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**2009 SMITH-MUNDT SYMPOSIUM:
PANEL 3: REBUILDING THE ARSENAL OF PERSUASION**

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MATT ARMSTRONG: Okay, if everybody could sit down, we're going to start with panel three. Kristin Lord, who many of you, if not everybody of you, know, she's moderating this panel and I appreciate Mike Durant and his comments and everybody that's gone before. If you want to grab your drink, hopefully you did, and I think this panel's going to be interesting. We have two more panel discussions. We have this panel, of course, and then we have the congressional view, where we'll have two congressmen in here. And then after that your ticker tape at the end is the hosted reception downstairs. So let's go ahead. I'm going to turn this over to the Kristin now, and thank you.

KRISTIN LORD: Great. Thanks very much, Matt, and thanks so much for hosting this event. At this point in the day I think people want to increasingly contribute their thoughts instead of listen to presentations. So what I am going to do is follow the brief that's been given to me by Matt, which is simply to just ask the first question of our panel, let them respond, and then open the floor to you. And as we do that, I'm sure all of our panelists will have the chance to share any additional thoughts that they might have. So let me just jump in and get right to the point.

My question is this: When the original Smith-Mundt Act was signed, it was intended to do a couple of things. One was to provide a legal framework for conducting public diplomacy and strategic communications for the United States. One was, though, to encourage a higher level of engagement with the world. It also provided some guidance about how to do that.

So my question for the panel is this: If we were to develop a new Smith-Mundt Act, if we were to develop a Smith-Mundt Act for the 21st century, not for the beginning of the Cold War, what would that act look like? And again, I have in mind not just the legal framework, but also touching on some of these other points that the original act also did. So with that I'd just like to ask Ted if we could turn it over to him.

Let me quickly introduce the panelists, before we go down the line. We have Ted Tzavellas, who is vice president of S4, and also senior information policy and strategy advisory to the Joint Staff, DDGD.

TED TZAVELLAS: G-O.

MS. LORD: G-O, sorry. Going down, we have Nancy Snow, who's an associate professor at Syracuse University. She teaches courses on public diplomacy. We have deputy

assistant secretary of state for public diplomacy in the European Affairs Bureau, Colleen Graffy, recently of Twitter fame. And at the end we have Bill Kiehl, Dr. Bill Kiehl, who is president and CEO of PD Worldwide.

So with that I'd like to just quickly ask each of our panelists to reflect on this question for a moment and then we will open it up to the floor.

MR. TZAVELLAS: Good afternoon. You know, when I became a part of this – or invited to become part of this panel, I looked at the biographies and I realized that I was part of a group that comprised three Ph.D.s, one LL.D. and a Phi Beta Kappa key carrier, and it made me realize that I'm just a meanly born, poorly raised peasant product of the Louisiana public school system, over-educated beyond my means to comprehend what I was taught. So if I say anything that sounds stupid, let's just agree to assiduously smear a patina of ignorance on it and move on. That's a very good question and I pass on it. No.

You know, it was not long after the events of 9/11 that the world went from viewing Americans as victims to the world viewing American victims, or victims of America. And I think one of the reasons for that is that we failed to pay attention to the aesthetics of our policies, both in terms of our U.S. domestic audience as well as foreign audiences. Public opinion most assuredly does not drive policy, but selling and marketing and conveying – any number of verbs – that policy and the actions and operations that enstantiate (ph) that policy are important. You have to sit and say to yourself, when a policy is a mere kernel of thought in your mind as a policy-maker, you have to start thinking about how is it going to play in Peoria, how is it going to play in Baluchistan. And you have to integrate. I think you've heard this earlier from some other people. You have to integrate that communications strategy from the very beginning of that policy development.

That communications strategy has to comprise the full range of U.S. government perceptual assets and informational capabilities. And at the center of that are public diplomacy, public affairs, the military information operations, efforts by USAID, so on and so forth. That communications strategy goes from engagement, outreach at the highest levels, all the way down to the last three feet of public diplomacy as executed by soldiers in the field, by public diplomacy officers at embassies, so on and so forth.

So I guess if I were to recraft a new Smith-Mundt Act, I guess I would want something that recognizes that you've got to address that full range. It is no longer something that can be focused strictly on a non-U.S. audience. You have to recognize that it's – although it's focused there, I should say that it's going to spill back. And I think you have to recognize that it's as important for a U.S. domestic audience to recognize and understand what those policies mean, and what those actions and operations are really conducting and achieving.

I think, you know, also we hear new media all the time, but I think it's important that we recognize – I think I said it earlier, the death of distance and collapse of time have come at the hands of information technology. So whatever a new Smith-Mundt Act is, has to recognize those realities. That's kind of the first perspective I have.

NANCY SNOW: I just wanted to thank you for putting my name on this side as well, so I won't forget who I am. We've got our names and our affiliation. I'm Nancy Snow from Syracuse University. Just wanted to plug new dual-degree program, masters program in public diplomacy that we've started at Syracuse, where you earn a masters in public relations. I heard the luncheon speaker talk about how Glassman was different because we were getting away from PR, which I took to mean to – it seemed to imply that PR was a pejorative. I don't know. That's maybe another discussion. And then we combined the masters in PR with a masters in international relations from the Maxwell School. So when you're in the area, ski on over, okay? Or snowshoe on over and see us.

I just wanted to share that I did work at the U.S. Information Agency. I was a presidential management fellow and I'm still a big advocate for that program. I was there from '92 to '94, and my first book, "Propaganda, Inc." really came out of that experience. I've been known as sort of a curmudgeon when it comes to public diplomacy, or a contrarian at times; kind of the skunk at the garden party, if you will. So I'm going to be very frank about public diplomacy.

I think that going back to statements that were made at the very beginning, this morning – I've been here since the start – we are not bringing in all the actors involved in the public diplomacy process, in particular uniting those forces from the Hill and State and USIA when it still existed. For instance, when I was a PMF, then known as a PMI, I asked to work on the Hill, and actually had an invitation to work on the Appropriations Committee, overseeing the resources for public diplomacy. And my bosses at USIA turned me down, and it was, I think in their minds, a bit of a loyalty issue. There was probably some concern that I wasn't showing full, 100-percent commitment to USIA, even though I tried to make the persuasive argument that it's exceedingly important to train people in public diplomacy who knows how this plays out on the Hill. Nevertheless, I lost that argument.

But I was advocating then in '92, as I'm advocating today, to repeat myself, that we need mutual understanding, not only that comes out of the Fulbright-Hays and Smith-Mundt Act in terms of congressional legislation, but also with each other. And I couldn't help but think again, going back to the luncheon comments, that remember when Obama ran, he was known as "No drama Obama" because he had such exceptional message control and coordination. So I wonder sometimes if we need to have a campaign for the next under secretary of state for public diplomacy, and have people run for this office because you would then create competing interests, and you would get people out there who can coordinate their message, whatever it may be. It was McCain v. Obama. I still can't even get over the fact that McCain's so big in Africa. I thought that was a great story.

If I could be queen for a day, which occasionally I am in my own mind when I look in the mirror, I would expand public affairs, the public affairs side of the equation, which includes that mutual understanding. Remember, the Fulbright-Hays, it was designed – and I used to go around the corridors of USIA repeating this – it was like the Gettysburg Address to me, to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and people in other countries. That's that two-way exchange of information. I was always a little troubled with USIA's motto when I walked into work, and it said, "telling America's story to the world," as if it's one official

story. I thought the great beauty of what we had to offer the world was that we have a multitude of voices. So it's not just the Voice of America, but it's voices of America, it's stories about America.

Thirdly, back to Dick Arndt's comments earlier about Fulbright, I was a Fulbright student to Germany. Yes, it changed my life. We always say that. That's the proverbial statement. But in that realm we now have this coterie of Fulbright scholars, returned Fulbright scholars who could be excellent advocates if they were tasked to be. The Rotary program does a much better job, I think, with this multiplier effect because they require – they build it into your exchange program that you have to come back and share your experience. You have to go around and give talks. We didn't have that with the Fulbright program.

So in fact I had to call up the Fulbright Association and say, hey, I'm back. You want to use me for something? And I ended up doing my doctoral dissertation on Fulbright scholars as cultural mediators. I've never published it, but I actually interviewed and surveyed foreign Fulbright scholars about this dual hat of being bicultural mediators. There were some interesting – there was interesting data that came out of that. I hope to update it. It was from 1992. But there was a need for, I think it was Pat earlier talking about, or several of you, cultural sensitivity, intercultural communication, having cultural knowledge but being able to operate both as a translator of culture as well as a synthesizer. In other words, to take your host country attributes and mores and cultural norms and to share those with your counterparts in your home country.

I think, too, in terms of two-way communication, we need to study the public diplomacy apparatus of other countries. If we're going to revamp Smith-Mundt, if I can keep my queen hat on. I'm amazed that there has been little if no mention of soft power. What a shock. Which is of course Joe Nye's term of this nonviolent aspirational persuasion, that there are different definitions to it, but each country has its own strength in different public diplomacy arenas. I think ours is still being a repository for so many international exchange scholars. Even throughout the war on terror and the declining image of the United States in the world, we still had people coming here wanting to have the U.S. experience because if we were to create a new motto for our country, it could be, "your home away from home." I mean, is there any other diversity and coming together of peoples from all over the world than the United States?

So I think that we can continue to be really true to who we are if we just dig a little deeper and get in touch really with our message.

I had a few more notes but I may have to stop there. I'm usually like giving a talk on my own, so I have to zip it.

Oh, I will add, active listening. I'm talking too much. But there's a two-to-one ratio, right? Ears, eyes, to mouth. And I do think in terms of monitoring listening, really listening, not just mm-hmm, mm-hmm, and then waiting to say what you're going to say. We have become a nation with an image and reputation of being declamatory, making statements. This doesn't always work to our favor because we have in the last several years amplified our message, as if all we need to do is speak louder and they'll get it. In fact, many of our international friends are

telling us, no, we get it. We may not like it, and why don't you listen to sort of our – not just grievances but our perspective.

So I'm really hopeful that we will enter into an age of really active engagement and active listening, and build that mutual understanding apparatus, which we already had there, that foundation. Thank you.

COLLEEN GRAFFY: Good afternoon. What would I do immediately about Smith-Mundt? I sort of agree with Glassman and Mike Doran that tinkering with it is going to be a big project and there's a lot of things that we actually don't want to toss out. So to simplify things, I would say immediately, starting this morning, this afternoon, to stop the self-censorship. By that I mean, ever since I joined the State Department, which was in September 2005, I've heard nothing but, well, I think that's a Smith-Mundt issue. I think that's a Smith-Mundt issue. I'm not sure that we can do that. I don't think that we can do this. SM this, SM that, sounds like State Department's gone kinky. (Laughter.)

But it really – for example, this morning I twittered, and I said, am I breaking the law by telling you about www.america.gov? You probably know [America.gov](http://www.america.gov) is for overseas, not for the United States. So if someone comes in in handcuffs before the afternoon, you'll know that it is breaking the law. But looking at that, it's obviously ridiculous to have an Internet site that cannot be promulgated here.

So I had on my signature card Colleen Graffy, deputy assistant secretary, State Department, address, and go to – to learn more about our public diplomacy, go to <http://Europe.state.gov>, left-hand side public diplomacy, where we have a whole section on public diplomacy. Well, that includes my speech I gave at Chatham House, on what is America doing to improve its image abroad. Am I allowed to do that?

I also had down, look at www.america.gov, and a message went out saying, take that off your signature card because you can't be having [America.gov](http://www.america.gov) on your signature card because that's for overseas. So there is an example of what we do not do because of Smith-Mundt. Now I already received a reply to my Twitter about [America.gov](http://www.america.gov), with that was Nirvanacable (ph), who said, the design of [America.gov](http://www.america.gov) has all the trills of a DMV office. Design contest couldn't hurt. However, I love dipnotes.

So I mean, terrific that the American people are giving feedback to say, you know, if we're going to have a Web site that's representing our country, I think we could kick it up a notch and do something better, and I'd like – you know, have a design contest so that we can participate. Fantastic. Great. So we miss out on empowering the American people and improving our public diplomacy abroad.

Now love-is-a-talk (ph) also replied to say about the [America.gov](http://www.america.gov), it depends on who your followers are. Well, I have followers from all over the United States but all over the world. So I then twittered, if I tell my American followers about <http://tiny.cc/ppd1>, will I be breaking the law? Well, [ppd1](http://tiny.cc/ppd1) is this. What we did was we took all of our highlights from our embassies, which heretofore you've never seen because they sent them in written form, which no one ever

read. We turned it into a visual product so that we would educate our bureau of European and Eurasian affairs, educate the State Department on what it is that our embassies are doing, so that the policy folks understand the value of public diplomacy, and we create that merger that everyone's talking about between the two.

But we also said, the American people need to know about this. So we took our weekly highlights and compiled a monthly one for external distribution. The immediate response was, we cannot do this. We cannot do this Smith-Mundt because these events, taxpayer, overseas, so to be disseminating this in America, we're not allowed to do this. So what we did was we – and this goes to the person who was talking about PA and PD, we scrubbed this through big PA at the State Department. So I feel like I'm money-laundering, right? So I'm taking the same information and I'm putting it through public affairs to create this product that we're now putting out. From this it allows us to also do this one on our green diplomacy. Wouldn't it be a good idea for people in America to know that we're actually doing a lot around the world about the environment, about climate change, about green diplomacy, as we call it? And we also have this product, which is our did-you-know, and it's specifically for our Muslim engagement.

I would guess virtually everyone in America does not know that we have a senior advisor on Muslim engagement at the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, and that we have a huge Muslim engagement program, including Muslim-Americans. So this product is essentially supposed to be for overseas, but why shouldn't Muslims in America know about this? And in fact, that's what we've done, putting it through Public Affairs, where we reach out to the Muslim community to say, would you like to be part of our citizen dialogue, where you can go overseas to meet with Muslims in Germany and France and the Netherlands, in order to talk about the experience here in the United States?

We are also asking all of our embassies to do something similar to our monthly one, so that every embassy would have a newsletter. Many of them think, oh, well, you can just go to our Web site and see it. But as you know, that's a pull-down, not a push-out. You've got to push it out. So uncensored, unfiltered. We can actually – maybe the media doesn't pick up good news stories, but this is a way for our embassies to be sharing in their own country the good public diplomacy that they're doing.

So for example, in Poland they have over 6,000 newsletters that are going out electronically, for no cost, to people around Poland. Well, why not send it to the Polish diaspora in America? Again, that would be a Smith-Mundt question, could we do that.

Now I Twittered my trip to Romania, another one to Moldova, Iceland, Croatia, Armenia, and I had two purposes. One is that I wanted to start connecting with people that were in that country, so I was meeting with Moldovan bloggers, and it was fun for them to know in advance that what I was doing so that when we sat down at the coffee shop we just continued right into the conversation. It was fantastic. When I met with the students from the University of Romania, Bucharest, they already knew that I'd been up in the middle of the night the night before and hadn't had breakfast or coffee, and they felt like they already knew me. And they said this made me more approachable, and they felt like they could talk and continue the conversation. That was one audience.

But the other audience was the United States. They don't know what public diplomacy is, what a diplomat does. So how do we look at when you're twittering and you've actually got two audiences going into both arenas?

It also, I think, affects our funding because when people don't know the public diplomacy that's going on, Congress unaware of it, then there's this view out there that America isn't doing public diplomacy, or if they are, they're not doing a very good job. So they're not hearing the fantastic and great stories. I'm very discouraged when I hear about congressman that actually don't want attention paid to their trips overseas where they're doing public diplomacy because it will be held against them in their campaign back in the United States because this is seen as a big boondoggle. Well, this is not good for the American people, that our Congress individuals are not wanting to go out and showcase the work that they're doing overseas. It also prevents American people from knowing what their taxpayer dollar is paying for, so I don't think that's good.

I see journalists – for example, Anne Applebaum had a column that I remember distinctively because she described that America's not thanking all of our allies for their engagement and participation in Afghanistan and Iraq. But yet we have stories about our ambassador – I think it was in the Czech Republic – who parachuted out of a plane to land to thank the troops in that country for what they're doing. And any number of stories about how our embassies are thanking the military in that country, but yet that's not known to the people, and also to the media. And of course it prevents the sort of synergies that I think are important to engage a public-private partnership in doing a better public diplomacy.

So for the future, we're really needing in every single embassy someone who focuses on social media networking. And that's going to mean the people of that country, but also around the world, diaspora and countries all over, including the United States. I think that every embassy is going to need a Facebook page because currently our embassy pages do not allow us to have the sort of vivacious content that young people are interested in. We're going to need to have the capacity to put up videos on youtube, and many of our embassies are doing this. So it's a whole new way of thinking of the way we're doing public diplomacy.

Now I have two other things which I'm not going to go into. One is, if I'm queen for the day, finish the merger, and I can go into that in the Q&A. And the other issue, stop the CRs, so if you don't know what that is, you'll have to ask me about it again in the Q&A.

BILL KIEHL: Smith-Mundt. I'll get to that in a minute. Okay, well, I'm Bill Kiehl and I'm not a legend of USIA but I worked for some. I worked there for about 30 years and then I moved over to the State Department for my last three years, after the anschluss of 1999. Now you might say, oh, he's an ex-USIA person, and therefore, all he wants to do is whine about that and say, bring back USIA, bring back USIA, bring back – oh yes. Good idea. But perhaps in a different form. Most of you would probably assume that, so I won't say it too often.

The 1953 Buick Roadmaster was a fabulous car in its time. I mean, if I were able to drive in 1953, I would have loved to have owned that car. It was terrific. But you know, in 2009

I'd rather have a Z4. And that's sort of how I feel about public diplomacy. The 1953 USIA, which lasted until 1999, was a terrific car in its time. It really was a joy to drive and to work for. But it's a new age, so we need a new vehicle. If not a Z4, maybe a Lexus. Something different, something more in tune with the times.

So I don't think – is Mike still here? I'm taking this couple of minutes because I was somewhat frustrated because I wanted to say all this in response to his presentation, and if he's gone, would you mind taking accurate notes and passing it along to him? (Laughter.)

You know, there is a need for an agency to do public diplomacy. You don't have to call it USIA, but you need an operational agency that can pull a lot of these tools together, with people who are dedicated solely to that work. Public diplomacy is everybody's job but not everybody can do public diplomacy well. You have to have a natural gift for engaging people. You know, you have to be a type-A personality to some degree. You need to go out there and not be afraid of falling on your face. That's a type of personality, and not every State Department officer has that. They try hard, and they do wonderful things when they engage in public diplomacy. And they also do best if they're in the guidance of a professional public diplomat. So we do need that kind of independent operational agency.

But I disagree with Mike in putting the center of the universe in the State Department in an office of the under secretary. Nobody in the State Department pays any attention to an under secretary now. Why would anybody outside the State Department pay any attention to an under secretary of state? I mean, they do pay deference but they don't pay attention. So what you need in order to get attention is to have it in the office of the president. That's who can say I want you to do this, and everybody will pretty much do it.

So I would like to see an office in the presidency similar to OMB, or similar to OPM. OMB does great things for budget across the government. Everybody listens to OMB. Not to listen to OMB is suicide. OPM does the same thing in essentially personnel, human relations. People have to pay attention to OPM or they get in big trouble.

Well, maybe we ought to have an office that does strategic communication, or whatever you want to call it. I'm not so hung up on these terms. Global engagement. Whatever. So that everybody has to pay attention to that office. And it could be cross-cutting across all government. So that's my solution to this conundrum. Get the centralized point in the office of the president so people actually pay attention and have a real operational agency very similar to what USIA was, but in a modern version, to do the hard grunt work. And put the emphasis on the overseas posts.

I wrote a piece not too long ago called "The Case for Localized Public Diplomacy." It's in Nancy's book, so read it, please. It's a good book, all of it. And you know, the creative ideas in public diplomacy and the real oomph in public diplomacy is really formulated there. The people who work overseas in jobs in embassies or in American cultural centers when we have them, et cetera, they actually understood a society, they understood, even more importantly, what works in that society. Placing the information that they needed to get to people in the context of the society. That's what it's all about. And building relationships over time. So that's – okay,

I've finished that piece. So there you know, that's what an ex-USIA person tends to think. Or at least one of them does.

Now the Smith-Mundt Act. I actually don't think we need a new Smith-Mundt Act. The Smith-Mundt Act has essentially been amended by the modern age. Sure, it still says prohibition on the dissemination of blah, blah, blah. Nobody actually pays any attention to that. Can I tell you a big secret? Now that the statute of limitations is in force, I've probably violated the Smith-Mundt Act a dozen times. Please don't tell the Smith-Mundt police. (Laughter.) Now granted, the Smith-Mundt police are not particularly active because no one has ever been charged with violating the Smith-Mundt Act. Oh, since 1948, and no one's ever been charged with violating the Smith-Mundt Act? How about that.

Len Baldyga, you've violated the Smith-Mundt Act, didn't you? Barry Zorthian, you probably did, didn't you? Whether you do advertently or inadvertently – well, Barry actually violated it before 1948. (Laughter.) And repeatedly.

Well, look, before I take up too much more time, and I'm sure we've got a lot of time for questions and give and take among the panel here, and Kristin's looking at me like, all right, shut up. That's the point I wanted to make, that the Smith-Mundt Act is very important. I can commend Matt for bringing us all together to discuss the Smith-Mundt Act because it leads us to more important discussions than the Smith-Mundt Act. The Smith-Mundt Act is fine. In fact, it's a very good act. As Dick Arndt mentioned earlier today, it forms the basis for everything we have done in international information, cultural, and educational exchanges. It's a terrific thing. So it's the baby. Don't throw it out with the bath water.

And if you want to amend it and tweak it and get rid of that one little provision, okay, but you know, it doesn't matter because no one really has to pay attention to it. The modern age has amended it. And that's about all I want to say for right now. But be prepared for more. Thank you.

MS. LORD: Great. And Colleen has one quick aside.

MS. GRAFFY: The problem is the self-censorship that I described. So even if we can agree that we don't necessarily have to amend it, we do need to have an interpretation that's broadcast very widely within the government to say, yes, it's all right to do this and this and this and this. I think that is one of the most critical aspects of our conversation today.

MR. TZAVELLAS: Colleen, but isn't the interpretation or the finding, the adjudication, whatever the term is, what is your intent? If your intent isn't to speak to the American people, then who cares? So is that not enough? Or do you think that people are just interpreting it too strictly?

MS. GRAFFY: I think just saying from the under secretary for public diplomacy, be aware that Smith-Mundt, you need to think through, is the intent in order to propagandize the American people, or is the intent this? And then we want to inform the American people, to just lay that out there – because people are making decisions every day about not doing something

that I think would be good for public diplomacy, and they're not doing it because they're self-censoring because of Smith-Mundt.

MR. KIEHL: In my humble opinion, the people who say that are people who don't want to do something and it's a convenient excuse.

MS. GRAFFY: No, it's good, sincere people that –

MR. KIEHL: Don't want to do something.

(Laughter.)

MS. LORD: All right, well, thanks very much for our panel. Let me just lay the groundwork here for our discussion. And the question again was, what would a new Smith-Mundt Act for the future look like? And our panel told us, first starting with Bill, that we don't need a new Smith-Mundt Act, but we need a new act that does not start with the initials SM, that would create a new, modernized version of USIA, and that public diplomacy would have a localized focus.

We heard that a new Smith-Mundt Act would allow people in the State Department and doing public diplomacy across the government from censoring themselves and that would be a very important thing to include. We heard that a new Smith-Mundt Act would focus on the need for mutual understanding in the two-way relationships that need to be built through public diplomacy. And we need a Smith-Mundt Act, Ted told us, that would help us to understand – that would help us to account for this international information environment we live in now that's incredibly open, where we don't have barriers between domestic and foreign. And he also emphasized a new Smith-Mundt Act that would focus on the need for American audiences to understand the world, as well as a need for the world to understand Americans.

So with that as a starting point, now I'd like to open the floor up to you. Bill. Would you please introduce yourselves before asking question.

Q: Yes. I'm Bill Rue (ph) at Tufts University. I want to congratulate Bill Kiehl for a couple of things. One, for saying what's absolutely true, that nobody pays any attention to the Smith-Mundt Act, certainly in the field, and we've heard that earlier, except for Colleen Graffy, who is self-censoring. I would amend – okay, well, some people are. Some people are worried about it. They never get arrested, they never get chastised or miss promotions because of violating it.

So if I had the ability to persuade Congress to make a change, I would abolish the restriction on reaching Americans for one reason, and that is that perhaps the public diplomacy efforts that the United States carries out would be better understood by the American public and better funded. Other agencies of government, particularly the Pentagon, but the State Department too, and public affairs, are unhindered in speaking about their activities to the American public. But somehow USIA and its successor representatives in the State Department feel hindered by it, and it's ridiculous and anachronistic.

Another thing I'm pleased to hear from Bill Kiehl that I haven't heard from really anybody else is the importance of the field operations. This discussion today has been about Washington. Smith-Mundt is a Washington issue, and that's fine, but so much of the work is being done by field operations, and so many of the proposals for reform recommend things that are already being done around the world by PAOs at embassies. Thank you.

MR. TZAVELLAS: You know, we do recognize the last three feet of public diplomacy. It's executed out there in the field. So I think we do recognize that. But let me ask you a question, or just throw this out. You say let's do away with the proscription, you know, of communicating with Americans. Is it the Americans' part, or is it the propaganda part, the perception that we're propagandizing? I mean, where is the bad part here? Is it the Americans' part, or is it the propaganda part? Because as I understand Smith-Mundt, that's what the roots were, were in the propaganda. So is it the Americans or is it the propaganda? I'm not looking to open that can of worms, but I'd throw that out as at least something to consider.

MS. SNOW: Let me just add something about propaganda because I write a lot about propaganda. We need to get over our hang-up about the fact that the world recognizes the world over that we – the U.S. is one of the most propagandistic nations on the planet. And this idea that we're always telling the truth, you can go back and look at the history before we had the Com schools and the J schools. We had the Harold Lasswells, Walter Lippmanns, Edward Beret (ph) talking about our propaganda versus their propaganda, or propaganda in a plural concept.

The difference between bad and good propaganda came down to intention, and we've been talking about intention all day, so it had to do with the consequences, of course, as a result of the intention. And where propaganda becomes a dirty word to people is that we often put the results first, and ethics sort of goes by the wayside. Whenever I travel overseas – I lived in Beijing, China last year. I mean, they use propaganda all the time there, interchangeably with publicity. As far as I can see, this is becoming China's century as we're sort of navel-gazing about maybe we shouldn't use this word. But I think we need to go back and re-visit the history. So I would say it has to do more with this idea of propagandizing.

MR. TZAVELLAS: I pride myself on having a lot of honesty and integrity, and my only difficulty is I can't give you both at the same time. So you have to tell me which one you want. (Laughter.)

You know, having said that, I've been involved in a lot of litigation in the past –

MS. LORD: About the Smith-Mundt Act –

MR. TZAVELLAS: No, against the tobacco industry and Publishers Clearinghouse and other such things. But lawyers tend to look at, well, what is the definition of propaganda in this case? Lawyers always go, let's open the book. So I did. Information, especially of a biased or misleading nature used to promote or publicize a particular political cause or point of view.

So I mean, are we doing propaganda? And I'm also of the belief that propaganda is in the eye of the beholder. I mean, when Charlotte Mears (ph) developed her shared values program, that wasn't propaganda, neither by definition nor by intent nor by stretch of the imagination. But as soon as that was rolled out, you know, you've got the feedback from our friends in Egypt and elsewhere saying, this is nothing but propaganda. So it's in the eye of the beholder, just like pornography.

MS. GRAFFY: That's the first question I get when I've overseas, is, isn't public diplomacy just propaganda? And I have to say, we can't do propaganda in this day and age. Propaganda is one way. It's the 1.0. It's one way. What we're engaging in public diplomacy has got to be two ways. So I described public diplomacy as the art of communicating, which means two ways. Communicating our policies but also our values and our culture, and you can't do propaganda in this day and age and be effective.

MR. KIEHL: I don't disagree with you, but I would say, let's get off the term propaganda. It has a lot of negative connotations and it goes back to Goebbels. Everybody thinks of Goebbels, or Soviet propaganda, et cetera. Let's make it a little more neutral. If you want to talk about influence, or information dissemination with a purpose to influence, that's really what we're all about. I mean, it's not just information for the sake of education. Come on. I don't think the taxpayer would want to spend his or her money on that. The reason we do this is to try to have some influence in the world, and there's nothing wrong with that. If you want to use that instead of propaganda, I think we can all buy off on it.

MS. GRAFFY: Can I tweet for a second? What's the difference between a person of influence and an agent of influence? I mean, there are different connotations there, aren't they? Becoming a person of influence sounds like how to become more like Oprah Winfrey, having persuasive qualities. An agent of influence, doesn't that have a more negative connotation to it?

MR. KIEHL: It's the agent part. That's why USIA was USIS overseas. The agency part is kind of another one of those scary terms.

MS. LORD: Gentle panel members, I'm going to take three questions at a time now. Yes, one, and two, and then over here, Doug.

Q: Bill has identified me as a fan of Smith-Mundt. Of course I am. It's a necessary evil. But it's not a very good act. And as I pointed out, it was superseded in 1961 by Fulbright-Hays Act. By decision of the legal office of USIA under Charles Z. Wick, it was decided that Smith-Mundt lived and that Fulbright-Hays was the authority for the soft side, and Smith-Mundt was authority for the hard side, which was a lot of nonsense. But that needs to be revisited.

Now, no one's really answered the question that Kristin put to you – what would you do tomorrow with regard to this act. Now I'll tell you what I would do. Very simple. The first part is simple, the second part is complicated. First of all, recognize that Fulbright-Hays superseded Smith-Mundt, and then tweak Fulbright-Hays a little bit to bring it up to date. It won't take a lot because it was written, as Wayne Hays, the co-sponsor said, if you lawyers – if you can't find

authority for whatever you want to do in this act, then get your lawyers to look again because it's there. Okay, so that's step one.

Now, step two is a much more complicated process and would take longer. Following Fulbright-Hays, there was a committee of Congress, an inter-house committee, at which the jurisdiction was gerrymandered. In other words, you do this, you do that, you do that over there, and they drew these complicated lines down the middle of this administration, this legislation, so that AID did this, USIA did that, CU in State did that. Peace Corps wasn't even mentioned in those days. And so forth and so on.

All right, now that is really out of date, really out of date. And particularly when someone like Mike Doran says that this agency doing this, whatever it is, needs coordinative power. Then you don't want AID over there saying, well, we do this, you know, according to our mandate, and we don't do what you want us to do. We just do what we want to do, and so forth. So that's the easy part and the hard part. But the hard part isn't that hard when you come right down to it because it's all common sense now, it seems to me.

MS. LORD: Second question.

Q: Hi. My name is Joe Milata. I'm with the State Department, a Foreign Service officer. I just wanted to pick up on one of the issues that was raised about Smith-Mundt, and the issue of resources and all, and I think it's a really important point that we haven't touched on. And as an officer in the field thinking about it, I think there are certain aspects of Smith-Mundt that are useful and worthwhile to consider, namely, if we are working in the field or here in Washington or wherever and our focus is on foreign audiences, if we have to turn our attention as well to talking to domestic audiences in the United States continuously, that's a drain on resources, and resources we don't have.

I mean, if you have in the State Department a bureau of public affairs that is geared toward dealing with media in the United States, that is their purview and they should be the ones who handle it. They're funded for that and they have the expertise for that. And so working together between the public diplomacy side and public affairs to get those messages out through that channel is an appropriate bureaucratic way of handling things. I mean, I think that the lines of communication are well enough established and work well enough in the United States State Department that we can rely on it to a certain extent.

Likewise, if you're looking at broadcasting or at some of the publications, as long as you can rely on the fact that Smith-Mundt says that the focus of those efforts has to be overseas and not domestically, then you don't run the risk of saying some of the things – having some of the things happen that George Clack referred to previously, of schools in the United States saying, we like that book about the United States Constitution. Can you get us some? And then you have a supply chain problem where you can't provide those resources to schools across the country because you're not resourced to do that. Your focus is supposed to be on foreign audiences.

Likewise, if you're focusing on international audiences with broadcasting and you can rely on the fact that you have a law that says that should be your focus, then you're not cast with trying to turn that broadcasting effort into a domestic outreach effort, which if you tried to get into the American broadcasting market is going to be a huge drain on resources, which is going to take away from what you're trying to do overseas. So I think there are elements of Smith-Mundt that actually do support what the State Department is trying to do, and actually provide an excellent context, and we shouldn't throw that out. We have to keep that in mind. I don't think we've really brought that up too much.

MR. KIEHL: You know, you make some very –

MS. LORD: (Off mike.)

MR. KIEHL: Oh, sorry. Okay. Hold the thought.

Q: Thanks, and thanks for doing that, Bill, because this is actually an endorsement of what you had to say and what Bill Rue had to say with regard to personnel. When the Smith-Mundt Act was drafted, there was no mention really of personnel, of the human resources. But you have a situation now where you don't have a regeneration, a new generation really, of public diplomacy practitioners, people who are motivated to come in and spend their careers doing the kinds of things that a lot of young people are doing via NGOs because they don't want to come into the government.

So my question is this to the panel. If you are looking at Smith-Mundt, or maybe legislation is not the right way to do it, how do you address the credibility of those who are our public diplomacy practitioners? Do you believe that those people working around the globe remain kind of the linchpin of our efforts to inform and educate and listen to foreign audiences? Or are the other tools of public diplomacy, do they supersede them? But if you do believe that the human resources remain the key, how do you revitalize this, and how do you give these people the credibility they need to do their job, which I would, speaking personally, posit they don't have?

With all due respect to Twitter, I think that that takes a secondary role to the long-term communication efforts by people who are trained and want to spend their lives and careers doing this work.

MS. LORD: Take one more question.

Q: Yes, question and then a brief comment. The question is, it seems to me that some of the sillier applications of Smith-Mundt restrictions could be overtaken if the products of Smith-Mundt were susceptible to FOIA, to the Freedom of Information Act, so that when schools or attorneys or politicians or journalists or academics or anyone else asked for product, they would be able to receive it based on the reimbursement rules, and so on.

The comment, and this sort of gets a little bit to what Bill was talking about with the Buick to be replaced by a Lexus, probably should be a hybrid. I think people need to remember

that the USIA didn't go out of business, didn't get disestablished because it was a relic of the Cold War. It got disestablished because USAID did not get disestablished. I mean, basically it was a – USIA would be in existence today but for the politics surrounding Jesse Helms and Madeleine Albright and Vice President Gore, and trying to consolidate international affairs agencies. But Helms' real target was not USIA, but USAID. When he missed, it was USIA that was hit and disestablished.

MS. LORD: Sir, would you please introduce yourself?

Q: I'm sorry. I'm Joe Brons (ph) from WETA, but formerly with the USIA.

MS. LORD: Thanks. Why don't we start with you this time, Bill.

MR. KIEHL: Do I just take one? Well, I think you made some good points about the resource aspects of this, and that's looking at the glass half empty. You can also look at the glass half full and say, oh, you know, Smith-Mundt's a handy little thing to have because any time we – well, for example. I was involved in something called yellow rain. Does anybody remember that? The bugs and gas business, chemical and biological warfare back in the early '80s. Well, to make a long story short, we got the State Department to print up and create a white paper about Soviet influence in the chemical, biological weapons area, or actions, I should say, and then USIA distributed it overseas. So it was a PA product. They paid for it. USIA got a free ride. It's not the only time USIA got a free ride on those kinds of publications. You get State PA to pay for it because they wanted it internally to, you know, propagandize the American public. But we used it overseas for the legitimate purposes of disseminating information and educating people abroad. So they used it for the spin in the United States and we used it for an education purpose overseas.

Okay, sorry. Enough of that. Maybe I'm too subtle.

You have some very legitimate points here, and of course it can flow either way. You can either win or lose on that. Should I just stop with that? Well, on the personnel thing. Look, you can't stop me. I'm just this kind of person. Sorry.

On the personnel side, you know what you have to do is give people something at the end of the rainbow. There are a lot of bright people who want to be PD officers in the State Department right now, but they're in dead-end jobs. First of all, they're not getting PD, PD, PD, PD. They're getting consular, admin, PD, political, consular, whatever. They're not getting enough experience in public diplomacy to even know what it's all about.

And then of course just about the time they get it figured out, there's no job because there aren't any senior level positions in public diplomacy any more. So if you want to make a career in the State Department, you've got to be a DCM, or you've got to, you know, shoot for something else. And that's a real problem. If that little twist were corrected, even in the bankrupt system that we have now it would mean a lot because you'd get a lot more enthusiasm in public diplomacy than you currently have because there's really no place to go if you're in PD. I'll leave it at that. Thanks, Joe. I appreciate your thoughts.

MS. GRAFFY: We're all familiar with the magic eye pictures where you look at something and you can see one picture, or you look at it long enough and you see another picture. I sort of feel we're at that moment where people from USIA, Foreign Service officers who see that image and see the R bureau and ECA and IIP as kind of a USIA and are contemplating we need to replicate that outside of State, or make it work within.

Then there's this other vision that is, I think, what the merger was supposed to be about. That's where my position was created, which was as a public diplomacy deputy assistant secretary. Because as I'm sure you all know, currently the deputy assistant secretaries break down the geographic portfolio further. And the idea was that I was supposed to be right there at the policy table, sitting with our assistant secretary, Dan Freid (ph), but also connected with the under secretary for public diplomacy, to sort of straddle both. The problem is, we've never really implemented that because only the Bureau for European and Eurasian Affairs did that.

So I think that this is a model that we should look closer at because it gets to what Mike Durant was saying about getting inside the DNA, that it's not just about the bilateral relationship. It's understanding the public diplomacy part. Now you might say, well, she would say that, wouldn't she, since she's in that position? But I can also say that my public diplomacy desk officers feel the same way because what we did was, instead of all sitting together, we embedded them into the country team regions, so that they are also the public diplomacy expert, side by side with the policy people. They love it. And they say they would never go back to the idea that they're outside of State or they're not at the policy table. So pulling them and putting them in an R, a functional bureau, would just be taking a step backward to where we're trying to be.

So we have, for example, our PD desk officer on Kosovo, she's getting amazing face time with the deputy assistant secretary for the Balkan region. I mean, our desk wouldn't think of doing anything without immediately consulting that PD officer. So our desk officers are hugely empowered with the policy people, getting face time, getting known with the front office.

But going to your point, it's all about – and I repeat this mantra over and over and over again – how are we bringing value to the field, because that is our whole purpose in Washington is bringing value to the field. So everything that we're doing with our desk officers is to be enabling those individuals. And so when you say about, with all due respect to twittering, no need to respect it. It's not a matter of hierarchy, secondary, so on. It's just a tool. So it's like saying, should we use television or radio or print. We need to use whatever tool is most effective.

So I did this as an experiment to see how can this new social media networking tool be used, and it's phenomenal. I mean, I have craigslist as one of the followers, and we're talking about how we could have a craigslist in order to connect people with public diplomacy projects. And our embassy in London is twittering. So this morning Esta (ph), as you probably know, is a big deal now. And they're able to twitter, and their twittering followers are growing. And our embassy, one in Africa and Ottawa, are also doing this.

So there's, I think, a need to look at a new model which creates special public diplomacy officers who are close to the policy. And as you say about the dead end, we have one of our PD desk officers, one of our PD people who's a DCM, another who's just made a DCM, another who's a DCM, another who's been made ambassador. So there's lots of examples. And this also means that the dynamics are changing of having people that become experts in PD and then just stay in PD because they're moving into all sorts of other directions.

Q: Can I – I think you're missing the whole point, Mr. Kiehl. It's just sad. There happen to be no sitting public diplomacy professionals on any of these panels today. I told Matt long before today that this is a problem. It is a problem. I am a PD professional. I think there are others here in the group who should speak up as necessary.

Mr. Kiehl hit on a very real problem in the career Foreign Service today with public diplomacy professionals. Yes, we are in a hiatus between what was and what will be. And part of what we're really talking about with the future of Smith-Mundt is what will be with people who are defined as public diplomacy professionals. We are losing, we have lost in a larger sense the career track that was. That doesn't mean being DCM and ambassadors. That's what a State Department person does. That is what we're losing.

I can't be a desk for public diplomacy. I'm not a political appointee. There are several of them. That's why –

MS. : You don't have –

Q: Excuse me! That is one job that I cannot aspire to. I can go ahead and be a public affairs officer somewhere. Those positions are being downgraded step by step. I happen to come in under a different system so almost all my jobs have been public diplomacy jobs. Somebody coming in now, as Bill just said, would probably end up doing two, three, maybe more tours outside of the – this is a very different system. How do you define this for the future? How do you get good people to do PD work? How do you do it in the State Department? These are very, very serious questions.

And it's not to make political officers out of us. It's not to make us chiefs of mission. It's how to conduct public diplomacy. Thank you.

MS. GRAFFY: Just to point out that Glenn Davies is a career Foreign Service officer and he's the PD desk for EAP. And so the idea would be to have these positions in all the bureaus. Some could be political appointees, some career, but at the moment they haven't implemented it, and I think it would be a fantastic opportunity for career officers to be able to be a PD desk.

MS. SNOW: Wow. Okay. I'm up there in Syracuse. I'm in the ivory tower, and I'll tell you what they're saying out there in that field, and that is that many of these young people do not want to go into government service. In fact, we had a number of them really resisting this internship build-in that we made as part of our two-year masters program, where they would come to Washington, D.C., and do internships. In fact, many of them wanted to go abroad.

They wanted to go to New York, they wanted to go to other cities. They're interested in working for nongovernmental organizations, environmental organizations. They feel somewhat constrained by the government track.

Now, I talked to them about presidential management fellows program, but then I finished the program and went into the academy, so I'm not the best model. And why did I do that? Because I felt constrained too. For one, I was a non-FSO. I was not on the Foreign Service track. I was on the civilian track. I saw a lot of political appointees who got to do all the fun stuff. And meanwhile I was picking up faxes and reading the paper sometimes until 10:00. I didn't have enough to do there, frankly, even as a PMF in that prestigious program.

So who are the most influential actors today? I'm not sure if it is a James Glassman or deputy assistant secretary. It may be an Angelina Jolie is a public diplomat working on behalf of the U.N. We talked about, briefly about UNESCO earlier, but really, who are the persons of influence out there?

My objective over my career in the last 16 years or 14 years since I left USIA is to make public diplomacy the people's business, to make it everybody's business. And you do that by decentralizing it somewhat, demystifying it, and also taking it away from the elite confines of what Washington, D.C., often represents to people, and that is, you give people a voice of persuasion in international relations and not just rely on the experts.

I guess this goes back to John Dewey versus Walter Lippmann. Lippmann said, you know, that public opinion has to rest in the elites, in the hands of the elites because the public is nothing but a bewildered herd, according to Lippmann. Well, I'm in the Dewey camp. I believe that people really can get the impetus to want to be public diplomats, to really care about their role as global citizens.

I will tell you, the buzz word that my students use in this masters program in public diplomacy is indeed becoming a global citizen. They care a lot about that. They care about human rights. They care about the direction of this country. But even more, they care about the direction of the planet.

Q: (Inaudible, off mike.)

MS. SNOW: Well, we might be chasing our tails a little bit, but I'll do my part.

MR. KIEHL: Nancy, be careful. You may be crushed by the stampede.

MR. TZAVELLAS: The only thing I have to say is I'm a thorn between two roses and we ought to take more questions.

MS. LORD: Okay, more questions, then. Yes. And while we're waiting for the mike to be passed, in universities outside of Syracuse, in places like Washington, D.C., there are a lot of students who want to be public diplomacy professionals in the State Department. And I just left

George Washington University where we have literally thousands of students in that camp. So I think it partially depends where you're working.

Q: Thanks, Kristin. Darius Oodrey (ph), Center for Civic Education. There seems to me to be a contradiction in some of what's been said so far between public diplomacy as a strategic activity with a message, a consistent America story, versus a kind of public diplomacy that is a conversation or a dialogue that engages in an open, free-flowing kind of exchange of views and information, potentially off-message.

I was wondering if the panelists could address this issue, and how they see the future of public diplomacy. Can these two be combined? Should they be separated? Should they be one package? Or should we focus on one or the other.

MS. LORD: Three more.

Q: Thank you. This is Dennis Murphy again, from the Army War College. Just to talk to both Bill and Colleen's piece about Smith-Mundt and the fact that, you know, if you violate it, you won't be prosecuted, you don't have to worry about that, and Colleen's piece about it, that we self-censor.

I come from a background of about 35 years in an organization of rules, regulations, doctrine, and our culture says, by God, if it's outside those rules, regulations or doctrine, don't do it. That's kind of the way we're raised. So it's a different cultural perspective, and I think all people are different. But certainly if you tell a military person who's now involved in this dialogue and who's wondering about what to do, that hey, if you do that, you'll break the law – guess what? They aren't going to do it, and they're going to push back real, real hard. And you can say, well, don't worry about it. Nobody's ever been prosecuted for it. And they're going to say, okay, well, good, that's great but I'm not going to do it. So I suspect there are a lot of people like that.

So, again, the question is, how do you change Smith-Mundt so that at least in that piece the self-censorship ends, even though it's ridiculous, it's foolish. There are anecdotal – I could give you lots of anecdotal stories about where people have stopped doing things because they were afraid of Smith-Mundt, but the bottom line is, we've lost a lot of synergy and energy and the capability to bring a lot of people to bear on the problem because of the reticence. So what's the small tweak we can do to change this?

MS. LORD: Next question? Any other questions? Over here on the right. You haven't had a chance to ask a question.

Q: Matt Morgan, Defense Public Affairs. It's been mentioned Smith-Mundt may not apply directly to the Department of Defense, but the panel members have mentioned propaganda a couple of times. I think from the Defense position it unfortunately is something we can neither embrace nor completely dismiss, because the legislation that does apply to us specifically forbids us from engaging in publicity or propaganda.

So as another part of this, Congress doesn't define propaganda for us, but luckily, as Dennis Murphy mentioned, we do have our own regulations and doctrines, et cetera, and part of that doctrine is a dictionary of military associated terms. And in that, if you look up propaganda, it essentially defines it as any communication designed to influence behavior or opinions, either directly or indirectly, which is not particularly useful for us.

So if you look at essentially the law, it says we can't communicate with any intent to influence whatsoever. So as part of this we have considered updating our own doctrine to bring the denotation of propaganda in line with the popular connotation – that is, negative, malignant, incorporating lies, misattribution, et cetera.

So my question would be, I'd like some input as to how useful you think that might be for us to do, and if it could potentially impact our ability to better communicate in accordance with the law because, as Dennis mentioned, you're not going to find a commander who's going to willfully violate the law.

MS. LORD: Okay, let's take one last question for today, maybe from someone who hasn't had a chance to ask one. Yes, sir. All right, we'll take two questions. We'll take Rhonda's question and then.

Q: Rhonda Friberg. I'd like to follow up on one of the points Colleen made, which addresses the personnel issue, and also refer back to something that Mike Duran suggested. If we're going to make the under secretary for public diplomacy the strategic center, and if we're going to respect the enormous contribution that the field and public diplomacy officers in general are making to the enterprise, then I don't know how we can continue to put public diplomacy officers in the anomalous position of reporting to assistant secretaries in the regional bureaus, and then also getting resources from the under secretary for public diplomacy.

I think to strengthen the strategic center you might want to look at having public diplomacy officers report to the under secretary. And I raise that because I would like to hear reactions from the public diplomacy officers in the room to this concept.

MS. LORD: Okay, and the final question. This gentleman right here, with the glasses.

Q: George Clack again, from IIP publications. I want to pick up on a comment from the other side of the room, and as always on these things, it's from where you sit that these things look a certain way. It has to do with resources though, and one of the places I sat was on the transition team when USIA merged into the State Department. And what I would say about Smith-Mundt, there is, from my perspective, a beneficial, I think, unintended consequence of the act. And by that I mean the ban on dissemination to the American public.

What it has done is it has created a cadre of people, public diplomacy professionals. Right now there are about 270 of them working in the IIP bureau, whose job basically is produce content for overseas audiences. These are filtered out basically through our embassies overseas, though we do have web sites where people go directly.

I guess my point is that in sitting on the transition team and getting to know my State colleagues well, no person from the State Department culture understood the distinction between public affairs and public diplomacy. They thought they were the same message. They basically believe that the spokesman when he stands up there at noontime, he gives you the talking points and that's the message and that's that and we've done our duty, and there's nothing more that's needed.

So I guess what I would say is if you believe that there's a distinct message tailored to foreign audiences, then I think you need to be in some form of a law that fences off content to be produced for foreign audiences because my guess is that within about five years there would be no staff aimed at producing material for foreign audiences if there weren't some kind of legislative barrier that fenced those resources off.

MS. LORD: Okay, thank you. Let's start with Ted this time.

MR. TZAVELLAS: Okay, I can just comment briefly to the question here about the difference between staying on message versus conversational engagement, so to speak. You're right, if you stick to the talking points, you know, so doctrinally that you sound like a broken record and you lose credibility. That being said, you can engage conversationally and still be on message if you understand the message, and you embrace it and you take ownership of it, so you can talk to the message, not talking points. I think that's a distinction, and that's kind of training, education and confidence.

Over here, the question about propaganda. The way propaganda is defined within the Defense Department obviously is just hokey. It's stupid. So I yield the balance of my time to the good lady from Syracuse.

MS. SNOW: I go back to the influence matrix, where Mike was talking about this at lunch. There were a couple of points where we are exceedingly weak, and I'm wondering if the public diplomacy professionals would like to address this. I defer to them. That is, empowering partners. This goes back to my point made earlier that maybe we need to figure out what our true strengths are and not try to do everything in public diplomacy. I mean, back in the days when we used to use the word propaganda, or it was batted around a lot, the public began to use this phrase, well, it's all propaganda anyway, which is virtually useless when you say that.

Well, if public diplomacy becomes, well, it's kind of everything, then that's also meaningless. So the United States, going back to Alexis de Toqueville, we've always had that strength in our associations. And when you want to get things done, you roll up the sleeves, you associate, you coordinate, you empower people and partners. But as Mike said, we're weak on this.

The fourth point was in countering adversaries. We may need to, in terms of public diplomacy, we're always going to have those who want to focus primarily on the war of ideas, and that's a somewhat troubling concept to me. But I allow that to continue because I think you can have a both/and approach. It doesn't have to be either/or. So we do need to counter

adversaries, we do need to engage somewhat in a war of ideas. I don't necessarily use that terminology readily. I focus more on the Fulbright-Hays soft side of the equation.

It's interesting, there's a gender dynamic here too because when I was at USIA, it was so heavily empowered, or the personnel was so heavily female. Not at the top, granted. But when I went over to the State Department, of course, it was like, okay, now, this is the guy stuff, this is the kind of harder side of the equation where they get to make policy and we get to be kind of the water carriers.

So I do think that there are, you know, a number of dynamics going on here in terms of gender. But I still bring it back to, again, a second strength of the U.S. again, and my own bias is in engaging people. I think that when you use Twitter or Facebook – I welcome your friend request on Facebook, by the way; I love Facebook. Or LinkedIn or whatever it may be. We're really – we're creating these networks of influence and engagement, even in the gaming community, if some of you all are aware of Joshua Phelps' work in that when he was the director of the Center on Public Diplomacy. So people are meeting online and engaging.

Are they engaged in public diplomacy? Maybe not to a public diplomacy official, a careerist in that, but what do we mean again by public diplomacy? James Glassman says it's diplomacy to publics, and if it's that then it is something that we all in different respects along the continuum can get involved in.

MS. GRAFFY: To Dorris' point, and then the point here about do – should public diplomacy offices report to the under secretary or the assistant secretary and the under secretary is the strategic center. I think that there are sort of two different things going on. One is the strategic message. And I think, for example, when we need to communicate on the economic crisis, where we need to be saying, no, this does not mean the end of free market and capitalism, we need to have a message from America out on that. Or on climate change. The big theme is that we need to be having strategic interagency messaging. I think that needs to come from the under secretary, or whatever person that is, however we figure that out. The under secretary needs to have the sort of relationship with the president where, if they're not at the White House, they're as close to being there as you can be because they've got that sort of relationship with the president.

So there's that role where we need one person who's able to bring the interagency together to say, this is how we're going to go out with this message.

But then the other is the strategy (ph) involved with our public diplomacy that is communicating America's values, culture, and policy, and I think that, rather than being centralized and bring an interagency together, needs to be decentralized. That's why I am a big proponent of having the public diplomacy officers close to where the policy is because if you try and have the PD officers in the different bureaus reporting to the R bureau, that's not where the policy is happening. So they've got to be at that table.

So I think if we bifurcated the two, the strategic message centralized, a strong figure that's got the ear of the White House or is there somehow, and then the other is the

communication from getting the policy and into the field is decentralized so we can also learn competitive-wise from what the other bureaus are doing and how they're doing it and coming up with good ideas. That means that some of the PD funds are in the R bureau and you make your case for special – special, key things that need to happen, as Karen did to say, all right, Muslim engagement, I really want you to say what you're going to be doing with this money, and then on a case-by-case basis we're going to give it out. And then another certain amount of the funding is given to each bureau for you to make the sort of decisions that you need to make because you're close to the policy and know where you need to be spending it.

MR. KIEHL: Okay, I think we probably all need a break so I'm going to be uncharacteristically short. DOD, please fix that definition – (laughter) – to reflect reality because you are propagandizing the American public. You know that.

George, don't worry. If my plan comes to fruition and you're an independent agency, you don't have to worry about somebody stealing those jobs.

The talking points versus the dialogue, I completely agree with Ted. Every good PD officer does both simultaneously and backwards and while walking on water.

And finally, the last question, I would like to hear from the PD officers who are here who are active PD officers rather – you know what I think already. Could we do that or not? Or during the social hour.

MS. LORD: Why don't we take two comments from PD officers only, and then just make a final wrap-up statement here. So we have a public diplomacy officer, Aggie, and also Joe.

Q: Hi, I'm Aggie Cooperman. I'm an ex-PD officer and now I'm with Booz Allen. Of 25 years of experience, a career that I loved as a PD professional, I would like to tell all of you that I had the great fortune recently of doing a study on nine African countries. And one of the points that I had to do is go to the embassies in each country. The bifurcation that has come up so often, that term, just doesn't exist at the post. And one of the things that I would like to emphasize is we have great people at each of the posts, PD officers who really know what to do, ambassadors who allow them to do what they do best, and there is tremendous coordination of point of view and messaging. It works.

What doesn't work seems to be Washington. And so what I'd like to suggest is that we not tamper with anything that the post does so well and has been doing for a long time. We have a concerted effort at a – what is it called now – country mission plan, something like that in my time. And everybody knows what to do. Now, if there is a problem with the defense attaché because of Smith-Mundt, he turns to the public affairs officer and we fix it. There is no problem at all of the posts where I visited, and that I served at. And I can tell you I served at, I don't know, 14 places. I've never run into any kind of problem where the problems are as serious as what we hear today. So thank you.

Oh, one more problem. I also worked with the military, and when there is a crisis situation like I was spokesperson in Bosnia and in Romania, there's no problem there either. At the post, everybody knows what to do.

Q: And I'm Joe Milata. I'm PD officer. I'd just like to reiterate what you said about the role of PD officers today. I joined as a PD officer after consolidation, so I don't have experience as a Foreign Service officer. Prior to that, however, I did work in the Civil Service at USIA in the mid- and early '90s, so I have an experience also at USIA in that capacity. And what I would say is, the comments today that I've heard about, the fact that a PD officer career is a dead-end career is completely the opposite of my own experience. I would say in fact what consolidation has done for us in PD, it has provided us – rather than looking at this as how do we now hive (ph) off from State again the PD officers who are there, I would say, how do we as PD officers infect State so that State officers can be PD officers in the field. I think we're doing a very good job at that in our level, at the lower levels, in the mid-levels, because we now have colleagues who are political officers, economic officers, consular officers who have also served as PD officers. So they know the experiences of what it's like to try to get content for our programs, which is our number-one problem. How do you find someone to talk about something? If you've got a political officer who's been a PD officer as well, they understand where you're coming from.

So I would say what we've been able to do through consolidation is infect the State Department and change the culture there. And I say, give it a couple more years and it's going to be a whole different place and it won't be the focus on bilateral issues, but rather on transformational issues.

MS. LORD: Thanks very much. I am going to add just a concluding remark about it. If someone were to ask me, we're starting a new Smith-Mundt Act, whether that's a good idea or a bad idea, it's happening, what should an act like that include? And my very quick answer to that would be, first, it should state what we think public diplomacy is and is for. What's a philosophy of public diplomacy in the world we live in now?

Second, it would lay out the multiple strategic objectives that public diplomacy and strategic communications seeks to accomplish. Third, it would identify and create if necessary the organizational capacities we need to carry out that strategic vision. And fourth, it would clarify the lines of authority between those different organizations or departments, so on.

If you're curious as to what new organizational capacity I would create, many of you will not be surprised to hear me say that I think a valuable compliment to strengthening public diplomacy in the U.S. government would be some sort of public-private organization that can help to engage the private sector to support the U.S. government's public diplomacy efforts. Anyone who's interested, Brookings recently published a report on this, Voices of America. It's on the web page, and there are a few down in the lobby. That's my 2 cents.

But thanks to our panelists, who have a lot more than 2 cents to put in, and we're very grateful for that. And thanks to all of you for your comments.

(Applause.)

MR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you very much. I'm going to add two things as the host prerogative. To Greg Garland's point, I would advise that you read the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy's report that no one in PD does PD. Also to Dennis' point, one thing that doesn't get mentioned, and I think those that don't wear a uniform don't really realize is that the military is the anti-democratic protector of democracy in that – democracy is about laws that tell you what you can't do. The military has laws to tell it what it can do. So if it doesn't have specific permission to do something, it's not going to do it. So I think that was essentially what Dennis was getting at.

So with that, we're on a 15-minute break, 16-, 17-minute break, and then we're going to get into the next panel, the congressional panel. So thank you.

(END)