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2009 SMITH-MUNDT SYMPOSIUM:
PANEL 2: AMERICA'S BIFURCATED ENGAGEMENT

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MATT ARMSTRONG: (In progress) – some more ideas, so each panel, of course, is going to build on the other. (Pause.) So let's get seated, everybody, please, so we can get moving on to the next panel. (Pause.)

So, as we get settled here, the second panel – so the first panel was the history and the second panel we're going to ostensibly start from a point of what is the issue – what are the issues today? Of course, the conversation will carry over from the first panel. I hope it does. Get your questions ready, ask them, and then in just a moment here we'll have panel two, and panel two will have the full 90 minutes, so that does mean that we'll bump lunch a little bit, but, again, there's buffer that I built into this, so – just a moment. (Pause.)

All right, we're going to get started here with Marc Lynch. He's the moderator for this next panel, so if you can give him your attention we're going to go the 90 minutes for this discussion. So if we can have a seat, I'd appreciate it. All right, Marc?

MARC LYNCH: All right, well, as people begin to filter back in and take their seats, I really enjoyed the first panel and I'm hoping that on this panel we're going to have a lot more time for discussion from the audience and questions from the audience and a lot more back and forth, so I've asked the panelists to limit their remarks to about five to seven minutes, and I'm going to ask each of them a framing question and just let them say what's on their mind, and then have as much time as possible for back and forth with the audience.

I thought I would take just a few minutes to, you know, give my own framing remarks on the conference and on Smith-Mundt in general. And I'm glad that I'm on this panel because I think it's – while I find the discussions of the original creation of the Smith-Mundt Act very interesting, you know, I'm not a conservative constitutional lawyer, I'm not a Salafi Islamist, and original intent doesn't matter that much to me, from where I sit.

Where I sit is looking at the Arab world, looking at the Islamic world, and looking at how the struggles over ideas, over information, over influence are actually happening, and I'm very, very interested – and I agree with Matt completely that the evolution of the global media has rendered, in practical terms, the ability – it's rendered impossible, in practical terms, to actually prevent the almost immediate, instantaneous feedback of any information whatsoever released abroad – it comes back over here immediately.

So in practical terms, it strikes me as very much an anachronism. Where I think I disagree with Matt, and many people in the room, is that to me this raises a question, not an answer, in that it strikes me that whatever the original intent of Smith-Mundt, the idea of trying

to preserve some sense of a firewall between influence operations overseas and at home is an important one, and increasingly important, and that rather than the impossibility of the prevention of domestic dissemination leading us to abandon any attempt to do so, we might want to think in the other direction of attempting to strengthen that firewall in a more creative and innovative way to try to adapt it to the globalized era rather than abandoning efforts to do so.

So I'm hoping that this panel, which tries to assess the current globalized information environment as it actually is will begin to move us in that direction and try and engage with some of these very difficult questions that are raised.

We have on the panel, as you know from looking at the program – we have David Jackson, who, most relevantly for our purposes here, was the director of the Voice of America for several years. We have Karen DeYoung, one of our senior diplomatic correspondents and one of my favorite reporters. We have Jeffrey Grieco, who is the assistant administrator for USAID and deals heavily with the public affairs dimension. And we have Rear Admiral Gregory Smith, who is the director of communication for U.S. Central Command, and was most recently the spokesman and chief of public affairs for Multi-national Force-Iraq.

So we have people who I think are at the heart of these issues, and have engaged them in their professional life at every level. So I've very excited about this group of panelists and what they might have to say.

I think we'll simply go down the roster as it is on the program, and we'll start with David Jackson. And I thought I would just ask David to speak for five to seven minutes about his experience as director of VOA with Smith-Mundt, and the evolution over the last decade.

DAVID JACKSON: Okay, well, thank you, Marc. I think, as Marc points out, it's great that we now have an opportunity to talk about how Smith-Mundt, rightly or wrongly, is felt today. And it was something that I felt when I was at the Voice of America for a little over four years. There's a great demand for VOA's programming. And let me also add that most of what I say about Voice of America really applies to all the U.S. international broadcasters – Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Radio and TV Martí, and the Al Hurra TV and Radio Sawa broadcasting. These are all non-military U.S. international broadcasts.

And the other point I wanted to make upfront and emphatically is that none of the stuff that you will hear or see or read on these broadcasts is propaganda. I know that that's not a surprise to most of you, but, I mean, there is an assumption I sense every once in a while that U.S. international broadcasting is wrapped up into a bundle of products that U.S. citizens have to be protected from because it's propagandistic in some way. There's nothing in any propagandistic about what goes out over the U.S. – over the airways by U.S. international broadcasting.

The building on Independence Avenue with the satellite dishes and the antennas on the roof is filled with journalists. They're not propagandists. And you could no more tell them what to broadcast or what stories to choose or what to say about those stories than you could tell Karen's colleagues at the Washington Post. They are journalistically independent, and their

independence is guaranteed and protected by the Board of Broadcasting Governors. So I wanted to make sure that I made that clear because it's a subject that every journalist at the Voice of America and all the other broadcasters feel very strongly about and very proudly about at the same time.

The one point I wanted to leave everybody with about the impact today of the Smith-Mundt Act is that there has been an unintended consequence of it, and that is that this rule has been turned into a charge against the credibility of DOA and the other broadcasters, and the way it works is this: Foreign critics – and they're invariably critics who don't listen to or know the content, because if they did they would know this is an empty charge – but they frequently will say that VOA, or the other broadcasts, are propaganda because the U.S. government won't even let American citizens be exposed to it. I mean what more proof do you need of the incendiary quality of these broadcasts than the fact that Americans are prevented from being tainted by them? And of course, Americans aren't prevented from seeing or listening to these broadcasts anymore, and the Internet has made this moot, but this is one example of an outcome, that if you were to remove the prohibitions against the dissemination, or even just the access to U.S. international broadcasters like VOA, it would remove, you know, a damaging talking point against the credibility of those broadcasts.

Contrary to what Jim Glassman said earlier – he may have left some people with the impression that VOA and the others are eager to start placing our programming on, you know, your local cable distributor. When I was at Voice of America, if anyone had asked me if I wanted to do that, I would have said, thanks but no thanks, because that's not VOA's mission. Our mission was to reach out to foreign audiences and to inform foreign audiences in different countries, speaking their languages – 24 languages at last count – of what's going on in the world. And we did not have the money or the interest in placing our programming in Los Angeles or anywhere else, but it would be nice if someone said, can we place that programming there, and I would have been able to say yes. As it was, Smith-Mundt prevents us from doing anything to facilitate the domestic distribution.

Now, we can hand it over to someone and they can do it themselves, but we can't help them, so you end up with these ridiculous situations where people ask for a show or a story or a reprint and we have to go through this sort of awkward dance of saying, well, we really can't tell you where you can find that or how you can download it or, you know, where the archive is. I mean, they can find it on their own. Nobody's breaking any laws if they reach out and grab it and distribute it, but it's sort of a farce the way the law is interpreted. And of course in many of these cases it's up to the lawyers, and the lawyers are always very cautious about doing anything to assist in the distribution of this content.

I'm getting near the end of my five to seven minutes, but I did want to make those two points. Thank you.

MR. LYNCH: Actually, I wanted to ask a follow-up question because you've described very effectively the mission of VOA, but what about Al Hurra and Radio Sawa? For instance, for a long time – I find it very interesting that Al Hurra would – the TV station would not do anything in the interests of transparency – no transcripts, no live feed, a rudimentary website at

best, and when I asked about this I was told that it was because of Smith-Mundt, but at the same time, Radio Sawa had a live feed broadcasting on its website, which was hosted on the same platform. And I found this very confusing and I'm curious if you think that the same kind of mission issues for VOA should also apply to stations that were created expressly to fight this so-called war of ideas in the Middle East. Do you think that the same mission applies and the same standards should apply?

MR. JACKSON: Let me start by trying to answer that, and then I'm going to refer you to someone else who may have something to add. I think the short answer is yes, they all have the same mission. They all interpret Smith-Mundt the same way. Al Hurra is very new, and it takes time to roll out these services, these websites, these audio and video broadcasting streams on the Internet.

I don't know of any reason why the people at Al Hurra would object to anybody having access to what they say, except for the point mentioned earlier by Jim Glassman, which is that it's exorbitantly expensive to translate any one program? And this issue has come up with the VOA Persian broadcasts, where there have been questions about content. Anytime you're broadcasting in a language that a lot of Americans don't speak, you know, there's going to be questions from Congress or elsewhere, and the BBG has always responded to requests for translations. We have nothing to hide. I mean, the general feeling among the broadcasters is the more you know about what we're broadcasting, the better we look. Our stuff stands up to scrutiny. In fact, we like it when people know what we do because – especially around budget time – you don't want to be a mystery about what you're doing in the government.

But let me – I think if Tish is still here – Tish King, who is representing the BBG. Tish, do you want to add to anything I just said? Did I get it right?

TISH KING: You covered it. You know, start-ups take time, and there's also the – (inaudible, off mike) – in the International Broadcasting Act in terms of VOA's mission. Did everybody hear that? The same standards apply under the International Broadcasting Act. And there's Jeff Trimble.

JEFF TRIMBLE: Hi, I'm Jeff Trimble. I'm the executive director of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Dave, thanks for your opening remarks there. I'm happy to follow up on any of these questions, but just very specifically to the points that Marc has just made, the 1994 legislation, the International Broadcasting Act, as amended in '98, the mission applies equally and universally to all the broadcasters in U.S. international broadcasting. The VOA charter, which is enshrined in that legislation, and its standards apply to all U.S. international broadcasters, period.

The translation and transmission of Al Hurra streaming is a technical issue. We didn't have the sufficient funding to do it initially. That funding is in place now. Al Hurra is streamed and archived. So that was just a technical issue. As you may know, handling video stream is a more complicated and more data-heavy operation than a pure audio stream. So I just wanted to make those two quick points, and if there are other points that come up about BBG and its operations, I'm happy to answer them.

MR. LYNCH: Thanks, Jeff and Tish, and why don't we move to Karen now and have her speak a little bit about her experience coming from the media end of this equation?

KAREN DEYOUNG: Thank you, Marc. I wanted to talk a little bit about these efforts from the perspective of a media person working overseas. When I started out as a correspondent for the Washington Post, which was – I hate to say this but it was in 1975 –

MR. : You were a child.

MS. DEYOUNG: I am a child. I was 10 then – (laughter) – a prodigy. One of the most amazing things that happened to me very early on was – I don't even remember where I was in Africa, but walking around and I identified myself to somebody just on the street and they said, oh, Washington Post, Watergate, Woodward and Bernstein, and I thought, how can this person possibly know about this?

That, however, was kind of an anomaly, and one of the pleasures of working overseas, particularly in the third world – and I worked a lot in Africa and Latin America during those days – was the anonymity you could operate with, also even in the Middle East. You could go anywhere you wanted. You could ask anybody anything, and people were remarkable open and willing to talk to you as an American. Even though a lot of these places had very strong U.S. policies and the United States was a major player in what was going on there – Central America, for example, where I spent a lot of time in the late '70s, early '80s – it didn't really affect our ability to talk to people on all sides of issues. Sometimes we got information from embassies and from PAOs, but I would have to say not very often. You weren't really considered to be doing your job if you spent anymore than just minimal time with Americans. You know, you all know some embassies are really good and some embassies are not so good. Some PAOs are really useful; some are really not so useful. Obviously it's very different today. There are a lot of places you can't go safely or you can't go as openly or get as much access as you could in the past because its too dangerous.

Obviously also there is the Internet, which makes things available so that things – for example, I could go interview people anywhere and they would never see what I wrote, not have a clue. Even if it registered on them who I was, they would never see it. And so that was a kind of a dangerous freedom, really, to have, that you could sort of say anything you wanted about people.

The other thing that's different now, I think, is the extent to which the military is involved in communications. It obviously is a major part of counterinsurgency doctrine, strategic communications, as a war-fighting tool, and I think that for people like me, working overseas, your interest is not so much in getting stuff on VOA – although I think VOA is very, very good in a lot of countries. It's not what's happening at the American center; it's not what's happening in terms of public statements that are made there. You want to know what the military is doing in terms of winning hearts and minds.

Several years ago I wrote a biography of Colin Powell, and one of the things I did was to go back through all the records and the archives of his units during the Vietnam War, and you would find these kind of monthly reports where they would talk about what they had done in terms of winning hearts and minds, and it was almost – I mean, I'm sure there were people who were doing things that I'm never going to know about, or I was not going to know about for purposes of this book, but there would be endless lists of almost kind of naïve, we distributed X number of pamphlets; we showed movies to 30,000 people this month about the United States; so and so went out and made a speech. And this was our communications effort. It's very, very different now. If you look at the money that's spent, the personnel that are involved, and the programs that are under operation in Iraq, you will see that that in fact is the major communication effort of the United States, not what's being broadcast, not what's being done in the embassy.

For my purposes in terms of Smith-Mundt, the important thing is for us to understand what that effort is – what's being said, what's being done – and I frankly don't even know how that fits into the parameters of Smith-Mundt, and I'd be anxious to hear people in here, maybe Greg, talk about that a little bit. Nor do I think we have a very good handle on how effective it is – again, what's being done in our name and what a lot of money is being spent on.

So, I think that in terms of openness, that that's the area that people in my profession are more interested in at this point.

MR. LYNCH: Well, let me ask you a follow-up on your last point. When you, as a reporter, get information from a military source, whether a public affairs officer or otherwise, about, say, some brutality committed by al Qaeda, or a good-news story from Iraq, do you consider yourself the target or the instrument of an influence operation aimed at American domestic public opinion?

MS. DEYOUNG: Sure, but that's what, you know, government public affairs or military public affairs is all about. I mean, you're always a target. I wouldn't say a target – I mean, you're – you know, you're one of the people that they're trying to influence. That's fine. We do that every day. We do it here. We do it every time we go to a press conference. That's what we do. That's okay. But it's our job to make judgments about news, to try to put things in context, to try and get information outside of that source network, and then, as I say, make a judgment about whether something is newsworthy or not, on our own, not because of who told it to us or what the military or public relations objective is at the moment.

MR. LYNCH: So Smith-Mundt would be fairly irrelevant for you. This is your judgment – your editorial, journalistic judgment, which is the important filter, not a legislative obstacle.

MS. DEYOUNG: Right. As long as the information is available to you, then you can make a judgment about it.

MR. JACKSON: Let me make one comment about that, putting on my hat as a former correspondent. I spent 23 years of time. One of the first things you do when you parachute into

some country, as Karen knows, is you usually stop into the U.S. Embassy and you spend a little time with the political officer or whoever happens to be the person who's an expert on that situation. It's not your only stop. You know, you don't write a story solely from that meeting. But this is, I think, another example of how Smith-Mundt is sort of irrelevant in real time because their job isn't to – I mean, what the say – what they tell you and their view of the political situation, or whatever the story happens to be, you know, you take that into account as one of your sources and as information to be mulled over and to be weighed, and it is reflected in your story that's probably read back in Washington, or wherever your publication is.

So, you know, it's – as Karen says, you're not just sort of a victim to whatever they want to pour on you and you just then ride it that way.

MR. LYNCH: Len's got a question.

Q: (Off mike) – to talk to you guys as journalists to find out something from you that we didn't know – (off mike).

MS. DEYOUNG: That happens.

MR. JACKSON: Sure. It's a give and take.

MR. LYNCH: I think, though, that this is an important thing which I think we should continue and take up later in the panel, especially when Admiral Smith gets a chance to weigh in, because I think in a battle-space environment where you don't have free access to a wide variety of sources, it might be much more difficult for you to exercise your independent journalistic judgment when your only sources are military, when you're being shuttled to a village and shown progress there without being safely able to go and investigate otherwise.

But at any rate, these are questions which we can set aside for the moment because I want to give Jeff Grieco a chance now to talk about the USAID perspective on this.

JEFF GRIECO: Okay, great. Thank you very much, and thanks to Matt and everyone that's hosting the conference today. It's long overdue that we did this.

I'd like to begin first by talking about a report that we published. We had an outside advisory group that we hired to analyze, how are we messaging U.S. foreign assistance? Are we being effective or not? And what changes do we need to make to improve it? And throughout the report there is not a big mention of Smith-Mundt, surprisingly.

So I'd just like to quickly summarize a couple of main points from that and then I'm going to get into the meat of what I think we want to talk about too on the domestic versus overseas side for USAID.

Their two main conclusions were that the lack of knowledge of how America is helping the world, especially the developing world, stems from two factors. First is a lack of effective communications by USAID due to limited resources for communications, and then secondly, that

there is no single public or private entity in the United States that is charged with communicating about what U.S. foreign assistance does. And while it pales compared to the Pentagon budget, the USAID and the U.S. Official Development Assistance budget last year was over $24 billion and has been at the highest levels that it's been for a long time.

Their key recommendations – now, this is a bipartisan group. This was Mike McCurry, Sig Rogich – if you can imagine those two guys on the same working group – Paul Clark and Craig Charney – Craig brings that polling and surveying background as well as political experience – Mike Kiernan from the Global Leadership Campaign, who is very knowledgeable about foreign assistance generally, and Rob Tappan, and a host of others. So it was a bipartisan group.

Their main recommendations, just quickly, are that we have a strong need for a strategic, a coherent, and a multiyear set of communications in outreach requirements that are going to identify resources, audiences, architecture and the tools by which we need to get those done, including outside partnerships; secondly, that USAID must use polling and focus groups more, both domestically and overseas, which for us is an issue that I'll get to in a second; that the annual budget planning process and guidances and all the requests that go into an annual budget planning process for the president need to start having carve-outs for communications, especially in the foreign assistance side, and that process doesn't necessarily exist right now; more extensive training for communications officers, both here and in the field, as well as institutionalizing our development outreach officer program, which, if you don't know, after 9/11, AID has now placed development outreach and communications officers in every one of our missions.

We have more than 104 of them around the world in the developing missions that we work in, helping the PAO to get the content, to pull that content out of the programs that we're operating in and delivering them content that they can package, and then through their authorities within the embassy to get it out to the wider audiences. And, lastly, one of their requests was to turn the USAID press office back over to USAID and not have it be a State Department – if you didn't know, it's a State-Department-appointed office and staffed office. The reviews are done by the State Department, not by AID.

So, that being said, let me now get into the domestic versus overseas and the Smith-Mundt impact of what we do. First let me start with the domestic.

I don't worry every day, in managing our domestic outreach campaigns and activities, about whether Smith-Mundt is going to stop us, because we're very structured in what we do. There is a shadow of Smith-Mundt. Our attorneys debate whether Smith-Mundt actually applies to the agency or not, but I don't want to be sitting before Senator Menendez in a review committee in the Senate Foreign Relations and having him decide that it was wrong for us to do it, so we pay homage and respect to the act but we're not certain that the act really applies to the things that we need to do domestically. So there is what I call a shadow of Smith-Mundt. We operate within that.

There are carve-outs that we provide to our agency for if they're doing domestic programs. That has to be related to education of our foreign assistance activities. That is within our Foreign Assistance Act requirements, that we educate the American public about what their foreign assistance is doing to help them and to help U.S. national security. And we try to stay on top of that to make sure that it doesn't become something else. There have been problems in the past where you, say, used domestic-funded activities for political purposes – this was many, many decades ago – and that resulted in a major-scale congressional attack on the agency. We don't want to replicate that, and our goal is to make sure that doesn't happen.

Now, is Congress then domestically giving us an ability to go out and proactively fund domestic outreach activities? And I can say that they were but they're not anymore. Our Biden-Pell grant is our only official programming money that's given to the agency to talk to the American public. Those are called development education grants. For an agency of 8,000 people and a $24 billion U.S. Official Development Assistance budget, I get $25,000 a year to talk to the public about what it is we do. I can't hire a contractor for less than $10,000.

So the U.S. hasn't taken it seriously and I think Congress is willing now – there is a change of attitude in Congress to relook at all this strategically and see, what do we need to do to try to get the American public more educated about what our foreign assistance dollars are doing, and so that they see the connection between our national security requirements and what we're doing on foreign assistance.

Just one side note as a comparison. One of our staff was in London about a year ago and had gone into a grocery store to pick up some medicine, and at the checkout counter was handed a coupon, and the coupon was paid for by the British development agency, and it was a coupon given – every citizen that buys groceries in that country gets a coupon telling them about what their development money is being used for and how it's helped them overseas to make Britain more secure and so forth. They have money to do coupons in grocery stores, okay? (Laughter.) I don't have $25,000 to do a single program to talk to the American public. So it gives you some scaling, I think.

On the overseas side, Smith-Mundt for us is not an issue. We are moving very aggressively with our doc (ph) program, with our training programs overseas. We are even undertaking now strategic ad campaigns in targeted countries, especially countries that are listed as fragile, failed or terrorist states. We are aggressively moving in, and this includes countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon. We've done campaigns in Indonesia and in other countries too. And I'd be happy to talk about those separately.

So we are trying to innovate, and when we do that we're going in and do preliminary focus groups and polling to measure the awareness levels of U.S. assistance. Then we go in and target the themes that the audience is most likely to be interested in. In developing countries they usually center around three main themes, which is education, healthcare, and jobs, or economic growth training. And so we tend to focus our ad campaigns on that. And then we go back in after we're done with a six-weed ad effort, and we measure. And we can show – which has been the biggest issue for Congress, frankly. We haven't talked a lot about Congress. Congress is very interested in giving us dollars as long as we can show what the impact of those

dollars are, and it's very difficult, as I know – IIP, in my work with them – it's very difficult sometimes to go in and show that.

We've tried to do it in our narrow little strategic ad campaigns by measuring awareness of the foreign assistance provided by the United States and then measuring afterwards. In Lebanon it went from something like 24 percent knowledge, especially in South Lebanon, where we had our biggest problems, to over 60 percent knowledge. In West Bank in Gaza, the knowledge was like 17 percent in Gaza about our programs, that the U.S. is the largest aid provider to Gaza and to West Bank since the Wye accords, more than $2 billion, but most of the people didn't even know the U.S. was in there, even at the height of conflicts. Even now there's U.S. assistance going in. Those numbers went up in the West Bank and Gaza to over 70 percent after we ran our ad campaigns. And in the West Bank and Gaza, I might note, we did billboards – they're of very effective use there – and not a single billboard was torn down for us, or desecrated. So I think that's an improvement, and that just goes to show you.

The biggest issue for us, though, on our external outreach activities is resources. It's a constant battle for resources. And something that somebody said on the last panel – and I'll just end up with this – you know, to me it was a last-minute statement, but it resonates. On an interagency basis, and within the U.S. government, there is a chauvinism against communications and a chauvinism against public diplomacy that it's not the serious – it's not the substantive issue, and that if we're not engaged earlier in that process, I can guarantee you that there is not going to be an ability to communicate effectively and that the goals of the whole program may fail. We need to figure out why that is. Is that a relic of Smith-Mundt? Is there some other reason why that's happening, that there's not the respect level for what we do every day? I don't know. I'd like to throw that out as kind of a closing. To me that's a huge issue, bigger than probably anybody gives attention to it. Thank you.

MR. LYNCH: Thanks, Jeff. That was really fascinating. Those are great questions. In the interests of time, I want to press on and move on to Admiral Smith, and then we'll have time to engage with all – grapple with all of these questions collectively. And I guess I'll just throw out the same question that I was asking Karen, which is that in a world where we're defining the home front as an important part of a counterinsurgency and sustaining public support, how does the Pentagon and MNF-I, how does it navigate to Smith-Mundt both in letter of the law, and I think perhaps more importantly, the spirit of the law in terms of trying to determine what's legitimate and what's not a legitimate way of approaching information operations in this kind of information environment?

REAR ADMIRAL GREG SMITH: Well, thank you. First of all, as a military guy, you follow orders. One order was to read all the homework, which I did. (Laughter.) The second order was to make no opening statements, which I'm not, so I'll answer the question and then we'll move on to some good dialogue. But, really, the important part of this is an understanding that the environment we live in, in the military certainly is largely focused on the tactical areas where we operate.

In the case of an area like Iraq, where we entered a war some years ago now that began with an information environment that had collapsed what there was of it, obviously run by the

Hussein government, and had to be rebuilt and it still being built today, and we've operated in that environment now for several years and we've learned a great deal, I think, about operating in a nascent information environment to where the U.S. government had to step in, in the case of DOD, and play a much larger information role than I think doctrinally we are aware of our requirements having been.

And partnering with State over the last several years, again, we've learned a great deal about that. We've created some of our own institutions of – some of our own mediums of delivery – Al Hurra, Radio Sawa. We've certainly created a tremendous amount of capacity in the information environment, both in the traditional public affairs lanes and also in the information operations.

In fact, the art of information operations has truly grown up in this conflict in the sense that it has really begun to understand the role it plays, not only at the face-to-face communications between our troops – which, by the way, are our most communication that we have – but all the way up to some of the tools they now employ using the broad mediums of the Internet, satellite television, radio and so forth. It is a responsibility that we have as a military in order to ensure that we have mission success, the end-states are met.

So there's a partnership, I think, between all the mediums of information and the tools or the tradecraft we all practice that is not the firewalls we talk about, and I think a lot of these firewalls are associated with discussions here in Washington. They just don't play out in the field. I think others have said that today. Some of the greatest partnerships in Iraq were in fact with elements of our government that you would not think public affairs – being the career person that I am – would have spent much time with.

I spent a great deal of time with the intelligence community, a tremendous amount of time with our Special Forces committee, a tremendous amount of time with our information operations – really our psychological operations communities, and of course, in the public diplomacy and the role of State in public affairs, a tremendous amount of time with their staffs at the embassy there in Baghdad, and all because it's the understanding and the counterinsurgency game that we play in. There are roles we will all play, but they are not, I don't think, built along firewall discussions as much as they are along the collaborative and really the necessity to work together to achieve what we want to achieve in places like Iraq.

There are probably going to be new and exciting opportunities in the future for our governments to figure this out all over again as we move in other security challenges in the years to come. But there are lessons in Iraq that I think are very valuable, and many of those lessons I'd love to talk about in more detail. And as we now move into other theaters of greater focus – Afghanistan, although we were there much longer, now some seven years and just beginning to really understand that environment – Pakistan, Yemen, Lebanon and so forth – these are environments that we are not going to solve with DOD information operations or DOD information activities alone. They will not be the pure domain of the Department of Defense, nor should they be.

The problem we have, I think, is that there is a lack of a constituency amongst other arms of government to do communication, but within the department we have, I think, a fairly good constituency of understanding on the Hill. We have a process to seek funding for resources. I think we're pretty good at that, and we're pretty good at the accountability piece as well, relative to the Congress's oversight of our activities.

To the degree that the American public knows about every piece of information we put in the information sphere, that maybe is a discussion we should have separately. This transparency thing that Matt talks about is an important piece of it, but there are some very – really, really good reasons why not everything we do needs to be completely transparent to everyone, and we can talk more about that later. But I'll stop there and take questions.

MR. LYNCH: Thanks. I think at this point I want to open it up to the floor because we have an outstanding group of people assembled here, and rather than us talking I'd rather turn this into a wider discussion. Do we have two microphones to cover – okay.

Q: Joel Harding. I am the director of the IO Institute at the Association of Old Crows. Admiral Smith, for years we've been hearing that the operations officers within the DOD are – they feel that they are constrained or restricted by the PAOs, by Smith-Mundt, and what I'm trying to find out is why that perception still carries through today, because it's been proven that it doesn't apply to DOD, but we're interested in exploring the why aspect. And, secondly, what is being done to counteract that?

RADM. SMITH: I think there's a lot of – in fact, there's a lot of military folks in this room that just decided not to wear a uniform today. There's two brave ones back there and maybe a third over here – (laughter) – and they can tell you some of their frustration.

I think what the issue goes to is, again, an unnecessary discussion about firewalls in the sense that psychology operations can only target certain types of audiences, and therefore their mediums they use must be very prescriptive and there has to be virtually no probability of bleed-over. I think that's an unrealistic expectation of how this really plays itself out. And, again, I'm very pragmatic and realistic about the game that we play in terms of information, and that game is very complex, and there are a lot of actors brought to the table.

And the fact is that our psychological operations task forces, and the people that do that business and that art, will employ I think virtually every medium that I can think of that is at their disposal, and I don't know that we have done any more than just constrain ourselves by policy. And the fact is there's never been a legal challenge to anything we've done within the department under Smith-Mundt that I'm aware of. The DOD general counsel I think has reviewed, a few years back, this very issue, and while it comes down on the purest view of Smith-Mundt doesn't apply to DOD, therefore – the reality is, again, it's the intent of our activities and the intent of psychological operations activities, the information operations component. It is targeted on non-U.S. audiences. That's by doctrine. And for very good reason; the same reason that I think State would argue that their main intent is not to target a U.S. audience.

We cannot get ourselves in a strain, though, by having unrealistic expectations that the means which we use will somehow make it into the homes in Des Moines, Iowa. That's just unrealistic.

MR. LYNCH: That's very interesting, but unfortunately intent is very difficult, right, because, you know, who knows what evil lurks in the minds of men, you know? The Shadow knows but State Department lawyers don't – (laughter) – which makes it very difficult to build a regulatory foundation on questions of intent, particularly when, as you suggested, intent can be multifaceted and highly complex. So, is your position that firewall discussions aren't particularly relevant extant to that level, that this should mainly be something guided by tactical considerations on the ground? Or do you see some value to try and figure a regulatory approach that might actually guide such decisions?

RADM. SMITH: Well, I think the best regulatory approach is our own media themselves, and Karen I think would be the first one to tell you that if she ever felt that she was being manipulated in a sense of propaganda – and the term "propaganda" I think really needs to be defined in a context of an intentful purpose to mislead, to misinform, to somehow have an agenda that's at counter-purposes with the truth, and so forth. That's what propaganda needs to be defined as. If Karen felt there were elements of the government wearing a uniform that approached her and fed her a stream of information purposely in that mind, then she has every right to just throw the red flag up on the front page and say the government is doing wrong here.

But, again, all of our programs are not designed upon anything but the truth, whether it's in psychological operations or in public affairs. And so the strength of our programs are in the foundation of the truth to begin with, and I think that's the best defense against any regulatory oversight that's necessary.

MS. DEYOUNG: Can I just say, I think the question, from my perspective at least, in terms of whether there should be a firewall, is the objection to letting this information out because there is a fear that it will interfere with operations or because there's a legal restriction on people in this country knowing what it is. I would like to know what kind of – I mean, call it propaganda or information or whatever, is being told to people overseas in my name, and I think the people in this country should know and that if you look at the original reasons for Smith-Mundt under the Cold War, that somehow this would allow people in this country, whether they were communists inside the State Department or whatever, from trying to influence you as a population, I think that that – that's just not – shouldn't be the issue anymore.

The question is if there are psychological operations teams that are disseminating information to the Iraqi public in the name – in my name, both as a journalist and as a citizen, I'd like to know what they are, unless the military wants to make an argument that this will somehow undermine their operations, which is certainly an argument that we're happy to listen to.

RADM. SMITH: Well, let me try to make that argument because critical to much of what we do in the psychological operations component – again, built upon the truth certainly is the foundation, but, if you will, the less attribution, the less the messenger is the target of focus

and the message runs through, the more penetration we'll have, the more opportunity to reach an audience who would be tone deaf to the U.S. government once again messaging to them about something. And in many cases we're really talking about the art of public diplomacy, wanting people to live lives that are associated with good families, send your kids to school – all those kinds of broad things that we think of ourselves as Americans, wanting to have for our own families.

But then there is a much more tactical application as well of psychological operations. It plays a unique role of having an influence component to it, certainly, an information component to it necessarily, but done in a way in which the messenger is not the main focus here. And that's the art of what we do, and if everything that we did had to be completely divulged in an attribution format, in an attribution that would tie it back to the U.S. government, I think our effectiveness would be very, very much marginalized.

MR. LYNCH: I'm going to collect a few questions and comments now.

Q: Okay, I'd like to follow up on a comment that Admiral Smith made, namely that the media is – oh, sorry, Pat Kushlis. I'm from New Mexico and I co-write the blog WhirledView, and I'm retired Foreign Service.

The question I'd like to follow up on, or my question is, you made a comment just a few minutes ago that in a sense the media is you best regulatory organization around, but if you're doing things that are non-attributable or have no attribution, how is a reporter Karen DeYoung or David Jackson, coming into country, going to be able to sort through this and try to figure this out?

And then my second question – comment is that you also said that troops are your most important communication vehicle, among others, but if they have – if they really are not language and cultural trained, which a lot of them are not, how do you deal with this?

RADM. SMITH: The first point really goes to, again, who is the intent? Karen DeYoung, at the Washington Post, is not the intent of the message, and if the story becomes reporting on our business of doing communication, that's a story. If she needs the same information that we're putting out to the Iraqi people, if the Washington Post wants to learn that information, they'll learn it by doing their own reporting and their own investigating and the rest of it. But, again, we're really talking about sort of an apples and oranges discussion relative to what it is, is the role of a military information activity versus the role of media in that regard, of trying to uncover the truth, trying to put out information to the public writ large?

We have very specific goals and objectives set at very tactical levels. It could be, you know, a particular village, a design – putting together a program to help them educate on a particular issue. I don't think that's necessarily an issue that's going to be of great concern to reporters coming in to cover the war in Iraq, but we have a requirement to do so. Now, is there a desire on my part to have that be completely transparent? As I pointed out earlier, not necessarily, because I'd like for that activity to occur in the background, in the discussion such

that people aren't necessarily seeing it as a military officer, military person making that communication clear to them.

I guess your second point on our own ability to speak culturally and with language skills, you're right, that is very much an issue within the department, something which we're trying to address over the long-term generationally, quite frankly, because it will take years and years to build up that capacity, but it is a shortfall we recognize.

Q: Peter Kolach (sp), Department of State. I cannot resist the temptation, with three of you sitting up there, to talk about embedding as a phenomena. It certainly adds relevance to the question. I remember the '91 Gulf War and the – I think the justified complaints of journalists that we were keeping them too far from the zone, and then you had embedding and, I mean, in a way I experienced this a bit bringing people up to the earthquake relief zone during the Pakistan quake – kind of Stockholm syndrome. They become too much a part of or identified with the team. And I have to say that the best reporting out of Iraq, you know, as a consumer of news was from organizations that had people embedded but also had people in Baghdad and Washington kind of balancing reports. NPR I'd cite in particular I thought did a terrific job.

And I guess the third think I'd put with that is the increasing mercantilization of the American news media. I worry sometimes – I worried during the quake, for instance. We did some dealings with Time and with CNN, and from sources that we could never figure out they came up with a storyline about 10 weeks into the quake that the winter was going to bring death and destruction and that the 73,000 that had died almost in the immediate aftermath was just going to be the tip of the iceberg. We felt on the ground, I mean, talking to health experts from around the world and then Pakistani experts, that this was going to be the opposite, that there had never been the kind of clinical care available, ironically, in the zone in history. And we put that out and it turned out we were right.

So, with that let me just throw it open and see what the reaction is.

MR. JACKSON: Well, I'm a few years away from Time so I'm not going to try and defend what the Time story was, but ironically I was – the first Gulf War I was in the Gulf as a Time correspondent, and by the time the second conflict in the Gulf came about I was actually at the Defense Department working with Torie Clarke, and I wish Torie were here because she could describe those times better than I can.

But I did find it, as a former journalist, sort of ironic. As you pointed out, that for so long journalists have always been clamoring for closer access. It was very rare to actually go on a military operation just because – a variety of reasons, obviously, but that Torie felt very strongly – and her view prevailed at the Defense Department, fortunately – to give those reporters access. And, I mean, they had unprecedented access to the invasion and to, you know, the conflict. And as you point out, then came the complaints that, well, they're too close to the conflict and, you know, they're sympathizing with the people they come to meet. And I really – again, I speak both as a former journalist, at that perspective, also seeing it from the other side of being inside the Defense Department, and I thought it was sort of an unfair claim because, you know, it's up to the journalists to, as I said earlier, weigh the sources, weigh their credibility, weigh what you

see with your own eyes. And, I mean, that goes to the heart of what journalists do as a job, and they can handle it. At least they should be able to if they're a good journalist.

And I also favor, at the same time, as much openness and access as the government and the military can give them because I think – if you ask them they're going to say they don't have anything to hide. The want the journalists to see what they're doing, see the impact of what they're doing is having on the people there, and that was the view inside the Defense Department in 2002 – in 2001, and I think that it was – it's going to be hard to put the toothpaste back in the tube.

MR. LYNCH: Sir?

Q: Hi, I'm John Primm (sp) with Northstar Productions, and I had a couple of comments, first to Jeff here. Before I became a consultant I spent many years in the Pentagon, and I think your point about a prejudice against information is absolutely true. I can't tell you how many hundreds of men and women I would try to say, tell the story, tell the story. And I think what it comes down to – and I'm coming not from a theoretical but from the operator's perspective – it's people are afraid to get out there. People are afraid that if I say something I'm going to get slapped, of if I take a risk, this is going to happen.

Reference your last point and this gentleman's last point – embedding journalists with the troops. Well, that certainly didn't work that way in Vietnam. Don North, who I'm associated with, did some of the best reporting out of the Vietnam War. A lot of it was censored, but by his own people. But part of that is the difference in the business of the news from 40 years ago to what it is now – a whole different subject. And, Admiral, I'm very pleased to hear that you are using this enveloping concept because in my work in information operations, it is usually the public affairs people that are trashing it and saying, you know, you've got to have a firewall, you've got to do this, you've got to do that. And I think you're absolutely right that people like Karen and David, they're journalists, they know what's going on, and they can tell a pitch from a story.

But that's my primary point is I think – and I've worked with people in USAID, and I actually had one woman who was very helpful and then all of a sudden, whap, things stopped.

And I said, what happened? She said, well, you know, we can't talk about that.

Why can't we talk about that? It's good news.

We don't want to talk about that. It's good news.

And that's the way – that, unfortunately, is pushing a rock uphill when you're working inside the government trying to tell the good stories. It just doesn't work that way. Thank you.

MS. DEYOUNG: I think those are very good points that you made. A lot of times you find that the people who are supposed to be talking about these stories are either not equipped to talk about them in a way that somebody like me understands, or are not really – that they're

actually fearful. I mean, they feel like as soon as somebody like me comes around, you know, it's like stay away.

But I wanted to just go back very briefly to the embedding point. I think that was an absolutely brilliant strategy. It was terrific. If you go back to Vietnam, what you said is totally true. I mean, if you wanted to go someplace in Vietnam, you went. If you wanted to get on a helicopter, if the pilot said you could get on, you could get on. You didn't have to go through all this stuff. It changed very radically in Grenada, which I was involved with, which was we actually had reporters – what amounted to imprisonment to keep them away from what was going on, and we later found out that what was explained in official briefings was very far from what was actually happening. And then they tried this thing in Panama where you would have pool and the pool was restricted, so I think that – then you had the first Gulf War where nobody could go anywhere and everybody was complaining all the time, and that then led to embedding.

I think it was great. I think it gave a lot of opportunity for journalists who did not have an intimate relationship with the military to have one, to understand; to understand how operations like that worked, to understand the people. On the other hand, there were a lot of news organizations there who only did embedding because they couldn't afford anything else. And I think you can only do that if you are a big enough operation that you can have your own – you know, do the embedding but you have to have your own people.

One of my favorite stories that we did during the Iraq – it was really after the Iraq invasion, was we had two reporters that went with a patrol down the main street of a town, and the first one was walking with the troops and everybody was saying hello, hello, hello. Whoever the commander was, was saying to our reporter, you see, you know – they were throwing out candy; they were giving out stuff – see, it's really great. Everybody was smiling, waving. The other reporter, who was an Arabic speaker was walking at the end of the group and was talking to people after the troops went by and they said, goddam these – blah, blah, blah, blah, blah – you know, totally complaining: We haven't gotten anything from them. We hate them. What are they doing here? They're arrogant, they're this, they're that. My electricity still doesn't work. So you get a completely different picture. But you have to have the resources to do that.

And I think that either – a lot of news organizations either don't have it or they do what you were talking about with the earthquake coverage, which is, what makes good TV; what makes a good sort of sexy headline? And in that case I think it's incumbent on people like you to – you know, in the same way we figure out who we trust and who we think knows what they're doing, you've got to pick out those people too and go to them and say, hey, you know, did you just see that? That's crap. You know, here's – let me tell you what's really happening.

MR. : That's right.

(Laughter.)

MR. GRIECO: Can I just add one thing on this? And Karen can jump all over me if she thinks I'm wrong. I think that there's a dramatic structural change happening right now within the U.S. news media – you know, bit alert there – but what's happening in our world, in the

developing world especially, from where we work every, day is that I predict five, maybe seven years there won't be any more Washington Post Foreign Service corps overseas; the New York Times Foreign Service corps will be gone. They're going to pull them all back. They can't afford to have them in the field anymore. Those reporters in the field are having to spend more and more time writing for the Web from their foreign position, which for a reporter who likes doing in-depth, front-page, above-the-fold stories about human interest in the developing world, those stories will go away. So a journalist won't want to do that because it's the most experienced journalists that are doing these things.

So that's a fear I have is that we're going to likely lose that very soon, and what comes next? What's going to replace that? Where is that four-page inside context that the American public gets that tells that human interest component about what's going on inside a camp in Al Fasher, that you can't get from parachuting in for a day and jumping in a security convoy of the U.N., going out and seeing it and leaving the same day because they won't let you stay overnight, they won't let you visit with anybody?

So worry about that a lot because I think that's going to impact – I know it will impact us in getting the message out to the American public about what our foreign assistance is doing overseas. It's definitely going to have an impact, I think, on the news media overseas, which drives a lot of their coverage: What are the Americans covering right now in Kenya? What are they covering down in Darfur right now? What storylines are they working on? And the wires tend to migrate to some of them in the field, based on what they look at what they're doing. Is it Emily Wax – is that – from the Post, who I traveled with a little bit in Africa. They watched and read every word that she wrote, and followed that for months, and drove a lot of their storylines based on that. So, what happens next when that goes away? I don't know. I'm really worried about that because I don't think the Web can necessarily replace that yet. But things are migrating there.

MR. JACKSON: The Web's not the problem; it's the funding for that reporting is the problem. I mean, you know –

(Cross talk.)

MR. JACKSON: – on the Internet.

MS. DEYOUNG: – on the Web.

MR. JACKSON: Right. Okay.

Q: Sherry Mueller with NCIV. You all are talking about resources one way or another, and, Mr. Grieco, it was very helpful for you to say exactly what you have available for this, and I was wondering if Mr. Jackson and Admiral Smith would do the same. And then a tack-on for Admiral Smith. How much of our strategic communications is outsourced? And I'll confess; I just finished "Blackwater." So the discrepancy in resources.

MR. JACKSON: I couldn't begin to tell you precisely, without being wrong, how much money is being spent on communications within the Department of Defense. Certainly the war-fighting component of this you could define very tightly, but there are lots of components to this that I think, if you really took an honest look at it, you'd come up with a different number than I could come up with today, so I don't want to hazard a guess. But obviously it is an expensive business. That's why they're not in it. And we're trying to figure out ways to stay in the fight in the communication environment. That goes to your second question, the outsourcing piece. That's where it gets expensive.

Much of what we do is not done by our uniformed men and women because they don't have the capacity, the language skills, the cultural skills. We had to buy that. We've got to buy all of our analytical work skills to understand what's going on in the environment, largely. And then, to a great degree, when we use products, that's done through an outsourcing vehicle as well.

So the pure public affairs stuff, pretty cheap. That's pretty easy to do. When you're really trying to have impact with intent – communicate with intent, target audience analysis, reaching audiences with products – it gets very, very expensive, and it is a cost of doing business at the department. Again, through constituency, begin to understand and making that investment. In fact, I would tell you that I believe on the next Quadrennial Defense Review coming out there will be even further emphasis on this thing we call strategic communication, and that will drive even more resources.

So we're not going to, at any time in the future, I think, back down from our responsibility to address this issue, and resources will always be a fight, which I think goes to an earlier discussion point about what was all the talk about between PA and IO. It had a lot to do with turf wars over at resources; less to do with Smith-Mundt and the ideology of those principles. And I think we're overcoming most of those in the current leadership in the building.

MS. DEYOUNG: Could I just say, just in terms of resources, just as one example, the Department of Defense a couple of months ago signed a contract for information specialists, strategic communication SYOPS, that was projected – a $300-million cap over three years to begin now, essentially, in Iraq at the same time we're theoretically withdrawing. And that was only one of several strategic communications contracts. There are others. But you can find them. I mean, you can find the contracts. They're where you find all those contracts.

Q: Ted Sivellas (sp), senior information policy and strategy, dah dah dah dah dah.

MR. : Ted, dah dah dah dah dah.

Q: Ted, yeah, dah dah dah dah dah. I do have a question, but I want to address what Ms. DeYoung just said. Just because a contract is $300 million over three years does not mean it's funded to that. That's just –

MS. DEYOUNG: No, I think that that's the cap.

Q: Right. Right, it's the cap, but I think a lot of times that's misconstrued as, oh, well, the Defense Department just gave a $300-million contract to such and such company; do something. And sometimes that's perceived as such, that that's the amount of investment, and it really ends up being very little compared. I mean, the way you said it is right, but it's sometimes misconstrued by people who read that.

MS. DEYOUNG: But I wonder, if you go back and look at Iraqi contracts, how many of them have spent less than the contract cap over the past X number of years.

(Laughter.)

Q: That's a fair question, and as Greg said –

MR. GRIECO: And in case we have any appropriations committee staffers here, I'm sure he's not saying that they have not spent all their money – (laughter) – because that would be taken back to Congress immediately.

Q: No, I'm not saying that. Moving on. (Laughter.) The death of distance and the collapse of time have not only eliminated the distinction between U.S. domestic and foreign audiences, but have also created competition, not only for hearts and minds – which is a term with which I'm not enamored – but also a competition for market share. Given that kind of a competitive environment, there are many who would say that the traditional media has abrogated its responsibilities of authentication and verification in favor of being first and fast, even if flawed. How would you address that kind of a comment about, quote, unquote, "traditional" media?

MS. DEYOUNG: What in the blogosphere they call the MSM, the mainstream media. You know, is there a lot of pressure now to – there's always been pressure to be first. I mean, that's – but you can't – even if you're first, if you're wrong too many times you don't remain as part of the mainstream media, or as an individual who's articles get on the front page of a mainstream media organ.

There's no question that the Internet puts new pressure on people. I mean, I find that my job now – about 20 paces outside my office is a huge TV camera, and when you see somebody at the Washington Post where it says, "The Washington Post" – I don't know if some of you have seen it – where they interview people, it's right there. So if there's an ongoing story that I'm working on, which is usually some Iraq, Afghanistan, something related, you know, maybe three times a day somebody will come and say, uh, can you step out here and be – you know, and sit in this chair with the camera on you and talk to whoever from CNN or MSNBC or the Canadians or the Brits or the – so, yes, that's time-consuming. Writing stories for the Web; they want to get it up on the site.

And so you would go to – I would got to an editor and say, at 11:00 in the morning, I think I'm going to have a story about X, Y and Z today, and the first thing they'd say is, how soon can we get it up on the Web? And I would say, well, you know, I haven't done any reporting yet. (Laughter.) I don't know what I have to say. I know I have a fact or I have an

idea, but, you know – and as anybody else who is in my profession – I'm sure that David knows – even though people in government tend to go to work very early in the morning, they also work very late at night, and calls from journalists generally – I would say most of your best calls come between 6:00 and 8:00 at night, and so you wait all day. You can call somebody at 8:00 in the morning and they will call you back at 7:00 at night. That's inevitably what happens. Maybe they wait for the secretaries to go home or whatever, I don't know.

So there is a lot of pressure to do that, and those of us who are kind of old media people who started in this business before all of this, you know there's a big resistance to it, and right now a lot of tension on, you know, get with the program or you're not with the program anymore. I mean, I think that that's absolutely true.

If you have – the other side of it is if you do have some stature, you know, you can say – and if you're not at a point in your career where you're trying to, you know, rise up, you can say, uh-uh, it's not ready – not ready. I'm not doing it. But that's increasingly difficult to do, no question about it.

RADM. SMITH: Well, it's interesting because their tradecraft obviously is to be, you know, right when they go to print obviously, but be there before the competitor. We're in the same business. I mean, we have to be first with the truth. If not, guess who is? It's usually our enemy and it's often not the truth. And so our challenge is to find the mediums to be first with the truth, which has invented our, if you will, a lot of this discussion, because we cannot rely on waiting for my call to pick a paper, to be the only medium that gets that out there. I've got to find ways to do that directly. And that's why, you know, my face, unfortunately, when I was in Iraq, was always up there at the podium talking all the time, or jumping on the radio right away, or whatever it took to get the information out, along with my information operations friends doing the same thing. It was because we had to be first with the truth.

And having, I guess, the discipline of the system to recognize that is what's also been a new learning curve for the department, in that in the old days, you know, the operators did things and they sort of did what they did, and if they got caught maybe they would tell you about it, but now the transparency of operations within our department is very much the game, and we learn precisely what we need to know about an issue relatively near-term across the enterprise. In fact, if you take – one of the most impressive models, quite frankly, without going into great detail, is our special operations community, and how flat they are. In that room will be every single member of that command staff element is saying the exact same information all at the same time. The old days of having all kinds of firewalls – literally walls and doors – to block out information was seen as now an impediment in this information environment.

So, to flatten the organization you create – you empower people to learn. At the same time, all of us learn. And then you have roles we play to participate in that. And that's really the power of what we do in the information environment that's much new to my experience in Iraq from the old days when – you know, put out a press release, old-speak; you know, wait around for the morning paper to tell you what – all that's gone away.

So we've got – we have got to figure out – and we've, I think, done a pretty good job of that – how to resource that piece so that we can become the first with the truth, and that's very expensive.

MR. LYNCH: This has been an absolutely fascinating discussion, but I feel some sense of residual loyalty to Matt Armstrong – (laughter) – to try and refocus this on Smith-Mundt and on the question of – and actually I want to invite statements or questions from the various professionals in the room on, do you think that it is, in fact, viable and possible to do anything related – to actually prevent the domestic dissemination of information from the foreign to the domestic – is it possible, is it desirable? – and just try and get more perspectives on the table from those of you who are working in this domain. So I'll call on people who are ready to address that question. I'll just collect a few rather than –

Q: Hi. Sharik Zephyr (sp) with the Department of Homeland Security. And I'm sitting next to my very close colleague, Eric Train (sp), and he and I work – he's at the Department of Justice, and we work domestically – we engage domestic communities, including Arab, Muslim, South Asian Americans. And the reason we're here is that we've – you know, we work very closely with our colleagues – Jeff, you know, we've worked together at State Department – and there's a real appetite for – when we work with communities domestically, they want to know more information from USAID, from State Department, et cetera, but what we've seen – what we've been told is that Smith-Mundt is a roadblock to engagement.

The second thing, if you look at countering violent extremism, you know, I think there's a consensus that geography is now arbitrary because of the Internet and among other things. So if you're trying to engage communities – and fortunately we don't have the same problem like they have in Europe or in the U.K. where you have domestic communities that are becoming very, very radicalized. But there may be some information that someone at State or USAID has that may be useful in a domestic context. Right now we can't use it. At least that's what we're told.

The final thing I'd point out is just in the structure, the way the government is structured and the war of ideas, my understanding is that the person that's in charge of it is a State Department person. Now, war of ideas, engagement, that is not something that's limited to the international audience. That's something that, you know, the American public would benefit from learning more about. And, in fact, some of the folks that we would be targeting in our engagement would be over here. So I don't know what the answer is, but that's the reason I'm here, and I was hoping someone, either on the panel or someone here today, could sort of shed some light.

MR. LYNCH: Thanks. Let's take a few.

Q: Hi. Jeff Trimble again from the BBG. Just something that maybe pulls together some threads even back to the first panel – and I'll just put it out for everyone's consideration – U.S. international broadcasting today is a very robust journalistic organization with about 3,500 people around the world reporting in 60 languages. There is a lot of information, and going back

– I was thinking about Barry's point in the first panel about what could you add in the domestic market.

To coincide with the collapse of American journalism, foreign correspondents – I was one for 15 years and that business is just kind of going away – there's a huge amount of information available right now on our websites, mostly in the vernacular, about all kinds of things happening all over the face of the Earth, right now.

And if you look back at Tibet last March, a key source of information for other media outlets that then got propagated all over the world was the original reporting being done out of Tibet by journalists reporting to Radio Free Asia and to Voice of America. This stuff was being followed by the American media outlets. People were reading the stuff in the Tibetan dialects at U.S. media outlets and repurposing it and quoting it widely,

So, again, back to this big issue of where are the barriers and what's getting disseminated and who has robust assets now to report around the world, U.S. international broadcasting really is a very big, vibrant media organization.

Q: Hi. Chris Tomlinson with Associated Press. I'm one of those foreign correspondents that's going away. (Laughter.) You know, to bring it back to Smith-Mundt, the DOD legal opinion that we've talked about refers to – the attorney who wrote it said that the American people have a legitimate concern about being targeted by a government campaign of information, that it would endanger the relationship between the governed and the government, and I was wondering if that's what Smith-Mundt is out there to protect, should we be concerned about the DOD's and even USAID's desire to start campaigns to inform the public opinion. And particularly, if there aren't as many foreign correspondents, do we want our foreign news to be coming from government agencies? And that seems to be a question that isn't coming up, is whether or not this is a good idea.

RADM. SMITH: I'd like to just make one point about this obvious difference between the Department of Defense and nearly every other agency in government, and that is that we live amongst Americana. We are the part and parcel of communities around the country. We've got a presence, we've got naturalized shifts that have to occur for those communities to want to accept, often, the burden of hosting a military in their locale, and over those years have developed all kinds of outreach programs and so forth.

We're not out explaining the policy of the United States government per se to Americans, but we certainly are addressing, for them, the investments they're making in defense by way of having the human capital show up at their community events and so forth and be a part of that community. And that's a huge difference. That makes a huge difference, I think, in our constituency of understanding across the country about what the Defense Department role is and what we're doing and not doing. And it makes it much more challenging for State and others who don't have that natural abilities necessarily to live amongst – in the same sort of way that the department gets to.

The same way in the war footing. I mean, if you look at Iraq, the number of State Department USAID, in just sheer numbers, is just miniscule compared to the Defense Department's just prevalence across that battle-space, and that's why I go back to our troops being our best communicators, or really our effectual communicators, not so much by what they say – which I guess defends a little bit about their lack of communication skills – but what they do, because that obviously sends the strongest message about who we are as Americans. If we're knocking down doors, guess what? But if we're in there helping people rebuild their lives, it sends messages.

So we have a different environment we live in, and it give us an opportunity I think that's unique to the department, which really keeps us from the Smith-Mundt piece.

MR. : And, remember, that's a Title X requirement if it's legislated.

RADM. SMITH: Yeah. Yeah, so we've got the built-in ability to do it, and it appears, in much of this discussion – it would sound as if the State Department and others are being prevented for, I think, largely old reasons, misunderstood reasons.

MR. GRIECO: If I could jump in, maybe on the talk about the DHS. We do a great deal of outreach to Muslim-Americans, in cooperation with DHS and some other interagency partners, targeting major population centers where we know there's major concentrations. In those outreach sessions we're basically providing educational materials to them about what USAID, for example, is doing in predominantly Muslim countries to help them improve their health, their education, their welfare and so forth. So we don't see a conflict with Smith-Mundt on doing that, and we believe that we're encouraged to do outreach to those communities and constituencies of the United States, so that's important for them to know it.

However – and tying it into the point over here – do we want our public to be a recipient of an ad campaign from us? I can promise you, A, I don't want to do an ad campaign to the American public because Congress would never allow me to do that. Again, Congress is the elephant in this room. Congress reviews every dollar that we spend. The approve it or not, and they are not going to allow us to use targeted media campaigns to educate the public. However, they would be willing, I think, to be able to have the agency partner with organizations that are doing major public diplomacy messaging around the United States on what U.S. foreign assistance and development money is doing: the ONE Campaign, the Malaria No More Campaign.

So there's a lot of large partnership efforts to try to get the message out, and I think it's important that we have an ability to interact with them and to encourage them, and if we can provide them educational material or content that they need to help educate an American public, or Rotary International, that's got Rotary offices in every congressional district in the United States, I think that's a perfectly legitimate use of our stuff and shouldn't be withheld. But always Congress will review everything, and I know that they would never approve us doing targeted media domestically. Anyway, so –

MR. LYNCH: I'm going to collect one last round of four or five statements or questions and then give each of the panelists a chance to give their last thoughts. Sir?

Q: Yeah, my name is Greg Garland. I'm with the Department of State. I want to take the opportunity to clarify a misperception I think that's being thrown around here today that the State Department doesn't do outreach domestically. We do outreach domestically – my title in the Bureau of African Affairs is media and outreach coordinator. Google my name, Gregory L. Garland – it's public – and you'll find speeches all over the country, you'll find blogs, you'll find articles, and that doesn't count everything else we're doing in the Bureau of African Affairs, just to name one part of the department. We do it. We don't have the resources to do what we think is necessary, but the fact is we're doing it. We call it public affairs, not public diplomacy. There is a Smith-Mundt issue here that we should be addressing. Please don't call what we do domestically, however, public diplomacy. It is not. I have no question to follow that.

Q: My name is Rick Barnes. I'm a retired Army officer. I'm a manager of radio operations of Voice of America, but I'd like to speak from the perspective of being a Ph.D. candidate, working on my dissertation in looking at success and failure of new technology for radio broadcasting. I interviewed commercial radio broadcasters, I interviewed innovators, I interviewed people at the FCC regarding the potential success and failure of HD radio here in the States and Digital Radio Mondiale, DRM, which offers the possibility of short-wave radio sounding as clear as CDs. And almost to a person, everyone who I asked about having VOA within the continental United States, possibly eliminating the Smith-Mundt Act, almost to a person everyone said yes. I will tell you that an engineer in Dearborn, Michigan – which, I've been told, is the largest area of Arabic speakers outside of the Greater Middle East – said there's as much of a need for VOA Arabic in Dearborn, Michigan, as there is in Amman, Jordan.

So our commercial broadcasters are looking at FM stations having the capability of three streams of audio, yet very few are interested in doing that because there's no large audience out there and because it costs money to produce content. But there are communities within the continental United States where various languages are spoken, and I would argue that VOA content is needed, and it would be compelling content and help promote HD radio as well. So there's a thought for you to consider. And, again I've got raw data that I'll be providing. Mr. Armstrong, he can take a look at that.

Also, on his library, I suggest you look at – there's a story about Jim Weitzman. Actually there's two. One is on there and one isn't. When Mr. Weitzman was a young boy, he was a ham radio operator and avid short-wave radio listener, and he heard a jazz radio broadcast on VOA and he wrote to VOA asking for the name of a song, and he was denied that. And, again, the Smith-Mundt Act was cited, saying, oh, we can't let you know about that because that's public diplomacy stuff. And so he couldn't find out about it. Later in life – he is the owner of a number of radio stations – WUST here in town – and they do foreign-language broadcasting, and somehow or other he was able to encrypt the VOA signal with a satellite receiver and VOA content was on his station, and his listeners found it compelling. So I would argue there's some data for you to consider in using VOA products in a domestic environment. Thank you.

MR. JACKSON: Can I just comment real – one sentence – a thing to add to that? When people call for the need for VOA content, I want to make sure that you understand, it's not because there's some secret ideology running though it; it's because it's credible, objective information in their language. That's what that means. It isn't because they're being sent some secret messages. I mean, they just don't have access to unbiased, credible news information. And, you know, again, go back to why VOA was created. VOA was created to counter propaganda, and the idea was not to counter propaganda with our own propaganda; it was to counter it with the truth, and over time that's where you get credibility, and that's why VOA has a good reputation around the world.

Q: Yeah, Jake Schaffner, Booz Allen Hamilton. I find it commendable, the comments that we get from Mr. Jackson and Mr. Grieco and the admiral over their willingness to submit the material generated by their organizations to public scrutiny, particularly scrutiny by the press. Now, what concerns me is that I really haven't heard a lot of dissention in here over the fact that Smith-Mundt is either not a hindrance or certainly one that we couldn't come to some accommodation on with some minor modifications of law, at which point material generated for dissemination overseas one would presume then would be widely available, openly available in the United States and would be subject to the scrutiny that, you know, particular Mr. Jackson welcomes.

The problem I get worried about is where is the press then going to be, because we've sort of discussed the existence of an implied oversight mechanism where a professional journalist corps and a professional press corps provides an informed, adult supervision or oversight of the material being generated by the government, yet we're predicting that that group is disappearing or going to go out of existence. And I'm interested in comments on that. What takes the place of our journalists, or how do you see that moving ahead in the future where there is some mechanism that provides an oversight? And I'd like to defer to the admiral since I'm an ex-Navy guy.

RADM. SMITH: Well, I think it implies that there –

MR. LYNCH: Can we just get one last question from Doug Wilson, and then we'll each answer however many questions? Sorry. We've only got five minutes left.

Q: This is a question for Greg Smith and also one for Mike and for Ted when they speak. The topic of this is America's bifurcated engagement, and we've talked about bifurcation on dissemination. I have a question on the bifurcation of resources. Secretary Gates has spoken eloquently, and it has resonated very positively in the diplomacy community, about the need to allocate more resources for diplomacy, public diplomacy, foreign assistance and others, but there has not been any, you know, next steps with regard to tangible transfer of resources. And I'm interested from you, Admiral Smith, and others from DOD, is it time now for the Defense Department, given the fact that there are zero-sum budgets – it is a not a rising tide lifting all ships – is it time for the Defense Department to take a look at what it would rather not do and pair that with a very tangible look at what kinds of resources can go from the Defense Department account to the 150 account?

MR. LYNCH: Why don't we start on the right end of the table and then just work our way –

RADM. SMITH: Yeah, that's a great question. I think what we have said all along is that there is an understanding, a recognition, that the Defense Department has assumed a greater role in the last several years, and we've done that largely in part because we're – it's a get-it-done attitude. We're in the fight. We're losing soldiers. Lives are at risk. And we're going to do what it takes to get the job done, and we're not necessarily going to wait for the system to catch up. Well, now the system is sort of catching up on itself and realizing that we're going to be in this for a long time and we've got to sort of right-size this discussion.

I don't know precisely where the gives and takes would go, and, you're right, it is somewhat a zero-sum game, but you cannot replace human capital in this discussion, and that – I mean, purely dollars won't solve your problem anymore than it ever solved ours. And we have invested and continue to invest heavily in our communication professional corps, both in the information operation component as well as in public affairs. My own Navy – I've been joint now for a long time, but I still think back to my Navy days – is going to nearly double the size of its cadre of public affairs professionals, as an example. We now have two one-star flag officers in the communication realm in the Navy. No other service does.

So there are investments being made on that side, on the information operations – a large cadre of professionals being groomed from the early days of their both enlisted and officer corps to make them, through education and real-world experience, real professionals by the time they hit later years of their careers. You cannot do that as some sort of a will of the Congress to transfer that over to State. And so I would argue that there's got to be a long-term approach here and a buy-in by State to make the investment inside of its own lifelines on the human capital, and then the dollars will naturally come to those I think that can deliver, would be how I'd argue it.

MR. GRIECO: Yes, Secretary Gates' comments have been extremely helpful, I think, and especially his comments from our standpoint about rebuilding the Foreign Service corps of our development – primary development agency, USAID. So we've already actually begun that process, and I believe that without his statements we would not have gotten success in getting the '09 budget money that we've gotten to double our Foreign Service in five years. I think it's a direct result of his intervention changing some minds in the executive branch and on the Hill to get us started, and we're already well on our way to recruiting a new corps right now, so we're down to about a thousand Foreign Service officers. So he's already had an impact.

Now, translating that into impact on our messaging and our communications and our public diplomacy activities is whole other thing, but institutionalizing our communications activities, I think which we'll probably do, is going to help us to get a long way to that. And we're also recruiting people now with communications background, where before that never existed. That chauvinism was there within the recruiting environment.

MS. DEYOUNG: Just on Smith-Mundt, going back to what the guys from DHS and Justice said, it seems to me that – just from listening to all of you talk – that there are very different interpretations from department to department on what you can do and what you can't

do. You know, the fact is that I get emails every day from – I mean, I must get 15 from Afghanistan, from the military, saying, here's what happened today. You know, we did this, we did that; they did this, they did that. From the White House you get these just-the-facts things – you know, here's what we're doing, on all kinds of foreign policy issues. The same with the State Department – you know, this whole public affairs function that was talked about.

Anybody in Dearborn, Michigan, can call that up and look at it, so why is there an interpretation that these things are prohibited, that they can't be distributed out there? I don't understand it. So my question about Smith-Mundt would be does it actually prevent things from being done, or is it as anachronistic as some departments of government appear to think it is, even as others have adopted what would appear from comments here to be fairly draconian firewalls that other departments don't pay any attention to at all?

MR. JACKSON: A question was asked about oversight – who does the oversight of the journalists? Are there any more? First of all, I hope the journalists are still going to be there for a long time to come, but I don't want to leave the impression that there's no oversight at Voice of America. Besides a cadre of professional editors, VOA and the other broadcasters also have something that even Karen doesn't have it at the Washington Post, nor probably would you want to have it, but that is an annual, outside, independent review of a panel of journalists and outside private-sector people to translate, look at the content, and sort of give the broadcasters some independent feedback and make sure they're adhering to the charter and the standards that they're obliged to work under.

And, finally –

MS. DEYOUNG: Well call that letters to the editor.

(Laughter.)

MR. JACKSON: And, finally, VOA's and the other broadcasters' audiences have always been a source of feedback. And, you know, if you get something wrong, you hear about it really fast. And that's good. I mean, you want to hear about it, and you correct it fast too. And I include in those audiences the embassies – you know, the embassies' staff, the embassies' officers, State Department people who speak the languages. And they do listen. And those of you in the audience who have done that, you know what I'm talking about.

You know, we live in an information-rich environment and it's hard to get away with not telling the truth on anything because there's, with very few exceptions – North Korea comes to mind – very few exceptions, even in countries where they don't have a lot of news sources, you can't get away with giving only one side for very long.

MR. LYNCH: I'd like to thank you all for an outstanding panel and a very interesting discussion. There was one question raised by, I believe, Chris Tomlinson which I think pointed to a discussion which we could continue having, and I would like to see in a much sharper form, which is essentially that a lot of this discussion, it seems to me, boils down to, as citizens, our trusting the government's intentions, which is something quite contrary to what a political

scientist would tell us to do, or many people's gut instinct; and secondly, on the ability, willingness and competence of journalists, as individuals and as institutions, to have – forgive me – a bullshit detector – (laughter) – which they might or might not be able, in practice, to exercise, and these strike me as rather thin reeds upon which to rest our understanding of what might protect the U.S. public from influence operations aimed abroad and coming inward.

I don't pretend to have an answer to this question, but as rich as this discussion was, I'm not at all sure that I'm comfortable that we've yet produced answers which would be reassuring to the American public and to many people involved in these policy debates, so luckily we have the entire afternoon to pursue those questions.

Mike Doran wanted to jump in but I didn't let him because he would then be the only thing standing between you and lunch, and I don't want to put him in that position. So I will turn it back over to Matt Armstrong.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Thanks, Marc. Now I'm standing between you and lunch. There's buffer built into this. Thank you, everybody before. Thanks for the panel and moderating. Thank you very much. (Applause.) As Marc mentioned, we don't have the answers yet. The plan – the hope is that this will be the first edition of a couple of meetings. That's to be laid out later, but I just want to give you that tease.

As for the rest of the schedule, lunch is already in boxes in the back. If you can go grab your lunch, grab your drink, come back, linger – what you want. You have time, until 12:45, when Mike will come up here and speak – former deputy assistant secretary of defense. And I'm curious how many of you, for you, that's the first time you knew that "former" is there. I'm still amazed. And so he's going to come up here at 12:45 to speak, so you have time until then. Then he will speak for one hour and then we'll have a short break before we go into our third panel. So go eat and we'll see you back here.

(END)