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**2009 SMITH-MUNDT SYMPOSIUM:  
PANEL 4: THE VIEW FROM THE HILL**

**WELCOME:**

MATT ARMSTRONG,  
ARMSTRONG STRATEGIC INSIGHTS GROUP,  
[www.MountainRunner.us](http://www.MountainRunner.us)

**MODERATOR:**

DOUG WILSON,  
FORMER DIRECTOR,  
U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

**SPEAKERS:**

REPRESENTATIVE ADAM SMITH (D-WA),  
U.S. CONGRESS

REPRESENTATIVE PAUL HODES (D-NH),  
U.S. CONGRESS

LYNNE WEIL,  
COMMUNICATION DIRECTOR,  
HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

**TUESDAY, JANUARY 13, 2008**

*Transcript by  
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MATT ARMSTRONG: All right. If I could ask you to – (inaudible) – our next panel a couple of minutes late, but we’re still going to go the full 90. If I could ask you to sit down, please. Yes, you just pushed the – so if I could ask you to sit down – real brief before I turn this over to Doug Wilson, the moderator of the fourth panel and the last panel.

As I mentioned at the opening of this symposium, this is a unique discussion that we’re having today, not only did we walk through and have a variety of people – walk through time, and have a variety of people giving their variety of opinions and world perspectives, but this is one of the few instances, I think, that you’re going to hear this subject discussed – where we’ve been talking about DOD, DOS, USAID, broadcasting, et cetera, through the day, and then we’re going to end up with a congressional panel and we’re looking exclusively at Congress’ view at the subject that we’re talking about.

This is, as I said at the beginning, an interagency, intertribal and intergovernmental discussion on how do we do global engagement. So with that I’m very honored that we have two congressmen here, Representative Adam Smith and Congressman Paul Hodes to come here, take the time out of the schedule and speak with us.

So with that, I’m going to turn this over to Doug and then we’ve got 90 minutes. We’re starting five minutes late, so we’ll end this panel five minutes late as well. Thanks.

DOUG WILSON: Matt, thank you very much, and before we turn to our congressional panel, if the congressmen, and if Lynne Weil will permit me, and if all of you will permit me, I just have to say one thing about our conference organizer, Matt Armstrong.

I’m the person who wrote the transition paper on public diplomacy for John Podesta’s Change for America and in the process of doing so, I read the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy’s recent report on personnel, which I thought was not only outstanding, but very much hoped that this would be the first report that didn’t sit on the shelf collecting dust and actually would be implemented.

And as I was looking for comment, I Googled the report and the first thing that comes up is Matt Armstrong’s MountainRunner and his comment that, for the first time, he had written about this report that this is – making clear that we have no formal assigned people overseas to engage with foreign publics, and I thought it was a really outstanding report and I had no idea who Matt Armstrong was.

So I kept – I followed his blog. I was so delighted that public diplomacy, which I’ve spent my life doing, and have felt often that most people don’t know what it is, that it had resonance out in the country.

And then as I watched Matt organize this conference, I saw that not only did he understand what public diplomacy was, but he understood that it involves many more people and many more elements than just those who have been – who have devoted their personal careers to

it, whether they be in USIA or in the State Department, and listening to speaker after speaker and members of the audience, particularly those – our representatives from the Department of Defense. I had the pleasure of serving as a deputy spokesman there in the second half of the Clinton administration.

I realized that what you've done, Matt, is not only put together a day of discussion on the Smith-Mundt Act, but you have provided a platform, really for the first time that I can remember, for all the stakeholders to come together and listen to each other. So the discussions are not to the choir, but that we've gotten out of our stovepipes and been able to talk to each other.

So I would just ask, before I start, because I don't know who's going to be able to do this at the end, so I want to do this – if everybody would join me in thanking Matt for organizing this. (Applause.)

I was a USIA Foreign Service officer for eight years and then came back as a political appointee to be the congressional director of USIA in the first Clinton term. My assignments there were the consolidation of international broadcasting. I'm the person who came up with the initials BBG because we couldn't use BIB anymore, and I was also the person who was charged in the first Clinton administration with leading the fight against Senator Helms' efforts to consolidate USIA into the State Department. And so for these four years, they took my book of matches away and sent me afterwards to the Department of Defense, and now, they gave me the book of matches back for Congress. And I'm delighted to have this opportunity to listen to and to engage in discussion.

Adam Smith, congressman from Washington State who sits on both the House Armed Services and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and a friend for a very long time, ever since DLC days, and I'm a former constituent of Matt's; Congressman Paul Hodes of New Hampshire, whom I'm meeting actually really for the second time; the first time, probably 20 to 25 years ago when we both worked on Gary Hart's campaign; and Lynne Weil, who is the communications director for the House Foreign Affairs Committee. They are very, very lucky to have one of the most knowledgeable individuals I've met on the Hill.

And I know that in the audience today, there are a number of other folks who work in staff positions on the Hill and I really hope that you will engage in this conversation as well.

For most of us, the Smith-Mundt Act has been defined for years, and even throughout most of this conference, as issues of domestic dissemination, but as Matt has pointed out in his paper, and to all of us, the Smith-Mundt Act was much larger than that. It laid the groundwork for informational and educational exchange, and it was put together at a time and by individuals, including members of Congress, who cared very much about how America was going to engage in the world. It was put together at a time of transition.

We're at a time of transition again, and rather than just focusing particularly on the dissemination issues of the Smith-Mundt Act – although Congressman Hodes, I know that that will be one of the issues that we want to talk about, given your interest regarding the Pentagon as

well – I'd just like to start by asking the two members of Congress and Lynne – today, you are faced with the same kinds of challenges that this country was faced with in 1952, '53, when the Smith-Mundt Act was originally developed.

Is it still relevant and what are the criteria now that each of you think defines how America needs to engage effectively in the world? And let me start – let me just go down and – Adam S., if you'll start.

REPRESENTATIVE ADAM SMITH (D-WA): Well, thank you very much for the invitation to be here today. I think this is a critically important issue and this is a critically important time because this is an opportunity. There will be changes in how we approach this. So it's an opportunity to make some of the changes that I'm sure a lot of people in this room have been thinking about, sort of update the way we do public diplomacy and strategic communications, and it's very important that we take advantage of this opportunity and get it right.

And I guess – I think it's incredibly relevant right now because when Smith-Mundt was done, post-World War II, it was sort of setting up what is the message that we want to send out to the world. What do we want to get out of public diplomacy and strategic communications? Well, that was 60 years ago. It is an entirely different world now and we need to think again about what we want that message to be, how it should be delivered, what are mediums and who should deliver it? And we've not really done that.

The Cold War ended, certainly, and I think a lot of folks have engaged in public diplomacy, obviously, in a variety of different ways, but there hasn't been any sort of central reorganization of those fundamental core ideas of what should be contained in strategic communications. I think we need to do that.

I personally think Congress needs to act. We need to update Smith-Mundt, to basically give our stamp, our vision, and certainly, that will not be the end of the story. The executive branch will have a lot to say about it, but I think it would be a little bit of a mistake for the legislative branch to simply stand back and say, well, let's just let the Obama administration go and fix that through the State Department, through wherever. As the legislative branch, we are supposed to win our own way, help set and articulate policy, and this is one that we haven't touched in 60 years.

Similarly, I'm working right now to update the Foreign Assistance Act, which we haven't done in 45 years, or a little bit more, two critical pieces of the global challenges that we face right now, that we're still sort of stumbling along with what was set up and then sort of ad hoc corrected over the course of the last 40 to 60 years.

Congress needs to lay out at least some broad parameters as to what we want to do. Personally, I also have a bias that on the executive side both of those things – global development and strategic communications and public diplomacy – need their own shop. There needs to be a separate USIA and USAID – hard to get all those initials right without mangling them, but if that doesn't happen now, that's okay if we work from the State Department, then we

do have to coordinate because right now, it is not coordinated. There is a lot of sort of ad hoc ideas. They're spread out over a bunch of different agencies and they sort of bounce all over the place. We needed to be coordinated because this is a critical time to get our message out.

I think of this in the same way that I think of the very first political campaign I ever ran. Whenever you're doing anything like that, it's very simple. Develop a message and deliver it to the people who you wish to persuade – a very simple sentence, but there are about 1,000 things contained within that. What is the message? And in this case, we have, I think, a lot of broad goals for the United States, but certainly, one central one. We are fighting an ideological battle against al Qaeda and the violent extremists, so they are inspiring right now. What's our message exactly to counter that? And then what are your chosen methods of delivery?

It's very funny. If you read Smith-Mundt, they were talking about they wanted to use all the up-to-date methods of communication that were available, and that's our law now, 60 years later, when 60 years ago, there was no Internet; there were no video games. All the different ways that people get messages and information now, they didn't even exist 60 years ago, and that's the law we're operating on?

If you look at the battles that we have fought in Iraq over strategic communications, in some cases, it comes down to comic books. That's where a lot of young people get their information and the images that are set up there, persuade. So we need to update what the methods are and then who's our audience and where do they get their information? That's always the great battle and that's a huge challenge in the information age because it changes.

We saw this in our last presidential campaign. The Obama campaign, in particular, was very, very aggressive about getting people messages on their cell phones. Wherever the audience that you're trying to persuade gets their information, that's where you need to be and you need to know what the message is. So I think this is not just relevant, but incredibly relevant.

We have to have this overall strategy and it has to be viewed in an interagency piece. We all like to control our message. I always laugh whenever I work in a campaign and there's always the candidate that, well, we have to control the message. It comes through here; we just have – there's going to be a dozen, probably 1,000, 10,000 different people who are, one way or another, going to be sending your message out there.

The idea that you can control it from one central area is ludicrous in this age. You have to have an interagency piece, so those dozens, or even hundreds, of different pieces that are delivering your message are at least in the same book, if not on the same page, and it's got to be over an interagency cooperation, as opposed to one person controlling it all.

I could go on, but the bottom line is, we really need to take advantage of this moment to have a coordinated strategic communication strategy that is interagency, that figures out what the message is, who we're trying to deliver it to, and what the best way to deliver it is.

MR. WILSON: Paul Hodes, do you see the challenges the same way?

REPRESENTATIVE PAUL HODES (D-NH): I do. We're in a totally different age. The time the Smith-Mundt Act came into being, those few people who had televisions were looking at a tiny, 2-inch by 2-inch black-and-white screen housed in something the size of a house. And today, computers are ubiquitous and the challenge is managing information in an information age when global financial crises can be seen, in some sense, as the result of short traders around the globe using the Internet to manipulate stock prices. Well, the same thing happens with information critical to national security.

I sit on the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee and we held hearings last year about Iran, and we had a distinguished panel of experts before us. And I asked the question, so what is America's national security strategy for dealing with the Middle East? And the answer came back – they all looked at each other and the basic answer was, well, we don't have a national security strategy. I said, what do you mean? And they said, well, we have 27 national security strategies.

I was not surprised. That was what I expected to hear and I think it amplifies Adam's point about the need for coordination as we move into a new era.

I caught some of the testimony from Secretary of State-designate Clinton today and one might say there is a fundamental shift going on towards diplomacy first. Use of military is a last resort. She was very explicit about that, and along with that, goes the importance of our using every available means in our information arsenal to counteract the growth of terrorism. And that will require new tools and a new look, I think, at Smith-Mundt.

I comment at the Smith-Mundt discussion from a slightly – a very narrow vantage point because I filed legislation last year, which was passed into law to prohibit the Department of Defense from engaging in anymore covert domestic propaganda campaigns, as was revealed in the New York Times with the message, "force multipliers," and the 4,500 appearances by military analysts coordinated through the Office of Strategic Influence, which was set up with an operative from the White House, who went to the Pentagon and was designed to sell the war to the American public.

There's now legislation that prohibits the Pentagon from doing that and there was to be a report issued yesterday by the inspector general for the Department of Defense, which is overdue now, about whether or not laws have been broken and the GAO will come forth with the report in another 90 days.

So one of the things I'm particularly concerned with is, as we update Smith-Mundt, I want to make sure that we strengthen prohibitions against domestic covert propaganda campaigns aimed essentially at breaking down the constitutional barriers between who controls policy and who makes war and how that needs to work. It's a, I think, an important point, given the recent history.

MR. WILSON: Lynne, you've not only worked on the Hill, but you've lived overseas and you have engaged yourself as a journalist in some of the communication activities and met

the kinds of people that – folks who deal with public diplomacy have to deal with. How do you – now from your perch, as the communications director of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, see the key mission of public diplomacy? What would a Smith-Mundt for today look like?

LYNNE WEIL: Thank you, Doug, and thanks for your nice remarks at the beginning. I'd like to take this opportunity, since all our comments are on the record, to make the standard disclaimer that what I say here will represent my own views, and not necessarily the views of Chairman Howard Berman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, unless I say otherwise, but I do make my views known to him and I'll be bringing back a lot of information from today's discussions.

I also wanted to thank Matt for organizing this event and not only the panels, which have been excellent, but also bringing together such a rich trove of knowledge from various aspects of strategic communications and public diplomacy. The questions have been almost as enlightening as the answers, and the period between the sessions has brought up a lot of issues.

Now, I understand the organizing principle of this conference is, and has been all day, Smith-Mundt, and I think it is relevant to talk about a law that over the years, has been modified, but basically, dates back 60 years. And while there's anyone who has approached or achieved 60 years knows, talk of retirement can be alarming, but talk of reinvention is always appropriate. And it's a good thing to look at the realities of today and see how well they match up to not just this law, but also how we approach the challenges of strategic communications and public diplomacy.

As Mr. Smith knows better than most, it's something where legislation has been introduced, passed, and in fact, is now in law to ensure that the administration looks toward this as an issue of importance and actually, follows up on it with reporting, but it can't stop there. PD is an ascendant issue, not only with the current administration, but also with the previous one. And I think those who've worked with James Glassman know that he really set new and high standards for public diplomacy work by encouraging public-private partnerships, taking greater advantage of 21<sup>st</sup>-century technology for communications, and the interagency coordination process with which Mr. Smith in particular has been involved.

My boss, Howard Berman, has been concerned with the resourcing issue for a long time, also with questions of international broadcasting, which we can go into. He's been separately involved with that, but specifically resourcing for public diplomacy and every year – or rather, every Congress – he has sent around a “Dear Colleague” letter asking for a huge increase in – no specific number, but just increase the foreign assistance budget, so that we can give our diplomats and our development programs the resources that they need. And I think that's a key issue that you'll see coming out during the upcoming administration and out of Congress.

In fact, the same type of “Dear Colleague” letter went around with the assistance of key NGO constituency recently, and more than 200 signatures were on that letter this time saying, yes, the administration needs to, in its upcoming budget request, place a greater emphasis on foreign assistance and our foreign affairs budget. And if I'm not mistaken, the current process

leading toward that submission to the OMB is underway and may actually reflect this wish and it's unfortunately, at this point, almost a wish and nothing more.

The budget request, of course, will be submitted to Congress and then we'll have an opportunity for members to discuss it with the new secretary of state, but I think we already have a promising indication of where she wants to go with her confirmation opening statement today in which said, we must use what has been called smart power, the full range of tools at our disposal, with smart power. Diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy.

And smart power is a combination of what some have called soft power and what has to then be the only remaining option, hard power, but the idea of combining all of our tools – I wouldn't adopt the war on terrorism nomenclature of arsenal of diplomacy, but our tools, all the tools available to us. I think we're going to see more of that in the months to come.

I know we want to leave a lot of time for questions. I personally would love to hear more from the assembled audience, but for those who didn't have the benefit of hearing all the presentations today, I took notes on just a few and five statements leapt out at me as most salient. If you don't mind, I'll just run through them very quickly.

One was from Undersecretary Glassman, considering the source. What he said was, opening any legislation can lead to unexpected consequences. I think that's relevant discussion for this panel, and for our attendees as well to look at, and if opened up – and this was sort of an implied comment of his – if opened up, it should be accompanied by funding for domestic distribution and restrictions on raiding the PD coffers if we end up dumping Section 501 of Smith-Mundt and re-listing this prohibition on dissemination in the United States.

Second, Rear Admiral Smith said, a large cadre of public affairs professionals is being groomed to rise through the ranks – paraphrasing here – in the military. Well, that's great to the extent that we need to work in battlefield conditions, or to prevent failed or failing states from controlling our message, but the face of American diplomacy should be its diplomats.

The third point that leapt out at me was – let's see – oh, Mike Doran, who said that the undersecretary's position should be a national security position, I'm not sure how one defines that in law, or if one has to, but, yes, public diplomacy and strategic communications, as the Defense Department calls it, will, of necessity, be a national security priority – I think already has been, and people have recognized that since 9/11, but we need to start doing more than giving lip service to lip service.

Fourth point that rose for me only from this discussion was – oh, Bill Kiehl, who said, roughly speaking, that the incentives and the promotion opportunities for public diplomacy professionals in the State Department need to be revised because otherwise, if your goal is to rise to DCM or to ambassador, well, you don't really have a direct path, but more than that, we need to ensure that not only incentives are adjusted, but also that people don't get punished for taking risks.



And too often, I've met with Foreign Service officers, either overseas or at the FSI, where I've done some speaking, who say, well, I'd love to be more entrepreneurial, but you make one small mistake and that could be the end. One small – everybody makes mistakes. One small mistake, if it's really that dramatic, then that needs to be revisited, and I liked what Nancy Snow said about – Professor Snow said about the students with whom she works, who want options, who want flexibility, many of whom prefer to go to NGOs or engage in citizen diplomacy.

I heard the same sort of thing when I was in graduate school, not too long ago. We need to restore the honorable tradition of public service and even if it's in the federal government, which does have its restrictions, but we need to make sure that young and talented people are recruited and encouraged to go into this field because the strength of our country and our future – it may be a cliché, but it's true – really is in the energy and entrepreneurship of the next generation.

That's one of the exciting things about the way the Obama campaign was conducted and also about our new president-elect, is that this has really opened the door for people to bring their ideas forward, who may otherwise not. They're being encouraged to do so.

And the last point I wanted to make was that the election of President Obama has really surprised a lot of people around the world. I had the good fortune recently to go on a staff delegation to two countries in northern Africa and to a European country where people universally were saying, you know, America still has the opportunity to pleasantly surprise the world for a variety of reasons having to do with his background or the way the race – the election was conducted, or because of previous election results and how they were decided in 2000 and 2004.

People had begun to be very cynical about the American way of politics and about the American people, and here we've done this almost unimaginable thing for some, and not only that, but many people in the world identify with him. And so this creates an opportunity like never before. We have this open door on which we could be pushing in public diplomacy. One hopes it stays open for eight years or more, but who knows if it actually will? And so we need to seize this moment through congressional action, through the next administration, and through citizen diplomacy to really make a point of showing America's best face to the world, the America that most of us, and many of our countrymen know. We need to make sure that people around the world understand who we really are.

Thank you.

MR. WILSON: Thanks, Lynne. I'd like to turn to particularly our members of Congress to ask a couple of questions about the legislation that you have proposed and have passed. As we look forward to a new administration, and the role public diplomacy will play, or will be asked to play, over the next four to eight years, and how congressional culture can either facilitate or impede it.

Congressman Hodes, you talked briefly about your legislation, essentially prohibiting domestic dissemination by the Defense Department in terms of propaganda efforts. And I know

that the initiative at the Defense Department which stimulated your legislative initiative was criticized really across the board, including by many friends of mine in the military, who basically said this is not the kind of thing that we should be doing, but there are so many vacuums with regard to engagement, effective engagement of foreign publics, that we end up doing too much and we're not playing to our strengths. It's the flipside of the coin that there is not enough resources, either human or financial, to enable those who deal with public diplomacy or foreign assistance, whatever, to fill those vacuums and do their job, so that it really becomes kind of a vicious circle.

My question to you, and also to Congressman Smith is, is Congress at all prepared, in an era of zero-sum funding, where a rising tide does not lift all boats, but that in order to increase any kind of budget, you take away from another budget.

Is Congress prepared to work with the Defense Department and with the State Department to help define what the strengths are that each entity needs to play to and allocate resources accordingly?

And the second issue I want to raise with you is, do you believe that the Pentagon, the intelligence community, public diplomacy, foreign assistance, all of them, have roles to play in foreign engagement or should it be the responsibility of just one entity?

Congressman Hodes, would you want to start?

REP. HODES: I'm going to be very interested to see what both the inspector general and the GAO tell me about the program which I addressed in my legislation, which went as an amendment to the Defense Department's appropriations for fiscal year 2009. It prohibited the covert program basically, and called for the reports.

What I don't think those reports are going to address is the question of the costs of the program that was undertaken. The program that was undertaken, at least according to a 2002 CNN article, talked about the establishment of the new Office of Strategic Influence to market America's war on terrorism outside the United States, and talked about the clear understanding by those at the Pentagon that this was only intended to influence those outside the United States and was not to be directed inside because that would be against the law, and we now have seen what happened.

The question that hasn't been asked yet – and I will be asking – is how much did it all cost? How much was spent? I have some information that a shocking amount of money was spent on this program designed to sell the war internally. If the numbers are as high as I think they are, and we talked about using those kinds of numbers for the true purpose of public diplomacy and information in all its guises outside the United States, we don't – the answer to your question about zero-sum is going to be moot because it's an awful lot of money, but that's going – that question will have to remain for another day.

And as with many other questions, the answer often is, can we afford not to, and especially as we move to an era in which we know we have to rebuild our military in terms of

our hard power, given what we've spent on the current conflicts? Can we afford not to use information technology in the way in which cultural and public diplomacy work to our advantage, especially given the relative bargain that it represents, and the fact that investing in people is the best thing we can do for the long term?

One of the things that it gets to is the importance of thinking longer term than simply annual or biannual congressional budget cycles, which is one of the things that is most dysfunctional about the way we do business in Congress. Instead of planning long term and thinking where do we want to be in 2012 or 2020, and planning to do it now and setting ourselves on that road, we think about what we can get passed in next year's appropriations bill, and that's where it stops.

So if we think long term, I'm prepared to make the argument that the investment is going to be required and that through other means, we can definitely find the resources that we will need to.

MR. WILSON: Congressman Smith, same question.

REP. SMITH: You just touched on two issues here. One is the money, the budget implications, and then also who should have a role in public diplomacy, and specifically talking about the Department of Defense. Actually, this is sort of where I came into the issue. I chair the terrorism subcommittee on the Armed Services Committee, which has jurisdiction over the Special Operations Command. That's a mouthful, but it basically means that we are working on the fight against al Qaeda and violent extremists, what has been called, for the last eight years or seven years anyway, the global war of terrorism, and looking at all the different pieces of that because the Special Operations Command in particular has been out front in battling these violent extremists in a whole lot of different places.

And they, as well as the rest of us, have taken a step back and said, okay, we can put a list up on the wall and say these are the bad guys, let's go get them. And we've actually done a fairly effective job of that, but they understand, better than anyone, that that doesn't win it. That doesn't get it done. How do you deal with the other issues that stop more from coming?

It's sort of deal – to joke about it – the worst job in the world to be the number three person in al Qaeda because you're getting killed every other day. They just keep cranking out more, so the military has really thought about this and they're not just saying, we're just going to keep fighting forever. They are looking at the issues in – all the issues in counterinsurgency that General Petraeus synthesized in Iraq and is now synthesizing across the Central Command that frankly, are development, are public diplomacy and strategic communications. Basically, how do you stop people from becoming radicalized because that's the only way that we're going to win this? You simply cannot kill them all.

They will keep coming and you will build more anger and more discord and you'll have a never-ending problem. You'll be on a treadmill that's picking up speed constantly. So the DOD has a strong understanding of these issues.

Now, let me just say one thing. Congressman Hodes is absolutely right and I think he's talking about a narrow area, and people are more concerned about the broader area. The military should not be in the business of propagandizing American citizens. They absolutely should not be.

The president of the United States can do that; that's cool; that's part of his job. It's a political job, but the idea of using the military to make a case for one policy or another in a strategic way, I think, is bad, all bad, on a whole series of levels. Forget the legality of it for the moment. The military is supposed to be focused on giving the best information and they got a job to do and it's not persuading people in Iowa that they ought to support one policy or another.

So I think Congressman Hodes is absolutely right to take a very, very critical look at how that may have played out in the last seven years and do something about it. But the larger issue of should the Pentagon, DOD, military personnel, out in Iraq or in Afghanistan, be engaged in influence operations – my initial take on that is of course, they should. How can they possibly do their job without occasionally doing that?

There was all this controversy over how we were planting stories in Iraqi newspapers several years back to sort of get our side out. Now, on the one hand, you don't want to be heavy-handed about this and this is part of what makes the world a far more difficult place than it used to be. You used to be able to do that and nobody ever saw the fingerprints. I always assumed that this was a legitimate story from some source and they didn't see that it led back to the military or wherever, so you could do that.

Well, in the information age, that's a heck of a lot more difficult to do and you wind up shooting yourself in the foot by losing credibility if it does look like propaganda instead of news. But to my mind, that's an argument for being more careful about how you do it, not stopping doing it.

We have got to be engaged in trying to get our case out there, our side of the story, because believe me, al Qaeda and all those folks, 24/7, that's what they're doing on the Internet, everywhere else. Every time a bomb goes off, they got a story out almost before it explodes that it killed 15 innocent civilians and they're spreading it as far and wide as they can. So we have got to be able to fight that and DOD is going to be part of that, which leads me into the second point, and that is who should be doing this? That's where it gets back to what I was saying at the start.

I get worried about this because you've got a lot of strong personalities working on this and every one of those strong personalities is going to say, the most important thing for us to succeed in our mission is that I be the one who's in charge, and I understand that sentiment. You want to control it; you want to know what's going on, but when you got about 75 of those different personalities in a given thing, it just all goes to hell.

So you're not going to have one person, whether it's the secretary of state or a new independent USIA agency. No one person is going to completely control this. There's going to

be a lot of different pieces who are engaged in messaging, particularly when you think about it as broadly as I think we have to think about it.

All the different pieces of America's face to the world that impact that message is going to be a lot of people playing on it, and they're not all going to be able to pick up the phone and call the secretary of state before they say or do anything that influences where that message is going.

So a lot of different players and DOD is going to be one of them. They're going to have to do that. So how do you make it work? The model that I think works best – and I can only give some broad outlines of it because some of it is top secret, frankly – is the way the Special Operations Command went about targeting the high-value targets, sort of performing the kinetic side of the military mission, which was – and believe me, this is an important part of our mission – disrupt the operations of al Qaeda and their core supporters. And they've done an outstanding job of this. Keep these guys jumping, so that they can't be planning attacks on the West or any place else.

Now, there's – in that instance, with that fairly narrowly defined mission, even there, you have a whole bunch of different players here. The Special Operations Command plays a huge role; Defense Information Agency, different aspects of the DOD, CIA, FBI; national geospatial folks have a little piece of it. So you've got all these different agencies and they're all doing something, and this is sort of the 9/11 lesson that it was stove-piped. They didn't communicate.

So how do you do this? Well, you can't really sort of take all of them and say, okay, you all now work for DOD, all right, because they're all going to have their little fiefdom. You set up an interagency operation, which is what we did, that communicates on a regular basis and creates an atmosphere of trust, where we are working together towards a common purpose and each of us has an important role to play. Now, that's hard.

In this case, General Stan McChrystal had the strength of personality and the absolute dedication to spend four years of his life making sure that this happened and that those relationships were built and that communication was put in place. And it does take a strong personality who's willing to help pull that together, but if you take that back and analogize it out to all the different players who are in public diplomacy, that's the way we've got to look at it.

We've got to understand who has a role, what is that role, and how do we work together with them, not to take the power away from them. So that, I think, is what we're going to have to do on better understanding strategic communications and DOD is going to be part of it.

On the budget, I'll just say quickly, what President-elect Obama said this weekend is exactly what we need to say about the budget. On this issue, and on a whole bunch of other issues that Congress is dealing with, we always wish we had more money. Where does it come from? If you don't deal with entitlements, if you don't deal with having a more rationalized revenue code, we're not going to be able to do anything after, of course, we do the trillion dollars in stimulus and add to the debt, which I'm not belittling. It's important. We need to do it.

But we can do that because it's an emergency, and it's more important to do that than to worry about the debt, but if we're going to be able to spend on any of these other things, we have got to deal – well, with health care entitlements and our tax cuts and I think the president-elect is aware of that and trying to deal with it.

MR. WILSON: Thanks, Congressman.

Lynne, let me just ask you to comment here as well on – do many entities have a role, and should they be allowed to play their roles, or is it just one, and also your views on where you think – I know you're speaking only personally – I'll reinforce that – but where you think your committee might be going with regards to the zero-sum questions on resources.

And then, after you do that, I want to raise two other issues with this panel and then we'll open it up.

MS. WEIL: Right, thank you. First of all, yes, there are many stakeholders, and as Representative Smith said, some sort of coordination mechanism has to be put in place, one with a sufficient level of authority to enforce its will.

I think Undersecretary Glassman did an extraordinary job of bringing people together and as one previous panelist said, partly because he said, I need to be the one to do this because nobody else is, and because he had some clout, but it can't just be personality-dependent. It should be something institutionalized, with sufficient authorities and funding, to coordinate the various pieces, at least from the government's perspective, and to do more outreach to the private sector and to NGOs and to universities to bring them into the discussion.

With respect to our committee, yes, we're going to have a foreign assistance authorization bill, which periodically, one is passed by the House, but this is one of those things that usually goes to the Senate to die. We expect there'll be a better chance of not only passing it through the House this time, but also through the Senate.

And Chairman Berman, for whom I am speaking at this very moment, is very much committed to that, and in fact, that process is already underway. He's been having discussions with, and holding briefings for and with his colleagues, with key stakeholders. And you'll see that legislation, which is in fact, in the drafting process – that is, people are actually writing bits of it, but also holding discussions with the administration, with people involved in the upcoming administration and with key stakeholders in the community.

So, yes, this is a high priority, as is foreign assistance reform, which Mr. Smith touched on. This is the second of the two key legislative priorities for Chairman Berman because the foreign assistance system, which has gone through repeated revisions, really needs to be overhauled. And so you'll see two pieces of legislation out of our committee, both of which will have a significant impact if enacted into law and also, pieces of these things could be enacted in other ways. So I think you'll see a lot coming out of Congress.

With respect to what can and can't pass Congress, I'd like to seek permission to revise and extend my remarks. I've always wanted to say that.

MR. WILSON: You can revise them. (Laughter.) But we don't have a whole lot of time for extending.

MS. WEIL: Then, in that case, let me just say that the people who are – with all due respect to my staff colleagues and for myself, the people who are in the best position to know what might or might not pass the Congress are the legislators and their leadership.

MR. WILSON: Thanks. Congressman Smith, let's turn to your legislation with regards to the structure of public diplomacy. There's been a great deal of discussion here and some division of opinion here over the course of this day about the structure of public diplomacy.

Is it better to reinvent something like a USIA, which is structurally independent from the State Department, or will the costs of creating a new bureaucracy, and reinventing the wheel once again, complicate, rather than facilitate, our public diplomacy efforts?

There have been many reports issued over the course of the last several years, a number of them calling for independent entities, and almost all of them being greeted with some skepticism about the nature of the independent entity. What's your view?

REP. SMITH: Well, I've kind of stated it a little bit earlier, so I'll just be brief here and say that I'm with you on the creation of a new bureaucracy. I think that was a big part of the problem, certainly with the Department of Homeland Security.

In this case, in both the case of USAID and the public diplomacy, they exist already. You don't really have to create a new bureaucracy. The question is what level of authority do they have? As they exist now, they exist under the State Department, which has a broader mission than just those two things.

And I think because of that – just listening to Lynne a little bit, I've learned a little bit about some of the things that we've passed and done. I think because they are tucked under the State Department, my point is that a lot of members of Congress don't know a lot of what the stuff that's going on, because it is sort of buried somewhere deep in the State Department bureaucracy. And theoretically, I'm supposed to be one of the ones who does know more about this stuff.

So that would be my one argument. If you want to get greater importance, you need to separate it out, give the leader more authority – not more bureaucracy necessarily, but just that separate authority to conduct the office. So that would be an argument for it, but again, I will say, wherever it winds up, I think we've got some good ideas to try to work with the entity to make some of the changes we've talked about here today.

MR. WILSON: Congressman Hodes, Lynne, do you have comments on the structure issue?

REP. HODES: I think efficiency is really important and I think Adam's points are well taken. Shuffling deck chairs is not necessarily the answer to greater efficiency and smarter use of programs.

MS. WEIL: It's difficult. We're in a difficult environment right now with respect to the country's priorities, the number one being the economy and the global financial situation, and I am unsure whether there is the energy at this point also to undertake a major restructuring. I guess it depends on how you define major.

Certainly, there wouldn't be the opportunity to, let's say, create a new department. Look what it took to create the Department of Homeland Security – still taking and look how it's turned out. So I think it's important to consider how much is feasible and also to keep an eye on continuing to do what is being done, or has been done, and maybe improve on that as well.

Representative Hodes spoke a little while ago about the funding issue. Because of the appropriations process – and remember, I work for a committee that is involved in authorization and not appropriations – but I have heard again from Foreign Service officers in the field, and elsewhere, that this is a continuing barrier to their effective exercise of public diplomacy because you can't plan programs two years out.

And sometimes, it takes that much time to bring a scholar, a well-known scholar, from the United States to your post, or to several posts on tour, because they don't make plans one year out, and yet, the Congress continues to find itself in the position of having to pass continuing resolutions, rather than budgeting in the long term. So I think that's an issue that has to be looked at as well, and perhaps first.

MR. WILSON: Thanks. Final question for the three of you before we open this up and this does have to do with domestic dissemination, but because we've talked already at some length today about the issue of original intent, and the issue of whether technology has essentially made the Smith-Mundt prohibition irrelevant or moot, I'd like to get your views on the issue of dissemination and American public understanding of the role of foreign policy and the lack of a real constituency within this country to make the kinds of coherent, effective arguments before Congress regarding resources, or really anything else, that other issues have in terms of their spokespeople.

On the one hand, the American public is frustrated because they think that America's image is at an all-time low, and they wonder why it is that's not being addressed. On the other hand, to bring up additional spending on resources – human or otherwise – for public diplomacy, particularly at a time where we're about to spend close to a trillion dollars on this economy, isn't necessarily priority number one in Congress. And most Americans, even though in their communities, they have sister cities; some of them have had their children study abroad; some of them have welcomed people into their homes, all elements of citizen diplomacy don't really know what public diplomacy is.



I've worked in public diplomacy for 30 years and when I told my mother I was going to chair something on a public diplomacy panel, she said, that's nice and what is public diplomacy? So my question, particularly to the members of Congress, is this: has the Smith-Mundt Act been the reason that the American public has been – has not well understood the role and mission of public diplomacy, and consequently, has not been flooding you with letters about increasing the resources, or are there other reasons and can those reasons be changed?

REP. SMITH: A, I don't think Smith-Mundt has anything to do with it, to be perfectly honest with you, in terms of how people look at it. I think it's because, by and large, people are more concerned about domestic issues. It's just that simple. They're more concerned about education, health care, the economy, what's going to affect them directly. That varies.

I'll tell you one thing; there's a massive increase in concern about global poverty on a very – on a constituent base level and those things do develop and come up, but I think, by and large, people are more concerned about local issues and that is what makes it difficult getting constituents more interested in things like public diplomacy and foreign policy, although that too has changed. Certainly, in a post-9/11 world, people are paying a lot more attention to it and I think that gives us an opportunity to build a constituency for the issues we're talking about today.

The Smith-Mundt thing, in terms of are you trying to influence domestic opinion and when do you cross that line, I think that – that is something that we need to clarify, because as I said, I certainly don't think we should be focused on trying to persuade domestic opinion in ways that I described earlier, but nor should we be trying to send the message out to the world and say, no, we can't do that because that message might also get to a few U.S. citizens. We need to figure out how to sort of update that to accommodate the technology.

MR. WILSON: Congressman Hodes, your views?

REP. HODES: I think the process of educating the people in this country about the use of diplomacy and a new role for America in the world has begun. It began during the presidential campaign with the debates about whether we engage Iran, for example. It began with the questions about the use of diplomacy and what its proper role and the context of our efforts were. And I think people have a general sense that the world has shrunk, and that for America to regain the respect and stature that I know my constituents want to see us enjoy, that engaging constructively in every way we can is the way to do it.

Now, at the same time, there is, I think, a reaction to the global financial collapse and the conflict in Iraq that has people feeling protected, insular, and withdrawn and so you've got these two competing dynamics. I more often hear from constituents who say, it's about time we stop spending so much money over there when we've got to worry about things here. Why are you building schools and sewers in Iraq when we don't have clean water in the United States? It's that kind of attitude that we need to address.

So the information and education of the American public begins in the presidential campaign. I think Secretary-designate Clinton began it, continued it today, talking about this

change, and I think there is room to inform people continually about why – about what diplomacy is, what public diplomacy is, and why it is important that the message of who we are and what we do and how we're going to use it gets out.

There is an opening now for all kinds of information to be put out there; that is, even if Smith-Mundt isn't changed, is consistent with Smith-Mundt, doesn't violate Smith-Mundt. It's not propaganda, but information about what we do and why it is in the interest of United States to vigorously use all the tools that we have to engage in the world. And I think it can be done and the people in this country know, the world has shrunk and the Internet is everywhere and we have to be out there.

MR. WILSON: Lynne?

MS. WEIL: Oh, yes, to the question of whether your mom, and moms across the country, don't understand public diplomacy as they should, is it because of Smith-Mundt, it also goes to the larger question of people across the country knowing what our foreign policy is about and how much we do to promote peace in the world.

As one of the speakers mentioned earlier in this program, the military has constituencies across the country – not only the bases and the community relations they have, but their sons and daughters and fathers and mothers and brothers and sisters often are taking part in the military or involved in supporting it in some way through contracts. And so, there's a built-in constituency for that aspect of our national security policy, whereas with our foreign policy, especially through the State Department and through USAID, there's less of a constituency.

It also has to do with how these institutions interact with the Congress. You need only to walk through the basement of the Rayburn House Office Building to see that the State Department Bureau of Legislative Affairs has an office there, and it's staffed, and people get out and talk to the relevant committees and their staff, as well as members.

But then you have offices right down the hall, right in a row, for Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and these guys and women are all over the place. They own the planes that many members of Congress use for their delegations overseas. Yes, I'm sure the State Department would love to have some planes they could take members of Congress, but the idea is that they have a certain amount of constituency building there that the State Department unfortunately doesn't enjoy to the extent they do. And by the way, the Bureau of Legislative Affairs doesn't have an office over on the Senate side, whereas the various branches of the military do. So I think these are also factors.

It's not just a question – although this is a major part of it, I agree, of education and information – I do think that's key to Americans understanding this, but also other issues. And we'd have to talk about a cultural shift if we wanted to see Americans as well informed about world affairs as people in other countries, that aren't in our security situation, with peaceful neighbors on either side and oceans at either end.

We need to bring about a cultural shift through education and information, as well as trying to build these constituencies. And fortunately, the president who's about to be sworn in next week, is keenly aware of this through his own life experience, as well as the people that he's surrounded himself with. And I think he will use the bully pulpit in a way that it hasn't been used in a while, not just for bullying, but also for informing Americans and bringing them along, so that they better understand what our foreign policy is meant to be about. And I think we'll see more people tuned into that because Americans tend to tune into these things only doing matters of crisis.

REP. HODES: You mean we'll get the pulp, not just the bull.

MS. WEIL: And I'm looking forward to seeing that being put to use in a way it hasn't for a while.

MR. WILSON: Thanks. We're going to open this up to questions, and why don't we take three or four at a time? Ted and – back there and this lady back there and then – and I did want to say, we have several people in uniform here and I don't know your names, but would welcome any comments or points that you'd like to make here because you're on the front lines doing this stuff, so go ahead.

Q: We recognize that extremism develops and thrives in a vacuum, and we've been able to provide viable alternatives to that extremism when we've taken – undertaken a coordinated and coalesced approach with all those people or entities, I should say, that have equities in filling that vacuum.

Rearranging the deck chairs works when you put them in a circle set and all the people that care about that issue talk to each other; that's a big step and when we've been able to do that on an interagency basis, we've succeeded. It doesn't take a lot to – well, it may take a lot, but in my opinion, it's a piece of paper. Put out an executive order from the White House establishing an interagency coordination group to undertake that kind of effort on a more structured kind of a basis.

Most assuredly, in that kind of a role, or in that kind of a mission or setup, the Defense Department does not have a role in leading that kind of an effort. I think everyone here who's in uniform, or out of uniform associated with the Defense Department, will gladly say, it's not our role to lead it. But it is definitely the Defense Department's role to provide substantial support to those kinds of efforts. The Defense Department has the resources; the Defense Department has extensive planning abilities that other entities within the U.S. government really don't have as refined a capability as does the Defense Department.

So the question is, would that kind of work in you all's – there's my southern roots – in you all's minds? Would that work? And having something like that established by executive order, that way, you don't have to reinvent a whole big wheel, just a little one.

And next question.

MR. WILSON: Great, and before the panel responds here, we're going to take these other couple of questions.

Q: Thank you. I'd like to make just a couple of notes and a plea, especially to the Congressman. I'm a person who is – I'm a budget officer. I did some crosswalk during the merger of all the resources for the Bureau of African Affairs for public diplomacy, and as a taxpayer, and also as a person who loves public diplomacy and practices public diplomacy, I would like to point out that continuing resolutions – and thank you, Colleen and Lynne, for mentioning that – have a really very bad impact on the ability of practitioners to plan programs overseas and not to mention their pain for me too.

And I would like to see – to make the point that it was 1996 when we last had an appropriation on October 1, and you need to take back to your colleagues to do their jobs and get these appropriations taken care of on time because it's just unacceptable for the Congress to be not doing their job because we can't do our job, and that's basically what I wanted to say.

And also, by the way, if you build it, they will come. I did the crosswalk. I can do that crosswalk right back, and it would not be impractical to put together another agency to conduct public diplomacy. It's not impossible; it can be done. Just as easily as it was done one way, it could be undone, and you would see people who left the practice of public diplomacy come back because the culture of that public diplomacy is practiced in – is not as conducive as it could be. Thank you.

MR. WILSON: Thanks. We'll take one more question over here now and then let the panel have a chance to respond, and then Colleen, and the gentleman back here and there will be others.

Q: Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Lynne. That was great, and thank you so much for spending time with us here today. My name is Lorelei Kelly (sp). I worked on the Hill for eight years doing national security work, and for the last couple of years, I've been out around the country doing national security platforms for candidates. And there's a real need for a much broader conversation about national security out there.

The nagging question that came up repeatedly, where people didn't have the substantive information, is how – we know that we need to have as much firepower behind persuasion as we do behind coercion today. For heaven's sakes, General Petraeus says this every time he testifies. But the division of labor in national security in general, there's a lot of questions about that, and it seems to me that the conversation that's so difficult to have is one about civil-military relations and about the role of the military in American democracy, because people don't really feel permission to have a critical dialogue about the military in general, and we could go on about why this is.

I think a lot of it is because the military has become so politicized over the last decade. In many ways, Congress didn't do its oversight role and I could be specific, between 1995 and 2006, on a lot of the questions that we're talking about today. The hard questions didn't get

asked where the policy-makers and civilian leadership are the perfect interface to talk to the American public about these issues.

And I'm really interested in hearing from you, your agendas this coming year, where can we, here in the audience who have domestic networks, help you create a much more active and informed echo chamber, so that you can be much more successful in placing this whole argument of the firepower of persuasion as the centerpiece of national security in general, because this backdrop conversation needs to happen to prime people to feel like all the stuff that we're talking about here today.

I think in the hundreds of candidates I've talked to over the last two years, maybe three people knew what public diplomacy meant. Can we call it something different? How about calling it public diplomacy in D.C. but re-branding it for the Americans because they don't know what this means?

MS. WEIL: Do you have a suggestion?

Q: How about something to do with hope and change? (Laughter.) How about also the foreign aid reauthorization this year? You know, the last time there was a really big public effort to educate was Alliance for Progress in 1961. Can we call it something different, so that it has more hooks? Like while you're talking about it on the Hill, another one would be how about a diplomacy supplemental for the next Iraq war supplemental, just to create an echo chamber for the fact that the civilian stuff has to happen simultaneously to the military stuff. Otherwise, you know what happens in Congress – it becomes guns versus butter and it becomes tradeoffs and the budget is balanced on the back of the civilian stuff.

So I'm really interested in have you thought about that? I know that there's this sort of Obama 2.0 movement out there that's looking for the next meaningful way to get engaged, and all of this seems perfect for that.

MR. WILSON: Okay. Congressman Hodes, we're going to start with you. You get to lead.

REP. HODES: First, about the executive order for interagency cooperation and the thought about creating a new agency, I was not here for the discussion before my panel. What is clear to me, just in general, and looking at the way this vast bureaucracy works, is that anything we can do to lessen turf battles, and coordinate effective use of our resources, we need to do. If that's an executive order that says, thou shalt cooperate, that may or may not be effective.

You can look at various battles over many years to say that executive orders saying, thou shalt cooperate has often left a president or others calling people back into the Oval Office to spank them for not cooperating, and having to do it over a period of time. It's really a question of how do you change attitudes sometimes, in terms of thou shalt cooperate.

So in terms of creating a new agency, given – I know it can be done and the walk backwards and forwards can be done, but my sense is that, given the pressures of time, budget

and where we are, some other way other than creating a new agency, but being explicit about how it ought to work and giving it the authority, and making the authority clear, and making it easy to follow and authorize and appropriate for, is the way to make it work.

One of the things that comes up from the suggestions I've heard is the analogy of our times to – the times when I grew up with JFK and the Peace Corps and the Voice of America and the way we projected American power then, and what we are talking about now in terms of projecting American power now. And most people don't remember those times because I'm old as dirt now, but they're young. They remember what happened. There's Internet and there's video games, so we're in a different era.

But I think you're right that change and hope, and a change in how we're engaging and that the world was holding its breath while we waited for this election, create an opportunity for us to inform here at home, to harness energy. Right now, that's around domestic community projects. I just was at a kickoff for a domestic service project, but at the same time, there's a lot of interest in how we're going to engage in the world and people want to know how they can help us engage in the world.

I think there's an opening for something similar to what happened during JFK's time to happen now about the way we engage in the world, and I'm using that as really a broad brush to talk about public diplomacy and all the elements of our engagement. I'm not sure what it is and what the language ought to be.

You're right-on about messaging. We need to make it simpler, clearer, and it's got to have a very clear hook that has nothing to do with Beltway language because what we talk about inside Washington, and how we talk about things outside, rarely the twain meet in terms of effective communication.

MR. WILSON: Congressman Smith.

REP. SMITH: Thanks. First, on the executive order for interagency cooperation, it's basically – and I think that certainly is the simplest way to do it – don't necessarily prom with it, except to the extent that I think we need to get the members of Congress more involved in this issue.

At some point, that can be relevant, and I think that's part of the concern, the increasing executive power over the last eight years. That's always the great advantage the executive branch has over the legislative branch is they can do what they want to do. We have to pass – we've got to go through the whole process of all of that so you stand to see that shortcut being taken again and again to make substantive policy changes.

I don't think that's good overall for representative democracy. I think it slowly pushes the people away from the policy changes that are being made and certainly pushes legislators away from the policy changes that are being made. And if we're talking about budgets, we can make all these changes, but does it get the budget? It would be nice to have Congress involved

in understanding why we've made the change, so when the appropriation battles come around, you have a few members of Congress who are more invested in where that's going.

Now, as a practical matter, I think that's what's going to happen. I think you're going to have that executive action, but I still think we ought to be working hard in the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House, Foreign Relations in the Senate, to get some legislation now, to get more members of Congress involved in what we're doing on this piece.

I fundamentally agree on the USIA thing. Again, analogies to homeland security and the – (inaudible) – cabinet level departments are not appropriate. This is an existing entity. There's a public diplomacy entity within the State Department. You simply have to sort of change the title of what the authority structure is. You don't have to create a vast new bureaucracy, and when we're talking about what's going to get diplomats, people who are inclined, there's young, bright and hungry people involved in things, having an agency to go to, I think psychologically, it makes a difference.

I know it made a big difference at USAID. You talk to people about what happened there and they said, once they got folded under the State Department, budgets got cut, good people got dropped and then all of a sudden, good people said, I don't want to go there; they're not doing anything. And that's more gray than black and white in terms of what do you need to do to make public diplomacy and strategic communications big and important enough that people notice it and they're attracted to it? It's no one thing, but it seems to me, that given that separate authority would be one step. So I don't think it would be that hard to do.

As far as getting the American people more focused on public diplomacy, I'm actually, I guess, more optimistic than most of the people who have talked about this and I agree with something Paul said a little while ago, is the first step in that was the election. I think one of the big issues out there was people just sort of looked and said, you know, we've had too much focus on military might, not enough focus on diplomacy, not enough focus on soft power.

And I'll speak up for my constituents. Okay. They may not know what public diplomacy means, they may not know the terminology, but they know that issue. Whatever you may call it, they may call it something different, but they were very familiar with that and I think that was a big piece of why this election went the way it did is the sense that the pendulum needs to swing back.

And I'll even defend them a little bit. It's understandable that there was a military focus post-9/11. There was a certain identifiable group of people who were bound and determined, and, by the way, still are, to kill all of us. And we, as Americans, having sort of our outlook was, well, you first. We're going to go ahead and defend ourselves, and I don't think that's necessarily wrong.

Now, what we learned throughout that period is that there are limitations under how much you can protect yourself by taking a strictly military approach. And I will say, even within the Bush administration, there have clearly been changes in the last two to three years in their approach to soft power issues. And Secretary Gates is not Secretary Rumsfeld in the things he's

talked about and things he's been doing. So you've started to see that shift. So I think it's happening.

And what people are concerned about that can do is what you do in a representative democracy: you advocate for those issues in a wide variety of different ways, at forums like this, by writing your congressman, by doing things online, creating groups, a whole bunch of different things. And I think that will happen, and I think it will be helpful to continue that push in the direction we want to go to get the public diplomacy and strategic and the soft power piece right and to reemphasize it. I think that is happening.

MR. WILSON: Lynne, you get the last few words for this part, and then, after this – I know there's five questions on the table here, and if it's all right with you, I want to start that point with the gentlemen back here and back there who haven't had a chance and then we'll come back here. And then we'll close – so Lynne.

MS. WEIL: Right, thank you. Then I'll run through this briefly. To the question of Lorelei's question of the civil-military relations and the role of military in our society, that is a conversation that, as I think both our members of Congress had attested – started within the couple of years, but will continue, and Secretary Gates made some very interesting statements in a couple of well regarded speeches on this subject last year. He also, in an interview with NPR, when asked whether he would be willing to give up part of his budget to this end, said, I don't think you'll find a secretary of defense who would give up part of his budget.

So it's a difficult thing, and of course, the momentum with respect to budgeting for various functions of our government generally goes one direction, or at least, stays stagnant for a year. It's not often that it's reversed, and I'm not advocating, by the way, a reversal of the tide, just an increase with respect to what we give to the instruments of soft power, some of which were touched on here and deserve a new infusion, for example, the Peace Corps.

God bless the Peace Corps and the young people and now increasingly, people at mid-career and retirees who go in, and they are some of our best representatives of what's best about the United States living in villages and riding the public buses and with respect to the regional security officers at embassies, they don't really have a lot to do with what the Peace Corps volunteers do on a daily basis. And still, we've had very few incidents involving security issues, especially terrorism, in the Peace Corps.

There are other programs out there that deserve that kind of growth that I'm talking about for the Peace Corps. There's a Fulbright program, the English Teaching Assistance program, ETAs, who are college graduates, or some of them in college, and who go out and help instructors in various countries. They don't take the place of instructors, but they offer assistance and get to know students at the high school level or even younger and these folks are doing amazing things on behalf of our country in showing our best face.

And let's see, the model of the Obama approach to engaging the American public, I think, could also translate – looking at the limitations of Smith-Mundt, I'm not sure how much it can translate to what the State Department does, but it can be used in other ways. The Foreign



Affairs Committee is, in fact, overhauling our Web site now, and we'll soon have – we're working on having a capacity for people to submit ideas, documents and links and that sort of thing, which we can review as the transition team had done for the Obama administration.

But I think there are many ways one could use technologies to engage the American public in this conversation. And the echo chamber that was also asked about, I think many people in this room have the access to that echo chamber to reinforce the message of the importance of our soft power.

And by the way, in my previous remarks, I neglected to point out that this administration went a long way to not only doing what was right for world health, but also increasing America's standing abroad by instituting, and then pushing for the reauthorization of our global HIV/AIDS program. When President Bush in his – I guess it was 2003 State of the Union Address, indicated that this was going to be a priority – excuse me – 2003, that's right – that this was going to be a priority, that we offer this funding for global HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis and malaria as well, but especially HIV/AIDS prevention, it sent a message around the world that the United States really cares about us.

And then the request for additional funds, which Congress augmented and passed in the Tom Lantos-Henry Hyde global HIV/AIDS reauthorization last year, I think that sent a strong message to the world.

We could be doing more of that and also informing Americans about the importance of that kind of thing and, yes, they have concerns. People are more likely to take in and remember information about their families and their communities and their cities and their states and their country before they think about what happens overseas. That's only natural, but we can reinforce the message by saying, look, what we're doing address it is important to fight HIV/AIDS in the United States, but we're doing that too, so –

MR. WILSON: Thanks. I'm going to ask those who have questions, because of the time limit, please, please to keep them a minute or less. Make your points and ask the question and that will give everybody a chance to speak and our panelists to respond.

Q: My name is Anho Tree. I'm a fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, and far from liberalizing Smith-Mundt, I'd like to think about expanding it and toughening it. And I'm less concerned about PD as much as I'm concerned about DP, which is to say, domestic propaganda, covert domestic propaganda.

And I want to expand on what Congressman Hodes talked about, that it goes far beyond the Pentagon, that the New York Times in 2005 did a great exposé on some 20 federal agencies had engaged in covert domestic propaganda. And this goes back to the Clinton administration as well, with the drug czars' office engaged in covert manipulation of prime-time programming, offering financial incentives to Hollywood to covertly manipulate their scripts to reflect the administration's position.

The Department of Health and Human Services used video news releases in fake news reports by their own staff people, which were then given to local television stations, which were presented then as independent journalistic reports. And they would say, this is Karen Ryan (sp) reporting from Washington. This was wholly owned and manufactured by Health and Human Services to sell the president's Medicare proposal. It was done by the Department of Education for No Child Left Behind, the same video news releases. Again, the home viewers never knew that this was a government-produced piece of news.

And if you believe what it says in the Declaration of Independence, that government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed, then public officials should never use public tax dollars to covertly manipulate or manufacture the very consent from the people from whom their legitimacy is derived, because when you do that, you erode one of the central pillars of the republic. Why go out and engage in public debate to win the battle of ideas when you can simply sit back at your desk and gin up covert propaganda? So –

MR. WILSON: I'm going to have to ask if – because of time, we'll take the point in your question and we'll turn over here.

Q: Chief officer, Booz Allen. I'm a retired military officer. I'll try to make this really fast. I want to make a comment and get your reaction about an unintended consequence of Smith-Mundt Act and some of the fears about covert domestic propaganda and that goes into the use of military capabilities to support Americans during natural disasters.

Case in point, Hurricane Andrew back in the '90s when it devastated central Florida and all the communications means were out, televisions were out, radios were out, people were cut off. The military was brought in to help the civil authorities. One of the things that we wanted to do was bring in our military information operations capabilities because we have means of giving leaflets out, getting newspapers out, bringing loud-speakers in, bringing in mobile television and radio stations to do that.

And we were told we can't do that because of the Smith-Mundt Act. You can't do that. You'd be propagandizing the American people, even though all we wanted to do is put out where you can get food, water, shelter and other information. We had to go up to the White House, to the president, to get approval. Got the approval; everything in Hurricane Andrew went fine.

Fast-forward a few years to Hurricane Katrina, which we should all be intimately familiar with – the same thing. You're thinking we would have gotten approval faster. No, it took weeks to get approval to use those assets to get information to the American people during a natural disaster out of the White House. And even when we did get the approval, the soldiers had to take their patches off the uniform and cover up their bumper stickers because everyone was afraid of, oh, my God, what happens if the media finds out we're using military information operation units to put out information to the American people?

MR. WILSON: Thank you. I'm going to call on this gentleman first and then we're going to go Colleen, Pat, Bill – again, a minute each.

Q: Thank you. I'm Chris Castelli with Inside the Pentagon. Congressman Smith, I wonder, do you see a clear line between information operations, which by definition, can involve some deception, and public diplomacy? And do you see that line blurring, or do you see them kept separate as the military and civilians work together?

MR. WILSON: Thanks. Colleen?

Q: (Inaudible) – the State Department, public diplomacy. Just to make sure that no one leaves this room thinking that public diplomacy officers don't get promotions that Bill mentioned, and then you also mentioned, because it's just not the case, that we have so many people that want to go into public diplomacy. My former officer director is now a DCM in Zagreb. My deputy director is going to counsel general in Barcelona, another DCM in Chisinau, and on it goes.

Our biggest problem is that some of the wonderful posts like in London and Paris require someone at a very high level in OCMC, but many of those have gone on to become DCM or counsel generals. So one of our greatest challenges are having enough public diplomacy officers at a high enough rank because so many have other opportunities.

Also, just to reinforce, it's wonderful that students are going into NGOs and citizen diplomacy, but we still have thousands more students interested in the internships at the State Department and also applying for the Foreign Service.

But my question does go back to the CRs. It is continuing resolutions. It is one of our toughest challenges because our Foreign Service officers can't plan an event without the funding, and so what they do is they miss that opportunity when schools are in session. And so then when they get the release of the funds, they either spend it or lose it, and so they end up spending on equipment.

And I'm just wondering – I believe that the Department of Defense has a separate hearing on budget. Is there some way that this could happen for State or public diplomacy so that those budgets get passed separately so that they're done through a different timing? Thank you – a different appropriation.

MR. WILSON: Pat?

Q: Yes, one question on authority and then a quick comment. Congressman Smith, I'm just – okay, my name is Pat Kushlis and I'm from New Mexico. I'm a retired Foreign Service and I've taught at the University of New Mexico for several years.

When you talk about authority, what level of authority do you see as appropriate for whomever does what in public diplomacy?

And then secondly, I'd like to just make a comment, and maybe, Lynne, you could comment about it also. I'm intrigued by your cultural shift needing to happen here, and I totally agree with you. I would argue having watched this for 10 years now, that there needs to be a

cultural shift in terms of how social sciences and government and civic education are taught K-12 because when you get them to the university level, it's starting at square-zero and it shouldn't be that way.

Secondly, exchanges, what I see coming down the pike from the State Department now is an awful lot of one-way coming this way and very little going that way. So you've got Americans who might like to go abroad and there's not the opportunities there. Again, if there's jobs in the State Department, if there's jobs in public diplomacy, people will apply. They really will and particularly with this administration.

And then finally, I agree, I think Peace Corps really needs to be bolstered. I think they're wonderful, and that's another way of helping to educate the American public. Thank you.

MR. WILSON: Bill, you get the last 60 seconds.

Q: Okay, to condense it, I'm puzzled, frankly, by earlier comments by both congressmen which maybe I misunderstood, but I hope they can clarify this. Their premise seems to be that don't propagandize the American people, but it's okay that we should be very aggressive in talking to foreign audiences, and there's a difference in what we say at home and what we say abroad and you can make a difference. I don't think you can make a difference.

First of all, information technology makes that impossible.

But secondly, I was a public diplomacy officer for 30 years and when I was a PAO in Cairo, and I talked to the editor of al Ahram, I presented truthfully, and with attribution, the best case I could make, and when I talked to a visiting American reporter, I presented the facts truthfully and with attribution as well. I changed my story. But only because the audience was different and I was, in both cases, truthful and the attribution was there.

The problem that we had with retired officers on CNN explaining the benefits of the programs in Iraq was that there was no clear attribution, and no admission that they had been briefed. If they had been truthful, and there had been clear attribution, there wouldn't have been a problem. So I suggest we eliminate the distinction between domestic and overseas dissemination and focus instead on truthfulness and attribution.

MR. WILSON: Thank you. Lynne, I am going to recommend that you and I cede the bulk and balance of our time to Congressman Hodes and to Congressman Smith to respond to whatever points here that they would like. And then we'll conclude and turn this back to Matt. Just now – go ahead.

MS. WEIL: Thank you, because a question was directed to me as well, with respect to K-12 education. I assume you're speaking of public education. Obviously, the resources across the board for that need to be increased and that should be a high domestic priority.

And with respect to teaching American civics as well as foreign affairs, I assume, yes, we need to give more resources specifically for that curriculum. It obviously should take a lot of

thought and funding and that sort of thing, but some easy things, relatively easy things, could be done right now – programs and materials for educators who are interested in this matter to maybe go overseas for a week or two, not just through Fulbrights, but also as visiting lecturers or that sort of thing. We already have some of that, but K-12 educators specifically, and again, materials, because many of them in our public schools are paying for materials out of their own pockets.

With respect to the question of propaganda within the United States versus overseas, one of our earlier speakers had indicated that it would be important to – his words – fence off content to be produced for foreign audiences, so that that kind of material, propaganda, couldn't be disseminated in the U.S. Well, how would that be viewed by our foreign audiences if we make a distinction between telling the truth to the American people versus what we tell others? We have to be very careful in discussing that issue.

And since this may be my last word, in addition to indicating that there are a lot of resources in this room in general that people can continue this dialogue – and I assume Matt Armstrong will be adding more information to the Web site after this so we can be in touch – I'd like to single out someone who probably would otherwise be too shy. That's Matt Weed, who works over at CRS, who helped me prepare at least for the question of Smith-Mundt and specifically, the legislation that had been introduced and passed by Congress recently.

Touching on this, CRS is used by all members of Congress, so in addition to talking to each other in the Web site, and to me, and to the members of Congress here, you could speak to the researcher who is in a good position to inform many members of Congress on this issue. Thank you.

MR. WILSON: I'm going to start with Congressman Hodes, and Congressman Smith, you get the last word.

REP. HODES: Let me go around the room this way. I'm interested in legislation that would clarify that covert domestic propaganda by any federal agency is improper and I'll look at that. I have a staffer in the room who unfortunately now, is burdened with taking that on. (Laughter.)

In terms of emergency information, I'll be very brief. I think that was a misinterpretation and is a misinterpretation of the Smith-Mundt Act, and to the extent that we're talking about a look at Smith-Mundt that will involve clarifying that misinterpretation to make sure that information is freely available domestically, as opposed to domestic propaganda, we can clarify what needs to be clarified there.

Oh, materials and cultural shift, somebody needs to do a video game called the "Public Diplomacy," or whatever word we end up using, like "SimCity" that teaches our kids the challenges of using diplomacy in all its forms and how we do it to reach into the Afghan villages and this is where it works. And that would sweep the nation, earn a lot of royalties for somebody in this room, maybe the taxpayers, and be a big help.

Maybe Britney Spears needs to be a special roving ambassador again. I mean, think of what Dave Brubeck did for the Millennium Foundation for years going to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic. He opened up a connection with Moscow that couldn't have been opened otherwise. It's an example of what we can do.

And lastly, the very important question about the differences about what we do at home and different – and what we do abroad. Let me ask this question. Is a moral foreign policy consistent or inconsistent with an effective strategic foreign policy? And I think that – if we believe that a moral foreign policy is the foundation of an effective strategic foreign policy, then the answer is that truth will out and the truth should be told.

MR. WILSON: Congressman Smith.

REP. SMITH: Thank you. I want to address the CR issue quickly, and I think that the rest of it actually – most of the questions actually have a sort of tie-together there, which I'll try to address. It is a major, major problem and it's not just within the State Department. We talk to our local school districts, talk to everybody out there when you don't know when the budget is coming and it has gotten worse, not better, as each year has gone by.

And I think the reason for that is because it's a really, really big budget. It gets bigger and bigger each time. We're talking about trillions of dollars. Then, of course, you have differences in terms of how you want to do it. It takes time.

I guess I would disagree with the idea that Congress isn't doing its job. With the exception of one year that I can remember, we didn't really just say, we really don't want to do this; we're going home; we'll deal with it later. We try. It's just that it's really, really difficult, which is not to understate what a couple of good points have been made. It's brutal. How would anyone conduct a budget when you don't know where the money is coming from?

And the final thing that has really confused this is getting into the earmark issue, because I started out in the earmark issue with the notion that there's good earmarks and there's bad earmarks, and done properly, it's members of Congress doing their job. And you know, if you're transparent, if you truly are trying to help support a local project and we can identify the ones that are bad. So have transparency, right?

And David Obey, who's smarter than most of us, was like, just get rid of the damned things and I understand why. How do you have transparency on 30,000 requests? How do look through 30,000 requests and make – even if you're trying to be honest, and not just help out your friends, and that has really slowed down the process.

So we don't just need transparency on earmarks. I don't know if we need to get rid of them, but we need to seriously cap them because they suck the energy out of appropriation staffers. I can see why they don't get this stuff done having to deal with that.

And all of the other issues, certainly starting with a couple of Smith-Mundt questions, and then the last gentleman who raised the question about we should be paraphrasing a little bit,

but basically, we should be providing fairly sourced truth in our message; that should be our job domestic or abroad.

And I think the problem is that you can set up an example of something that's clearly fairly sourced truth, and you can go all the way over to the opposite side with what this gentleman was referencing, where you have the guy standing up. Yes, I'm a reporter from XBC News and I'm – and it's all made up; he's lying about who he was and it is fundamentally and any rational person can look at that and say, this is dishonest.

And then there is about 10,000 miles in between those two points. You know, well, okay, I had one source. I didn't know who it was. I got it from somebody else, okay? They told me this was the source and I trusted them. Is that dishonest? Well, what if you know that the source that you got it from is notorious for being dishonest? But I don't know what you know. So we can't split the world the way you just described it. We can't, in any way that I can imagine, between we're only going to do honest stuff and we're not.

And also, I would say you have certain obligations in certain circumstances to not tell the whole truth. We have responsibilities in different places. I was a surrogate for Barack Obama for quite a while, and every once in a while, a question would come up and the direct honest answer was just not good. So I'm just going to give something else.

My favorite way of expressing this was when I was in law school and I was working for a law firm as a clerk, and we had a case and the attorney was getting me to work on some aspect of it. He said, I just want to let you know, we've got a lot of bad facts on this case and I loved that phrase. It's not that we're wrong; it's not that our client shouldn't win. There's just some bad facts out there that we need to deal with.

So that's going to have to be there. We can't draw that clear line. Now, I will say that we need to draw it one hell of a lot better than we have last time, and the reason isn't any sort of honesty thing. It's ineffective. If you get a reputation for being flagrantly dishonest and thinking that you can – as the cliché goes – convince people that the moon is made of green cheese, people are going to stop listening to you and honestly, I think that's where we're at. The current administration fell in love with the notion that they could convince us of just about anything, and it really gutted our credibility.

So I do think that we need to look at whether this references the question about what's the difference between an influence operation and public diplomacy. You know, at face value, you would say that an influence operation is more dishonest than public diplomacy, basically. You're being more manipulative, I guess, would be a better way of putting it. You know, you're trying to use that stuff.

And I'll tell you, I don't think we should send out a broad prohibition on our diplomats or on our military, that says, look, you can't lie; you can't be manipulative. I don't know how I would function in my personal life, much less in my professional life, if I wasn't allowed at least an occasional moment to be tiniest little bit manipulative, okay? And I don't know how any of

you would. I've been around a long time and I've not met the person who can do that. Maybe I will. God willing, I'll be around for a little while longer, but it just didn't work that way.

And then the question is how dishonest is the manipulation? And I think the answer that I would give is, you know, have the right message from the top, from the president on down, that credibility matters, that we're not just playing games here, that the credibility does matter.

And I've always sort of – well, I'll close with this analogy and I may get myself in trouble, but I'll make it anyway. There was this video game when I was growing up. I can't remember what it was called. Anyway, there was this little ship going across the field and all kinds of things were coming at you and you had to shoot them and you had – now, you had four smart bombs, and what a smart bomb was, you could blow up everything on the screen. Basically, everything is going completely to hell. I've got no choice. I've got to blow everything up, but you only got four of them, so when you're done, you're done.

And I always thought, I've always sort of used manipulation at that point. If you're doing your job right, you don't put yourself in a position where you have to hit that smart bomb and tell a lie that's going to put you in trouble, but you got four of them – (laughter) – because no matter how well you're doing your job, no matter how honest you are, no matter how dedicated you are, there's going to come that moment – a whole lot of family relationships that occurred to me at this point that I'm not getting into – where you just got to take that moment and say something that may not be perfectly honest, but it's going to get you and your country through the day and so you've got to do it.

The problem though is when you fall in love with the notion of manipulation and I really think that's what's happened. It is absolutely untrue that you can spin your way out of anything. Sometimes, you've just got to face the music and say, we're wrong; here's why we were wrong, and we're going to fix it, and I think we really got off of that, of that notion, and just came to rely on we'll make the world whatever it is we want it to be. We have to reemphasize honesty in our approach to public diplomacy. I will agree on that.

MR. WILSON: Congressman, thank you. Thank all of you. And Matt, before I turn this back to you, in thanking all of you, I know I speak for Lynne in saying that both of you, Congressman Hodes and Congressman Smith, represent the best of a new generation of the successive generation in Congress, and you are faced now with the kinds of issues and challenges that your predecessors were faced in dealing with Smith-Mundt.

And as someone who is a citizen and a constituent and who has been in Congress as a staffer and been in USIA, I would make just this final plea. When the United States Information Agency was consolidated into the State Department, it was done so on the basis of reinventing government and addressing the needs of Senator Jesse Helms with regard to what else the State Department needed in the Senate. It was not done really with the idea of what are the goals and mission of public diplomacy.

And so, as you go back and have to address the trillion-dollar stimulus package and two wars, and maybe three, and so many other issues and priorities, I hope that when you look at, and



make decisions regarding public diplomacy, that those decisions do not become the law of unintended consequences, and that you keep in mind – and that we all keep in mind – the mission for a public diplomacy for a period where the geopolitics are different, and the communication tools are new, and there are many more public and private sector players than there were, and that those overseas have thought of us and who we are and our image in increasingly negative terms and now look at a president whom they think is magic.

But the magic will not last, and those of us in this room are responsible for addressing that issue over the long term, and I hope you will keep that in mind in that whatever legislation is passed and addressed and prepared. that we do this together, because we are all in this together. And, Matt, thanks a lot.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you, Congressman. Thank you, Doug. Thank you, Lynne. Thank you very much. (Applause.) Because it's already after 5:30 p.m., I'm going to be really quick with my closing comments because now I'm standing between you in either going home or going down for the hosted reception – so real quick.

Some of the things – engagement in this global information environment is not like a football game. There are no set plays; there are no timeouts. Boundaries, when they exist, are discovered through trial and error, and may exist for one play, but not the next. More importantly, there is no end zone to reach, or needle that moves, or computer that clicks, to indicate progress, let alone victory.

Success is harder to find in this realm, but it is not a binary decision achieved at the end of a regulation period. I think that's something we need to pay attention to and understand that what we do is very flexible. There are boundaries. There are times when you cannot push that smart bomb or there are times when you need to, but you have to be very careful when you do that.

We understand that in the realm of communications. I think you know by now that the premise of coming here to talk about Smith-Mundt was really an act of subversion. The idea was to talk about how we conduct global engagement, the purpose of global engagement, how we do it, and why we do it. I think we've had a pretty good discussion today, an interagency, intertribal cross-government discussion that I hope that we're going to carry on in the future.

My plan is to have a second edition of this discussion. There are several panels that I could not have in this. As it was, it was a long day and it was packed and all we had was four discussions, just four minor discussions, and two minor keynotes, and there are more discussions that we would want to have and we should have.

I think it's important to talk about, when we talk about some of these issues, that we go back to what were the act's principles because even though this wasn't quite a straw man, there were some issues well beyond the original act from 61 years ago when it was passed in January of 1948.

The act's principles – as the committee who recommended passage said – the act's principles were to tell the truth – that was number one – to explain the motives of the United States – that was number two – bolster morale and extend hope, give a true and convincing picture of American life, methods and ideals, combat misrepresentation and distortion and aggressively interpret and support American foreign policy.

We've talked about the importance of foreign policy. The propaganda of the event is so critical to what we do, we can't just say words and change the subject and pretty up what we're doing. We have to acknowledge that what we do is synchronized with what we say.

Eisenhower, I think, has good words in this when he was a presidential candidate,. Everything we say, everything we do, and everything we fail to say and do has an impact in other lands, and I think as we've heard multiple times today, especially in this last panel, we have the issue; we have an opportunity. As Congressman Hodes says, we need a moral foreign policy. We need a foreign policy that can stand up on its own, which is what Smith-Mundt was actually passed to protect. It was passed to protect a smart foreign policy.

One of the things – a couple of thoughts I want to throw out there to you to think about that we really didn't touch on, but we've got close, and that is we've talked about the issue of leadership and that we need leadership to do anything in this realm. And one thing I challenge you with is how many times did the secretary of state come up today? How many times did the secretary of defense come up today? Where do we have leadership?

There are some themes we've talked about and that has to do with education, or rather, with resourcing. We've talked about resourcing the State Department, but when we talk about resourcing the State Department, one of the things I don't hear as often as I think we should, is when we talk about getting more resources in the State Department, we need to talk about education. Getting more FSOs means you have the opportunity to put FSOs through a training process.

One of the things that DOD has is enough training flow, enough personnel that they can rotate them through the National Defense University, the Army War College, the Naval War College, Leavenworth, et cetera. Talk about doctrine, instill practices, new practices, best practices onto another generation of officers; we don't have that in the State Department realm and I think we need to do that.

In fact, there was an issue that came up. I was speaking with General Caldwell. An issue came up where he has opened billets down there in Leavenworth and he's happy to backfill State Department slots within Army, with Army personnel. State doesn't know this and State still says even after I let them know this, State said, I don't have the people to throw down there; I can't spare people. I think this is one of the resources issues that we don't talk about enough.

When we talk about the role of PAOs or public affairs, I think one thing to take away from this is what is the role of a PAO? What do they get trained in now? They get trained in journalism and public relations. I think one thing we should take in the DOD realm is think about what do they need to do in the future? The example I'll throw out there is General

Petraeus. Does he need a public affairs officer that's trained in journalism? No. I think he needs a public affairs officer that's trained in public diplomacy, that's trained in international relations. These are things I think we should be thinking about that I don't hear as often as I'd like.

In the State Department, we seem to have an issue of zero tolerance of information. DOD had that; they've gotten away from that. How come? They have this issue called command – this thing called commander's intent where it propagates down. You have an understanding of what your boss wants. You have parameters. In State Department, I don't see that; I don't hear that. I'm not in the inside, but everybody I've talked to says the same thing. You do what's up there says. There's no zero tolerance. I think General Caldwell again brings a great example, the four E's that he's pushing: you educate, you empower, you equip, and you encourage people to go out and engage.

One of the panels I couldn't have is how do foreign countries deal with public diplomacy? I really like Sweden. If you read what I write, you'll hear me reference Sweden quite often. One of the things they do is everybody in the foreign ministry goes through media training. They encourage you to talk to the media. Everyone is in the DOD nomenclature, DOD wording, a strategic corporal over there. They know that every foreign ministry personnel engages. I think we need to do that in the State Department as well, because we don't tend to do that and it relies on the post itself, if we're talking overseas, on the ambassador. I think we need to institutionalize an additional capability.

Lastly, I think this issue of information persuasion is critically important. Understanding the power of this information realm is financially important. It's not just getting rid, or getting by, with not dropping bullets and bombs and firing bullets. We hear Joint Chief Mullen talk about this. He was in the New York Times. Thom Shanker wrote about it today. Yesterday, there was another article written on this general subject.

But it's also financially prudent. In the words of General Electric's chairman, he testified in support of Smith-Mundt in 1947 and he said, quote, "This will do more to reduce the risk of war and thus, to reduce the need for a multi-billion dollar military force than any other single factor." Information is cheap; we know that. Persuasion is cheap; the enemy knows that.

We've talked about asymmetric warfare. Well, why does the enemy conduct it? Well, they can and it's easy and they don't have the resources. We can conduct it too and it doesn't have to be in the kinetic conflicts.

So I hope you take away some of the things here, and you came here with a certain mind view, a world view, a certain mind set, things that you thought you knew, and I hope that what you thought you knew has been challenged, you've made some connections. There's more opportunity to make connections later. There are great opportunities here, as we've heard, to extend this conversation on.

So lastly, let me say thank you to the congressmen for taking time out of the busy schedule. I appreciate that. Thank you, Lynne; thank you, Doug. Thank you, all my panelists,

all the discussants, all my moderators. I appreciate it greatly – the undersecretary and Mike Doran as well.

I appreciate you staying here, coming here and attending this event, and more importantly, staying all the way through to the end. The fact that this room is still fairly full indicates your interest in this discussion. So I appreciate you staying here.

Also, the Reserve Officers Associations for the facility, Booz Allen for providing the support to help me pull this off and I think that's about it.

If you're interested in follow-up, I have your e-mail. I think what I'm going to do is do an opt-out policy. If you don't want me to talk to you about this anymore, tell me. Otherwise, I'm going to assume you want me to talk to you about it. (Laughter.) It's much easier on my side.

So again, lastly, my heartfelt thanks. This is a very important issue. This is a national security imperative, I believe, and I think you feel the same thing. So again, one last thing – thank you very much. There is a hosted reception downstairs. Stay for a while, enjoy it, instead of going out in the rush-hour traffic. And, again, thank you very much. (Applause.)

(END)