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By Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-TX)

On September 11^th, 2001, America changed.  Since then the United States has been at war with violent Islamic extremists who plot and plan against us every day.  We have sent American troops to Afghanistan and Iraq to defeat them in combat.  Our intelligence and special operations forces have fanned out across the globe to disrupt terrorist networks and deny them safe havens.  And we have cooperated with friends and allies to reinforce existing counterterrorism resources and build new coordinated capabilities.  While these actions are necessary to defeat the jihadist threat against the United States, they are not sufficient to do so.

To those who think public diplomacy is something that is simply done outside America's borders or that cultural relations does not have a direct impact on foreign relations, I strongly recommend Mary Dudziak's Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy. Dudziak documents the impact of domestic policies in the global ideological struggle to US-domestic interventions by the State Department and USIA to affect domestic policies and practices. For an example of this reality unknown or forgotten by too many, see Dudziak's essay at SCOTUS Blog, a blog on the Supreme Court of the US. An excerpt is below:

In May 1954, Brown v. Board of Education made headlines, not only in American newspapers, but also around the world.  "At Last! Whites and Black in the United States on the same school benches," was the headline in Afrique Nouvelle, a newspaper in French West Africa (now Senegal).  In India, the Hindustan Times noted that "American democracy stands to gain in strength and prestige from the unanimous ruling" since school segregation "has been a long-standing blot on American life and civilization."  For the Sydney Morning Herald in Australia, Brown would "go a long way toward dissipating the validity of the Communist contention that Western concepts of democracy are hypocritical."

The global reaction to Brown was also noted in American news coverage.  The decision would "stun and silence America's Communist traducers behind the Iron Curtain," argued the Pittsburgh Courier, an African American newspaper, for it would "effectively impress upon millions of colored people in Asia and Africa the fact that idealism and social morality can and do prevail in the Unites States, regardless of race, creed or color."

... When major Supreme Court cases are covered in the world press, they inform the understanding of peoples of other nations about the nature of American democracy.

... The Cold War balance of power itself seemed to turn on the faith of other nations in the benefits of democracy.  Yet in the world's leading democracy, citizens were segregated by race, and African Americans were sometimes brutalized for attempting to exercise basic rights.

The Soviet Union took advantage of this American weakness. ...

We may think that sending our legal ideas overseas helps others, but in this example American justice aided American diplomacy.

I strongly recommend you read the whole essay at SCOTUS as well as pick up a copy of Dudziak's book.

The following is Part III of a discussion between Jeremy Berkowitz and Matt Armstrong on Jeremy's paper "Raising the Iron Curtain on Twitter: why the United States must revise the Smith-Mundt Act to improve public diplomacy" (PDF, 415kb). Part I is Matt Armstrong's critique of the paper and Part II is Jeremy's response.

Below is Part III, my response:

The following is Part II of a discussion between Jeremy Berkowitz and Matt Armstrong on Jeremy's paper "Raising the Iron Curtain on Twitter: why the United States must revise the Smith-Mundt Act to improve public diplomacy" (PDF, 415kb). Part I is Matt Armstrong's initial response to Jeremy's paper available here. My response to the below, Part III, is here.

Jeremy Berkowitz:

I want to thank Matt for his thoughts on my paper. I appreciate his comments and strongly respect his scholarship on the Smith-Mundt Act. I would like to discuss a few of the ideas he raised in his critique. I believe some of his criticism is well-founded and I could have more precisely conveyed my ideas in certain areas. Yet, I also believe that some of his criticism is misguided either due to simple disagreements or misunderstandings of my paper.

This is the first of two parts. The second part will be a response by Jeremy Berkowitz to be posted shortly. This post will be updated with that link when it is available.

"Raising the Iron Curtain on Twitter: why the United States must revise the Smith-Mundt Act to improve public diplomacy" (PDF, 415kb) is an intelligent and thoughtful paper from law student Jeremy Berkowitz. It is a valuable contribution to the too-sparse knowledgebase of legislation that shapes much of the US Government's engagement with the world, including Americans. Written from a legal perspective - in May 2010 Jeremy will receive a Communications Law Studies Certificate from the Columbus School of Law at The Catholic University of America - this paper delves into juridical actions related to the Smith-Mundt Act not found anywhere else. Jeremy also explores some of wrangling between the legislative and executive branch, specifically the confrontation between Senator Fulbright and US Attorney General Kleindienst. I was pleased to see his discussion on the 1998 DC Circuit Court decision in Essential Information v. United States Information Agency. In this case, the Court failed to distinguish "dissemination" and "disclosure", ruling that "it seems unlikely that these two terms were meant to bear different meanings."

For two months in the Autumn of 1947, a Congressional delegation (CODEL) traveled Europe. Their purpose was to study America’s current information and educational exchange service, the conditions affecting it, with the goal of formulating recommendations to shape and make more effective US programs which “can fully implement US foreign policy.” Led by Congressman Karl Mundt (R-SD) and Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ), the delegation was sponsored by the special Mundt subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in support of the pending Smith-Mundt Bill.

In 1947, Congress was debating both the legislation and funding for the State Department's information activities. In May 1947, the House Appropriations Committee took up the issue of the State Department 1948 appropriation, during which Congressman Karl Mundt (R-SD), a former school teacher, made the following argument on the need to engage in the realm of information.

The forces of aggression are moving rapidly and we must step up our action and increase our efforts in the field of information abroad if we are to prevent the eventuality of confronting a world which has been either coerced or corrupted against us

Congressman Everett Dirksen (R-IL) also argued for the need to fund America's response to the threat of Russia's efforts to destroy the "integrity" and the "greatness of the American system." Representative Harold Cooley (D-NC) said the Communists wanted to vilify America through defaming out "institutions in the eyes of the peoples of the world."

Source: Parry-Giles, S. J. (2002). The rhetorical presidency, propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955. Westport, Conn., Praeger.

According to the Voice of America, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates endorses the recent report – Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan – authored by Major General Michael Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor. However, according to VOA, the SecDef took issue with the report being published by CNAS.

On March 3, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall testified before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on the issue of the Department of State Appropriation Bill for 1948.

Below is testimony and questions from a hearing before a special subcommittee of the House of Representative's Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 16, 1947. The subject is HR 3342, a bill that would become known as the US Information and Education Exchange Act of 1948, also referred to as the Smith-Mundt Act. George C. Marshall was General of the Army (5-stars), Ambassador to China, Secretary of State, and later Nobel Peace Prize laureate. He was the third Secretary of State in two years. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., served 1 Dec 1944 - 27 June 1945. James F. Byrnes served 3 July 1945 to 21 January 1947. Marshall served 21 January 1947 to 20 January 1949.

By Peggie Duggan

Exactly who is responsible for explaining the United States to the rest of the world? Perhaps, more importantly, who is responsible for explaining the United States to her own people? The answers are the U.S. Department of State and nobody, respectively. As Dr. Phil would say, "How is that working for you?"

On a forgotten day, buried in the Congressional Record, one senator stood up and said,

Our country, I think we can all admit, has experienced a tremendous decline in international respect since 1943. At the end of World War II, due both to our leadership toward victory and to an accumulation of international prestige built over the decade, this country occupied an enviable stance.

It was liked, admired, and trusted to a degree even by conquered nations, and we had the one great Military Establishment intact in the whole world.

Now what has happened? Why has the world deteriorated? You can't point your finger of blame at any individual or any individual policy. But when that kind of historic demonstration is before us, it seems to me that alert Americans ought to ask themselves why and what can we do about it?

This country today is being popularly blamed by much of the politically conscious population of the world for a great share of the misfortunes of the world...

Something is wrong with American policy. There is nothing wrong with American attitudes, nothing wrong with the American ideal, nothing wrong with the basic concept that we provide a lot of foreign aid and leadership and help the free world get stronger...Nobody really believes we are imperialistic. Nobody really believes we are trying to superimpose any religious creed or a political philosophy on anybody.

We do this out of an abundance of good will and out of some impulse of self-preservation, and we get attacked.[1]

The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 is the authorizing legislation for America's public diplomacy and strategic communication. This three-page information sheet addresses confusion surrounding the Act and makes recommendations that are fundamental to any improvement to US public diplomacy and strategic communication. It is ironic that legislation intended to counter misinformation is itself subject to misinformation to the point few know the Act’s purpose and true application.

The following is a short three page overview written at the request of and for a (pro bono) client who is neither the State Department nor the Defense Department. Download here or read below or at Scribd.

Years ago, the House Appropriations Committee opened an inquiry into “cultural diplomacy.” The response from the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs at the time was that it was a necessary response to the “enormous sums” our adversary was spending on propaganda, “possibly more than the rest of the world combined.” Below is an excerpt from the newspaper story reporting on State’s defense of its cultural efforts (details on the story are below the fold):

[Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs] said the giving of “ideas” or “propaganda” to other countries had become the “fourth arm” of foreign policy. … Congress and even the State Department did not fully appreciate its value, [the Assistant Secretary] said.

[The House Appropriations Committee Chairman] contended that most of the information [from the State Department] was “slanted” to favor the department’s views and thus constituted a “ministry of propaganda.”

[The Assistant Secretary] replied that everything that emerged from his office was “straight information”; that
any “slanted or one-sided information” always gave the source, thus removing it from the “propaganda classification.

[A]sked why [State’s Public Affairs] had more employees – 3,000, – than the entire State Department had [only four years prior], the [Assistant Secretary] explained the State Department rarely received requests for information [before] but now got an average of 34,000 a month.

Are you a graduate student looking for a research topic? Then I’ve got two topics for you. Actually I have a dozen topics, but here’s two, one I’ve shared several times over the last couple of months and another. I haven’t spent a lot of time refining these so don’t bang on me too hard on the wording but a discussion is encouraged.

For Americans, "influence" or "persuasion" in the context of foreign affairs is unseemly and even distasteful. While it is the responsibility - the requirement even - of a democratic leader to marshal and manage public opinion behind an issue or a platform, we have an uneasy relationship with this concept in the area of foreign affairs. 

Using carefully selected words for carefully selected audiences, leveraging social media, traditional media, and personal engagement to build support for an issue are the hallmarks of political campaigns. Whether running for office or pushing legislation, politicians and their advisors explore the psychology of constituents to push emotional buttons to influence and mobilize audiences.