, and passive aggression toward the military. Basic planning, organizing, and team-building practices are neglected as futile, and they pretend to be satisfied with individual contributions of action-neutral information. The second is the Department of Defense.... We are left with military leaders who certainly desire sustainable outcomes, but cannot appreciate the challenges the inherently political nature of conflict presents to our diplomats.

[How to make State great again](#)

Thomas E. Ricks, Foreign Policy, January 18, 2017

4. FAKE NEWS ▪ DISINFORMATION

- Many Americans believe a lot of dumb, crazy, destructive, probably wrong stuff. Lately this is especially (though not exclusively) true of Donald Trump voters, according to a new survey. The survey, from [the Economist/YouGov](#), was conducted in mid-December, and it finds that willingness to believe a given conspiracy theory is (surprise!) strongly related to whether that conspiracy theory supports one’s political preferences.

[Americans — especially but not exclusively Trump voters — believe crazy, wrong things](#)

Catherine Rampell, The Washington Post, December 28, 2016

- The truth is that while the American media landscape has been in a constant state of change over two centuries, the spread of hyper-partisan, scurrilous, and even phony news stories has been more common than uncommon throughout the history of the republic. Ultimately, despite the increasingly Wild West state of journalism, Americans have been better at finding the truth than less free societies.

[The Founders Anticipated ‘Fake News.’ Here’s What They Did About It.](#)

Jarrett Stepman, The Daily Signal, December 30, 2016

- . . . as more countries deal with the [prospect of fake news and hoaxes influencing their own political process](#), we should take stock of the potential fallout of Facebook’s new approach. Facebook will rely on users to report fake news despite evidence that suggests users have a difficult time assessing or identifying fake news.

[How do you deal with a problem like “fake news?”](#)

Robyn, Points, January 5, 2017

- German government officials on Monday said they were carefully examining an unprecedented proliferation of fake news items amid intelligence agency reports of Russian efforts to influence the country's parliamentary election in September.

[German government says closely examining reports of Russian fake news campaigns](#)

Andrea Shalal, Joseph Nasr and Andreas Rinke, Reuters, January 9, 2017

[Return to the Table of Contents](#)

- . . . we are trying to perform democratic politics amid a public debate that has been momentarily captured by a movement characterized by a striking indifference to truth. Importantly, this is not simple manipulation via the familiar top-down channels of talk radio and Fox News, but a spread of pseudofacts disseminated voluntarily, via the horizontal channels of social media, by voters themselves.

[Know-Nothing Nation](#)

Nathan Pippenger, Chronicle of Higher Education, January 15, 2017

- The most popular TV channel in Latvia – TV3 (<http://skaties.lv/tv3/>) – has started 2017 with a new Sunday evening show to uncover disinformation. This is the first time that a regular TV show about disinformation is offered in a prime time TV slot. [The first episode of the “Theory of Lies”](#) started with well-respected investigative journalist Ansis Pupols introducing the key topic: “Today I will tell you how Russia lied about the downed Malaysian airplane”.

[Debunking in primetime](#)

Disinformation Review, January 13, 2017

- This last week we have seen a near perfect example of how disinformation can spread. The story about NATO’s reenforcement in Europe has an element of truth mixed up with false information, all to fit into the often repeated pro-Kremlin narrative that NATO is the aggressor encircling Russia.

[A masterclass in disinformation](#)

Disinformation Review, January 16, 2017

- Sputnik, the Russian government-owned news service, [informed us last week](#) that a group of Russian engineers and space enthusiasts aim to develop and launch a satellite to check whether the celebrated moon landing actually took place. The plan is to send a microsatellite into lunar orbit, to take photos of footprints and lunar rovers on the surface of the moon. While the initiative is presented as fact-checking (“The project will put an end to conspiracy theories, which claim that some or all of the moon landings could be fake.”)

[Did the Americans actually land on the moon?](#)

Disinformation Review, January 17, 2017

- “The trouble is that the fakemakers are green and wild,” the *Indianapolis Journal* [explained](#) in 1896, in response to made-up stories being pushed by Bryan supporters. “They assume that the people of this country are densely ignorant and will accept as truth any fake which they can devise.” (The *Journal* concluded it was “too late to undo the mischief which this absurd publication of fakes has inflicted.”)

[How the Fake News Crisis of 1896 Explains Trump](#)

Adrienne LaFrance, “The Atlantic, January 19, 2017

[Return to the Table of Contents](#)

5. MEDIA SAAVY ▪ EDUCATION ▪ JUDGMENT

- . . . when you read the New York Evening Post in 1801, you knew that Alexander Hamilton had founded it, and you knew it was a Federalist paper. Research by Christian Sandvig and Karrie Karahalios suggests that many users of Facebook don't know that their friend feed is algorithmically curated, and don't realize the way it may be shaped by the political leanings of their closest friends.

[Ben Franklin, the Post Office and the Digital Public Sphere](#)

Ethan Zuckerman, Points, February 26, 2016

- Unreliable. Inaccurate. Biased. During election season, many people will give these descriptions to news media they disagree with. Similarly, these flaws are easy to overlook in the sources you like or tend to agree with. What's worse, however, is not thinking about these issues at all. Whether in election news or any other topic, it's important to be aware of how the news is produced and how you perceive it.

[Do You Know Which News Media to Trust? The American Press Institute Teams up With Newsela to Promote News Literacy](#)

Newsela Blog, October 3, 2016

- Last month, the *Washington Post*'s Jennifer Rubin . . . [wrote “In an era of ‘fake news,’ . . . “think tanks seem more important than ever.” She called on think tanks to author more joint studies, for example “a joint project confirming Russian attempts to interfere with our and our allies’ elections” . . . Rubin is certainly correct that our collective inability to sort out truth from fact is a major problem. Indeed, I'd go so far as to say that it's at the core of what is tearing this country apart. Alas, I'm not sure that her solution will work.

[Americans Aren't Buying What Fact Checkers Are Selling](#)

Christopher A. Preble, The National Interest, January 5, 2017

- Anxious about the widespread consumption and spread of propaganda and fake news during this year's election cycle, many progressives are calling for an increased commitment to media literacy programs. Others are clamoring for solutions that focus on expert fact-checking and labeling. Both of these approaches are likely to fail—not because they are bad ideas, but because they fail to take into consideration the cultural context of information consumption that we've created over the last thirty years.

[Did Media Literacy Backfire?](#)

Danah Boyd, Points, January 5, 2017

- I also included several tips for analyzing sources of information. In class, we spoke about journalism and the differences between writing from a particular political perspective and deceptive propaganda.

[Fighting Fake](#)

Melissa Zimdars, Chronicle of Higher Education, January 15, 2017

[Return to the Table of Contents](#)

- The pampering of students as customers, the proliferation of faux "universities," grade inflation, and the power reversal between instructor and student are well-documented, much-lamented academic phenomena. These parts, however, make up a far more dangerous whole: a citizenry unprepared for its duties in the public sphere and mired in the confusion that comes from the indifferent and lazy grazing of cable, talk radio, and the web.

[Our Graduates Are Rubes](#)

Tom Nichols, Chronicle of Higher Education, January 15, 2017

6. HYBRID WARFARE ▪ POLITICAL WARFARE

- What further complicates this form of warfare is the persistent fluctuation and manipulation of political, informational and ideological conflict-- key aspects of hybrid warfare which extend past traditional coercive diplomacy and unconventional war.

[Grading Gerasimov: Evaluating Russian Nonlinear War Through Modern Chinese Doctrine](#)

Victor R. Morris, Small Wars Journal, September 17, 2015

- . . . to get to an analysis of the strategic level competition, we have to briefly clear up the confusing terminology used to describe Russian doctrine and strategy, from the [Gerasimov doctrine](#) and [non-linear warfare](#) to [hybrid warfare](#), [new generation warfare](#), and [cross-domain coercion](#).

[The Moscow School of Hard Knocks: Key Pillars of Russian Strategy](#)

Michael Kofman, War on the Rocks, January 17, 2017

7. RUSSIA

- The network [RT] appears to have changed focus about five years ago to become more about promoting the Russian point of view on international affairs, and much less about covering Russia per se. It also became a platform for coverage of social problems in Western societies, government malfeasance, corporate non-accountability, and the dysfunctions of democracy that often contrasts in tone, and sometimes content, with mainstream media fare.

[Inside the belly of Russia's 'propaganda machine': A visit to RT news channel](#)

Fred Weir, The Christian Science Monitor, January 17, 2017

- Hopes are high in Russia that its investment in the US elections will pay off in the removal of economic sanctions and acceptance of Russia's illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea. . . . other methods to sell such an option are being applied. They include pushing certain 'messages' about sanctions repeating certain myths about Crimea, in distorting information about how the Ukrainian territory came to be under Russian occupation and in presenting the Crimean population as fully in support of annexation.

[USA Today Parrots Kremlin Propaganda on Crimea](#)

Halya Coynash, StopFake, January 8, 2017

[Return to the table of contents](#)

- The aim of this disinformation campaign is to weaken and destabilise the West, by exploiting existing divisions or creating artificial new ones. * * * * Often, outright lies are deployed, aimed at denigrating a particular person (1), political group, government (2) or intergovernmental organisation (3), as well as [NGOs](#), mainstream media, elites, experts, the “establishment”, and those taking [initiatives to counter disinformation](#). Another strategy is to spread as many conflicting messages as possible, in order to persuade the audience that there are [so many versions of events that it is impossible to find the truth](#).

[Means, goals and consequences of the pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign](#)

Disinformation Review, Jan 19, 2017

8. ISLAMISM

- Enter the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE), best known for its interviews of Islamic State defectors. Its scholars have also parsed Islamic State propaganda to understand better how the would-be caliphate sells itself to foreign women, and have [identified seven main themes](#): 1) Fulfillment of religious duty, 2) To become state builders, 3) Belonging, 4) Sisterhood, 5) Adventure, 6) Romance, 7) Influence

[What Do ISIS Women Want?](#)

Michael Rubin, Commentary, January 11, 2017

- First, you must [marginalize Daesh in the world of ideas](#). * * * * In many ways, President-elect Trump is [America’s first Information Warrior president](#). Turning those skills into a crucial tool shaping IW against Daesh and exposing them for what they are is a crucial challenge, which requires focused attention and funding. Part of the reason for the defeat of the Soviet Union was Radio Free Europe and its key role in fighting against the imperial Communist regime.

[Is Trump, Information Warrior, Key To Defeating Daesh \(ISIL\)](#)

Ed Timperlake and Robbin Laird, Breaking Defense, January 19, 2017

9. CHINA

- We estimate that the government fabricates and posts about 448 million social media comments a year. In contrast to prior claims, we show that the Chinese regime's strategy is to avoid arguing with skeptics of the party and the government, and to not even discuss controversial issues. We infer that the goal of this massive secretive operation is instead to regularly distract the public and change the subject, as most of these posts involve cheerleading for China, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party, or other symbols of the regime. [from abstract]

[How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, not Engaged Argument](#)

Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, American Political Science Review, forthcoming.

[Return to the table of contents](#)

- Ever since Xi Jinping became general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012, the government has tightened social, political, and economic controls in China and placed a renewed emphasis on CCP ideology. Xi set this new direction in a secret speech in December 2012 when he raised the example of the breakup of the Soviet Union, which he said was caused by a crisis of belief—the Soviet people had lost faith in the Communist Party. In another speech, in January 2013, Xi Jinping was reported as saying that “beliefs and faith” are the “calcium” of party members and without them they will “develop rickets.”

[Plus ça change? Media Control under Xi Jinping](#)

Anne-Marie Brady, Kissinger Center on China and the United States, October 3, 2016

- The CCP has long regarded persuasion and information management as top government priorities. It devotes considerable resources to them, and it has an extensive bureaucracy in place to carry out propaganda initiatives. (In CCP usage, the word “propaganda” or xuanchuan is not negative.) Traditional media and publishing are only one aspect of foreign-propaganda work. China has learned from Western countries also to incorporate public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, electronic games, and social media into public-opinion management.

[China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine](#)

Anne-Marie Brady, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, October 26, 2015

- The problem with that approach is that audiences are apt to view “Chinese elements” as tokenism and pandering. Increasingly, China’s moviegoers and news media have taken to [mocking](#) Hollywood’s over-the-top efforts to insert Chinese actors and products into films -- such as “Transformers: Age of Extinction” and “Independence Day: Resurgence” -- for no other reason than to expand market share. That’s partly why audiences haven’t been interested in what happens when Hollywood and China team up.

[Why China and Hollywood Don’t Mix](#)

Adam Minter, Bloomberg, December 21, 2016

- . . . Mr. Xi is demanding that the propaganda apparatus step up its game. His administration has [castigated propaganda officials](#) as ineffective, too slow to assert control over the internet and lacking in their commitment to Marxist values. He is pushing them to master the tools of digital media, resist foreign influences in popular culture and target younger audiences, a demographic that some in the party worry it may be losing.

[Propaganda With a Millennial Twist Pops Up in China](#)

Javier C. Hernandez, The New York Times, December 31, 2016

- Ideology has returned as a major factor in U.S.-China relations. Chinese government warnings against the pernicious influence of “Western values” have surged under Xi Jinping and vigilance against Western influence is now a guiding component of his policies toward the Internet, traditional media, culture and entertainment, universities, think tanks, and NGOs.

[Do Western Values Threaten China? The Motives and Methods of Xi Jinping’s Ideology Campaign](#)

Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, April 2, 2015 [webcast recap]

[Return to the table of contents](#)

- Ideology has returned as a major factor in U.S.-China relations. Chinese government warnings against the pernicious influence of “Western values” have surged under Xi Jinping and vigilance against Western influence is now a guiding component of his policies toward the Internet, traditional media, culture and entertainment, universities, think tanks, and non-governmental organizations.

[Do Western Values Threaten China? The Motives and Methods of Xi Jinping’s Ideology Campaign](#)

Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, April 2, 2015 [webcast recap]

- . . . the most effective allied options are likely to focus on applying several types of pressure against the Chinese leadership’s primary weaknesses in whatever theater that is appropriate. . . . Candidate measures will likely extend well beyond the standard diplomatic and military domains to include geo-strategic, information, economic, financial, immigration, legal, counter-leadership, and other initiatives. Some of these measures would comprise declaratory policies designed to deter Chinese actions, give confidence to allies and friends, and shape the broader operating environment.

[It is High Time to Outmaneuver Beijing in the South China Sea](#)

Ross Babbage, War on the Rocks, December 28, 2016

- The formal launch this month of [China Global Television Network \(CGTN\)](#) should be understood as the latest push to develop an international broadcast infrastructure allowing China to advance its messages and flex its “discourse power.” As bold and virile as this sounds, however, even a casual look at what CGTN currently has on offer indicates this is probably another misguided venture that will line the pockets of China’s state broadcaster while offering little in the way of globally compelling products.

[The Baffling Makeover of CCTV Global](#)

China Media Project, January 5, 2017

- China’s leaders, as numerous Chinese commentators have pointed out, are unhappy about the unprecedented barrage directed at them, so why such restraint? For one thing, the leadership, in the words of Liu Weidong of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “has yet to adapt to Trump’s unorthodox style in dealing with diplomacy.” Said Liu to the *South China Morning Post*, “Trump may think he is just making casual comments, but Beijing takes it very seriously, since this disrupts Beijing’s calculations.”

[Trump Tweets, China Retreats](#)

Gordon G. Chang, The National Interest, January 6, 2017

[Return to the table of contents](#)

- “Tell China’s story well,” [Xi Jinping] said in a [congratulatory letter](#) published by the broadcaster on New Year’s Eve, the day [China Global Television Network] launched. But as China pushes to enhance its influence abroad, CGTN’s mission is anything but simple. Experts on Chinese media say the new network will be at the forefront of Beijing’s foreign propaganda offensive, one of President Xi’s top priorities as he seeks to expand his country’s international reach and burnish its global image.

[The TV network at the forefront of Beijing’s foreign propaganda offensive](#)

Michael Holtz, The Christian Science Monitor, January 9, 2017

10. CHINA, PAKISTAN

- Economic power puts outside people into contact with transnational culture via trade. This . . . remains the driving force behind Pakistan and China’s . . . expanding soft power in the region via [China Pakistan Economic Corridor]. China’s President Xi Jinping . . . accordingly pledged to raise China’s soft power by developing China into a socialist cultural superpower. Similarly, Pakistan also realized the exigency of developing its soft power vis-à-vis hard power image by pragmatically rebalancing its national security policy from excessive militarist paradigm to human security-cum-development paradigm.

[Soft power expansion via CPEC](#)

S Qamar Afzal Rizvi, Pakistan Observer, January 5, 2017

11. EAST ASIA

- . . . Seoul has a formal alliance with Washington that leads Koreans to believe that the U.S. will defend them in case of a war. In this institutionalized alliance system, South Korea didn’t feel the dire need to invest amply in public diplomacy towards the U.S., being allies, friendship was taken for granted. The relationship was seen as something that required little maintenance and greasing.

[Taiwan’s public diplomacy](#)

Lee Seong-hyon, Korea Times, January 10, 2017

- Because more information is flowing into the isolated North through cellphones, thumb drives and the Internet, Mr. Hong says North Koreans have a greater understanding than ever about conditions in the South before they leave. A survey of 36 North Koreans inside the country conducted on behalf of the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies found that roughly nine in 10 read foreign media at least once a month, despite rigid controls on North Koreans’ access to outside information.

[North Korean Defections Swell as Political Elite Look South](#)

Jonathan Cheng, The Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2017

[Return to the table of contents](#)

12. NATO

- When it comes to comms, [NATO’s principal spokesperson Oana] Lungescu says there is co-ordination among the 28 NATO countries and between the political and military sides of the alliance, but complete control is yesterday’s model. "I don’t think in this day and age we can 100 per cent control the message, nor should we try to. This is also a lesson we have learned," she adds. "The world has changed with social media, so we need to empower people to tell our story in the way that they think best. It could be a soldier on a mission or exercise in the Baltics or Aegean, it could be a politician in Brussels. So we have a lot of people telling more or less the same story but from different angles."

[Russian propaganda, cyber security, trump-- Inside NATO’s comms operation](#)

Alex Benady, PR Week, January 10, 2017

13. SOFT POWER

- Soft power . . . describes the ability of international actors to coopt and attract, rather than coerce, in order to shape the preferences of others. Soft power can help a nation generate the outcomes it wants because “other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it.” Professor Nye argued that the quality of a nation’s soft power is determined by three variables: “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when others see them as legitimate and having moral authority.)”

[How the Appearance of Conflicts of Interest in the White House will Strengthen Terrorists and Insurgents Globally](#)

Andrew Kenealy, Small Wars Journal, January 11, 2017

- After 15 years of hard power, isn’t it time for soft? Eliot A. Cohen appreciates the force of this argument, and in “The Big Stick” he addresses it head on, making the case for the continued importance of hard power in American foreign policy and the limits to soft power.

[In Defense of Hard Power](#)

Walter Russell Mead, The Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2017

14. PUBLIC AFFAIRS

- So the process of a scoop’s dissemination is this: 1) the original organization lets it loose; 2) Others credit it for its work and then move forward from that; 3) The reporter becomes better-known and more respected in his industry; 4) the organization gets a boost in name ID and stature; and 5) other organizations continue to work the story, which makes it more important as it goes along. BuzzFeed has just up-ended that entirely.

[The BuzzFeed Standard](#)

John Podhoretz, Commentary, January 11, 2017

[Return to the table of contents](#)

15. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

- General Flynn and Dr. Ledeen...wrote the book for 2 reasons: 1) “to show the war being waged against us” and 2) “to lay out a winning strategy.” The ideas in this book fall well within a conservative internationalist tradition. The authors call for: a multi-decade Long War against terrorism, the use of all forms of national power including economic assistance and public diplomacy, confronting the “root causes” of terrorism, and working closely with partners and allies.

General Flynn's Book Offers Glimpses Of Priorities For The Incoming Trump Administration

Daniel Runde, Forbes, December 30, 2016

- Measurement and evaluation is nothing new to public diplomacy. [Nicholas Cull](#) holds that America’s public diplomats have always understood the need to *move the needle*. However, most historical accounts also agree that the topic has gained considerable traction since 9/11.

How to Move the Needle on Moving the Needle

Alexander Buhmann, CPD Blog, January 3, 2017

- Cashing in on government service is also a progressive activity. Rick Stengel, whose Twitter profile reads “Longest serving Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy in American history” has joined Snapchat as a Senior Advisor, the company has confirmed to Heat Street.

Snapchat’s Latest Hire, Richard Stengel, Is the Latest Obama Alum Heading for Silicon Valley

Heat Street, January 10, 2017

- Last Monday at the launch of the [Council's new book](#), our panel moderator, Dan Whitman of American University, noted that the various chapters provide a "What's In What's Out" listicle for public diplomacy. Dan pulled the words below from the various distinguished authors who contributed chapters.

Public diplomacy in 2017 - What's in? What's out?

Joe Johnson, Public Diplomacy Council Commentary, January 11, 2017

16. BROADCASTING

- Belair-Gagnon suggests that the use of social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Flickr and Bebo has resulted in the emergence of new structures and actors in the BBC newsroom, enabling novel spaces of reporting in which the boundaries between journalists and citizens are becoming increasingly blurred.

Book review: Social media at BBC NEWS: The re-making of crisis reporting

Jarad Ahmad, Media, War & Conflict, August 4, 2015

[Return to the table of contents](#)

- Now that the National Defense Authorization Act has been signed into law removing the Broadcasting Board of Governors from managerial and operational authority over U.S. international broadcasting, it is time for those who care about it to cease the hand-wringing over the loss of the so-called firewall, roll up our sleeves and get down to the practical work of operating in the new paradigm.

[U.S. International Broadcasting – A Way Forward](#)

Joseph B. Bruns, Public Diplomacy Council Commentary, January 2, 2017

17. SOCIAL MEDIA

- The political identity and attitudes of young citizens are thereby seen to be increasingly less by their social ties to family, neighborhood, school or work, but rather by the manner in which they participate and interact through social networks which they themselves have had a significant part in constructing.

[The networked young citizen: social media, political participation and civic engagement](#)

Brian D. Loader, Ariadne Vromen, and Michael A. Xenos, Information, Communication & Society, vol 7, issue 2, 2014

- Some studies have found Twitter and Facebook to be important tools for social organization and facilitating political involvement. Others, however, assert that these media act as echo chambers, reinforcing preexisting views rather than providing new information or perceptions. This research analyzes videos pertaining to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict to reveal how they provide information. The findings show that the methods – empirical and visceral – used to frame information in YouTube videos correspond to the narratives supported by the uploaders.

[Information dissemination in new media: YouTube and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict](#)

Matt Evans, Media, War & Conflict, April 18, 2016

- The political class is still coming to grips with what appears to be Donald Trump’s novel management philosophy: Government by Twitter. Put aside the by-now-familiar weirdness of our president-elect’s gloating over Arnold Schwarzenegger’s poor Celebrity Apprentice ratings or swipes at Meryl Streep. Trump’s Twitter addiction poses heretofore unnoticed challenges for his administration.

[What Trump’s Allies Have to Fear from His Twitter Feed](#)

Jonah Goldberg, National Review, January 11, 2017

- . . . we believe that Twitter doesn’t do enough to proactively monitor, identify and remove terrorist-related accounts and hasn’t made an effective or prolonged effort to ensure that the accounts are not re-established. In short, Twitter’s actions are too little, too late.

[Twitter Must Do More to Block ISIS](#)

Anne Cameron Cain and Beatriz Gonzalez, The New York Times, January 13, 2017

[Return to the table of contents](#)

- When Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj threatened Amazon on Twitter that they would either remove ‘products insulting our national flag immediately’ or ‘we will not grant Indian visa to any Amazon official’, she displayed exactly how powerful a tool Twitter had become. She had formulated and announced government policy in three tweets. And no one thought it wasn’t ‘official’ because it came from her personal Twitter account.

[Digital diplomacy is the new radio](#)

Vidya Subramanian, Hindustan Times, January 12, 2017

18. EXCHANGES

- A new law signed by President Obama on December 16 grants foreign states immunity from US jurisdiction in cases related to the temporary exhibition of loaned artworks and objects of cultural significance. Despite current tensions between Obama and Russian President Vladimir Putin—and opposition to the bill from groups like the Holocaust Art Restitution Project—the [Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act](#) could mean the renewing of cultural exchange between the US and Russia.

[Obama Signs Law That Could Reopen Cultural Exchange with Russia](#)

Alyssa Buffenstein, ArtNet News, January 5, 2017

- In that connection, I also want to thank our nominating partners – Sister Cities International, Global Ties USA, and the Alliance for International Exchange – for helping to connect communities across the globe and to thank all of you for being here as we present our first annual Citizen Diplomacy Award [to Greater Fort Lauderdale Sister Cities International].

[Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs: First Annual Citizen Diplomacy Award Ceremony](#)

Acting Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Bruce Wharton, Department of State, January 9, 2017

- On behalf of the American Embassy, it was the Russian minority I was there to address: The novel’s preoccupations — the psychic legacy of Soviet life, World War II — remain dear to it. The trouble was that many Estonian Russians had not managed, or bothered, to learn Estonian, and no Russian publisher had touched my little story of Soviet horror.

[On Being Translated Back to Myself](#)

Boris Fishman, The New York Times, January 13, 2017

19. WORLD WAR II

- World War II marked the first time radio became a widely-used weapon of psychological warfare. Both the Allied and Axis powers transformed the wireless into an anti-personnel device. They shot disinformation and psychological shrapnel at each other. In this era (1937-45), more than a hundred propaganda stations took to the air.

[Battles of Belief in World War II: Radio Wars](#)

American Public Media, n.d. [two part series]

[Return to the table of contents](#)

20. IMAGEFARE

- David Shields used to read *The New York Times* until he realized he had a problem. Each day he found himself enchanted by the images of war on the front page. In his words, ‘My attraction to the photographs evolved into a mixture of rapture, bafflement, and repulsion’ (p. 7). Bewildered disgust may seem to be a fitting response to war imagery, but Shields’ ‘repulsion’ did not stem from the *content* of the photographs (acts of war and human violence), but rather their *form* (how the *Times* presented them).

[Book review: War Is Beautiful: The New York Times Pictorial Guide to the Glamour of Armed Conflict](#)

Lisa Ellen Silvestri, *Media, War & Conflict*, July 21, 2016\

- Social media platforms have become important in spreading propaganda images during conflicts . . . including the Israeli– Hamas confrontation in 2012 and graphic internet videos by the self-proclaimed Islamic State in 2014. This study examines the role of visual propaganda in the social media age by analyzing themes, frames, and structural features of images posted on the official Facebook pages of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces in 2013 and 2014. . . . There were significant differences in terms of audience reactions to images with different themes and frames. [from the abstract]

[Visual propaganda on Facebook: A comparative analysis of Syrian conflicts](#)

Hyunjin Seo and Husain Ebrahim, *Media, War & Conflict*, August 5, 2016

- . . . the notion of ‘imagefare’ – ‘the use, or misuse, of images as a guiding principle or a substitute for traditional military means to achieve political objectives’ (p. 12). The current study tests their theoretical framework, and examines whether the use of imagefare as part of a political actor’s conflict strategy improves its foreign image as presented by its ability to promote its preferred frames to the foreign press. . . . Findings suggest that whenever a country uses imagefare as part of its strategy, it increases its ability to promote its preferred messages to the foreign press and to improve the country’s image. [from abstract]

[Does using ‘imagefare’ as a state’s strategy in asymmetric conflicts improve its foreign media coverage? The case of Israel](#)

Moran Yarchi, *Media, War & Conflict*, December 10, 2015

21. GASTRODIPLOMACY

- The practice of sharing a state’s cultural heritage through cuisine is called gastrodiplomacy. Malaysia has the potential to make its own stand in the eyes of the world by its capacity of using food as a soft power tool.

[Gastrodiplomacy as a Soft Power Tool to Enhance Nation Brand](#)

Fatin Mahirah Solleh, *Journal of Media and Information Warfare*, July 2015

[Return to the table of contents](#)

22. IDEAS, CONCEPTS, DOCTRINE

- In the digital era, this struggle is manifested in the work of civil-society organizations calling to expand the boundaries of digital rights such as access to the internet, freedom of speech, and the right to privacy. Alongside their traditional activity of confronting governments and internet organizations, these bodies have also engaged in educating citizens about their rights.

[Let’s be careful out there ... : how digital rights advocates educate citizens in the digital age](#)

Efrat Diskal, Information, Communication

- Based on media coverage of the Korean War in 1950 by *Life* and *Time* magazines, this article identifies five plausible scenarios of how US journalists performed acts of witnessing the unknown battlefield of Korea. This exploration prods readers to critically appreciate both the journalist’s role as memory agent and the journalistic text as the repertoire in our act of remembering.

[The repertoire, not the archive: The 1950 *Life* and *Time* coverage of the Korean War](#)

Suhi Choi, Media, War & Conflict, May 5, 2015

- SPG, which stands for Sonoran Policy Group, describes itself as a “public diplomacy firm,” and has mostly maintained a low profile in Washington, representing an eclectic array of clients . . .

[Trump insiders head for big K Street paydays](#)

Isaac Arnsdorf and Kenneth P. Vogel, Politico, January 6, 2017

- The fundamental mistake in suppressing groups such as the Brotherhood, or in effect condoning such suppression...such as the Cruz-Diaz legislation, is that closing peaceful channels for the expression of political Islam moves more people into the violent channels.

[Ideological Warfare Against Nonviolent Political Islam](#)

Paul R. Pillar, The National Interest, January 14, 2017

- . . . the authors explored the framing of the US drone program in American, British, and Arab news coverage. Consistent with research on social identity theory and ethnocentrism in news, they find that US coverage was more likely to frame the policy favorably – emphasizing its legality, strategic value and technological sophistication while downplaying civilian deaths – while British and, to a greater extent, Arab coverage was more critical.

[The view from above \(and below\): A comparison of American, British, and Arab news coverage of US drones](#)

Penelope Sheets, Charles M. Rowling, and Timothy M. Jones, Media, War & Conflict, July 7, 2015

[Return to the table of contents](#)

23. PROPAGANDA

- [Joel] Whitney attempts to link *The Paris Review* to the central cog in the CIA’s Cold War propaganda machine: the Congress for Cultural Freedom. The CCF was founded in 1950 as a [home for anticommunist intellectuals](#) who wanted to combat the influence of European communists, fellow travelers, and neutralists. CIA dollars and personnel made it possible, even as the CCF quickly expanded into a global organization that operated magazines, conferences, and art galleries from Asia to South America.

Literary Agents

Patrick Iber, New Republic, January 3, 2017

- In looking at the First World War one struck by 1) the frequency with which the term ‘propaganda’ is used and 2) compared with later periods, certainly by the 1940s, the lack of nuance. Essentially ‘propaganda’ is ‘the internet’ of the era: something new is happening but the conceptual frameworks for thinking about it are not well developed.

First World War Propaganda: Thoughts and Lessons

Public Diplomacy Networks and Influence, January 8, 2017

- [Abstract] In recent years . . . many have suggested that the United States might be losing its edge in world affairs. Little research has sought to examine the effects that these explicit challenges to American exceptionalism might have on U.S. public opinion. With this in mind, we conducted an experiment in which a large sample of U.S. adults was exposed to such messages... Our findings suggest that challenges to this idea have a significant impact on (1) U.S. adults’ sense of American exceptionalism, (2) their willingness to actively degrade other countries, and (3) their attributions of responsibility for the United States’ perceived decline.

America in Decline? Assessing the Impact of International Challenges to American Exceptionalism

Jason Gilmore and Charles M. Rowling, *International Journal of Communication*, no. 11, 2017

- Propaganda is notoriously difficult to define. Beyond the generally agreed upon principle that propaganda involves some effort at persuasion, it’s hard to settle on clear boundaries on what counts as propaganda.

What’s Propaganda Got To Do With It?

Caroline Jack, *Points*, January 5, 2017

- In an era of [post-truth politics](#), driven by the 24-hour news cycle, diminishing trust in institutions, rich visual media, and the ubiquity and velocity of social networked spaces, *how do we identify information that is tinted*—information that is incomplete, that may help affirm our existing beliefs or support someone’s agenda, or that may be manipulative—effectively driving a form of propaganda?

Fake News Is Not the Only Problem

Gilad Lotan, *Points*, November 22, 2016

[Return to the table of contents](#)

- When Russian TV news airs false reports of enemy troops crucifying a local toddler; the Russian Foreign Minister decries [the fictitious rape of a schoolgirl by migrants in Germany](#);...and the Russian Minister of Culture, a great reveler in great revelations, [literally ascribes his people’s triumphs over adversity to an extra chromosome in the national gene pool](#)—sweeping all of Moscow’s continuous and unbelievable logo-fallout under the familiar P-Word rug is no longer, you’ll agree, a very reasonable option.

What is it called when you go past “propaganda”?

Mark H. Teeter, Anti-Nihilist Institute, January 4, 2017

- As we defeat ISIL on the physical battlefield, we must ensure we are postured to prevail on the virtual battlefield as well. ISIL’s virtual caliphate has progressed beyond strictly propaganda or recruitment efforts. It is about more than the proliferation of ideas; it is about the proliferation of action and of violence. With a carefully crafted and dynamic narrative, ISIL has exploited the sociopolitical environment and young adults’ obsession with technology to establish a growing community in the ungoverned territory of cyberspace.

#Virtual Caliphate: Defeating ISIL on the Physical Battlefield Is Not Enough

General Joseph L. Votel, Lieutenant Colonel Christina Bembenek, Charles Hans, Jeffery Mouton, and Amanda Spencer, Center for a New American Security, January 12, 2017

- . . . we are in a new age of hoaxes, with frequent tales of Trump-inspired atrocities that have unraveled, as did so many of the stories of atrocities committed in WWI. Understanding the propaganda of the Great War may help us understand the motives and methods of the modern propaganda in what we might call the Hate War.

Untruth and Consequences

Eric Felten, The Weekly Standard, January 23, 2017

- Previous studies have indicated that animation is an excellent source of propaganda because children love animation. The problem occurs when an animation company utilises interesting animation to persuade children to accept hidden messages without knowing that their minds are in fact have been manipulated while watching it.

Animation Propaganda: The Hidden Messages in Disney Princess Animation That Affects Children Learning

Nadia Masturah Zaki and Nur Atiqah Sia Abdullah, Journal of Media and Information Warfare, July 2015

[Return to the table of contents](#)

24. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER

- The new law is remarkable for a number of reasons, not the least because it merges [a new McCarthyism](#) about purported dissemination of Russian “propaganda” on the Internet with [a new Orwellianism](#) by creating a kind of Ministry of Truth – or Global Engagement Center – to protect the American people from “foreign propaganda and disinformation.”

The War Against Alternative Information

Rick Sterling, consortiumnews.com, January 1, 2017

- There are two ways to look at this latest attempt at central coordination of influence. The positive view is that there is finally recognition that the US does not have a current influence strategy and needs one very badly. The new law and organization also concedes that the government does not have the internal capability to develop and execute this strategy itself. By placing the Global Engagement Center within the Department of State, it can legitimately foster the President’s influence goals as the diplomatic arm of the cabinet.

Global Engagement Center – New Focal Point for Countering Propaganda & Disinformation

Lawrence Dietz, Psyop Regimental Blog, January 5, 2017

25. INFORMATION WARFARE

- This paper proposes two types of offensive cyber operation, instrumental and strategic, and argues that strategic offensive cyber operations are a form of information warfare that aim primarily to act upon adversary perceptions, which are fundamental to warfare as viewed as a contest of wills.

Don’t Forget the Humans: Toward a 21st Century Offensive Cyber Strategy

Josh M. Cartin, Global Security Studies, Spring 2014

- This article considers the Russian and Chinese approaches to the use of information in war and makes recommendations on how the U.S. might respond.

Information War and Rethinking Phase 0

Robert Bebbler, Journal of Information Warfare, Spring 2016

- . . . the apparent success of Russia’s efforts—if, as [CIA and FBI officials have now both told the Washington Post](#), Trump’s election was the hackers’ goal—will only [embolden Russia’s digital intruders to try new targets and techniques](#). Expect them to replicate their influence operations ahead of elections next year in Germany, the Netherlands, and France, and potentially to even try new tricks like data sabotage or attacks on physical infrastructure.

The Biggest Security Threats Coming in 2017

Wired, January 2, 2017

[Return to the table of contents](#)

- The United States must increase its investment in information warfare as it faces cyber attacks from Russia, the Director of the Office of National Intelligence James Clapper said.

[Clapper: United States Must Beef Up Information Warfare Capabilities](#)

Yasmin Tadjdeh, National Defense, January 5, 2017

- Spies are usually thought of as bystanders who quietly steal secrets in the shadows. But the Russian versions, schooled in techniques used during the Cold War against the United States, have a more ambitious goal — shaping, not just snooping on, the politics of a nation that the Soviet-era K.G.B. targeted as the “main adversary.”

[Russians Ridicule U.S. Charge That Kremlin Meddled to Help Trump](#)

Andrew Higgins, The New York Times, January 7, 2017

- The Russians may have very well gotten involved, several people said. They added that kind of interference should be combated. But many assumed that foreign actors had long tried to play favorites in American elections, and that the United States had done the same in other countries’ elections. Even if the Russians did do it — which some were more willing to concede than others — what difference did it make? People did not need the Russians to make up their minds about Mrs. Clinton, Mr. Trump’s election opponent. Blaming her loss on the Russians was, as one Trump supporter here said, “just being sore losers.”

[‘What’s the Big Deal?’ Ask Trump Voters on Russia Hacking Report](#)

Campbell Robertson and Mitch Smith, The New York Times, January 7, 2017

- . . . from now on, at least as long as Putin is in power, Western elections are likely to be affected by the danger, real or not, of Russian involvement, transforming the campaigns into referenda on whether this or that candidate is Putin’s agent in place and thus undermining the democratic process by raising suspicions about the loyalty of this or that figure.

[Putin’s Active Measures Achieve a Second and Larger Victory When They are Exposed](#)

Paul Goble, Window on Eurasia—New Series, January 10, 2017

- The public airing of a dossier Tuesday on President-elect Donald Trump casts a spotlight on Russia’s dark art of kompromat, the practice of collecting compromising material on prominent individuals for the purposes of blackmail.* * *The Kremlin has denied any link to the dossier, and Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov called the reports “pulp fiction,” according to Russian news agencies.Kompromat, a contraction of the Russian phrase “compromising materials,” has a rich history in Russia dating back to the Soviet era. Diplomats, politicians and bureaucrats have all been embarrassed by leaked videos or other material.

[Trump Dossier Spotlights Russian History of ‘Kompromat’](#)

Nathan Hodge and Thomas Grove, The Wall Street Journal, January 11, 2017

[Return to the table of contents](#)

- “We were witnessing the emergence of an era in which fake news and fabricated facts would have very real results. . . . propaganda is now central, not secondary in its importance.”

Quotable: Brett Bruen’s four lessons on Russia’s information warfare

Public Diplomacy Council, January 11, 2017

- Deeply divided and in the grip of partisan passions, U.S. society is slipping into a quagmire of Russian disinformation in which the Putin regime will find it very easy to create reality and destroy facts. This has implications not only for U.S. security but also for the country’s psychological health. The recently released report that asserts that Russian president Vladimir Putin has been “cultivating assisting and supporting Trump” for years and that the Russians have compromising information (kompromat) on him is, I believe, a deliberate Russian provocation.

The ‘Trump Report’ Is a Russian Provocation

David Satter, National Review, January 12, 2017

- . . . Kompromat. Those who gain the most from this are people and countries that seek to undermine our system, erode belief in our institutions, seed questions about the quality of our democracy and distract from that which is real: Murder. Occupation. Dictatorship. Corruption. Doping. Yes, Vladimir Putin, I’m talking about you and the [failing pile of garbage](#) that you have made Russia.

Kompromat: The real failing pile of garbage

Danielle Pletka, American Enterprise Institute, January 12, 2017

- The Kremlin on Wednesday dismissed as “a total fake” allegations that Russian intelligence agencies collected compromising information about President-elect Donald Trump — a denial that was echoed by much of Russia’s establishment. But when President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman went further — saying the Kremlin “does not engage in compromising material” — it was widely greeted by the rolling of Russian eyes. Gathering “kompromat,” the Russian word for potentially embarrassing information that can offer leverage, has a long history reaching back to Soviet days.

Russia says it doesn’t gather dirt on others, but history of ‘kompromat’ says otherwise

David Filipov and Andrew Roth, The Washington Post, January 11, 2016

- Nations in Europe, where Germany and France this year hold elections, are erecting defenses to counter possible Russian cyber attacks and disinformation to sway Western politics, but intelligence experts say this might be too little and too late. The issue of Russian “influence operations” has taken on new urgency after U.S. intelligence agencies released a non-classified assessment , , , ,

Europe erects defenses to counter Russia's information war

Andrea Shalal, Reuters, January 12, 2017

[Return to the table of contents](#)

- First, recognize cyber represents much more than a technical problem. As the Russian information operations during our elections clearly showed, modern technology enables actors to easily fabricate facts and manipulate the media. This requires a multifaceted solution. Giuliani’s group needs to include news, cultural, and thought leaders too. The principal challenge he inherits is not just keeping hackers off our networks. It involves not allowing them to undermine confidence in our institutions and ideals.

[Five ideas for America’s capable new cyber czar, Rudy Giuliani](#)

Brett Bruen, The Hill, January 13, 2017

- The 2016 presidential election and Donald Trump have given Russia a wonderful opportunity to showcase one of its best national products: a particularly effective type of media manipulation called “kompromat.” Short for “compromising material” in Russian, kompromat is all about the intersection of news and blackmail. It’s the ability to sully the reputations of political opponents or pressure allies through hints, images, videos, promises of disclosures, perhaps even some high-quality faked documentation. Sex or pornography often figures prominently.

[How Russian ‘kompromat’ destroys political opponents, no facts required](#)

Sarah Oates, The Washington Post, January 13, 2017

- . . . kompromat is more than an individual piece of damaging information: It is a broader attempt to manufacture public cynicism and confusion in ways that target not just one individual but an entire society. And although this practice tends to be associated with Russia — the word kompromat is a portmanteau of the Russian words for “compromising” and “information” — it is a common feature of authoritarian and semiauthoritarian nations around the world.

[‘Kompromat’ and the Danger of Doubt and Confusion in a Democracy](#)

Amanda Taub, The Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2017

- . . . people who know the Russian political playbook say winking at these fringe movements—and even giving them a boost—is a part of a very real strategy. Not only is this a way of puffing Russia’s domestic claims at turmoil in the U.S., but it fits firmly within the Kremlin’s *modus operandi* of [cultivating fringe groups](#) in the West—including, most especially, those who would fracture the United States in a reprise of the Soviet Union’s demise, over a quarter-century later.

[Why Russia Loves the Idea of California Seceding](#)

Casey Michel, Politico, January 17, 2017

- The most effective western responses to the challenge of Kremlin media fall across three categories of action: exposure of Russian disinformation, engagement with endangered populations and enhancement of local media.

[Quotable: Nicholas Cull on expose, engage, and enhance](#)

Public Diplomacy Council, January 19, 2017

[Return to the table of contents](#)

- “You can call it ‘information warfare,’ ‘hybrid warfare,’ or ‘political warfare,’ but whatever you call it, an adversary’s attempts to shape the minds and will of people toward a political end is not new to the United States. Nor will this be the first time the United States sought to wield these weapons against its foes.”

* * * * *

. . . by blocking the development and deployment of civilian and overt activities, Fulbright’s actions on the Freedom Academy and the Smith-Mundt Act have done more to militarize American foreign policy than any other single act by denying Congress, policymakers, and practitioners critical experience, methods, and historical precedent to properly defend the nation through nonmilitary means.

[Quotable: Matt Armstrong on the institutions of information, influence, and opinion](#)

Public Diplomacy Council, January 19, 2017

26. SPORTS DIPLOMACY

- “I am the first professor of skateboarding and action sports here in the U.S., especially at a major university, USC. I’ve been looking at how skateboarding can be used as a tool for cultural diplomacy. So, when it came time to bring the class together, they knew that I’d been working out in the field in Cuba and Brazil and South Africa and that we were trying to find new ways to engage youth all over the world.”

[Neftalie Williams: Skateboarding Is a 'Tool for Cultural Diplomacy'](#)

Voice of America, January 4, 2017

27. INFORMATION OPERATIONS

- Traditional training and combat skills often do not match the modern battlefield. We must progress beyond the traditional combined arms doctrine. Modern soldiers must not only be traditional warriors; they must be competent in information operations and information warfare.

[Educating and Training Soldiers for Information Operations](#)

Aki-Mauri Huhtinen, Edwin ‘Leigh’ Armistead, and Corey D. Schou, Journal of Information Warfare, September, 2010

28. NATIONAL HISTORY NARRATIVES

- Russian embassy in UK says [#Russia](#) wasn’t defeated in Cold War, but after its fall, treated & humiliated like post WWI Germany.

[Russian embassy in UK says #Russia wasn’t defeated in Cold War, but after its fall, treated & humiliated like post WWI Germany.](#)

Joel Harding, To Inform is to Influence, January 9, 2017

[Return to the table of contents](#)

29. CONSPIRACY THEORIES

- . . . the unfortunate reality is that accusations of foreign plots resonate extremely well in a society that sees itself as constantly subject to harmful foreign meddling. Moreover, given the vital role of the family as the basic unit of society, activists seeking to alter family structures are particularly vulnerable to portrayal as enemies of the state itself. Because these ideas constitute powerful forms of delegitimization in Saudi discourse, foreign activists should be aware that certain actions could unintentionally undermine the legitimacy of local activist efforts.

[Twitter and the Saudi Campaign to Preserve Male Guardianship Over Women](#)

Kendall Bianchi, Fikra Forum, n.d.

- The problem with focusing on the content of conspiracy theories is that it can be hard to draw the line between irrational suspicion and legitimate mistrust. In an age when many voters have ceased to believe what politicians and other "experts" are telling them, describing a refusal to face the facts as a failure of reasoning simply fuels the problem it is meant to address.

[The Plots Against America](#)

David Runciman, The Chronicle of Higher Education, January 15, 2017

30. NARRATIVE

- . . . governments can actively shape and sustain public support for war through the strategic construction and deployment of narratives . . . by communicating clear, consistent ‘storylines’ . . . that emphasize progress and future success, governments will be more successful in sustaining public support for war. Having demonstrated this using Afghanistan, the authors offer four ‘ideal type arguments’ (p. 355) for governments to use, depending on . . . the policy goal . . . and whether the mission is driven by moral or national security considerations.

[Book review: Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion, and War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War](#)

Thomas Colley, Media, War & Conflict, November 26, 2015

[Return to the table of contents](#)

- On some channels, it was a heroic tale of the Syrian Army’s “cleansing” the area of “armed groups” or “terrorists” before leading a process of “reconciliation.” On others, the “regime” had routed “the revolutionaries” and planned to carry out “ethnic cleansing” against “the Syrian people.” Such drastically different narratives of the same event are prominent features of the media landscape in the Arab world, a reality that I have had to learn to navigate during a decade living and working here as a journalist.

[The Linguistic Labyrinth of Arabic News](#)

Ben Hubbard, The New York Times, January 14, 2017

[Return to the table of contents](#)

31. INTERNET

- The core challenge of the State Department’s Internet freedom agenda is not that circumvention tools are a bad idea, or that the censorship and surveillance programs they are meant to counter are not damaging to civil society. It is that at the same time as the 21st century statecraft program was supplying Syrian dissidents with counter-surveillance technology the US government was simultaneously building a large-scale surveillance program of its own. What’s more, at the same time the United States was supporting these dissidents to oppose certain regimes, the regimes were often buying their surveillance hardware from American corporations

[Book review: Disruptive Power: The Crisis of the State in the Digital Age and The Real Cyber War: The Political Economy of Internet Freedom](#)

Nathalie Marechal, Media, War & Conflict, August 5, 2016

32. SPEECHWRITING

- Over the past century, the list of presidents we lift up as especially gifted speakers is short — Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and Obama. In editing a collection of Obama’s speeches, “[We Are the Change We Seek](#),” published last week, we were struck that while he drew on all these presidential forebears in his approach to persuasion, his first political love was Abraham Lincoln.

[Obama, the orator](#)

E.J. Dionne Jr. and Joy-Ann Reid, The Washington Post, January 15, 2017

33. USIA “ON STEROIDS”

- During the Cold War, the United States fought a war of information (and [disinformation](#)) against Communism. The lead agency of that war was the United States Information Agency (USIA), the propaganda arm of the US government, which was dissolved in 1999. But now James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, says we need that group again. Actually, he just told Congress that we need a “USIA on steroids.”

[James Clapper Says That America Needs a New Propaganda Agency to Fight Russia](#)

Matt Novak, Gizmodo, January 5, 2017

- As history has repeatedly demonstrated, realistic and well-informed consideration of and investment in American public diplomacy, not steroids, make U.S. counter-propaganda successful.

[Quotable: Nicholas Cull weighs the “USIA on steroids” proposal](#)

Public Diplomacy Council, January 13, 2017

[Return to the table of contents](#)

34. STUDY IN THE U.S. • INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS

- A major increase in international enrollment in recent years has intensified the competition for entry to America’s top private colleges and universities, as ever-growing numbers of applicants angle for the limited supply of seats.

[Surge in foreign students may be crowding Americans out of elite colleges](#)

Nick Anderson, The Washington Post, December 21, 2016

- The Reuters findings cast new doubt on the ability of America's standardized testing giants to contain cheating in Asia, where security breaches pose an increasing threat to the integrity of U.S. college admissions.

[Chinese education giant helps its students game the SAT](#)

Reuters, December 23, 2016

[Return to the table of contents](#)