Recently in China Category

To be completely crass, disaster relief and humanitarian aid is huge opportunity to score points with locals. It is, however, best when it is not done blatantly, but making it clear where the aid was coming from both gives your side points and potentially denies opportunities to competitors.

Reading The New York Times on my Blackberry Thursday morning, the article "Haiti Lies in Ruins; Grim Search for Untold Dead" by Simon Romero and Marc Lacey, dated January 14, 2010, struck a nerve. These are the first two paragraphs as they still read on my Blackberry:

PORT-AU-PRINCE, Haiti - Foreign aid trickled into Haiti's devastated capital on Thursday morning as the victims of Tuesday's earthquake, many of them injured and homeless, began to wake from another night spent in makeshift accommodations or out in the open.

A China Air plane landed early Thursday with a search team, medical workers and aid, The Associated Press reported. ...

By Tiger Zhang

Only 35 years ago, Confucius was widely condemned in China's public rhetoric as a representative of the "corrupt segments of traditional culture" and a reactionary speaker of the hierarchical society that prevailed in China for at least 2 500 years. Not anymore. Today, he's begun to serve singly as the "cultural diplomat" for China with such new titles as "the great mentor," "representative of China's traditional culture" and "advocate of a common faith and social order." As part of China's public diplomacy efforts, over 300 Confucius Institutes have been established in more than 80 countries so far. The number is expected to reach 500 by the end of next year and finally around 1 000 in all major cities around the world.

Briefly, China is actively expanding into the world and has been for several years. Here’s a quick look at a few examples of China reaching out to improve their image and gain expeditionary experience.

We have the Mercy and Comfort, the Chinese have the Ship 866. From David Axe’s post at Danger Room last year:

[In October 2008], the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) accepted its first purpose-built floating hospital, the 10,000-ton "Ship 866." While seemingly innocuous on the surface, ships like this are windows into an evolving military strategy for an emerging world power. Hospital ships can be used for a wide range of missions, from supporting full-scale amphibious assaults against heavily defended targets, to humanitarian "soft-power" expeditions winning hearts and minds.

And Ship 866 returns to the news this week in The Washington Times, China tries 'soft power' with aid ship:

Ship 866 makes "the country one of the few in the world that has medical care and emergency rescue capabilities on the high seas while also raising the capability of the Chinese navy to accomplish diversified military missions," the Communist Party newspaper People’s Daily said recently.

Last week, China organized a “fifth peacekeeping team for Sudan”:

The team comprises 375 officers and soldiers who come from engineering and transportation corps of the Jinan Military Command Area. Of the team, 72 people will be on their second mission to the African country and 90 percent have participated in fighting against freak winter weather and the Wenchuan earthquake.

In 2005, China was the 15th largest contributor of forces, moving earlier this year to 12th, helped no doubt by increasing its contribution to 1,000 in Lebanon in 2006 to raise its profile in both the Middle East and Europe. In all likelihood, China moved up in 2008, but I haven’t looked. See also Who are the UN Peacekeepers? 

And then in January 2006, China announced a public diplomacy strategy for Africa:

China, the largest developing country in the world, follows the path of peaceful development and pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. China stands ready to develop friendly relations and cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence so as to contribute to peace, stability and common prosperity around the world.

See also:

• Bonny Ling’s China’s Peacekeeping Diplomacy (2007)

A rare take on political warfare from a Free Chinese general posted by Mike Waller (link)

General Wang Sheng wrote Theory and Practice of Political Warfare [21mb PDF], first published in Taipei in 1959. He ran the General Political Warfare College as a close confidant of Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek.

A searchable PDF (12mb) can be downloaded here.

Abu Muqawama questions NYT's timing of a story, but what about the Chinese soldiers in Zimbabwe? 

Update: At the request of the author, MAJ James Yin, the paper is removed pending publication in the Journal of Information Warfare, co-authored with Phil Taylor.  I'll post a link when it's available.

Another paper on Information Operations by a Major, this time it's MAJ James Yin of the Singapore Armed Forces.  It was presented at the Information Operations & Influence Activity Symposium at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.  MAJ Yin's abstract:

This paper is a comparative study of the practice of influence in its various forms i.e. propaganda, public diplomacy, psychological operations, public affairs, cyberwarfare, EW etc. in Asia. It will highlight the state of development, differences in concepts, organization and application of influence in Asian countries as compared to the Western models dominating discussions on information operations and influence today. By doing so, it attempts to provide alternative angles of approaching information operations and influence that could contribute to the generation of solutions to address challenges faced by policy-makers and practitioners today. Finally, such a study will serve to broaden the body of knowledge in influence to include both Eastern and Western viewpoints.

Yin examines China, Japan, and Taiwan "based on their ability to influence the balance of power in Asia-Pacific and their propensity to use cyber warfare" and Thailand because of its COIN operations against Muslim insurgents. 

Yin is currently at the University of Leeds (no doubt working with Phil Taylor) and wisely incorporated Smith-Mundt into his analysis (although he cited colleague Mike Waller's Public Diplomacy Reader and not this blog...). 

If IO is in anyway interesting to you, this is required reading.  Hat tip goes to Under the Influence by David Bailey.

See also: Planning to Influence by USMC MAJ Matt Morgan

This morning was the Blogger's Roundtable with "defense officials" to discuss DOD's 2008 report on 2007 China.  The presenters attempted to set attribution to "defense officials".  I'll honor that here (for now... pending the Roundtable posting), but that's not the terms of the Roundtable.  This is a follow up to the previous post Winning Informatized Wars.

My quick observations:

The presenters stated clearly at the outset that the report should be read in the context of improving relations with China that are "across the board". 

The call was one of the most widely attended I've been on, including James Fallows, Mike Goldfarb, Jason Sigger, David Axe (wearing his Wired hat), Andy Lubin, and many others.  Hopefully they'll all post on this as well.  Look for posts from them.

The issues raised in my previous post on the significant missing pieces were deflected with the response that Chinese asymmetric thinking is "broadly" addressed in the report.  The reality is "broadly" is super-high level discussion amounting to only a few paragraphs.  In saying that there is a "resurgence of the study of classic Chinese military figures Sun-tzu, Sun Pin, Wu Ch’i, and Shang Yang and their writings" is in the context of deception and not unrestricted warfare. 

Compare this to the much more detailed discussion of traditional warfighting elements and you have a report telling a certain story.  Like all communications, even objective just the facts communications, influence and persuade.  This report pressures the reader to fear a modernizing adversary.  That may be the correct thing to do, or it may not be, but what is concerning is the report's selectivity. 

On the expeditionary capability, the response to my point that increased PKO participation was dismissed as China finally stepping up to fulfill its responsibilities as a Security Council member.  That there "may" (or was it "perhaps"?) be public outreach benefits eluded the presenters.  The fact that China has stated publicly on several occasions that they see PKO as a tool of public diplomacy was lost as was the experience of force projection (logistics, movement, public affairs, etc). 

I'll post a link to the transcript when it is available.  Overall, the report misses the important elements of future conflict that will not start with bullets and bombs and may not ever get to kinetics. 

A holistic approach by China as part of its CNP (Comprehensive National Power, a variation on our DIME/MIDLIFE/DIMEFIL, but measured) sets the military not as a cylinder of excellence, but a component of national security.  The report, as written and presented, misses that entirely. 

UPDATE

Mike Goldfarb's post on the call is up.  His gist:

When the DoD first started this outreach program, there was a great deal of criticism--the Pentagon was spoon feeding administration talking points to conservative bloggers, they said. Well, that was never quite the case, the Pentagon has allowed any and all bloggers to participate in these calls. The effect: today's call was dominated by lefty bloggers explaining to the Pentagon why the United States shouldn't concern itself with China's build-up, and why Beijing's bulking-up is entirely reasonable.

I suppose this is a better post than what he could have gotten from his question of whether DOD knew who would be on the Chinese side of a hotline between DC and Beijing.

Responding to Goldfarb, James Fallows posts his response.  His gist:

One big theme in this Pentagon report is a continuing "large" increase in Chinese military spending. Large "compared with what?" is the obvious question here -- compared with U.S. spending and capability? (Explicitly not the subject of the study, "a Defense official" said.) Compared with their GDP? Compared with their limited previous levels? Compared with what it would take to invade Taiwan? With the concerns, interests, and capabilities of Russia -- or Japan? And so on.

The other theme in the report was intention and "transparency." Intention: why are they spending more money? ...

Has anyone read the DOD's 2007 report on China? Chapter Four begins with the following quote:

China pursues a three-step development strategy in modernizing its national defense . . . . The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third is to basically reach the strategic goal of building informatized armed forces and being capable of winning informatized wars by the mid-21st century.

Six pages later and the subsection "Information Warfare" has four paragraphs, including a long quote (p21). Granted, C4ISR is at times discussed within those six pages, but three discursive paragraphs on Chinese IW.

This seems to indicate the Chinese do not truly grasp asymmetric warfare, contrary to the report's assertion (p13). Secrecy and Deception (p14) gets about the same number of words as IW.

Some find the report interesting for what it says.  I find it more interesting in what it does not say. 

First, does this report really reflect the extent of China's grasp of "informatized" war?  Is informatized code for computer network operations and attack?  I just don't buy it. 

Second, its odd that "unrestricted warfare" doesn't appear once in this report?  Have the Chinese moved beyond Unrestricted Warfare?  I hope China doesn't come up at next week's Unrestricted Warfare symposium at JHU/APL.  That could be awkward...  

Third, is the exclusion of increased Chinese U.N. peacekeeping in the report (done, as stated publicly, including by the PM, as a tool of public diplomacy (links below) an oversight? Chinese PKO participation is an expeditionary education for China that is otherwise unavailable to them.  Seems to be a significant element in expanding Chinese military reach, capabilities, relationships, etc.

Fourth, the absence of the first three don't jive with one of the two pillars on which the report says Chinese strategy is based: Comprehensive National Power (CNP).  CNP is much like the American concept of DIME (or MIDLIFE/DIMEFIL,etc, pick your anagram) with the significant exception that each element is measured in the Chinese model. 

This report says more about our mirroring the enemy than a real examination of a future adversary who actively examines our mistakes.  This is a good Cold War analysis, but this isn't the Cold War. 

See previous posts:

• Chinese Public Diplomacy via UN Peacekeeping
• China, UN Peacekeeping, and Public Diplomacy
• Who are the UN Peacekeepers?
• Practicing Effective Public Diplomacy in Africa (or elsewhere)
• Various China news, including China becoming language of choice for Sudanese students

Some catch-up on China blogging included here to clear my China queue

China is upset, claiming foreign nations are causing "massive and shocking" damage by hacking into computers to "ferret out political, military and scientific secrets." Some might say that turnaround is fair play. Another thought is someone might be showing off for DHS that it's worthwhile to revisit a denied application?

The UN announced the first-ever Chinese led peacekeeping operation.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has appointed Major-General Zhao Jingmin as the new Force Commander for the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO), the first time that the world body has had a Chinese national head one of its missions.

This syncs with Chinese public statements to use peacekeeping as a way of increasing its profile with governments and people directly (like with a hospital). The public diplomacy angle has been stated repeatedly, perhaps most clearly when they voiced their intent to up their contribution to the Lebanese PKO to increase their profile in the Middles East (as well as in Europe).

As China builds its expeditionary capability and while building prestige and influence, how exactly is the US improving its image by forcing democracy at the barrel of a gun?

Version 1 of Did You Know?

Version 2 is below (updated stats, longer, and less interesting)

It's Tuesday and time for news on China

Preeti Aroon writes at Foreign Policy about Chinese becoming the language of choice for Sudanese students. It's one thing to provide English-language training, it's another to provide a viable and immediate use for the acquired language. (See previous post on Chinese policy in Africa)

Sudan sells around 60 percent of its oil to China, and Chinese companies, products, and restaurants have made inroads into the African country. Sudanese university students who learn Chinese can get jobs as translators and work for Chinese oil and telecommunications companies. Recently, Khartoum University had a Chinese speech competition, and a Chinese professor there said, "… nearly 100% of students who graduate from the department get jobs with Chinese companies." In a troubled country like Sudan, that prospect is a great motivator to learn the language.

More than a billion people speak Mandarin Chinese, and the Chinese government actively promotes the language as a way of extending its influence. The country has sent hundreds of teachers to Africa, and it has established "Confucius Institutes" around the globe to encourage speaking the language.

And the trend to learn Mandarin Chinese isn't limited to Sudan. In Britain, the number of university students studying Chinese more than doubled from 2002 to 2005. Other Western countries have had similar increases.

From Howard French in the International Herald Tribune, China is displacing France in Chad.

Less than a decade ago, the French claim on this region was still so strong, and Africa's importance to France's view of its own place in the world correspondingly so, that the French were paranoid about expanding American influence on the continent...

Imagine my surprise then, arriving in Ndjamena late at night on a visit from China, when I turned on my television at the French-run Sofitel Hotel to find that the program blaring from Channel 1 was a starchy variety show in Chinese, courtesy of that country's state broadcaster CCTV...

Fast forward to the present, and here in Chad what one finds is a U.S.-based oil multinational, Exxon, running the country's biggest and most lucrative business, with Chinese companies investing heavily to match or surpass it...

From oil to telecommunications, all the big new investments seem to be Chinese. And to the extent there is any construction going on, as in so much of the continent today, it is Chinese companies landing the contracts...

FranceAfrique has lessons for China, too, however: no durable interests can be secured on African soil where institutions are neglected and profit and flattery are the only considerations.

Sam duPont at Foreign Policy writes about China's silver-plated bullet. How deep is the economic shot in the arm provided by China? Not as deep as China promotes it to be.

But it seems naive to suggest, as the [Fitch] report's authors do, that China's involvement in sub-Saharan Africa will do much to "reduce poverty and promote development and the region's global integration." The success of Chinese oil firms at securing investment contracts in the region is largely attributable to the "no-strings-attached" loans they provide to the governments. Considering the weak, authoritarian nature of many of these states, it should come as no surprise that this money is rarely spent to benefit the African poor...

Some unsolicited advice to the purchasers of this Fitch report: Be wary of loaning money where mobs of angry young men are likely to arrive soon.

... was released. Download it here. My comments to come later...

As is the trend here, it's Tuesday and time for news on China.

• VOA reports on how Chinese are gaining African respect because of their "simple" living:

  ...in contrast with Western expatriates, says Brautigam, the Chinese always live at or below "local standards" - even when it's quite within their means to live lavishly....
  ..."The Italian project had a container of food brought in from Italy every two weeks! And the (Italian) experts were living in very comfortable houses that were built (specially) for the project."...
  ..."The United States.had eight experts and they had built ranch-style houses in a little subdivision, with street lights and sidewalks, and everything the way it would be in Texas or someplace like that!"...
  In Nigeria...the Chinese are perceived as being "better able to transfer technology to Nigerian employees than Western expatriates." ...China is popular amongst businesspeople in Africa because of a simple reason: Money. "Africans associate the Chinese with profits,"...

• China confirms terrorist camps in Pakistan 19 Apr 07:

  China has for the first time publicly acknowledged the existence of terrorist camps within the territory of its "all-weather" ally.
  It said that some East Turkistan separatists, who have been fighting for decades to make oil-rich northwest China's Xinjiang province an independent state, received training at the terrorist camps in Pakistan.

• China to Send Military Unit to Darfur 8 May 07. Posting on the article, T P M Barnett asks a question ("What is our military really doing to encourage this? What is our government doing?") that emphasizes the structural failure in American diplomacy. On the action itself, the Chinese should be expected to do the minimum necessary for appearances while pressuring Bashir behind the scenes to make a show of acceptance.

As is the new tradition here at MountainRunner, Tuesday is Chinese Tuesday, the day I post selected news and links on China.