Speaking of pirates

First Slate mentioned pirates, and Jules Crittenden commented on it. Almost immediately after that, Arms & Influences said he was reading a pirate book.

My turn. I’ll reiterate my strong recommendation to read The Sea Rover’s Practice: Pirate Tactics and Techniques, 1630-1730. My previous review is here (not that my reviews are masterpieces, and this was my first in a very, very long time).

Recently, I had the very fortunate opportunity to exchange email with the author, a former Navy SEAL. What I learned surprised me: I was one of the few scholars who found parallels between then and now in terms of privatization of force and insurgent warfare. (Maybe mom was right.)

If you’re interested in historical examples of privatized force and insurgent warfare remarkably similar to today, pick up this book. If you’re interested in a book that draws from period diaries of actual pirates (how cool), along with detailed discussion of their daily operations and tools, pick up this book. If you think 1648 was a magical milestone in the evolution of “state” ownership of warfare, don’t both because this will burst your bubble.

Critiquing Brave New War

Mamma always said I was special. According to John Robb, on his personal blog not Global Guerrillas, I am the only one to criticize Brave New War:

Knew it was going to happen. Oh well. To tell you the truth, I kinda expected more push-back to an outsider like me from the “conference crowd” guarding the walls around the counter-terrorism money/fantasy machine in [Washington]. This guy is the only one to do so publicly.

Am I trying to protect the “money/fantasy machine”? I don’t really know what he means by that (a little help?). Whatever it is, it sure sounds bad and I would probably agree the “money/fantasy machine” needs to be whacked. Regardless, my issue with the book pivots on a failure to include and factor in purposes and support systems into the analysis of his guerrillas. Insight into these two not insignificant data sets can’t be dismissed or ignored, but that is just what BNW does.

For more discussion on BNW, see the Small Wars Council board discussion that’s just starting up here (free subscription may be required, if you’re not already frequenting SWC and you’re interesting in COIN/Small Wars, you’re ignoring valuable insights).

Other reviews of Robb’s BNW may be found here:

  • New York Times
  • Scripps Howard News Service
  • DN-I Net
  • Washington Times / UPI
  • Discussing The Just Prince, an Arab Muslim manual of leadership by Muhammad ibn Zafar

    The approach to state-building in Iraq is anchored in Western concepts of governing. Many, myself included, would argue this was an acceptable approach in the Golden Hour after the initial resistance was crushed or crumbled before resistance could organize and the shock wore off. In this power vacuum, the United States was dealing with a largely secular state that had a strong sense of national identity (see Adeed Dawisha’s excellent book Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century for details). However, as the Golden Hour slipped away and the opportunity to rebuild was squandered and religious men, fakers, and criminals stepped into the vacuum, the framework for discourse changed. The Western Machiavellian mindset was being displaced by a retreat into religion and tribalism, neither of which are “accepted” by the Machiavellian power model.
    Especially today, four years into the occupation of an Arab country at the cross-roads of Sunni and Shia, Arab and Persian, and West and East, we should reconsider how power is spoken, framed, and understood. Other authors have written on this, some I have reviewed previously, and some I will review in the future.

    Continue reading “Discussing The Just Prince, an Arab Muslim manual of leadership by Muhammad ibn Zafar

    Book Review: Blackwater

    BlackwaterJeremy’s Scahill’s new book Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army has seemingly reinvigorated discussion on private security companies. Personally, I have not read his book but I’ve received a lot of email asking about it and asking if I listened to his appearances on various NPR shows and elsewhere. I have to say that on each listening and reading of a review, it becomes more apparent Scahill completely misses the mark and does a poor job doing so to boot. I think there’s something to be said that even Jon Stewart, who I watch nearly religiously (thank God for TiVO), wasn’t accepting Scahill’s sky-is-falling framework (I also don’t remember the last time Jon losing a book of his desk). Based on the interviews on the Daily Show and elsewhere, it’s apparent Scahill’s arguments are weak and when he’s not quoting somebody else his evidence lacks contextual reality. I wonder, if Erik Prince threatened Robert Young Pelton with a lawsuit, what will Scahill be threatened with?

    Continue reading “Book Review: Blackwater

    Book Review: Children at War

    Children at War Eddie at Hidden Unities has a thoughtful series (Part I, Part II, and Part III) on P.W. Singer’s Children at War which I urge you to read.

    From Part I:

    “We have young boys that are more familiar with a gun than with school.” — Afghan warlord

    A copious, systematic look at the alarming combination that rips societies, nations and even regions apart, P.W. Singer’s “Children At War” makes a serious contribution to the layman’s understanding of the emergent child soldier doctrine. Not only is it “probably the worst unrecognized form of child abuse” but the utilization of child soldiers endangers international stability like few other developments in warfare. Singer lays out the facts of child soldiers in serious detail (its global in scope (across the developing world) and massive in number (somewhere between 3-4 million children serve with militias, insurgents and government security forces), skillfully probes the roots and results of the doctrine’s development and then offers a round of thoughtful suggestions, ideas and observations for how to respond to its terrible consequences (the focus of the second post about this book).

    From Part II:

    P.W. Singer offers a range of options for addressing the ominous spread of the child soldier doctrine…

    • advocates for child soldier rehabilitation should link their calls to action to the broader security concerns yielded by child soldiers
    • Local NGO’s and religious and community leaders, who can make appeals against the practice on the basis of local values and customs must be supported if lasting change is going to take effect on the ground.
    • Foster “smart & judicial” efforts that focus on the worst abuses…Shrewd use of the limited political capital and media attention
    • Criminalizing the doctrine…Focus on the doctrine itself rather than the abuses that result, lowering the bar for prosecution.
    • Activists could focus their efforts upon the weak link in the enabling of the child soldier doctrine, the child soldier group leaders’ trading partners
    • an additive of deterrence is required as the cost/benefit calculation by groups must change

    Part III of Eddie’s review and analysis will be on Western vulnerability to the child soldier doctrine. I can’t wait. Eddie’s analysis motivated me to buy the book.

    By the way, Pete Singer, for those thinking his name is familiar made his mark with the de facto read on private military companies (Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry) and is now working on robotics and 21st Century conflict.

    Book Review: Losing Hearts and Minds?

    Losing Hearts and MindsBack in January I posted the Washington Times book review of reviews Losing Hearts and Minds?: Public Diplomacy and Strategic Influence in the Age of Terror. However, after reading the book myself, I found Josh Sinai’s review incomplete (although I do recommend reading his review as well as mine below).

    Carnes Lord, a professor at the Navy War College, takes on the question of how to win the “hearts and minds” in, just as Foreign Affairs wrote in their review of the book, a controversial manner. A look at the table of contents, one finds he is taking a rather in-depth look, with chapter titles ranging from Strategic Influence and Soft Power, Public Diplomacy and Psychological-Political Warfare, Problems of Organization, and, Defense Department: Into the Act?. Lord sets out to look at bureaucratic obstacles, friction from domestic politics, and the impact of media.

    From the start, I found myself in agreement with “controversial” label from Walter Russell Mead’s review in Foreign Affairs, but I don’t know if our independent assessment was for the same reason(s). I had trouble with Lord’s definition, arguments and positions.

    Continue reading “Book Review: Losing Hearts and Minds?

    Book Review: Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security

    Click to go to Amazon.comKurt M. Campbell and Michael E. O’Hanlon’s book Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security is written as a handbook for Democrats, as well as other soft power proponents, to discuss the importance and elements of national security. As the authors argue, Democrats need to stop fearing participation in national security debates and step up to form a dialogue and become a viable political party. National security is a wedge issue that is “often dominated by extremist ideology on one side and muted protest on the other” and Democrats and soft power advocates are ill-equipped to participate in the discussion is how Campbell and O’Hanlon frame it.

    The authors begin by establishing the importance of issue ownership and show how Democrats had used the imagery and language of national security forcibly and effectively. Just the same, they document the freefall from the legacy of FDR, Truman, JFK, and the early years of LBJ with the encouragement of Republican party politicking.

    Continue reading “Book Review: Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security

    Book Review: Web of Deceit

    Click to go to Amazon.comBarry Lando’s Web of Deceit opens with a detailed chronology of events concerning Iraq beginning in 1914. With an entry for nearly every year, there is but a handful of instances three gaps in time, Lando sets the factual and methodical tone and tenor of the book.

    The book’s ten chapters describes the creation and evolution of Iraq. In the first chapter, beginning in 1914 and spanning four and a half decades, Lando begins with a brief but useful look at pre-Twentieth Century history of the region. The real meat is the British and French actions and deals to divy up the region, which Lando uses to draw stark parallels to the current American involvement in Iraq.

    The rest of the book focuses Western and Soviet involvement in shaping Iraq through support, both explicit and implicit, whether accident or not. The book concludes in August 2006 in the appropriately titled chapter “Full Circle: The Occupation” that itself concludes by reminding the reader of history 80 years before when the British occupied Iraq.

    Continue reading “Book Review: Web of Deceit

    Book Review: Insurgents, Terrorists, And Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat

    Insurgents, Terrorists, And Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat is a very useful contribution to the growing body of literature of modern conflict. While the subtitle of the book suggests a tempo-centric view of the Now, the book’s purpose is really to demonstrate the value of anthropological analysis of the irregular warriors we are facing today. Unlike “modern” states who might employ irregular tactics, the authors look at the societal and cultural interactions specific in warrior societies, or “martial races” (a term indifferent to ethnicity), and their resulting organizing principles. This is done to satisfy Sun Tzu’s admonition to “Know the enemy” which we do not. The absence of this knowledge, in simple terms, means we not only don’t know or understand why or how the enemy fights but we don’t even know how defeat or subordination, perhaps a better word, is defined by the enemy or conforms to their belief system. Afterall, both victory and defeat must be acknowledged by all sides.

    Continue reading “Book Review: Insurgents, Terrorists, And Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat

    Book Review: Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations Under Stress

    Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations Under Stress is an outstanding book providing a real and practical look at American civil-military relations. Charles Stevenson comes to this book with the experience of two decades on the staff of four US Senators and as a professor fo the National War College. Unlike other authors on the subject, he puts significant ink in the beginning on the fact the “US Constitution was framed by men distrustful of standing armies and any concentrated power.” The product of this mistrust is evident in the established relationships, by Constutition and by practice, between the three institutions (Executive, Legislative, and military). There is an ongoing struggle where the military seeks autonomy and resources and offers professionalism and loyal subordination (per the Constitution) while the two political branches struggle, as the Framers intended, to make policies. The US military is “cross-pressured by its two masters and…often feels compelled to turn to one for relief from the other.” In the current national security crisis, this book is important reading to really understand the role of the military, the impact of Rumsfeld and the Generals Revolt, Congerssional debates and resolutions, and more.

    Continue reading “Book Review: Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations Under Stress

    Washington Times book review: public diplomacy in the “Global War on Terror”

    Losing Hearts and MindsJoshua Sinai reviews Losing Hearts and Minds?: Public Diplomacy and Strategic Influence in the Age of Terror in the Washington Times this week. It’s interesting, and a good sign, that from within the defense establishment (the book’s author is a professor at the Naval War College and was previously with the National Security Council) and presumably somebody more aware of the value of hard power, should come out and speak to the need for and value of soft power. What would be nice is to have somebody on the soft power side come over and say the same thing about the need for and value of hard power.

    Continue reading “Washington Times book review: public diplomacy in the “Global War on Terror”

    Book Reviews: Imperial Life in the Emerald City & My Year in Iraq

    Rajiv Chandraskaran’s Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone is, among other things, instructive on how to create an insurgency through occupation. Yes, you read that right. Chandraskaran shows how reconstruction efforts were short-circuited and really pissed off the population frequently and unerringly. Chandraskaran’s portrayal of a period that roughly overlaps the existence of the Coalition Provisional Authority is one of myopic and ignorant staffing, priorities, and execution. 

    How do insurgencies develop? Read this book to see how the people in the middle ground had their options removed and how extremists and criminals had recruiting opportunities handed to them on silver platters, not to mention plenty of time to refine their own operations as neon warning signs were ignored and dismissed.

    Because of their similarity and at the same time contrast, my book review here comments on both Chandraskaran’s book and Ambassador L. Paul Bremer’s My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. Nearly identical in scopy, they are diametrically opposed in their perceptions of reality.

    Starting with Imperial Life, Chandraskaran digs into the details like a forensic historian, tearing at the paper castles Bremer and the Administration created for themselves and the American public. He delves into the politics of who was allowed to participate, what information was not shared, and how “loyalists” without appropriate, or in many cases, any experience were placed. Michael Goldfarb, in his New York Times review of the book, hits some of the highlights of Imperial Life, including comparisons between people like the extremely qualified Frederick M. Burkle Jr and who was replaced by the extremely unqualified James K. Haveman Jr for the job of rebuilding Iraq’s healthcare (if the importance of healthcare isn’t obvious, see this RAND report on the importance of healthcare in ‘nation-building’).

    The difference between these two books is astounding, quite honestly. Bremer, as Goldfarb writes, has apparently “read one C.E.O. memoir too many”. An accurate states considering the frequent platitudes Bremer heaps upon himself.

    Bremer likes to finish a section on a positive reflection while Chandraskaran finishes with reality, a bit of bad reality. For example, on the disbanding of the Iraqi army, CPA Order No. 2, Bremer concludes with Kurdish leader Jalal Talabini telling him that the “decision to formally ‘disband’ the old army was the best decision the Coalition made during the our fourteen months in Iraq.”

    On the other hand, Chandraskaran notes Bremer’s plan backfired. Bremer was clearly not concerned with the large number of unemployed he created in a country with already high employment, which he was actually seeking to increase through privatization and restructuring. Failing to heed warnings from the military, State, and logic, Chandraskaran includes an interview with a soldier who had been a part of an Iraqi army protest against the disbanding:

    In a land of honor and tradition, the viceroy had disrespected the old soldiers…. I did see another former soldier [months later] who had been at the protest.

    “What happened to everyone there?”, I asked. “Did they join the new army?”

    He laughed.

    “They’re all insurgents now,” he said. “Bremer lost his chance.”

    On Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 1: De-Baathification, Chandraskaran writes about Jay Garner, effectively Bremer’s predecessor who lead the Office of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Aid (OHRA), “barging” into Bremer’s office with the CIA station chief protesting the de-Baathification order. The CIA station chief said the order, which Chandraskaran writes neither National Security Advisor Rice nor Secretary of State Powell had seen, would “drive fifty thousand Baathists underground before nightfall. Don’t do this.”

    Bremer, on the other hand, writes the order would only bar “about 1 per cent”, or about 20,000, would be knocked out, according to “our intelligence community.” He describes these top four ranks as “Senior Party Members”. The reality, which Chandraskaran writes, was much broader and deeper than this 20,000. Further alienating a nation without regard to how de-Nazification really worked (which was the model and an image Bremer frequently invokes in My Life).

    On a side note, Bremer blames Garner and his men for failing in their job and for leaking information to the press.

    One last comparison between the two books that I’ll make is on Bernie Kerik. Despite the obvious need to create security, police training was not given over to an expert, but to Bernie Kerik. It’s interesting how rarely Kerik appears in Bremer’s book. This is probably because of the terrible job he did, which is detailed on many pages in Imperial Life.

    Imperial Life’s theme is reward over execution. The civilian leadership, including former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s office and Vice President Dick Cheney’s office, disregarded knowledge and history of reconstruction, nationalism, identity, and even Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs in favor of placing people who, too often, were selected out of “loyalty” to the Republican party and got their first passport in order to work in the Emerald City, aka the Green Zone. Cause and effect was something that could be manipulated without consideration of reality. 

    The impact of private contractors in Iraq is evident in Imperial Life, while they are almost completely absent in My Life. From BearingPoint to Haliburton to DynCorp to Blackwater, Imperial Life clearly shows how independent, and even in charge, the contractors were, except when they made a suggestion contrary to Bremer’s perception of reality.

    This is not just a book in the “snafu genre”, as Foreign Affairs described it. It is a book on how the situation deteriorated so badly in Iraq.

    In the end, I’d skip My Life and read Imperial Life to get one view on how the situation in Iraq got so bad and our missed opportunities. Those two words — missed opportunities — appear too frequently in Imperial Life through interviews of OHRA, CPA, military, and contractors done after the completion of their tours. A clear take-away is the mess in Iraq today was not preordained but the result of our doing our damned best to screw it up.

    The new book club: Shelfari

    I’ve imagined book clubs as being a monthly meeting to discuss a shared book while drinking wine (or a good beer), enjoying some snacks, and catching up with friends. The modern book club is likely to take the form of Shelfari, with its ability to time-shift meetings, the opportunity to not share that bottle of wine, and have all the snacks to yourself.

    An interesting idea. See ZenPundit spread the word to ComingAnarchy and Draconian Observations.

    See my “shelf” here.

    Book Review: The Abolition of Privateering and the Declaration of Paris

    Written in 1897, The Abolition of Privateering and the Declaration of Paris is a superb resource when looking at the use of non-state forces by the state. Put simply, this provides period knowledge and perspective that is not available in later works.

    More important is the information on the broad use, impact, and deep understanding of privatization by the nascent American government during the Revolution and the War of 1812, for example. During the Revolution, many towns came to depend on income from their privateers, such as Salem, Massachusetts. Their roving tactics that took them along the European and British coasts produced public diplomacy backlashes as they “came to be liked as little as their brethren of England.”

    In 1812, when both political and financial capital were in short supply and with a navy outnumbered by almost 10 to 1, Congress granted the President the authority to “issue to private armed vessels of the United States commissions or letters of marquee and general reprisal, in such form as he shall think proper, and under the seal of the United States.” Congress, in granting the President this authority, gave specific instructions on compensation and, more importantly, monitoring the privateers as they were keenly aware of the impact on public diplomacy and foreign policy these raiders have.

    In both cases, Congress made it clear that it would not and did not cede responsibility for war when they authorized the President to hire private vessels, and compensate them as privateers, but placed clear parameters on pay and, more importantly, monitoring.

    This book is a hidden gem and is a font information on how privatization then is different than now. Further, it contributes to an understanding of why privatization went by the wayside.

    This is on Mountainrunner’s recommended reading list for privatizing war and a worthwhile purchase.

    Book Review: Mary Dudziak’s Cold War Civil Rights

    I read Mary Dudziak’s book, Cold War Civil Rights a few months ago, but since Dudziak just launched her blog, Legal History Blog, I thought I’d reissue my book review.

    The book is a must-read for anyone who thinks Las Vegas tourist ads apply to public diplomacy and international relations. If you think media coverage is intense now, consider the impact of coverage forty years ago and its impact on the global information war of the time. Continue reading “Book Review: Mary Dudziak’s Cold War Civil Rights

    Book Review – Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror

    Licensed to Kill is Robert Young Pelton’s broad survey of the modern world of mercenaries. Strike that, of contractors. Mercenaries, after all, as Doug Brooks of IPOA (International Peace Operations Association) said in the movie Shadow Company: anyone convicted as being a mercenary should be shot along with his lawyer (Doug, pardon my paraphrasing). Regardless, Pelton’s subtitle captures what these guys are: hired guns. Or as one of the contractors in the book put it: “guns with legs”.

    Pelton’s book is (or can be) a quick read. It’s conversational, often with the feel that you’re sitting in a pub having a beer while he tells you a story (as you do in his World’s Most Dangerous Places books). For me, however, it wasn’t a quick read. I found myself highlighting sentences, scribbling in the margins, and applying colored flags for quick and future reference. Pelton may challenge the journalist\ community with how he gets into the action (journos not always being the type who will ride with the bad guy when something might happen), but this is how he gets the facts, the story, and the respect that opens doors later. A perpetual cycle, his access gets him more access and so on. Unlike other others who seek to justify a point of view, Pelton comes off balanced, telling it like it is and, very importantly, with context.

    Licensed to Kill is more than a narrative of private operators, it is almost a forensic look into the use of private military forces. High profile actors in the world of hired guns, such as Erik Prince and Blackwater, Tim Spicer, Simon Mann, and Michael Grunburg (profiled deeper in Three Worlds Gone Mad) of various ventures, and even a con-artist who’s convinced he’s the greatest American hero.

    This book is a great resource the pulls the curtain aside to see how the firms operate and their motivations, and where they are being used. If you’re not provoked to learn more, you’re not paying attention.

    There have been numerous references to this book on this site, look for more in the future. There’d be more now in this review, except Ioaned out my copy…

    Miscellanea

    A bunch of short things to post today as I’m short on time for the blog but there’s news. I’d call this post Rapid Fire, but that’s taken, although I like that better than “Miscellanea”!

    Defining the War

    The new National Strategy for Countering Terrorism was released yesterday. I haven’t had the chance to review it, but Bruce Hoffman had positive things to say about the document and Bush’s speech announcing it. The Washington Post, which also interviewed Hoffman (who released an updated version of his great book Inside Terrorism in May), portrays a document that seems to have a greater understanding of the root causes of terrorism.

    Continue reading “Miscellanea

    Book Review: A Bloody Business: America’s War Zone Contractors and the Occupation of Iraq

    An element of private military companies is the rediscovered opportunity to join “the fight” without joining a public military organization. Reasons for taking the private route include being too old, too unfit, short-term goals (i.e. quick money, <1yr commitment, the experience, etc), flexibility of choice, or any number of other reasons. The fact is private military companies providing security, logistics, and other services in and around the modern battlespace is re-democratizing war.

    Looking at the private military industry operating in Iraq, in A Bloody Business Colonel Schumacher reviews many of its varied components beyond the almost cliche private security details (the shooters). From construction to trucking to training and even the security contractors, the author profiles elements of the private military industry as under-appreciated, undervalued, and, in many of his examples, highly patriotic.

    This is a book heavy on cheerleading for the private contractors as individuals without spending too much time on the question of the appropriateness of the industry. These men and women do not get the same insurance, logistic support, fire support, medical support, or equipment the public armed forces receive. In return, they get the opportunity to serve at their leisure, higher pay, and little recognition. This book attempts to correct the latter as “[n]either a glorification nor a cheap shot-riddled exposé”, as the back of the dust cover describes it.

    Indeed, most of the reviews on Amazon and other sites echo this sentiment: “…the incredible amount of dangers they face, often times it is more than money which motivates them. For the majority of the contractors, it is their chance to serve their country” and “[t]hey are no less patriotic, no less courageous, than people in the military.”

    Colonel Schumacher glosses over the issues behind the tremendous increase in using private military companies in the last decade. He largely attributes the availability of skilled security resources as a result of “Up-or-Out” policies, but this is a narrow reading of reality. There is more there than that, especially military downsizing etc but like most of the political arguments, Schumacher oversimplifies to spend less time on the intellectual analysis (and long-term realities) and more on the daily realities of the contractor.

    Interesting is his observation of the multicultural and multiethnic make up of PMCs, which reminded me of the democratic and ethnically blind pirates of the 17th Century as described in Benerson Little’s excellent book, The Sea Rover’s Practice (reviewed here previously). The comparison is not meant to suggest a similarity between pirates and private military companies beyond the organizational and motivational parallels between these non-state forces that operate with paradigms different from the societies they come from. One example is a more democratized operation that includes dropping the discrimination found in their contemporary societies — if they are operating on the same team or ship that is.

    When Schumacher does explore the raison d’etre of PMCs use, he has both hits and misses. One "hit" is when he writes: “[b]ecause contract operations do not get the visibility that military operations do, the true cost, in terms of lives and impact on US foreign policy is disguised. As a concerned public, we need to be far more aware and informed about where, when, and how the United States employs these firm.”

    However at the same time he misses the point by just including barely a page in his 262 page book on the political realities, but yet frequently returns to the point of the under-appreciated and under-supported contractor and their value. The latter is clearly the point he wants to make and does not want to delve into the politics behind their use like most other books on the subject. This is somewhat refreshing to a reader new to the subject but the human story should not outweigh the concern we the public should have over their deployment. The focus of the book is clearly to tell the story of the “unsung hero”. Schumacher makes no attempt to connect private military contractors with the evolution of war, which isn’t his purpose anyways.

    That all said, the book really is a good read and good on first person (almost whole chapters are told by the participant with only setup by Schumacher) accounts. The focus on non-shooters is almost refreshing. At times reading like a novel, it is a quick read.

    I was once asked for a reading list that included first-person accounts of private military companies in action. Just a few months ago, I was pressed to provide anything, but I’d include this on a reading list for another — non-academic — perspective.