

SYMPOSIUM ON THE



SMITH-MUNDT ACT OF 1948



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MORNING KEYNOTE

Keynote Speaker:
JAMES GLASSMAN,
UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE
FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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JAMES K. GLASSMAN: Thank you. Thank you, Matt. I was an ardent reader of Matt's blog when I was at the Broadcasting Board of Governors,¹ Mountain Runner.² I would consider myself a mountain walker at best. But when I became under secretary, he was one of the first people that I wanted to meet face to face. And it must have been six or seven months ago, Matt, that you told me about your plans for this conference. And he asked me then if I would participate. And I immediately said yes. I think for one reason was that it gave me an opportunity to actually think this issue through.

I certainly knew about Smith-Mundt from my activities on the Broadcasting Board of Governors, but frankly, it is a complex subject. And the opportunity to speak to you today is really an opportunity for me to think it through. And I must say that I am not – I am not completely satisfied with my own answers. And so I am interested in hearing the answers that you come up with. Matt, you are a great thinker and a great activist in the cause of public diplomacy and I thank you.

The goal of public diplomacy, the goal of strategic communication is a safer and freer and more prosperous world. And this conference on the 60th anniversary of the enactment of Smith – (inaudible) – hope that policy-makers will pay close attention to what is said and done here today. And other conference planners in the audience, take note. Matt knows how to run a conference. I think I have gotten an e-mail from him just about every day for the past six months. So this conference has been eagerly anticipated.

The panel just after my remarks today will look at the history of Smith-Mundt. But I am going to say a few words about history myself drawing from among other sources, Matt's excellence piece from "Small Wars Journal."³ Matt argues that two factors played a key role in the constraints on dissemination within the United States – what has become the controversial portion of Smith-Mundt legislation.

First, many members of Congress of both parties, as Matt just said, distrusted the loyalty of officials at the State Department – not their judgment, but their loyalty. To understand Smith-Mundt, we have to understand the politics of post-World War II America. The historian, David Oshinky – with whom, by the way, I went to Russia when I was 16 years old and so was he – describes Karl Mundt as a cheerful, roly-poly man from Humboldt, South Dakota. He was Joe McCarthy's best friend in Congress. And don't forget that Smith-Mundt was signed into law by Harry Truman in January of 1948. And Whittaker Chambers accused Alger Hiss of espionage less than seven months later before the House Un-American Activities Committee, on which, at the time, Mundt served. Mundt later moved to the Senate the next year.

So if you believe that the State Department can't be trusted, you certainly don't want the State Department proselytizing within the boundaries of the United States. It is bad enough that the State Department is operating abroad. The second factor behind the barriers to domestic dissemination was simply that Congress wanted to protect private-sector media from tax-payer-

¹ <http://www.bbg.gov/>

² <http://MountainRunner.us>

³ <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/07/rethinking-smithmundt/>

funded competition from government. This is the case that Matt makes from his reading of history.

Whatever its worst critics believe about the State Department today, it would be hard to find someone who thinks that its employees are spies working against U.S. interests. As for competition, the American media scene is extremely robust today and can certainly withstand competition from say, Voice of America. The Public Broadcasting System was started in part with taxpayer dollars in 1969, and has grown to 356 stations. We accept the notion of government involvement in domestic media within limits.

But long after the original justifications for Smith-Mundt lost their relevance in Matt's view, Smith-Mundt moved from enabler to "prophylactic" – his word. And I would say that Smith-Mundt is both enabler and prophylactic. And I will discuss the latter in a second. But first let me say some words about enabler. Again, remember the context. Early in his piece, Matt makes a reference to George Kennan's famous Long Telegram,⁴ or State Department cable, of February 22nd, 1946. It was a tour de force. I commend it to all of you, to all of you cable writers. That laid out the Soviet threat and how to deal with it in non-military fashion.

"The Russians," Kennan wrote, "have declared psychological war on the United States, a war of ideology and a fight unto the death." What Smith-Mundt did was provide the authority for the U.S. government to engage vigorously in the non-military battle at which, it was feared at the time, the Soviets had become so adept. Smith-Mundt, in Matt's summary, quote, "was a largely successful bipartisan effort, establishing the foundation for the informational and cultural and educational engagement that became known as public diplomacy," end quote.

We are indebted to the Congress of 1948 and to President Truman for having the foresight to launch the United States on this path, on which it continues today. But what about the prophylactic, the barrier to dissemination, if you will pardon the expression, which is Matt's. I will not argue, I will not argue about the historic roots of the legislation. And I am interested in what the panel on history will conclude. But – and I agree that the Red Scare and worries about competition are no longer valid, if they ever were.

But it seems to me that there are other concerns about the government's involvement in domestic dissemination of information that might be used to influence the public toward adopting views that the government or the majority party wants the public to adopt. And I say this with full understanding that individual members of government are always out to influence the public. But individual members are different from large institutions.

Those concerns go back to the suspicions of government power reflected in our Constitution with its mechanisms to constrain and disperse such power. And the fact that unlike other nations, we have no ministry of information, that criminal libel laws in this country are effectively non-existent and that our media are not licensed. We have a different view toward information from other nations. And I sympathize with the attempts of policy-makers to deter government from attempting to influence domestic opinion through powerful or potentially powerful means.

⁴ <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm>

So while PBS and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting get taxpayer funding, they operate at arm's length from the federal government. And local public TV stations have local boards and other safeguards. Should Voice of America have cable outlets in the United States even if VOA's programming by law and by practice and, certainly in my view, has to and does meet standards of accuracy, balance and objectivity? That would seem to cut across the American grain, but at this point, I am not going to say yes or no to that question.

Let me offer what I believe to be the proper standard or the beginning of a proper standard for legislation like Smith-Mundt intent. The reasonable way to judge whether the State Department should be prohibited from disseminating a film or a television program or a speech or a magazine is the intention of the department. Is its overriding intention to influence or merely to inform a domestic audience or a foreign audience? If a domestic audience can access – can merely access State Department material intended for a foreign audience, then it would seem to me that clearly Smith-Mundt's restrictions should not prevent such access.

I am not a lawyer – thank goodness. But I believe from my reading of the law that Smith-Mundt's restrictions do indeed not apply in such cases. If Smith-Mundt's restrictions do apply, then it ought to be rewritten. For example, America.gov, the prime Web site of our International Information Bureau, tells America's story in seven languages, including English. Its intent is to reach foreign audiences. But any person in the United States with a computer and a modem or other means of reaching our servers can type in www.america.gov and read the Web site's offerings. This example seems to be a very simple one. And I am frankly irritated with anyone at State or Defense who believes that he or she has to jump through hoops simply to prevent Americans from seeing something intended for foreign audiences.

But let me present some more difficult cases. First, information versus influence. Listen again to Kennan in the Long Telegram. He said, "We must see that our public is educated to realities of the Russian situation." And he is talking about our public. That is to say, the American public. "I cannot overemphasize the importance of this. Press cannot do it alone. It must be done mainly by government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved." Does the State Department have a legitimate role in educating Americans about say, the threat of violent extremism abroad? We are in the process of supporting through funding and otherwise a publication that will be called "Problems of Extremism," which will tackle violent extremism in just plain old extremism at a sophisticated, intellectual level.

The primary audience is foreign. But I, for one, would like Americans not merely to have access to the online version of the publication, but be able to receive the print version in the mail. Is this a violation of Smith-Mundt? Also, in the information category is simply material that tells Americans what their State Department is doing abroad. Shouldn't taxpayers know in detail, not just the extent of our international information programs, but shouldn't they be able to view the content of such programs to be able to judge for themselves how effective those programs might be.

My view is that if more Americans knew, again, in detail what we were doing at State, we would have more political support, which translates into more resources. For another example, should the State Department be able to disseminate domestically the results of polling that shows the attitudes of Afghans and Pakistanis toward terrorism? Should State be able to distribute a publication in the United States that helps Americans, along with non-Americans, better understand the nature of Salafism or the Takfiri ideology – strictly information, not to influence, but to enlighten.

The second difficult case involves a matter where a particular public interest may be so strong that it can be seen as superseding the interest in limiting domestic dissemination, especially where that dissemination is narrow. Consider translations of Farsi programming by Voice of America. Some members of Congress have expressed concerns about the content of VOA television shows broadcast to Iran seven hours a day by satellite. This corrupt programming has a large audience in Iran. About 28 percent of Iranians tune in at least once a week to what we call Persian News Network. To translate the shows into Farsi costs about \$20,000 for a day's programming or \$7 million a year. And then, of course, someone actually has to read the transcripts.

A better way to monitor VOA Farsi might be to allow VOA to broadcast its Persian programming into the United States by satellite or by cable. There are 159,000 Iranian Americans in California alone, most of whom or many of whom speak Farsi. They could do the monitoring and that is how we monitor NBC. That is how CNN is monitored. But Smith-Mundt would seem to bar such broadcasts.

The third category of example has particular relevance to public diplomacy today. So let me take a moment to describe what at least I am calling “Public Diplomacy 2.0.” Now, Matt’s “Public Diplomacy 2.0” was Senator Fulbright’s. Mine is a little bit different, so bear with me. This is an approach to public diplomacy that stresses government’s role not as a preacher or propagandist, but as a convener or/and facilitator of a global conversation, which we believe will be enormously beneficial in reaching the primary goals of foreign policy today. And that is our job – that is our job in public diplomacy is to help reach those goals, specifically promoting freedom and making America and the world safer.

Public diplomacy has some characteristics that may – “Public Diplomacy 2.0,” that is, has some characteristics that may provide a challenge to Smith-Mundt, which was, of course, written in the era of PD 1.0 when preaching and propagandizing were the norm. Or simpler, when broadcasting in its literal sense was the norm. One person sprang a message among a broad audience of listeners and viewers.

Today’s “Public Diplomacy 2.0” involves interaction – a deep, multi-sided conversation. It uses the tools of digital social networking. Our role in government is often to bring domestic, private-sector actors into contact with foreigners, rather than bringing government into contact with them. Best of all, we often bring individual Americans into contact not just through traditional exchange programs, but through non-traditional and more and more non-traditional information programs.

Here is an example. A few months ago, we formed a partnership with such private-sector organizations as NBC, Universal, the Directors Guild of America, the Tisch School at NYU to launch what is called the Democracy Video Challenge. Entrants in this contest make their own three-minute videos, which are posted to a site on YouTube with the topic, “Democracy is...” Winners will be determined by a vote of the public over the Internet. And the question is, should American entrants be allowed? We think so. We see this project as part of a global conversation about democracy. We don’t want to exclude Americans. In fact, we think that the presence of Americans is helpful in meeting our foreign-policy goals. But could encouraging Americans to submit videos be a nefarious plot to influence them in a particular way about the nature of democracy in violation of Smith-Mundt?

Another example – about a year ago, a young, unemployed computer technician in Colombia named Oscar Morales spontaneously started a Facebook group that grew quickly to more than 400,000 members. The group called 1 Million Voices against the FARC put 12 million people into the streets in a single day last February in 190 cities around the world just two months after it was set up in protest against the FARC, a violent extremist group that had been terrorizing Colombia for more than 40 years.

A few months ago after I visited Oscar in Bogota, we at State put together a partnership with such firms as Google, Facebook, AT&T, MTV and Howcast and convened a conference for representatives from groups like Oscar’s, groups that oppose violence or, in some cases, that simply promote social justice and oppose oppression, like a group of Saudi women who want to drive. In all, two dozen youth-empowerment groups were represented at the meeting of what is now called the Alliance of Youth Movements. The meeting was at Columbia University in New York last month.

Nearly all of these groups were foreign, but we wanted American organizations to attend, too. And we invited some. But did we violate the letter or the intent of Smith-Mundt? The point here is that with “Public Diplomacy 2.0,” we often want to engage both Americans and non-Americans. The intent, again, is to reach foreign-policy goals. Yes, our work with these groups seeks ultimately to help develop an anti-violent extremism movement globally to tell you the truth. But one can certainly argue that we were actively disseminating information purposely to Americans in violation of Smith-Mundt. If such an argument were to succeed, then American foreign policy would be the loser.

So let me pause at what I believe should be the rule. The work of public diplomacy is to understand, engage, inform and influence, ultimately, foreign audiences. This work is done directly or indirectly – that is, by government itself or by groups and individuals, foreign and domestic, that in turn, may be supported or influenced by government. If the intent of the work involving domestic audiences is to influence foreign governments – I’m sorry – foreign audiences, then according to this rule, that work is legitimate.

Does Smith-Mundt permit such a rule? It should, but I hope your work will examine that question today. I believe it does. But again, I am not a legal expert. I would also warn about – to tread carefully where opening up Smith-Mundt is concerned and not just because opening up any legislation can lead to unforeseen consequences. In this case, I think most foreign-service

officers would tell you that they are pleased to have the protections of Smith-Mundt because it insulates them from political pressures – domestic, political pressures to use public-diplomacy funding to engage or even lobby domestic audiences on particular issues of interest to Congress. Our public-diplomacy funds, as I have learned over the last seven months, are quite limited. And we wouldn't want to see them diverted in this argument.

So let me summarize. Matt convinces me that the impetus behind Smith-Mundt has little relevance to our time, but I do believe that American concerns – traditional American concerns about government involvement – not merely in influence, but in information, are deeply rooted and appropriate. Still intent should be our guide if our target is foreign audiences, as it must be in public diplomacy. Then we should be able to engage domestic individuals and groups in this effort. Such engagement is one of the principles behind Public Diplomacy 2.0, which is the emerging future of public diplomacy.

I would like to see Congress consider small tweaks in Smith-Mundt that would allow dissemination of foreign-language programming by taxpayer-funded international broadcasting entities. And that is my personal view, not the view of the Broadcasting Board of Governors itself. Such dissemination already occurs, by the way, through streaming video from BBG-entity Web sites. So if you are going to do that on little, tiny screens, why not be able to do it on larger screens?

You can call this formulation, if you'd like, Smith-Mundt Light. I won't be offended. So that puts a lot of interesting questions on your plate for this conference. I trust that with such a talented and energetic group, you will find the answers. But I can't end without another reference to George Kennan's Long Telegram. This talk and your conference is about dissemination, but nothing we disseminate can be effective without understanding, which is why we use that word first in our definition of public diplomacy.

You can argue about whether we in public diplomacy should spend our time and money trying to get Americans to understand, for example, the violent extremist threat. I think that is clearly beyond our mandate. But you can't argue with Kennan's basic sentiment, which he expressed this way. "Our first step must be to apprehend and recognize for what it is the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with courage, detachment, objectivity and determination." Active understanding, in the phrase of my colleague, Mike Doran, from whom you will hear later today, must precede anything that we do in public diplomacy. Thank you.

(Applause.)

MR. ARMSTRONG: There is time for questions if you have any questions. There should be microphones floating around. We should have one microphone over there. We have one here. We have another one going that way. So if you have a question –

UNDERSECRETARY GLASSMAN: By the way, I have to note that yesterday I did a press conference on second life. And in a way, I sort of prefer virtual reality to – (laughter) – real reality. But in second life, I was dealing with all these avatars who kind of looked really

Transcript of the Morning Keynote by Hon. James K. Glassman (incl. Q&A)

interesting – not that you don't. (Laughter.) I mean, this is a great group. And by the way, I looked a lot better as my avatar. (Chuckles.) Yes?

MR. ARMSTRONG: If we can get the microphone –

Q: Great. Thank you. My name is Pat Kushlis and I live in New Mexico. And I co-write WhirldView⁵–

UNDERSECRETARY GLASSMAN: Oh, you are Pat Kushlis?

Q: Yes. (Chuckles.)

UNDERSECRETARY GLASSMAN: Nice to meet you.

Q: Nice to meet you.

UNDERSECRETARY GLASSMAN: This is one of the great advantages of this conference. I actually get to meet people face to face.

Q: Yeah, first life. Just two quick – one comment and a quick question. Comment – really in terms of “Problems with Communism,” we did distribute in the U.S. I mean, it was exempted from Smith-Mundt. My question is when you talk about understanding and understanding, I guess, essentially – you are saying violent extremism. But the further you get into it and the further you get into the study of Islam, you discover really how complex it is. And, I mean, how do you explain in – I can't say 150 words, 140 words or less and engage in any kind of conversation when you are dealing with such a very complex or very complex situation.

UNDERSECRETARY GLASSMAN: Let me get to the second part. But – you had to get a waiver for “Problems of Communism”?

Q: Legislatively. (Off mike.)

UNDERSECRETARY GLASSMAN: Oh, okay. Okay, fine. Okay.

Q: Some of the films, as well.

UNDERSECRETARY GLASSMAN: Right. Well, I know about the films getting a waiver starting with the Kennedy film. But there were 100 – weren't there 100 separate waivers granted?

Q: Yeah, if you added them all up.

UNDERSECRETARY GLASSMAN: Anyway, I would like to live in a world where that doesn't have to happen. There is no doubt about that. You know, people devote their lives

⁵ <http://whirledview.typepad.com/>

to trying to understand these ideologies that are built on the foundation of Islam. And I think it is very difficult. But I also think that we in public diplomacy should have some understanding of these ideologies, let's call them, that we are faced with. And I also think that the American people need that, as well.

You know, the question is whether that is our job here at the State Department or not. And I think that is an important question. I mean, I don't mind talking about it. I don't think I am violating Smith-Mundt in doing that. But mobilizing massive programs to do that – I think one could argue that that is a violation of Smith-Mundt.

You know, I think Americans have come a long way from 9/11 in their understandings of Muslim societies in general. But I think we still have a long way to go.

Yes?

Q: Darius Udryns, Center for Civic Education.⁶ Isn't the kind of public diplomacy as an international conversation – does it run into problems if you give a fair hearing to views that are objectionable in the United States? And how do you envision that conversation taking place given those constraints?

UNDERSECRETARY GLASSMAN: Well, I think that – I think that that certainly does – that is the political problem that is involved. And I think that is one of the things that we are dealing with. I mean, we strongly believe that exposing those ideas in the kind of conversation that I am talking about makes that conversation much more effective as far as our own ideas are concerned. That I think for too long, accurately or inaccurately – and I think mostly inaccurately – America has been viewed as a country that has either ignored those ideas or has kind of bullied our way through them.

You know, I think they ought to be part of the conversation. And I don't think we should shy away from that. Now, it does present some serious problems for government. I mean, for example, on a very simple level, the Educational and Cultural Affairs Bureau has launched what we believe to be the first social networking site in government – it may not be, but I think it is – called Exchanges Connect.⁷ And it is a .gov site. That is to say, it is maintained by government. We have, in the past, supported social networking sites. But this is a .gov site. And it is on the Ning platform. So it is not directly – it is not part of our server, but it is a .gov site.

There will be things that transpire within the confines of this site, which is a monitored site, that don't necessarily comport with all the policies of the United States government. Same thing, by the way, is true of the Democracy Video Challenge⁸ that I described earlier. I mean, we will be getting videos – and the deadline, by the way, is January 31st, if you would like to submit one. We will be getting videos and many of them have already come in. I haven't seen them all. But there is no doubt that some of them will be viewing democracy in a way that might be inimical to certain American policies. And maybe the winner may end up with those kinds of

⁶ <http://www.civiced.org>

⁷ <http://connect.state.gov/>

⁸ <http://www.videochallenge.america.gov/>

positions. But that is the kind of risk that we run. And I think that is – I think government – government can't expect to control everything that occurs within the ambit of this new concept of "Public Diplomacy 2.0." It just can't. But we think it is the most – it is a very effective way to communicate. It is not the only thing that we do. We think it is a very effective way to communicate.

I am going to have Matt choose the people. (Chuckles.)

Q: Sherry Mueller with the National Council for International Visitors.⁹ So much of U.S. public diplomacy in some way is a reaction to the public diplomacy of other countries. And I wondered from your vantage point, which of the practices of other countries in this area do you admire most? And which do you think we should emulate? Thank you.

UNDERSECRETARY GLASSMAN: Actually, I have never – that is a good question, which – I am not – I think we do public diplomacy pretty well. And certainly, you know, you can look at what other countries are doing. I mean, the Chinese, for example, have just – are massively getting into international broadcasting. They are all over Africa spending huge amounts of money and actually pushing us out as a result. There are a lot of things going on in public diplomacy.

I still think that we do it best. Frequently, when I go to Europe and tell Europeans what we are doing – and Colleen knows this very well – the Europeans – the Europeans are kind of amazed at this. And I say to them, you know, you are supposed to be the soft-power guys. How come you are not doing it? I mean, even things like exchange programs. But there is a real competition going on. You know, a few weeks ago I was in Kabul. And I was visiting what we call Lincoln Centers. They were like American centers. And there is one at the University of Kabul. And, you know, it is a place for young people to gather, to read about America, to use computers, which they don't have access to otherwise, to listen to speakers and so forth.

And right next to our Lincoln Center at Kabul University¹⁰ is an equivalent center run by the Iranians. So I think that is about as good an illustration as you can get of the competition that is going on in the realm of ideas around the world. The Iranians are extremely active here. I can't say I admire them. But they are very, very active both in broadcasting and in these other methods of communication.

You know, one of the things about some of our competitors in the public diplomacy realm is that they often don't tell the truth. We have to tell the truth. Some would say that puts us at a disadvantage. I don't necessarily think so. But that is a fact.

Q: Doug Wilson from the Howard Gilman Foundation.¹¹ As we go into a new administration, and although the discussion here I know is going to be focused a great deal on the dissemination issues of Smith-Mundt, Smith-Mundt is larger in scope than that. And I wonder if as we are going into a new administration if you have thoughts and recommendations that you

⁹ <http://www.nciv.org/>

¹⁰ http://kabul.usembassy.gov/glassman_visits_kabul.html

¹¹ <http://www.gilmanfoundation.org/gilman/>

would recommend either to the administration or to Congress based on your experience and perspective, whether there are changes to this law that you would like to see made.

UNDERSECRETARY GLASSMAN: I think that the law in general is sound with some of the reservations that I expressed today. There are some things I would like to say to Congress and the new administration. And they don't so much involve the Smith-Mundt itself, as the question of resources.

And I am not one of these guys who gets up and whines about gee, we don't have enough money. A lot of people do that. And that is not what I am trying to say here. So if it sounds like that, I'm sorry. I think that public diplomacy has to be viewed within a broader context for starters. And I believe the incoming administration certainly during the campaign talked about viewing public diplomacy in this way. That is, as part of the overall national security effort.

And if that is true, then I think public diplomacy should be treated in that way, as far as the general approach and the scale is concerned. And, for example – well, a lot of what we do in public diplomacy would appear to an outside observer to be kind of a pilot program. Well, let's try this. You know, we now have a very effective program called the Digital Outreach Team that Karen Hughes started, where we have got roughly 10 people going onto sites in Urdu, Arabic and Farsi – and we hope soon in Russian – setting the record straight, talking about American policy, identifying themselves, of course, as State Department employees. We have got eight or 10 of them.

When I described this to a friend of mine at DOD, he said eight or 10? You ought to have 800. I mean, it is not worth doing something with eight people, okay? But most of what we do is the equivalent of having eight people do it. And I think that is a real problem. And if you are serious – you know, when I hear what Robert Gates – Secretary Gates has said about public diplomacy, about how we cannot kill or capture our way to victory. And I think this is a notion that is generally accepted now across government. It wasn't five years ago. I mean, that is not reflected in resources – and not just in the actual dollar amounts, but not even in the approach to it. I mean, you wouldn't tell DOD well, you know – well, we will send eight guys out and, you know – or we will build a half a tank or something like that. It is just not – it is just a different approach in a different scale.

So what I would like to see this administration do and this Congress do is get serious – I mean, dead serious about public diplomacy – if you really believe in it. And I think the incoming administration does. I think that Congressman Berman absolutely does. I think Senator Kerry does. And I think that it ought to be reflected in the overall approach to public diplomacy.

And let me add one other thing. I really do believe that since the end of the Cold War, we have kind of stumbled our way to developing the kind of public diplomacy that meets our time. And I remember when I was on the Djerejian group five years ago, I don't think at that time I would have said gee, public diplomacy is ready for these resources, ready to be treated any serious way. I think it is today. And – because of the work that my predecessors have done,

Transcript of the Morning Keynote by Hon. James K. Glassman (incl. Q&A)

because of the work that I have done – the small work that I have done in a short time, because of changing attitudes, I think. So I think we are ready to do it. And the resources need to follow.

MR. ARMSTRONG: (Off mike) – stay on schedule, so this will be the last question. Wait for a mike.

Q: I think I have found my voice. My name is Bill Kiehl from PD Worldwide.¹² I tend to write on paper mainly, but sometimes find its way into the Internet. I would like to go back to your statement – two statements. First of all, the Long Telegram and the role of the State Department in educating the American public, and then secondly, your point that intention is the key to interpreting Smith-Mundt.

There is a big gray area that is scarcely ever mentioned in this. And that is the exchange programs of the U.S. government in which many thousands of people, whether they are on the International Visitor Program or in Fulbright programs, come to the United States and interact with literally hundreds of thousands of Americans every year. And of course, the intent there is for them to return to their country with a better understanding of America. But as you know, the second mandate, which has so often been talked about and very much often ignored, also stresses the role that they have in educating the American public.

So I think that is a – I think that is a point that really the defenders of Smith-Mundt and the intention aspect of this really need to take into consideration. What is your view on that?

UNDERSECRETARY GLASSMAN: I think this is a very good point. And in a way, in describing “Public Diplomacy 2.0” in a speech that I gave I think about a month ago, I sort of laid it all out, I referred to exchange programs as being – as being sort of the root of this idea or the embodiment, in fact, of this idea. I mean, in exchange programs, you are right. There is an exchange of ideas that takes place. And also, we don’t tell the foreign students who come to the United States what to think or what to do. It is their exposure, their involvement in this conversation that I talk about that is what we seek, in fact.

And I think that is the right approach. And that approach can, in fact – not in the case of exchanges, but in other cases and information programs, can bump up against some of the strictures of Smith-Mundt.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you.

UNDERSECRETARY GLASSMAN: Thank you.

MR. ARMSTRONG: We are going to have to move along.

(Applause)

(END)

¹² <http://www.pdworldwide.com/>