Contractor Sued for Charges to Army

From the Associated Press yesterday,

The federal government is suing KBR Inc., the largest military contractor in Iraq, over what prosecutors say were improper charges to the Army for private security services. The lawsuit, filed in federal court in Washington, charges that KBR knew it could not bill the government for private armed security for the company and 33 of its subcontractors, but did so anyway.

This is an old issue that was long buried and ignored: that some, if not much, of the money spent on private security in Iraq was illegal. The reality of security contractors, despite the claims of so many that they are inherently outside the law, is they have always been potentially liable if the client, in this case the US Government, chose to make them so. Ultimately, their impact on the struggle in Iraq was significant. For all the talk on the importance of rebuilding and the invocation of the Marshall Plan, it would have been hard to come up with better methods of so-called ‘development’ to alienate the people more.

See also:

Review of the Blackwater Lawsuit

The Nation has a good article on the Blackwater lawsuit that is slowly working its way through the court system. In Blood Is Thicker Than Blackwater, Jeremy Scahill describes actions by a company that is the worst fear by many opposing privatization (did someone mention CusterBattles?).

When firms act like this, as Blackwater is alleged to have done, it not only taints the industry but also the United States. As an interview in the movie Shadow Company demonstrates, Stephen "Scott" Helvenston, Mike Teague, Jerko Zovko and Wesley
Batalona were attacked not because they were contractors or because they might have been military, but because they were thought to be CIA by the locals. While Americans tend to see contractors as independent operators, others see them as extensions, or a part of, the US Government (USG). The thousand or so deaths in Fallujah that were a direct result of the alleged failure of Blackwater to protect its men and the international coverage had tremendous impact on the image of the United States. Blackwater didn’t take the hit and in fact may have gained value from it (this is not to suggest it was intentional or even desired publicity). For the United States, this is image management and public diplomacy by proxy without recourse or management.

Below are some the highlights from the article.

According
to former Blackwater officials, Blackwater, Regency and ESS were
engaged in a classic war-profiteering scheme. Blackwater was paying its
men $600 a day but billing Regency $815, according to the Raleigh News
and Observer. "In addition," the paper reports, "Blackwater billed
Regency separately for all its overhead and costs in Iraq." Regency
would then bill ESS an unknown amount for these services. Kathy Potter
told the News and Observer that Regency would "quote ESS a price, say
$1,500 per man per day, and then tell Blackwater that it had quoted ESS
$1,200." ESS then contracted with Halliburton subsidiary KBR, which in
turn billed the government an unknown amount of money for the same
security services, according to the paper. KBR/Halliburton refuses to
discuss the matter and will not confirm any relationship with ESS.

All this was shady enough–but the real danger for Helvenston and the others lay in Blackwater’s decision to cut corners to make even more money. The original contract between Blackwater/Regency and ESS, obtained by The Nation, recognized that "the current threat in the Iraqi theater of operations" would remain "consistent and dangerous," and called for a minimum of three men in each vehicle on security missions
"with a minimum of two armored vehicles to support ESS movements." [Emphasis added.]

But on March 12, 2004, Blackwater and Regency signed a subcontract, which specified security provisions identical to the original except for one word: "armored." Blackwater deleted it from the contract.

"When they took that word ‘armored’ out, Blackwater was able to save $1.5 million in not buying armored vehicles, which they could then put in their pocket," says attorney Miles. "These men were told that they’d be operating in armored vehicles. Had they been, I sincerely believe that they’d be alive today. They were killed by insurgents literally walking up and shooting them  with small-arms fire. This was not a roadside bomb, it was not any other explosive device. It was merely small-arms fire, which could have been repelled by armored vehicles."

On March 30, 2004, Helvenston, Teague, Zovko and Batalona left Baghdad on the ESS security mission. The suit alleges that there were six guards available that day, but McQuown intervened and ordered only the four to be sent. The other two were kept behind at Blackwater’s Baghdad facility to perform clerical duties. A Blackwater official later boasted, the suit says, that they saved two lives by not sending all six men….

The four men were, in fact, working under contracts guaranteeing that they would travel with a six-person team.

…they
charge that Blackwater knowingly refused to provide guaranteed
safeguards, among them: They would have armored vehicles; there would be
three men in each vehicle–a driver, a navigator and a rear gunner; and
the rear gunner would be armed with a heavy automatic weapon, such as a
"SAW Mach 46," which can fire up to 850 rounds per minute, allowing the
gunner to fight off any attacks from the rear. "None of that was true,"
says attorney Callahan. Instead, each vehicle had only two men and far
less powerful "Mach 4" guns, which they had not even had a chance to
test out. "Without the big gun, without the third man, without the
armored vehicle, they were sitting ducks," says Callahan.

…Without a detailed map, they took the
most direct route, through the center of Falluja. According to Callahan,
there was a safer alternative route that went around the city, which the
men were unaware of because of Blackwater’s failure to conduct a "risk
assessment" before the trip, as mandated by the contract…

Attorney Marc Miles says that shortly after the suit was filed, he asked the court in North Carolina for an "expedited order" to depose John Potter. The deposition was set for January 28, 2005, and Miles was to fly to Alaska, where the Potters were living. But three days before the deposition, Miles says, "Blackwater hired Potter up, flew him to
Washington where it’s my understanding he met with Blackwater representatives and their lawyers. [Blackwater] then flew him to Jordan for ultimate deployment in the Middle East," Miles says. "Obviously they concealed a material witness by hiring him and sending him out of the country."…Blackwater subsequently attempted to have Potter’s deposition order dissolved, but a federal court said no….

Blackwater has not offered a rebuttal to the specific allegations made by the families, except to deny in general that they are valid. It has fought to have the case dismissed on grounds that because Blackwater is servicing US armed forces it cannot be sued for workers’ deaths or injuries and that all liability lies with the government. In its motion
to dismiss the case in federal court, Blackwater argues that the families of the four men killed in Falluja are entitled only to government insurance payments. That’s why the company moved swiftly to apply for benefits for the families under the Defense Base Act.

"What Blackwater is
trying to do is to sweep all of their wrongful conduct into the Defense
Base Act," says Miles. "What they’re trying to do is to say, ‘Look–we
can do anything we want and not be held accountable. We can send
our men out to die so that we can pad our bottom line, and if anybody
comes back at us, we have insurance.’ It’s essentially insurance to
kill."

In the end, Scahill notes President Bush mocks the question of private security companies. It is incredible, but unfortunately not surprising, that the President does not have an answer on how such a large number of people (to call them a group would imply some sort of larger unity) that has direct impact on our public diplomacy and foreign policy is regulated or controlled.

Blackwater & Peacekeeping Operations

Recently, Blackwater announced that it was willing, and could, provide a brigade size force for humanitarian interventions (HI), such as is needed in Darfur. The Blackwater pronouncement (I think it goes beyond ‘announcement’) is largely based on Tim Spicer’s observation, as quoted in the Green Paper: "too often the major powers won’t intervene or delay until it’s too late." What might the Blackwater deployment look like and how might it work?

Continue reading “Blackwater & Peacekeeping Operations

Shadow Company movie review

Later this month in Texas, the movie Shadow Company will make its debut at the South by Southwest Film Festival. Self-described as a “ground breaking investigative” documentary, Shadow Company explores the origins and “destinations” of private security contractors (PSCs).

Back in January, Onnesha Roychoudhuri interviewed Nick Bicanic, Shadow Company’s director and co-founder of the production company putting the movie out. If you haven’t read the interview, you should.

Not to be redundent with Roychoudhuri, I asked Nick why he made Shadow Company.

"I decided to make this film because I could see that the Rules of War have changed. There was a relevant message about modern warfare that did not come across in other media. While wars are more and more in the public eye – they are also more and more in private hands. Thousands of private security contractors – soldiers for hire – were working in Iraq and I wanted to find out a number of things about them. What exactly do they do? What kind of people are they? What motivates them to do it?"

There are two interwoven themes in the movie. The first is a description and history of mercenaries. The second is the role of private military companies (PMCs), focusing on the subset of private security companies (PSCs), in modern conflict.

This movie will open some eyes, as it should. When you see the movie, go in with an open mind. Afterwards, consider investigations of corruption and bad behavior of firms like AEGIS, CusterBattles and financial improprieties from KBR, etc. The incident with the Blackwater contractors in Fallujah is discussed, but understandably not included is a lawsuit alleging a corporate penny pinching contributed to or allowed the incident to happen in the first place. Also keep in mind that of the dozens and dozens of firms operating in Iraq today, you’ve heard of only a few.

Will you be swayed for or against privatization of war zone duties? According to Nick, an early test screening was polarized: half of the audience felt the movie was biased for PMCs and the other half saw a movie biased against PMCs.

I would have complicated the survey if I were in that early test audience. To me, the movie showed a failure in usage and control. The powers that be intentionally grant too much autonomy to corporate entities and assume the mantle of responsibility is on the company. Nick does a great job in showing how PMCs operate at arms-length from the military; the US Armed Forces are hardly seen or referenced.

Delegation of authority is done without consideration of lost accountability. Academic debate over PSCs frequently begins or quickly gets to issues of accountability. This movie, however, hints at a deeper implicit, if not explicit, leeway USG grants the PSCs. It also highlights the US’s reliance on PSCs, which you, as the viewer, should judge as appropriate or not.

Engaging companies with poor and unsatisfactory track records, even tainted leadership, indicate bad policy. The choice to allow AEGIS to “fail upward” is, in my opinion, central to understanding the impact of PMCs.

Rarely, if ever, discussed is the impact PMCs have on our overall mission, which isn’t military. Interviews with Robert Young Pelton touch on this and the insurgent interview nails it.

If you saw Gunner Palace (see it if you haven’t) and saw a movie about inappropriate staffing (cannon-cockers working missions they weren’t trained for), you’ll probably see what I’m talking about in Shadow Company.

Overall, the film is well-done and thought provoking and does a good job distinguishing between mercenaries and PMCs, which too many people still can’t fathom. Interviews with Robert Young Pelton and Cobus Claassens, and the voice over by Oxford-grad James (an Operator), were excellent.

When you see this movie, ask yourself “What is the real impact of PMCs?” If you’re not concerned after watching the film, you weren’t paying attention.

Technorati Tags:
Shadow Company,
Iraq,
Mercenary,
PMC,
Current Affairs,
Politics,
Security,
GWOT,
Public Diplomacy

PMC Fraud: Tip of the Iceberg?

Briefly, the Custer Battles lawsuit will likely be an eye opener for many. The Iraq war has been a watershed in the outsourcing of not just tangible assets and roles the military used to provide for itself (meals, logistics) but intangibles also. The role of private military companies in the war, from pre-deployment training to site security to force and VIP/"nation building contractors" protection, are part of the soft power of the United States.

Continue reading “PMC Fraud: Tip of the Iceberg?

ICRC and PMCs

News brief as I continue to clear out the drafts linking in the to be posted file. This one is an item off the ICRC website from 2004.  

Private security firms are an established feature of the 21st century war landscape, working for states, corporations and even NGOs. The ICRC is stepping up contacts with these companies, to ensure that they know and respect international humanitarian law.

Djibouti Sues France

From Opinio Juris comes news Dijibouti, where our Marines have an counter-terrorism base and are practicing the a real campaign of public diplomacy (see CT in the Horn and Revisiting the Roosevelt Doctrine).

[T]he Republic of Djibouti has filed an application with the International Court of Justice against France alleging France violated its treaty obligations to provide judicial assistance in a Djibouti criminal investigation.

This looks like a fairly tedious and unimportant case. The only
interesting aspect (to me, anyway) is whether France refuses to accept
the ICJ’s jurisdiction. France famously withdrew from the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ back in 1996 (those unilateralist Frenchies, so
disrespectful of international courts!) and this case can only go
forward with France’s consent. If France refuses to accept ICJ
jurisdiction, even here in this fairly minor case, it will be a slap at
the ICJ’s authority and credibility.

Kathryn Cramer: Top Cat Marine Security Has an Executive Level

In an effort to keep information fresh, from Kathryn Cramer’s blog on TopCat Marine Security:

We had our differences and I’m no longer associated with Peter Casini, TCMS, Cobra Boats, Topcat Design or any other Casini enterprise.

It seems that "Bacehlor #3" in an earlier post by Kathryn is a man who now is making it clear he has nothing to do with TopCat. TCMS is an interesting org, but still more interesting: Did they hope to get in front of the coming action?

Rove Energy Corporation Limited

Somaliland_maplarge_1The blogosphere is increasingly used to incite and investigate and this recent comment is a further example of this growing use of the new pamphleteers to influence events. The region in question has obvious links to other disucssions on this site (see the Somalia category and take your pick of readings).

How does the South African Ophir Corporation has recently announced a 75% stake in the Rova Energy Corporation figure into all of this? The maritime diplomacy of the Chinese, Yemini fields accessed from Somalia, and the general lawlessness of the region certainly makes for some interesting reading. More investigation on this surely to come. Comments, leads?

Update: Has TopCat Marine Security Been Ordered to Cease & Desist? & Other Regional News

Possibly so, according to Kathryn Cramer’s blog, Top Cat Marine Security Ordered to Cease & Desist.

…the US Department of States Bureau of Arms Control has issued a Cease and Desist order to Top Cat Marine Security on their pirate-fighting contract with Somalia….

But so what?

Ethiopia_eritrea2_map416 From the region are BBC reports of Eritrea ejecting UN peacekeepers monitoring the border with Ethiopia. This comes as a possible reaction to threatened UN sanctions resulting from a lack of compliance with a five year old peace agreement. Kofi Annan and the UN Security Council gave an unusually strong rebuke in response: "The Security Council unequivocally demands that Eritrea immediately reverse its decision without preconditions." The most recent flash point was Badme, far from the contested Horn areas and the coast. Is this related or coincidental? Keep reading for a lesson on complexity systems (you’ll have to read my other posts… at some point I’ll do another, overview).

The region has a lot going on right now. Rumors of something happening before Christmas seem to be gaining traction with reality.

However, some key questions yet to be answered:

  • Was a "cease and desist" actually issued, assuming that is the appropriate legal remedy in this case? If not, will it be? Will it be a paper tiger?
  • Does this mean the dissolution of TopCat Marine Security for either the purpose of protecting Somalia’s coast or for good?
  • Will those involved with TopCat regroup, if the haven’t already, and continue on their planned path?
  • If this was a clandestine operation, will USG do a better job next time? (Based on the participants in this fiasco I highly doubt this was a USG-sponsored adventure. If it was, somebody should be demoted or fired.)
  • Lastly, will there be similar fanfare in the media over the termination of this coast protection solution? I doubt it because I doubt the validity and legitimacy of the whole TopCat endeavor.
  • Will there be another public attempt at a private or public solution? Will the EU, AU, UN be more involved the next go’round, especially as a result of the publicity?
  • OR was this all a complete shame by a criminal (see Kathryn Cramer’s post on Casini & TopCat, the "man" behind TopCat Marine Security) and Somalia is no closer to security or will good things result from the publicity? Based on certain rumors and suggestions, I question the likelihood of this path… it seems like a lot of mobilizing went in behind the scenes to stop a scam artist and a lot interest from people other than District Attorney’s (lawyers working for municipalities in the United States) and Attorney’s General (lawyers working for states in the United States).

My money is on the last option AND the third option. This puzzle isn’t complete, just one of the pieces has been dropped (kicked?) to the floor. While we don’t have confirmation yet, Casini may be getting called on his failure / inability to deliver product to (shady) buyers and compliance with US Code (and apparently bankruptcy courts, etc). However, what is the real importance of the "cease & desist"? Does it not just legally halt TCMS’s involvement? What was their REAL participation anyways? Providing some boats, making some wonder how long before the pirates are cruising on COBRAs, to the region, possibly some teeth? The change of scope from littoral anti-piracy to seeking the "mother-ship" and back was either a lack of discretion by the in-over-his-head Casini or ?

Kathryn Cramer has a theory it was related to insuring ships.

Information / feedback I have received and reviewed indicate TCMS was simply part of something larger and not a lone wolf out to make a few bucks. With TCMS out, will the underlying effort it was clearly providing cover for cease, burrow, or disperse? The access to natural resources (including Yemeni fields accessed from Somalia), the Chinese, and armed factions inland are at most related to the piracy problem and not direct consequences of privateering. The land-bound warlords obviously have at least some control (are there sealords in the area? Kevin Costner, are you out there? sorry…) over the pirates, but they aren’t the whole game.

More to come for sure as the security situation of Somalia is dire. A reality underscored by the  reporting from Kenya of another hijacking of a ship of "unknown ownership and registry was seized in the pirate-infested waters of Somalia early Tuesday".

:: See also the Somalia and Africa categories for additional information, include Chinese and energy implications

More on TopCat associations

Without getting into details here, but Kathryn Cramer has done some interesting investigative work on those associated with TopCat Marine Security, which makes for an interesting read. Her information paints TopCat more like an Executive Outcomes / Sandline mercenary outfit than a respectable private military firm providing security services, of which there are many. Her research indicates a Fox News link to TopCat. Definitely worth the read.

TopCat, Somalia, Ethiopia: Ogaden, Gedi, EPRDF/TPLF

Some excellent questions and conflicts in wording were raised by a reader (see Marathon, PETRONAS, and PexCo Oil and Somalia) that deserve their own post. The additional research was insightful and makes me more confident in my Boots on the Ground post earlier today.

To start, Hale pointed out a contradiction found on the Global Exploration and Product News website
(aka "Oil and Gas Investor" in my previous post, or E & P) regarding the validity of Range Resource’s
agreement with the Transitional Government, of which Prime Minister
Gedi (Geedi) is the (nominal?) head. The exact wording of the text I posted contains the contradiction Hale points out:

Mixed messages are being sent about licensing in Somalia with a Dutch firm taking acreage but an Australian firm, which thought it had won a block, being told it had negotiated with the wrong people. [Holland’s] PexCo exploration has signed up for with the Ministry of Mines and Energy for exploration in the Ogaden area, according to reports in Ethiopia.

As Hale points out, there is apparently a valid agreement signed by Prime Minister Gedi and Range Resources. The contradiction is possibly just in the reporting, as the Ministry of Mines and Energy is Ethiopian, as Hale points out referencing the Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connection announcement of 19 October 2005.

So, with the Ogaden area in Eastern Ethiopia and not actually in (anymore) Somalia, what gives? Is there some rumbling fallout from the 1977 war when Somalia invaded Ethiopia to "liberate" Ogaden? (This was ultimately led to Somalia agreeing to American use of "naval ports and airfields at Berbera, Chisimayu, and Mogadishu.")

There seems to be a flurry of interest in Ethiopia and Somalia and the region. So why the "mixed messages" in E & P? Was it simply a mistake? Somebody misreading Range Resources claim with Somalia and thinking it was Somali? I don’t think so.

There is an overall deterioration in security in the region with Ogaden "rebels" claiming civilian deaths at the hands of Ethiopians. Between ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front) and the recent public statement about al-Qaeda in Mogadishu, Ethiopia is lining us reasons to move eastward. Fighting AQ is always a crowd pleaser and wiping out pesky ONLF while lining up routes to the sea would seem like a by-product when it is the real purpose.

Hale also commented on the agreement between Puntland and HAFZA, specifically in regards to the suspension of work due to security issues. Hale correctly points out this suspension, which I had already commented on in Puzzle Pieces when I first researched HAFZA. This security problem could be Ethiopian stocked, but that is speculation. What is not speculation is an increase in arms shipments into the Transitional Government’s capital that may or may not be intended for the TG.

The cooperative agreement signed between Somalia and Ethiopia
on 1 Dec 2005 came with pledges of assistance to calls "upon the
international community to extend financial and political support to
the transitional government and take measures on those forces who attempt to hamper peace
in Somalia" [emphasis added]. Further, the "African Union, European
Union, UN, World Bank and other donors pledged for their continued
support to the Transitional Government of Somalia."

This "take measures on those forces…" statement could be the public pronouncement to what is coming.

Something else I noticed during this additional research was the both
HAFZA (left) and Range Resources (right) used an identical map with
identical dot-styles to indicate place. [Update 9 Dec 05: still believe the web designer for both are the same, which has pretty much been proven; add’l info: this map graphic is found at State.gov]

Hafza_free_zones

Somalia_sm05_range

Based on this information, I think the scenario painted by Donna is going to be accurate. The details are fuzzy and contradictions do appear, but I believe the weight of the evidence points toward war breaking out in the region. With Chinese, American, and other interests heavily involved over the natural resources in the area, it would seem likely that at least one government is involved. Unfortunately, based on the TopCat starter (possibly with the luxury cruise ship w/ military grade hardware conveniently on-board… violation of the Geneva Conventions anyone? The media never questioned that, just fascinated by its use), it appears the United States may be involved.

Boots on the ground?

Looking back at a previous post, I’m struck by a statement by a minister of the Transitional Government, Abdalla Haji Ali: "Besides donating assorted weapons to favored factions, unfortunately Ethiopian military personnel crossed deep in to Somali regions of Bakol and Bay in the last 48 hours."

The timing of Ethiopia’s recent announcement of what may seem like public knowledge — "We have a very active terrorist cell in Mogadishu, which has been involved in terrorist activities in Kenya" — is curious. Both Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s statement and Ali’s statement were reported the same day.

Ethiopia’s offer to "help" comes during ongoing African Union peace
talks last week. The AU was apparently discussing plans to send troops
to Somalia to guarantee the safety of the Transitional Government.
Ethiopia has said that "should the process collapse, we very much
hope it doesn’t but if it does, we plan to protect ourselves, not sort
out the mess in Somalia."

It sounds to me like preparation for putting boots on the ground in
Somalia, if they have not already moved in as Ali claims they have,
through proactive action.

The TopCat-led or fronted "mission" could be coming under the cover
of Tim Spicer’s hope (cover? hard to not question Spicer w/ the current
problems of AEGIS) of humanitarian intervention through private forces
since governments “won’t make a decision to intervene…or [delay] until
it is too late”. Use of PMC’s (private military companies) for HIs
(Humanitarian Interventions) is something many have written about, even in the NGO world of peace and serenity.

A side note: a paper listed in the previous link by Christopher Spearin, is located on the Sandline website. A reference Mr Spearin used is Col "Bernie" McCabe (ret.), the same as in my recent post. Only then, he was a Director for Lifeguard. He provided the information to David Isenberg, now of BASIC, on Plaza 107 (see "Background" and note 94).

Col McCabe, as Sandline rep, once said "we don’t work for white powder gangs or rebel groups", preferring to work more noble causes, apparently. But Lifeguard was linked to supplying arms to Sierra Leone rebels and employed by mining companies for security. While on its face simply a security arrangement, it cross past the boundary of propriety as it was part of SL’s working both sides (Sky Air Cargo) of the conflict. The region has a long history of working with private military companies. Puntland hired the Hart Group to protect its shores (why not hire them again? or are they…) in the past. Overall, listing the companies with previous engagements in the region currently connected to TopCat personnel (e.g. Lifeguard, Sandline) could make for an interesting map. Anyone going to do that chart?

This backgrounder by "Donna Somala" is interesting in its tracing and similar path my research has taken me. Of most interest is this (emphasis added on parts I’ve heard rumors of before): "It is evident that a US intelligence team will back Ethiopian troops when they invade Somalia in order to ensure the planned works of the Caluba oil pipeline project toward Somali ports. The interest of Ethiopia is purely economic and has nothing to do with IGAD’s so-called plan to disarm the militia."

In the end, I am confident boots will be marching in Somalia sponsored by this state or that state (Ethiopia and others), and probably including the United States in some direct or indirect manner (remember the $50m ITAR / AECA etc limits). Rumors indicate such, as does the news.

Is war about to break out in the Horn?

News from the Horn of Africa heats up.

"Ethiopia’s prime minister said on Thursday that he believes it iscommon knowledge that an al-Qaeda terror cell is operating in Somalia’s
capital, Mogadishu…The African Union, also based in Addis Ababa, was meeting late on Thursday to discuss plans to send troops to Somalia to guarantee the safety of the government-in-exile, which was formed after three years of peace talks in Kenya."

Back in May 2005, US Marines were reported to have landed in the area, but that’s dated. Currently, the heat is between the Transitional Government and the "other". From today’s news (emphasis added):

A group of Somali lawmakers in-exile on Tuesday accused Ethiopia of smuggling weapons to militias in Somalia in violation of a 13-year-old UN arms embargo on the war-shattered Horn of Africa nation.

Abdalla Haji Ali of the group said: "Besides donating assorted weapons to favored factions, unfortunately Ethiopian military personnel crossed deep in to Somali regions of Bakol and Bay in the last 48 hours."

He said: "It is a matter of hours or very few days before an Ethiopian-masterminded war breaks out in Baidoa."

The US may still have a presence at Camp United, established Feb 2004. Related to piracy, TopCat, Marathon, etc? Something is clearly coming up…

Updated: TopCat and Marathon Link & Oil Diplomacy

Back in Aug 2004, TopCat conducted a symposium on "security vulnerability assessment procedures and how to develop a comprehensive security plan for your facility or site." Listed as one of the "Expert Instructors" was a Col Bernard "Bernie" J. McCabe (ret.), manager of Global Security for the Marathon Oil Corporation but a one-time rep for Sandline.

More information on McCabe and Marathon oil is found in a lengthy document about "the new world order’s mercenaries" has more food for thought:

…old-boy network had put him in touch with oil entrepreneur Anthony Buckingham. Buckingham, also ex-military, has been described in some press accounts as a former member of Britain’s naval special forces, the Special Boat Service, although the description has never been confirmed. After working in the North Sea oil industry as a diver, Buckingham moved into the oil industry, working initially with Ranger Oil of Canada….

Buckingham later founded his own company, Heritage Oil, which he ran from the modern, glass-fronted “Plaza” building at 535 King’s Road, Chelsea…"Plaza 107"…a single receptionist handled incoming calls to more than 18 different companies. From the Plaza suite, Buckingham, Mann and others ran businesses that included oil, gold and diamond mining, a chartered accountancy practice, and offshore financial management services. To this, they would add military ground and aviation companies.

[FYI: Tim Spicer and Buckingham were both involved in PNG through Sandline, the repacked EO…]

A November 1996 memorandum from Buckingham announced the appointment of retired U.S. Special Forces Col. Bernie McCabe as director for the Americas. His task was “to develop Sandline business, and exploit opportunities for other group companies where appropriate in North, Central, and South America. He is also to develop our image/contacts with U.S. government agencies.”…

There is also mention of Marathon Oil and bribe money. The realist says this would be expected in a corrupt region, so no big deal, right?

On July 15, 2000, the Marathon Oil Company sent $13,717,989.31 to an account in Jersey, an island in the English Channel with stringent bank secrecy laws. The owner of the Jersey account was Sonangol, Angola’s state oil company. The sum represented one-third of a bonus that the Houston, Texas-based company agreed to pay the Angolan government a year earlier for rights to pump the country’s offshore oil reserves. That same day, Sonangol transferred an identical sum of money out of Jersey to another Sonangol account in an unknown location. Over the course of that summer, large sums of money traveled from the Jersey account to, among others, a private security company owned by a former Angolan minister, a charitable foundation run by the Angolan president, and a private Angolan bank that counts an alleged arms dealer among its shareholders.

At 64,000 words, it is a lengthy read, better to search for keywords.

TopCat now linked to Marathon… (see previous post on Marathon in Somalia). A tangled web has indeed been weaved.

Marathon, PETRONAS, and PexCo Oil and Somalia

More information on the Somalia, Oil, and possibly TopCat continue. Reporting from Oil and Gas Investor indicates Marathon Oil, of Texas, and possibly other firms have taken over the Conoco claims, or at least is moving in on them, and bumping yet another company to boot.

From the Nov 2005 issue, emphasis added:

4. Mixed messages are being sent about licensing in Somalia with a Dutch firm taking acreage but an Australian firm, which thought it had won a block, being told it had negotiated with the wrong people. [Dutch] PexCo exploration has signed up for with the Ministry of Mines and Energy for exploration in the Ogaden area, according to reports in Ethiopia. The company has taken the Ferfer and Abred blocks covering 18,546 sq miles (29,865 sq km) and has agreed to spend US $5 million in the initial term.

However, Range Resources [an Australian firm] has had its claim over the Puntland region put in doubt. Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi said the deal with the regional government was invalid as only the country’s transitional federal government could negotiate the sale.

Rangeresources_02122005
This contradicts Range’s statement on its website (picture at left in case site changes) that it received in written approval for the deal from the Somali government. Gedi had said that foreign companies and investors that local administrations could not legally negotiate contracts over natural resources.

“Foreign companies should desist in attempts to deal with local authorities … without prior written consent from the federal government,” he said.

On 19 October 2005 it was announced Petronas (Malaysian) and PexCo (Dutch) (More here and also here, but very little on PexCo), had signed deals with the Ministry of Mines, giving them rights to some of the same regions as Range, also reported on 15 November 2005.

On 6 October 2005, Range Resources eyed "Puntland as one of the remaining under-explored areas in the world that has a high potential for vast reserves of hydrocarbons." Their PowerPoint presentation [also stored locally here] indicates a positive co-operative relationship with the indigenous population, with the intent

to facilitate the exploration and commercial development of the State’s natural resources (farm in, joint venture) to bring the commensurate benefits to the people of Puntland and shareholders of the Company

Range believes this is possible because the "Political situation in Puntland is stable with a respected President with no civil unrest like that currently affecting Mogadishu".

The logical, but possibly coincidental, connection is with the Australian / Canadian HAZFA partnership (read more here). The Range Resources Code of Conduct, prominently available on their website, is clear and straight-forward. The Marathon Oil Code of Conduct, has a different feel and tone. Much of this difference is undoubtedly the result of Marathon’s far greater size.

The cooperative agreement signed between Somalia and Ethiopia on 1 Dec 2005 came with pledges of assistance to calls "upon the international community to extend financial and political support to the transitional government and take measures on those forces who attempt to hamper peace in Somalia" [emphasis added]. Further, the "African Union, European Union, UN, World Bank and other donors pledged for their continued support to the Transitional Government of Somalia."

It seems maybe some oil resource competition is happening. Is there payback for Malaysia for its assistance in GWOT (PETRONAS is wholly government owned)? Or is there something else because of a Chinese connection (PETRONAS contracted Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau)?

The Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau (ZPEB), a powerful subsidiary of China’s second largest national petroleum consortium, the China Petrochemical Corporation (SINOPEC), appears to be the principal oil firm operating in Gambella at present, under subcontract to Malaysia’s national oil company PETRONAS. The base camp for ZPEB equipment and petroleum explorations is located approximately 1.5 kilometers from the center of Gambella town on the Abobo-Gambella road. The Ethiopian site manager, Mr. Degefe, is a highlander who tersely describes himself as "responsible for making all operations and security." The base camp is under tight security and heavily guarded by EPRDF troops. PETRONAS and the China National Petroleum Corporation currently operate in Sudan. A recent report by Human Rights Watch raises charges that the Asian oil giants have provided cover for their respective governments to ship arms and military equipment to Sudan in exchange for oil concessions granted by Khartoum.

If this last item is a critical piece of the puzzle, then getting back to the original story about TopCat is about USG counters against China and not about US oil interests directly, but blocking Chinese? If so, then again, why pick TopCat??

Is this why Rumsfeld has asked the IG probe Feith and the Pentagon? The IG is a direct report to the SecDef and if Feith was working for Rumsfeld, why would he call this? As CYA if something blows up? Or, here’s the Black Helicopter version (are no more Black Helicopters since FEMA has been gutted?): Rumsfeld calls the IG probe to placate Congress as cover for another internal investigation that he is not happy with? There are serious differences between the civilian elite and military elites.

Potential Cost of Private Military Companies

The recent AEGIS video possibly showing inappropriate behaviour (allegations until proven) is further opening the eyes of the public on private military companies. One proported reason for the expanded use of these companies is  that private enterprise can provide services quicker and at lower costthan public enterprises is rooted in the American corporate experience.
However, the “low-cost” advantages of private military forces fail to
provide net cost savings when the entire engagement is included in the
calculus. Consider the value of military procurement when the two
options are private firms or public agencies and the private pitch is
high efficiency at a lower face value than public agencies.

Not included in this first level of analysis is the loyalty and trust of the public agency, for example the US Marine Corps and soldiers on kitchen duty. Additionally, dollar for dollar comparisons oversimplify long-term costs of private markets which fail to be perfectly competitive with hidden and substantial transactional costs. Hidden costs of the private-public partnership include higher finance costs (the government can always can borrow money at lower rates), vendor incentives to skimp on quality or adhere to the letter of the contract not the spirit, future public costs to return outsourced skills in-house, and transactional costs of writing, enforcing, and monitoring contracts. Most important is a lack of committed loyalty to the project or consequences of under-performing. Further, the private business may seek contractually-allowed alternatives when uncertainty is likely in any war situation when other outcomes are desired by the client. This, along with unpredictability of warfare, results in expensive cost-plus contracts.

The cost of returning the outsourced task to the public agency is actually two-fold. The obvious expense of retraining aside, once the private sector has the ability to conduct war operations (especially large scale war) without the state it is likely to seek clients and projects for its skills, a dangerous situation as the larger the private firm grows, the more influence it wields and the more its is able to shape policy and further inoculate themselves from oversight. Military equipment and training has little value in alternative civilian uses, limited their marketability and companies must seek revenue streams to make a profit and diplomatic costs of this new private ability are likely to be very high in the long run.

While at least one private military company now requires an oath of allegiance of its employees for United States’ paid missions, the company is still for-profit, still outside of military control, a vendor to the civilian leadership, and more frequently, not wholly or even partially infused with US Armed Forces trained and indoctrinated professional soldiers. Missions may now be performed in the name of the state but short-staffed not because of tactical concerns, but because of contractual limits and profit motives. The four Fallujah contractors killed in March 2004 allegedly died in part because their employer did not provide a fifth man for rear cover to save money, did not provide adequate situational intelligence, and did not allow the contractors to become familiar with the territory. The decision of a private military force to withdraw from a combat zone because of rising interest rates, leverage for contract negotiations, or loss of the contract may seriously damage and reduce military capacity with virtual impunity. Outsourcing to private parties shortens the decision making horizon into immediate “commercial concerns and lobbying rather than real gains to the nation and citizens” that encourage the use of companies that “lack verification and mandatory evaluation safeguards to deliver promised results”.

As the accountability tests illustrates, an additional cost is lack of accountability through the military command structure, military legal system, or in-country legal system of the private military force. Hidden costs from the accountability issue includes the impact on moral of public troops, lack of steadfastness in time of need, and public diplomacy and image problems resulting from conduct.

That being said, there are valuable uses of private military companies. They simply should not be used willy-nilly but for specific purposes, with oversight and monitoring. The opportunity for abuse is too substantial but their value is too great to ignore.

Puzzle Pieces: HAFZA…Somalia…TopCat….intent? Goal?

The TopCat situation becomes ever the more fascinating as each day passes. More information from the blogosphere surfaces as amateur and not so amateur investigative reporters seek out details. Most of the speculation is most likely wildly off the mark either negatively (almost like the Black Helicopters that hover overhead) or positively (the world will be saved by one merc at a time). Still other commentary is not. It is simply restatements of "facts" and facts, as a quick review of Technorati will show, including some information found in posts on this website.

Background information I've posted on oil may be foundational or it may not. Time will tell if it goes to the motive of the TopCat debacle. I've made other comments wondering if the contract and insertion of Western military people and equipment might be related to a inadvertent payload ejection back on 3 Feb 1991, in other words a Project Jennifer II. That may not be accurate as there are some reports, valid or not, the payload was already recovered by somebody else.

Continue reading “Puzzle Pieces: HAFZA…Somalia…TopCat….intent? Goal?

Accountability of Non-State Force

The issue of private military companies, private security companies, or private military firms brings up the question of accountability. This question can be asked in different dimensions: moral, legal, ethical, and command and control. This is a brief draft on the legal accountability of private military forces, divorced from any profit motives. It is my belief that private military forces fall into the same "loophole" (really a misnomer, it is an intentional gap) in regulation in which non-governmental forces "approved" by the international community, namely Blue Helmets, are also found.

Continue reading “Accountability of Non-State Force