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**2009 SMITH-MUNDT SYMPOSIUM:
LUNCH KEYNOTE**

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MATT ARMSTRONG: (In progress) – today, a lot more ground to cover. These last two panels and the under secretary’s keynote I think – I hope was enlightening and interesting for you all.

A quick announcement – support. Marc showed me – Marc Lynch showed me a little love; I’ll show him a little love too. Tomorrow at George Washington at the Elliott School, Linder Commons, sixth floor, I believe it is, the under secretary is going to be talking 10:00 to 11:30. That’s tomorrow. No reservation needed. The topic is “Public Diplomacy: Past, Present, and Future for Victory.” Mike, is that “victory”? Now that you have a full mouth, I waited for that. Is it “past, present, and victory,” or “past, present, and future.”

MR. : It should be “future.”

MR. ARMSTRONG: “Future.” Okay. Maybe I just – that was a Freudian slip. Victory was the idea.

So that’s tomorrow. Again, no reservation needed. GW Elliott School, Linder Commons, sixth floor. And then, let’s see, what else.

So we got our schedule. The next up is Mike Doran, senior advisor, U.S. Department of State. Mike, feel free to get that out of your way if you don’t want it there. The bios are up on the web. I don’t want to take any time, but he was the former – he is the former deputy assistant secretary of defense for support to public diplomacy. He and – well, I’m going to let him talk and give his spiel. He’s going to be up here for the next hour, and then we’re going to have a short break, and then we’re going to roll into our third panel. He will be available for questions and answers, and that’s it. I’m going to turn it over to Mike now. Continue eating.

(Applause.)

MICHAEL DORAN: Well, thanks very much to Matt. After listening to Jim Glassman this morning, I’ve been trying to come up with a way to use the word “prophylactic” – (laughter) – in a sentence because I knew it would get a laugh. But, see, I couldn’t think of one other than just to tell you I couldn’t think of one.

No, really, enormous gratitude I would like to express to Matt for putting together an outstanding conference. And of course it’s coming at a very important time as we look forward to a new administration.

I would like – I would like to say a few words today, focus my remarks on what we need to do to rebuild our arsenal of influence. I would like to talk a little bit more broadly than just public diplomacy and strategic communications and talk about it in terms of influence because I think the United States government got out of the influence business largely after the Cold War. I think we need to get back into it. And so I’d like to give you just a few thoughts to consider in that regard. And I certainly hope that the next administration will look very seriously at this question of influence and how we need to reorganize ourselves.

In particular, I want to take this opportunity to make two major points. The first point is that we need a strategic center in the U.S. government for – let’s call it in the influence enterprise. And the second point I want to make is that we need to – we need to, within that context, assign some new missions to public diplomacy, to our public diplomacy officers.

And I’m going to – I’ll actually take those two in reverse order. I’ll first talk about the new mission and then how I think we might think about creating a strategic center. Before I do that, let me just say a few words about Smith-Mundt. I would number myself among those in the room who think we can do everything that we need to do within the – within the framework provided by Smith-Mundt, that in fact Smith-Mundt empowers us in many ways, and that

reopening Smith-Mundt might, as Under secretary Glassman said this morning, might take things away from us that we currently take for granted.

I think there are, as somebody mentioned here, a lot of silly impediments that Smith-Mundt puts in front of us but that these are impediments that we can get around rather easily. For me, the key thing about a discussion about Smith-Mundt would be to say that Smith-Mundt was a product of its time. Matt pointed out a number of the political – aspects of the political circumstances that gave birth to Smith-Mundt. Of course the most obvious one is that we were fighting the Cold War. And Smith-Mundt was I think set up with a Cold War mindset. And the thing that strikes me the most when I look at this influence enterprise in the current situation is that a lot of the old Cold War – (inaudible) – don't really apply to this situation. Some do, some don't. And I think there needs to be a much more broad-ranging discussion about what the public diplomacy and strategic communication mission is in the current environment.

Okay, before we go into more detail about that, let me relate to you an anecdote. Last week I received from a friend of mine an e-mail that a friend of his had sent him from Africa, very perceptive observer, a guy who's spending a lot of time on the ground in an African country. And he said that what was a very – to me what was a very interesting e-mail about African attitudes to our election.

And on Wednesday, November 5th, this American traveler had some very animated discussions with his African hosts. The election was tremendously exciting to them. They followed it very closely. And they came away with a tremendous amount of admiration for a particular American politician. And on the night after the election, they wanted to do nothing but talk about that politician, who was of course – no surprise here – John McCain. “McCain is a gentleman; McCain, he is a good man. He fought hard and when he lost, he stepped aside. This is the right thing to do.” Apparently there is some tremendous excitement in some African countries about John McCain and biographies of him are selling like hotcakes.

Another quote: “This is why America is a great nation. This would never happen here. In Africa, no one wants to give up power. And he says now he will support Obama. Wow.” To me, this anecdote illustrates two very important points about how we conduct public diplomacy and strategic communication in the current environment. The first point is obvious and the second, less so.

To the first one, it is very important, still, in the post-Cold War period, to tell America's story, which is extremely powerful. It's gripping to people all over the world. For all that people are bombarded by information about the United States, foreign audiences often live in a state of well-informed ignorance of us and frankly we of them. At the heart of Smith-Mundt is the notion that the United States will achieve its strategic policy aims by telling America's story. The anecdote from Africa illustrates that doing so is as important today as it was in 1947.

There is a growing consensus, however, that the United States could tell its story more effectively. There is a growing consensus that we need to – we need to improve our capacity to deliver soft power. However we define this term, I think it comes down to meaning two things:

increasing our ability to understand the cultures and concerns of global audiences, and building new challenges, both human and technological, to those audiences.

While it's easy to identify these needs, it is much harder to draw up a blueprint of the necessary organizational changes. As we enter a network communication age, the world is undergoing vast techno-sociological changes, but we are still organized along pre-networked lines. I think a lot of the discussion this morning goes to that point.

Jim Glassman's concept of "Public Diplomacy 2.0" lays out the policy agenda for the networked age, and has given us a few examples – I think very potent examples – about how to implement this policy. Unfortunately his very short tenure as under secretary, as secretary of state has not afforded him the opportunity to make any of the deep bureaucratic changes that would ensure that we do this on the scale and the depth necessary to achieve our strategic aims.

When you identify the need to make bureaucratic changes, you immediately conjure up the specter of creating – recreating USIA, which Smith-Mundt created of course, or which Smith-Mundt enabled us to create to tell America's story. Abolished as an independent entity in 1999, USIA was split up into pieces, some of them were discontinued all together and others were incorporated into the State Department. They were incorporated under State R, the under secretary for public diplomacy, as most of you know. They were incorporated in such a way as to make R much less powerful than these elements were when they were under an independent agency. I'm sure that was no accident. I myself – many of you in here are probably aware of the politics around that whole reconstruction – I myself am not.

But deep in the DNA of the State Department is the notion that the mission of the State Department is to carry out bilateral relationships with other states. Communicating over the heads of diplomats to the publics that they serve is not deep in the DNA of the department. So I would assume that it was on purpose, if not actually thought through completely, just simply by the way the State Department usually does business, that State R should not be as powerful as it was under U.S. – as the enterprise was under USIA.

In this regard, I find interesting reading Nick Cull's book on USIA. There is a – I loved hearing this morning the discussions of, was it Frank Shakespeare because I had not heard of them until I read Nick Cull's book. And to hear – there's a fascinating discussion in there about the U.S. attitude toward the positioning of Soviet missiles in Egypt. USIA came out – under Shakespeare came out with a position on our public position about the missiles. The secretary of state objected. Two weeks later, the entire government was on the USIA line and not on the state line.

So it shows you that when there was a politically powerful or politically empowered leadership at USIA, it was, as we always say, the public diplomacy effort was there at the takeoff and not just at the crash landing of policy.

We don't in the current – in the current structure, we can't really hope to have that kind of influence for this larger enterprise, and I think we need to aspire to that. Advocates for improving communications can, with some justification, argue that the government needs a

single authoritative body for communications activities. If nobody is in charge, they argue, then much important work is ignored and agencies trip over each other. They can point to USIA's successes during the Cold War as a model for addressing the challenges of the networked age.

I must admit that when I first entered the field of strategic communications, which was already 16 months ago – so I've been here for a long time – I felt the absence of a single strategic center for the government, and I quietly advocated in favor of resurrecting USIA. Today, however, I no longer believe that creating a new bureaucracy is the right way to go. We face new problems specific to the networked world in which we find ourselves, and it would be a mistake to address them with the model from a different era.

I think here the key question for me is how do we ensure that our efforts in this area are strategic. Now, you can define strategic many different ways but I'll just define up here what I'm talking about today. Number one, closely tied to policy, to top policy aims.

Number two, well-coordinated across the government. I think all of us who have been working during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars are aware that when the State Department and the Department of Defense are on the same page and they're strongly supported by the intel community, there's almost nothing they can't do. If you add into that coordination with USIA, with USAID, then it's really quite an amazing force. We need that across-government effort on all of our major problems. When we don't have that, when the agencies fall all over each other, then that's when I think our problems begin.

USIA confronted in many respects a much simpler challenge than the one we face today. During the Cold War, USIA broadcasts messages of freedom and democracy to peoples who being held captive by communism had few windows to the outside world. It broke through the iron curtain of ideas by successfully conveying information from an open world into a close information environment. USIA broadcasts U.S. societal values, conducted valuable cultural exchanges around the globe, and these efforts undermined the communist ideology by encouraging democratically inclined individuals to rally for change from within.

The key point here is that telling America's story in the Cold War context was strategic. It was strategic in the sense that it undermined our primary adversary in international politics. USIA functioned effectively in a hierarchical information age. Before the fall of the Soviet Union, state-controlled media disseminated communications in the East. In the West, a handful of major media organizations towered over the scene. In such an environment, the U.S. government could more easily deliver a single consistent American message, and importantly, it could assume that the world was listening intently to that message.

By contrast, the rise of the new media means that people today all around the world are continuously exposed to a cacophony of voices and a multitude – and a deluge of images. Unlike the era of the big-three network broadcasting, today a multitude of global satellite networks continuously broadcast content of all kinds. Cell phones, handheld computers, and other forms of mobile communications permit the cheap generation – the cheap dissemination of user-generated content. That's true abroad and it's true at home and it's what we're talking

about this morning about the destruction of the foreign correspondent – the foreign correspondent’s role.

Consequently, the American message must now compete in a vibrant marketplace of ideas. In this environment, even our non-state adversaries possess powerful communication systems. We now live in a world in which a terrorist organization like Hezbollah maintains a well-oiled media machine that includes a telecommunications network with TV and radio outlets, and a sophisticated online presence. And I might add to that, they also have very sophisticated ways of ensuring that their propaganda gets into the American media.

I wanted to point out in one of these earlier – one of the earlier sessions, somebody asked very rightly, how do we ensure that a propaganda campaign or an information operation by the United States doesn’t end up blowing back and influencing our own population. I’m also concerned about the fact that information operations by foreign governments come back and blow back against us.

I’ll give you one little tiny example. I used to be at the NSC. I was the senior director for the Near Eastern/North Africa. And I watched a very – from that perch, I watched a very sophisticated campaign orchestrated by the Syrians possibly with the help of the Iranians to put out information about the nefarious alliance between my boss, Elliott Abrams, Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia, and the Hariri clan in Lebanon to arm Sunni radicals, Sunni extremists in Lebanon against Hezbollah.

This of course was a complete fanciful fabrication of the truth picked up by Seymour Hersh who published it in The New Yorker, and then from The New Yorker, it was published throughout the American media. Our denials, which we put out quite aggressively were ignored by The New Yorker. And so I watched as a Syrian-Iranian campaign designed to influence primarily Lebanese blew back into the American media and was picked up by authoritative outlets with no problem whatsoever.

As we’re all very well aware, the age of the new media changed the way we process information. Yesterday’s was a deferential communications age. People deferred to governments and authoritative media outlets to validate information. By contrast, ours is a referential age. People now refer to their peers in order to retain trusted information.

This morning, Under Secretary Glassman talked extensively about the FARC Facebook protest. This episode arguably did more to achieve a strategic aim of the United States, namely the de-legitimation of the FARC than any set of information activities conducted by the United States government itself.

In today’s referential age, messages by Americans about American strategic concerns will not necessarily command the attention of key local groups. To address the strategic threat posed by hostile information networks and to tap into the constructive power of the new media, a revamped public diplomacy enterprise must be tasked with supplying local credible voices with material and resources tailored to their specific environment. It cannot simply be tasked with getting out the American message.

It must, in other words – and this is my key point – create networks that promote the strategic interests of the United States. This is not to suggest that the new enterprise should be engaged in covert or clandestine activities; it simply needs to support third parties whose efforts dovetail with those of the United States even if those efforts are not directly engaged in telling America's story.

This brings me to the second, less obvious point about the story from Africa with which I opened up my remarks, and that's this, foreign audiences are first and foremost concerned with themselves and not with the United States. The Africans who loved John McCain do so because what his actions tell them about their own political systems.

If we've learned one thing in the Middle East and Afghanistan, it's that the attitudes towards the United States are often – that local attitudes towards the United States are often byproducts of struggles for power and authority in those societies. These are sometimes highly parochial conflicts about which we are poorly informed.

For instance, it's not uncommon to learn that one village in Afghanistan will decide to support transnational terrorist networks in order to strengthen its hand in land-standing conflicts, conflicts that at their essence have no direct connection to the United States and its struggle against al Qaeda, nonetheless they have a big impact on that struggle.

The United States must therefore be concerned about such issues because they impinge directly on our most vital interests. In attempting to influence local debates, telling America's story is not the most important action that a revamped public diplomacy could take. In such circumstances, supplying a local credible voice with cultural resources wholly disconnected from the United States might be the most appropriate step to take.

This kind of activity of course requires significant research of a kind that we are not accustomed to conducting on the necessary scale. As Nick Cull's outstanding book on USIA demonstrates, the old USIA played a very important role in overseeing a vast network of listening posts around the globe. A new information organization must also engage in what might be called strategic listening, or as Jim Glassman said this morning active understanding.

We need to be much more attuned to local political and intellectual discussions, not just among our enemies but also among our friends. Strategic listening requires paying more attention to open-source information, the kind of intelligence that anybody who has run a political campaign is intimately familiar with: conducting polls, focus groups, and simply identifying the key people who have their finger on the pulse of their community.

Strategic listening also means redirecting a small part of the vast information-gathering capabilities of the U.S. government away from learning the secrets of our enemies and instead focusing on the public discussions of strategic significance that nobody is trying to conceal. But if you turn to our intel communities and you ask them to do this, they say that's not intel. That's not intel.

You know, long before the attacks of 9/11, there was a line of reasoning developing in the Muslim world that the United States was making war on Islam. I don't think anybody in this room would disagree that that line of reasoning has had a tremendous strategic impact on the United States. But who in our government was responsible for listening to that, and who in our government was responsible to developing policies to counter it, policies and activities to counter it? I'm sure there were people in our government who were tasked – who were aware of it and were concerned about it but they were not empowered by the structures currently in place to do anything about it.

And this is the thing that has struck me the most as I move from the NSC to the Department of Defense to the Department of State: There is no lack of very good ideas out there about things that we ought to be doing and things that any observer from Mars would say a government concerned about the things we are concerned about should be doing. But we always run into this problem, well – in the Department of Defense, isn't that State's job? In the State Department, isn't that the agency's job? In the agency, well, that's not our job. It's absolutely nobody's job.

There's a fantastic book, which again, many of you from the Vietnam era are probably much better aware of than I am, that RAND wrote after Vietnam called "Bureaucracy Does Its Thing." And it's all about how there were tons of people around who understood the conflict on the ground in Vietnam and how we were not winning it, and the kinds of things that we needed to do in order to win it. But the bureaucracy kept doing its thing because it was set up to do that and not to do the other things that we needed to be doing.

I think – when I look at it, this influence enterprise, I think there are broadly four areas where need to be focused. The first is understanding the environment, creating cultural competency in and out of government, researching the flow of information through key target audiences, much as marketing companies do. This would be the first step. But the success of the effort hinges on ensuring that this information generates strategic insights which in turn will reach operational communities in a timely fashion. And that requires something else, a strategic center, which I'll get back to in a minute.

Secondly, engaging peoples. And that – engaging peoples, this is what State public diplomacy has traditionally done, continues to do, as Jim said, better than anybody else in the world.

Third, empowering partners. This is the area where I think we fall down the most. The Facebook protest against the FARC demonstrates the power, especially in a networked age, of messages delivered by third parties to their peers about themselves. While USIA focuses activities on getting out the American message, its 21st century counterpart should expend more effort on identifying and strengthening the capacity of third parties, be they state or non-state actors. In today's world, the power of the American message will be measured by its ability to spawn cognates across networks and cultures.

Fourth, countering adversaries. This is another area where I think we fall down. As I said before, since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has gotten out of the business of

counter-propaganda. We need to relearn this skill. Developing the means to counter al Qaeda's ideology should be our first order of business but this should not blind us to the fact that we have much greater long-term concerns in this regard.

We face challenges from State adversaries, to name just one, Iran. And Jim this morning talked about the Iran section right next to the – the Iran section right next to the Lincoln corner in Kabul University. We have – if you follow the – if you follow the Iranian propaganda machine, it is amazing to me how synched up it is, in fact. They will have the foreign minister making a statement about our policies in Iraq or about the political situation in Iraq, and within seconds, you will have the – you'll have the correspondent from Iranian television speaking Arabic on the streets of Baghdad interviewing seemingly – you know, an innocent passerby, an Iraqi, about the situation, and the Iraqi on the ground will utter – will utter an opinion that is of course in complete synch with the foreign minister's – with the Iranian foreign minister's position.

Now, how effective all of that is, I don't know, but what is amazing to me when I look at it and what I aspire to is the coordination between all of the different elements. And I think what in our system we would have to do to have a corresponding – you know, an analogous coordination effort and it staggers the imagination.

Now, if you agree with me about these four areas of the enterprise, understanding the environment, engaging people, empowering third parties, and countering adversaries, the next question is, well, what do we do about it? And where I come down on this is I think that the most important thing is not legislation. I think the easiest route to putting together a system that can deliver on those four tasks is not legislation like Smith-Mundt or creating a new bureaucracy like USIA. Instead, it's to build on what we already have in place. The path of least resistance should begin by looking around the government.

And you'll see when you do that that we are actually, as a government, engaged in all of these activities right now. We are doing a lot of things around the world, and in some parts of the world we're doing them very well. The problem is from a systemic point of view, that our efforts are not well-coordinated and not necessarily directed toward a set of strategic priorities.

The key parts of our government that are engaged in what I call the influence enterprise are State, the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and USAID. Bureaucratically, we are all in need of a strategic center, an organization that can coordinate between the influence activities of these agencies. It's been amazing to me to see – unfortunately I don't know that I can talk to you in great detail about it – but Jim Glassman distinguished himself from most of his predecessors by saying I want to coordinate the interagency. Simply by saying I want to coordinate the interagency, he allowed us to build a number of synergies that were previously unthinkable.

And I met with some colleagues a few weeks ago in which we looked at some resourcing questions and made decisions about reallocating resources on the basis of what would make better sense in terms of our strategic priorities, and it all went very collegially and successfully. There's a lot of trust in the room and so forth. And afterwards, I went to Jim and I said, you know, Jim, you did this. And he said, how did I do this? You did it because you said you

wanted to coordinate the interagency. Just having somebody play the leadership role and saying this is how we should proceed is tremendously helpful.

It's especially helpful because a lot of us who are engaged in this influence enterprise are, in our respective agencies, sort of orphans. This is true across the board. People who are working in information operations in the Department of Defense are in a fuzzy position. There are lots of senior leaders in the Department of Defense who are uncomfortable with it. They don't think of it as a traditional military activity, although it is. It makes it a lot easier for them if they have state cover even on activities for which the Department of Defense has all of the authorities and all of the legalities that it needs in order to do its – in order to do its job.

As I said before, the public diplomacy within the State Department is part of another – you know, it was part of another agency that was broken up and put into the State Department in an imperfect – in an imperfect marriage. If there is an empowered leadership, then synergies can develop that in the absence of leadership are missing.

After having examined a number of different options, my own preference is to create a strategic center at State R. Until the appointment of Jim Glassman, there was a pronounced tendency to see the under secretary's position as a PR job. It is my fervent hope that the future – that future administrations will, by examining the Glassman record, see the job instead as a national security position.

By national security I mean two, maybe three, things. The first is that it is strategic in nature, that is to say that it is focused on the strategic priorities of the government as a whole. The second is that it has responsibilities that extend well beyond the State Department, that it has this coordinating function within the entire government to play. And thirdly, I would say, as I stressed in my talk, that its mission includes but goes well beyond telling America's story. It also means, as Jim suggested this morning, that the resourcing, staffing, and investing the office with the authorities that it needs is consistent with the seriousness with which we say this mission should be regarded.

Many people who are well-versed in the history of USIA and of State DOD relations, to say nothing of the internal workings of the State Department, will balk at the suggestion that building up State R to the leadership position that it deserves is the right way to go forward. And they will point out that there are tremendous bureaucratic obstacles to doing that. I would very much enjoy discussing these obstacles. I've done a minor Ph.D. on them over the last three years. But in a short one-line response, I would say that recreating USIA or doing anything else that could allow us to put together a strategic center for this enterprise would come up against similar, much greater obstacles than just building on the structures that currently exist.

So to sum up, I do not think that Smith-Mundt is our key problem. We need to redefine the public diplomacy mission for the current strategic environment, keeping those Cold War capabilities that fit the current context and augmenting them with new ones that meet the challenges of the age. And we need to build our arsenal of influence by coordinating the functions of government that already exist. This can best be achieved by creating a powerful

leadership office, perhaps in an ODNI-like structure rather than by creating a completely new structure. Thank you.

(Applause.)

MR. ARMSTRONG: (Inaudible, off mike) – questions.

MR. DORAN: No, I'll let you do all of the coordination.

MR. ARMSTRONG: (Inaudible, off mike.) We'll start with Ted.

Q: Ted Tzavellas. Let me preface what I say – what I'm going to say now. I'm not speaking for the Department of Defense; I'm speaking based on my experiences having been pulled out of the private sector and thrust into the Department of Defense for what I thought is going to be four or five months and it's now seven-plus years.

Been there, done that. What you're saying – and you were absent earlier when I said that what you're saying, trying to pull it all together in an organization, not a new organization, but pulling together capabilities that already exist and vesting some entity with recognized authorities to do what you're saying has been trying, as I said previously, 14 or 15 times.

The best hopes that those of us dealing it had was when the executive order set up the OGC. And if you read the executive order, it looks like that's where it should have all been pulled together, but that didn't really come to fruition either.

One of the reasons, from my perspective, again, that no one – that we couldn't pull it all together is because whenever we said let's put Mike Doran in charge, let's put Susan Smith in charge, let's put somebody else in charge, everybody else didn't want to relinquish their perquisites, prerogatives, and powers to say, well, why should I give Mike Doran recognized authorities? That means that I'm going to be giving up people and money. I mean, that's what this whole city or town is about: people, money.

So because of that we have failed. I think when Ambassador Glassman came in and he said, you know, I'm willing to take this, his successes – and I recognize his successes – are as much the consequence of others saying I'll gladly coordinate with you; you got it; I'm loving you like a brother. Go ahead and I'll support you. So it was a change of personalities that kind of – coalescence of all of those factors that allowed us to start getting better in the past – in 2008. You were part of that, and I commend you for it.

I hear you calling for the institutionalization of such. What makes you think – and I'm not a naysayer, and I'm not against it or anything, but what is it that you think we have to do in order to get past, you know – now we have all of the right personalities that have pulled it all together in the past year. These personalities, a lot of them are going away, and now you've got a new crop of people. What can we do – what can we do or what do you think will be the motivator to make happen your vision?

MR. DORAN: Well, those are great comments. Thanks, Ted. Let me just emphasize one thing you said: That's my big worry. I mean, my big worry is that all that we have done in the last two years is going to get washed away because a community has coalesced, and it did coalesce before Jim came on this – you know, it was coalescing in all of the major agencies that saw this through a common lens, and a lot of those people are going to rot out.

So look, in direct answer to your last question there, it requires leadership at the top. I mean, I don't know that Nick Cull said this in his book, but the thing that struck me when I look at the history of USIA is that it worked best under presidents like Eisenhower and Reagan – perhaps Kennedy too, I'm not sure – who took the mission seriously and empowered the agency. And so the first step – it's not the only thing we need, not the only thing that can move the enterprise forward but in an ideal world, I would like to see the senior leadership of the government take this enterprise as seriously as they say they do, and think through what it means to have public diplomacy, public affairs, and so on, there are at the takeoff and not just a crash landing. Now, that's highly aspirational. But I think – you know, there's been enough discussion of this but I think that's not a complete pipedream, but I realize it's difficult to get to.

Secondly, I don't think – and I'm glad you asked this; you allowed me to clarify. I'm not saying that we need a czar who can tell – the czar who can tell – in the State Department who can tell the information operators what to do in the Department of Defense. What we need is a powerful center that has purview over everything that is going on in this arena and can discuss it. Believe me, my feeling after working in the Department of Defense is that the Department of Defense would more than welcome this. And the intel community would more than welcome it.

You can imagine, if you had an R that was resourced like we're talking about so that when it came time to – when it came time to advocate for cooperation with the Department of Defense and USAID, and so on, if the Department of State could put down the lion's share of the money for the project and then ask for others to come in, it would create a completely different – a completely different conversation. So we're talking more about leadership.

But there are also other ways. You have, like I said, people are orphans in these communities – are orphans. You've got floating around in the Department of Defense – not floating around, but you've got over there the first IO command, the GEOIC (ph), a lot of support organizations who, with the press of a send button, could be putting a lot of information into State that they're putting into – that they're putting out to support to the field.

So if you had a coordinating center in State R, it could very easily and in a short period of time have that complete cycle that I think we all imagine, where it's getting information from the field, making decisions about how to respond to that information, and then putting out suggestions about how to act. And it would work to the benefit of everybody working in this environment. And I think that the information operators and the public affairs people in the Department of Defense, if armed with relevant high-policy guidance coming from an empowered R would strengthen their own positions at their commands.

So I don't think – you know, it's really a coordinating function more than it is – that's why I said an ODNI-like structure. One last point on the DOD side: There is, for those of you

who are not aware, there is a movement to put in the Department of Defense to create named operations in each one of the combatant commands, named operations for countering ideological support for terrorism along the lines of the assured voice, which was in EUCOM and migrated over to AFRICOM.

I don't want to go into great details about these, but this is an attempt – the significance of it is this: A named operation of the combatant command level puts into the budget line a recurring stream of resources for this activity and thereby creates in the command a culture that is – a culture and a community that will withstand the rotations for engaging in this activity. Especially in AFRICOM and in EUCOM, they are very much aware of the fact that anything that they do in this realm has to have a state lead, it has to, because they are not – their title 10 authorities don't allow them to act without the coordination of State.

So these named operations at the combatant command level are functioning as the plug, the DOD plug, to put into the State socket. So my question is where's the State socket. And right now the distribution at State is such that R can't quite play that function as much as one would like. But once you have – if you created that in R, then you would have immediately a very strong synergy with a lot of things that are going on at DOD.

Q: Thank you. Lynn Wiel with the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I'm a panelist later, so I'll keep this brief. Comment and a question to your point about empowering third parties and discovering and promoting credible voices – we have a tremendous resource already on the ground in many countries, which you're well of, I'm sure, in the form of what they are now called locally employed staff. They used to be called Foreign Service nationals, the backbone of many of our cultural affairs and to some degree public affairs operations, people who have been serving in the Department of State as citizens of their country but serving our country for years. And their constituency within the Department of State could do with some strengthening, point one.

My question is with respect to helping identify credible voices, how well are we now using the resources within the United States, including scholars and Muslim Americans who wish to be more engaged in this discussion? Thank you.

MR. DORAN: I think that we are – we are using them in a – what would – I don't want to say in a poor fashion because you've got – the point I want to make is that we are not well-coordinated and there is no strategic center. So you'll find that we're engaged in a lot of different activities – as Sharak (ph) before mentioned that, you know, he's out there; he has an extensive Muslim-American network. What Sharak can't find – you know, we've got the DOJ plug; where's the socket. I don't think it's really Smith-Mundt that is keeping us from having the socket.

So I think the Department of Defense as well has an enormous array of programs that bring it into contact in a variety of different ways with all sorts of people, but again, we don't really have the – we don't really have the mechanism for turning this into a strategic asset. That's the point. So I couldn't begin to say what's out there. What's out there is a lot of things.

By the way, just a story: When I was in NSC, I was part of a group of people at the NSC that thought this was very important, this enterprise, and was very frustrated that we weren't doing anything, we thought. And we went around saying we're not doing anything; we're not doing anything. Once I got over to the Department of Defense and I had a different info stream coming up to my office, I realized that actually we were doing a lot. And if you go out to the country teams, right, you go out to the country teams in specific countries, if you have an ambassador who takes this seriously, that's where you get the really creative ideas, the real close coordination.

I was just out with Jim to Kabul a couple of weeks ago, and I don't want to get all misty eyed here but really tears came to my eyes when I saw the public affairs – the public diplomacy people from State working hand in glove with the PSYOP, the people from the Department of Defense, and actually given up an office space to allow the Shoppers into their office space. And that was emotional enough.

But thing that really – I thought I was in the presence of some kind of divine force is where I saw the public affairs people from the Department of Defense working hand in glove with the PSYOPers from the Department of Defense. (Laughter.) So you really had – it was going so well that they were actually starting to think of bringing in the British and the Afghans as well so that you're going to have foreign partners as well.

So when you go out to the field when you see that there's a lot of exciting stuff that goes on out in the field, that's where the best coordination, most creative stuff happens. My point is that we don't have – we don't have anything at the center that does justice to the kind of coordination and creativity that we've got in the field. And they can build on it, you know, can look and see, wow, they've got a very innovative – they've got a very innovative program in Kabul. Can they apply that somewhere else? Or they've got a very innovative program in Kabul that's really working. Let's give it more resources – no mechanism for that.

Q: Dennis Murphy, Army War College. You know, when you went on your pieces of the strategic center – that is, it's strategic in nature, coordinates all of government, includes but goes well beyond telling America's story, I think to myself, it's a statement that the current process of the National Security Council to coordinate this through the PCC process – and you would know this much better than me – is broken and doesn't work. That's kind of my first statement that I welcome a comment on.

The second thing is tying it down to a few of the details of what the center would consist of, and that is would it have tasking authority, would it be a standing interagency mechanism where people from these other organizations are – (inaudible) – to the strategic center much like the CTCC because with a quick turnaround you're talking about it operationalizes the strategic focus I hear you saying you wanted to have and then of course won't have a separate funding stream.

MR. DORAN: Hey, those are great questions. Let me modify what I said a little bit or go into a little bit greater detail because these are really important. When I listen to these discussions about whether to create a new USIA or how to create the strategic center, one of the

arguments is invariably, well, put in the NSC. And for a while – and if I look at my own intellectual progression on this thing, that was one of the things that I said – put somebody in charge at the NSC. I don't think that that is the answer, the NSC answer, and I don't for two, maybe three reasons.

One, I think there does need to be a counterpart at the NSC, somebody who is coordinating at the NSC level through the NSC processes what the strategic center that I'm talking about should do. So I should change my vocabulary a little bit and say we need a strategic operational center. That's what we need. And the one at State I think needs a counterpart in the Department of Defense. And that's a whole other question. I don't want to go into all of the great details about how you create the strategic operational center.

At State you have the problem in that State in its DNA is designed for bilateral relationships and so it doesn't really – it's not really comfortable thinking about trans-regional. In the Department of Defense the maneuver element is the combatant command. So it can go trans-regional, which is a benefit that DOD brings to the discussion but then you have the gaps and seams between combatant commands and so forth and there's nobody looking at the larger picture.

So there needs to be that in DOD as well. On why the NSC – back to the why the NSC is in it. The NSC, I didn't realize when I was there and thought I was in the center of the world, is often the place where good ideas go to die. (Laughter.) So it is – it's counterintuitive. You think let's empower somebody who's right next to the president, and that means that things will really go like gangbusters. Well, not everybody there is an Ollie North, right, and so – and by even bringing up Ollie North, we see part of the problem.

There's a real problem with an operational NSC. That's a real problem, which in the DNA of that organization makes people very nervous. And there's a way in which this messaging stuff, this influence stuff is operational immediately. So if you have one mistake, it's going to go like an electric jolt right up the line all the way to the president and burn him. So it's got to be pushed out of the NSC to a certain extent.

Secondly, it is the place that often the good ideas go to die. You try to get a – this is all on the record, is it?

MR. ARMSTRONG: It is on the record.

MR. DORAN: Can I say something off the record?

MR. ARMSTRONG: No.

(Laughter.)

MR. DORAN: On a major – on a major – on a major – on a major issue around which there is some controversy at the principal's level or some disagreement at the principal's level, you can't get a decision, you know, to blow your nose on it because every suggestion that is put

forward is read as a position in the larger policy debate, and so there's gridlock. We need to be on these more sensitive issues – like Iran, right – we need to be messaging all of the time. We need to be out there countering what the Iranians are doing.

If you had to put every information operation regarding Iran before the principals, no decision will ever be made. And I've seen that a million times. So you got to get it out. The same thing we learned in the Department of Defense, that if you want anything to actually happen, you've got to get it out of the Pentagon and you've got to – it's just the way our system work. So it's got to be this strategic operational center. And the State Department is the logical place to be because that's where the policy – that's the lead for foreign policy.

You could though – I mean, there is a good argument to say that, you know, if we want this enterprise to be all that it is supposed to be – is an under secretary at State really going to be fully empowered to do it, and especially in an under secretary's office that has traditionally has not been empowered. And so my answer to that is not put it in the NSC; my answer to that is, well, maybe we need to think about something like a USAID structure where this is semi-autonomous and maybe we raise the under secretary's position up hire. Maybe it's a cabinet level position. That would then give it some clout within the – I would thinking in those – in that direction.

I don't have it all thought through but the issue is get it out of the NSC; have somebody at the NSC to do it. Actually, now as I'm saying it, the NSC – you know, who is in charge of this at the NSC? It cuts across – it's cross-cutting, so you've got all of these different people at the NSC and they'll fight with each other about who should be running it as well.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I know we have a lot of questions but we already have – so this is the last question. Joan.

Q: Hi, it's Joan Mauer (sp) from the Voice of America. I handle public relations. I hope I didn't hear you to mean you to understand that you'd like to put broadcasting, which, as you know, is half of the government, State Department, public diplomacy budget, excluding Defense Department. But I hope you're not planning to have VOA, for instance, turn into a state system where we go find men on the street who will echo exactly what the foreign minister has said, a la the Iranian system because we are independent. The reason we have great audiences, one in four in Iran, for instance, is because we do present credible news. So I'd like to know what your view for broadcasting is for the future and, again, to have you reiterate that your grand communications scheme would not include putting broadcasting into the messaging scheme.

MR. DORAN: Yes, I will very quickly and clearly reiterate that I do not want to follow the Iranian model. (Laughter.) My point about the Iranian model was how well-coordinated they are. That they have – they have clearly – they produce disinformation. They don't have the kind of firewalls that we have, but they have clearly resourced that activity in their government and empowered it such that they can pull people together from disparate part of their system to all be on the same page at the same time, which is what I aspire to within our system operating in accordance with our own authorities, restrictions, firewalls, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

And with regard to broadcasting, I don't have a – I don't have a vision. I think that would fall – that would fall very much – that would fall very much in the realm of one of those things that really requires legislation. I was trying to restrict my remarks to things that I think we could do tomorrow with the right leadership within the framework of the existing legislation.

So if Congress wants to reopen the whole – Jim this morning mentioned that there's only five governors right now sitting on the broadcasting board of governors. And so the – it seems to me that it might be worth looking at that model and asking if it's the right way to go ahead because it seems to be kind of a leaderless organization at the moment but I'm not addressing that at all in my remarks.

MR. ARMSTRONG: So because of the time, I'm going to take one more.

MR. DORAN: Sure.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Okay, we'll do one more –

MR. DORAN: I got nothing but time.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Bill was waiting for a long time, but Bill can you – you'll have to – (inaudible, off mike) – oh, is there somebody. I've got a good – (inaudible) – has already asked a couple.

(Laughter.)

Q: You're asking about how we can turn this on tomorrow. Actually, we could turn it on today if we all got on the same page. There's platforms built like Intelink-U where State Department officers, PSYOPS, IO, human training analysts, socio-cultural analysts at DIA, CIA can all get on the same page in sharing information, putting information into Intelipedia, blogging about, you know, what they're studying, what they're analyzing. And then also interacting via instant messenger, chats, et cetera. It's all there. You can share documents. Why don't we do that at a grassroots level or have that strong center at R be a node in that grassroots network?

MR. DORAN: You know, I don't really know. To a certain extent it does happen. And as we said before, there did develop a community, an interagency community about a broad agreement about some of the things that we need to do over the last few years, and that happened without anybody sort of saying this is what needs to happen.

But you still have – look, I had a conversation a couple of weeks ago with one of my colleagues in the State Department who works in public diplomacy and I was talking about the centergies that I thought needed to develop between Department of Defense and State, which is the thing that I care the most about. And he said, look, I don't want it. I sit, you know – I go to the countries that I go to and I sit in people's houses, and if they think that I am involved in Department of Defense information operations, it will ruin the relationships that I build up,

relationships that are useful to the United States government. So I want to be – I want to have this totally separate.

So you have a current of opinion that runs through the PD community that contact with the Department of Defense and the agency will taint them and undermine them in achieving their mission. You have in the Department of Defense a Sunni-Shiite conflict between public affairs and PSYOPS as well.

If I could be – and so you have all of these different organizations that have different histories, different authorities, and no history of working together, a history of thinking about their missions in very different ways, and so there's just a lot of bureaucratic inertia to overcome there.

You know, if I could be king for a day and say how I would like to have it happen, I would like us to examine each situation and say in this – you know, there are situations where contact with the Department of Defense – this I say to my State colleagues – contact with the Department of Defense will help you with local populations and not hurt you. There are other situations where contact with the Department of Defense will absolutely taint you and ruin what you're trying to do.

So I would like it to be taken on a case-by-case basis and not be part of a doctrine, right. So we say in this situation with this kind of – this kind of – this kind of synchronizing is going to help us; in this situation it's not. But in order to get to that point, we have to have teams in State, in DOD, in USAID, and so forth, who all understand each other, have a sense of a common mission, and so forth, and that's a long way away.

Let me get into the realm the fanciful. What if we had – what if we had common schooling where all of these people came together and learned a common set of tasks, and the authorities and policies that would govern their activities would be dependent upon the specific role that they were playing in the government at that time and not the specific agency from which they came. So we would have a kind of the across-government communications, public-diplomacy influence cadre that was similar and that understood each of the departments. I mean, that's – I'm remaking the whole government here.

But none of that is going to happen, none of that is going to happen if you don't have a strong center that could be a proponent for these interests. So we're not going to get an intel communication that is going to do proper intel support to information operations and public diplomacy until we have a strong center in the government that taps on the door all of the time and says what are you doing for this enterprise, and that doesn't exist right now.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Well, we have to cut it off so that we can stay on schedule. We're going to go into a short break. But, first, thank you very much.

MR. DORAN: Thank you.

(Applause.)

MR. ARMSTRONG: So we're going to take a short break. The next panel is going to start at 2:00.

(END)