Max Boot, in the 5 July 2006 LA Times wrote "Our Enemies Aren’t Drinking Lattes" (thanks Small Wars Journal for the heads up). He starts:
Category: Psychological Struggle
Cultural Warfare, continued
A vigourous discussion on an earlier post "How Not to Conduct Cultural Warfare" (to be continued here in a new category "Cultural Warfare") should have a greater obvious context with recent news. As Eccentric Star ("Murdered US Soldiers Linked to Rape & Murder of Iraqi Civilians") notes:
A link — however tenuous — between the two US soldiers who were abducted, tortured, and murdered in Iraq recently and the rape of an Iraqi woman and subsequent murder of her and her family is explosive. From an Iraqi’s perspective, this must make the insurgents who killed the US soldiers look more like righteous avengers than anything else.
At some point who we are, or rather how we see ourselves, becomes disjointed with what we do. At some point, what we do is who we are, especially if it is repeated often enough. Put yourself in the shoes of locals and consider the trend from their perspective. Cultural warfare and public diplomacy (wartime and peacetime sides of the same coin) does this and the Haditha videos (commented on in How Not to Conduct Cultural Warfare) reinforces stereotypes, the wrong stereotypes.
From the US side, Shawn Howard in The Difference Between Us and Them, writing before the news of the rape, echoed a sentiment leaning toward "kill them all, let [insert deity here] sort ’em out" (by the way, I’m not being politically correct, it’s just a tool to ack different perspectives… for all I care, assume God is written there):
…These insurgents have a long pattern of obscene violence that goes well beyond the rules of engagement.
I will not argue that the U.S. military and the private contractors are always choir boys….Also, when we find out about alleged atrocities, we investigate them and hold people accountable. The insurgents are praised when they commit disgusting atrocities….
What we are fighting is a barbaric culture that refuses to develop into a civilized society. Even if we stay for a decade, we will never be able to teach them to respect human life. That is a fight we will not win.
This last paragraph essentially echoes Dan of tdaxp (in the comments here) in our recent discussion, most notably [for this discussion, I’ll move past the comment about investigating and holding contractors accountable]:
Iraq and Afghanistan are not Core [as in Core-Gap of Barnett’s Pentagon’s New Map] states that somehow went off the rails (like Germany and Japan did). They are from the deepest part of the AfroIslamic Gap.
As such a "hearts and minds," or even a narrow Westernization, strategy is out of the question . Attempting to make Iraqi Shia and Sunni like us because of who we are is a fools errand. So would attempting the reverse. Neither is much possible. We’re not going to enrage Iraqis with things like this. Too little, too late.
There is little need for our side to descend to aggregations of Them into a collective evil. It is wrong to say
…the "All in all, I’d rather not have Americans here right now" ship has long since sailed. Those Iraqis that support us do so because they think we can improve their lives…
There are more Iraqis that would support us if a) procedures and policies of both military and private forces and reconstruction efforts considered locals as assets and part of the solution, and b) fear keeps many from secretly or openly from supporting us and hence pushing away criminal and "insurgent" groups.
The reality is, now and in the past (another dig against tempo-centric and situational unaware 4GW here), that an overall environment is necessary to bring out allies as force multipliers (consider the role and purpose of the Green Berets and the fact we don’t need warm and cuddly friendships, just a mutual understanding who the bad guy is).
David Galula, writing in his 1965 CounterInsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, noted the clear need to get the population on your side which you do not do by alienating them. As an example, Galula cites mainland Chinese who, when expected to side with Nationalists during a quick hit and run in fact fought back viciously. Why? Because they knew where they were living and reality of the attack (not to free the people but simply to prick the side of Mao).
Does cultural intelligence matter? Consider this CS Monitor story "What US wants in its troops: cultural savvy" (and many other references to be posted soon, but the CS Monitor article was timely… posted this evening). If cultural awareness matters on the battlefield to diffuse or prevent tensions, why not in peacetime? Hence, public diplomacy… CW (cultural warfare) is a variant of PD (public diplomacy).
Knowing the terrain, both physical and social
Paul at Soft Power Beacon writes about situational awareness in Iraq:
…That said, Behn writes, some Iraqis will get their hair cut like famous Iraqi singers or Brazilian soccer players. None of this appears in any textbook on the Middle East; it’s just one more facet of Iraqi society that U.S. forces and policymakers must have people on the ground–outside the Green Zone–to understand.That said, Behn writes, some Iraqis will get their hair cut like famous Iraqi singers or Brazilian soccer players. None of this appears in any textbook on the Middle East; it’s just one more facet of Iraqi society that U.S. forces and policymakers must have people on the ground–outside the Green Zone–to understand.
Understanding how society ticks is critical to creating a secure environment. Cops working in gang territory know this, just as our military forces, acting like police forces, must become aware of this. This is situational awareness
Cultural Warfare, a quote
"Conventional warfare struck at the heart to kill and thenconquer;
Economic war struck at the belly to exploit and acquire
riches;
Cultural war strikes at the head to paralyze without killing, to
conquer by slow rot, and to obtain wealth through the disintegration of cultures
and peoples."
— Henri Gobbard, La Guerre Culturelle
Nigeria Language Map
Languages of Nigeria: Index Map (old)
How not to conduct Cultural Warfare
As an intentional or unintentional tool to reach out and communicate with people, online videos have tremendous power. Websites such as YouTube and GoogleVideo allow the rapid and uncontrolled proliferation of content, regardless of language or intent. From the recent slam on the Bush Administration by a rural 15-year-old girl in Alabama to a video by an active duty Marine seemingly, even if not intentionally, mocking the Haditha killings.
Unlike other military videos commented on here, such as the Norwegian video mocking the politics behind Kosovo mission or the Brits having fun in Iraq, this new video demonstrates a severe and damaging insensitivity to the mission (Download hadji-girl.wmv).
The Marine who made the video says it was a joke and a search for the video’s title, Hadji Girl, primarily turns up blogs with little to no understanding of the implications of such a message. The reality is perceptions matter and this video plays into a popular mental framework of America. The concept of Cultural Warfare, a somewhat new term, is completely wacked by a video like this.
Question: is it best to ignore this video or to quickly refute it to the public (not the American public)?
Credibility: a requirement for a Spokeman but not a country?
Human nature is fascinating, everybody knows that. We either tend to believe people or we tend not to believe people. Sometimes we want to believe what is congruent to our belief systems and disbelieve that which is not. This to-believe-or-not is influenced by by the valiance of the item and the visibility or frequency of the item, to borrow from Jarol Manheim. In the case of a country, the relationship with the news provider may cause a leaning one way or the other, and in the case of a reporter, influence the output, in this case the news.
The construction of the White House Press Secretary, in the American tradition, provides a level insulation from the President and the Administration as whole. When messages fail to maintain positive traction with the reporters in the room, the inoculative effect of the messenger increases. Because of intentional independence of the Spokesman, potential "crash & burn" media briefings may be seen as frustration in reporting (the reporter might to work more since the information desired is not as readily available as desired or expected), a loss of credibility from the Spokesman, but apparently not of the Administration. In the case of Scott McClellan, his rumored resignation is founded on this notion.
According to PR Week (14 Nov 05):
There
are certain things no effective press secretary can do without. Topping
the list are a podium, a BlackBerry, and credibility.White House spokesman Scott McClellan certainly has the first and
probably the second. It’s the third that some are starting to doubt.
First, it is interesting how much leeway certain people get. The desire to trust, if it matches our pre-formed beliefs, is strong and for reporters who are dependent on the Press Secretary for their jobs, they really want to trust him. Interesting is this trust is not transferred to the Administration, or distrust for that matter, in equal amounts. The Press Secretary is a convenient firewall.
In contrast, the spokesperson of the UK Prime Minister is not identified by name nor is there a picture of the "Prime Minister’s Official Spokesperson" (seen as the PMOS or PMS). The language of the PMOS is polite and formal, as is expected of the British of course, and never standing in front of the PM to take a bullet. The difference is largely in the managerial style of the chief executive. The buck stops with the Prime Minister for he has to defend it personally and weekly during the Prime Minister’s Question Time in Parliament. In reality, the PMOS is the spokesman for the government of the Prime Minister. This model makes the American Press Secretary more like a separate office, which is the goal when trying to insulate.
There are a couple of interesting exchanges Scott McClellan had with the press recently that should have reflected poorly on the Administration but because of the construct of the Office of the Press Secretary, had far less of an impact on the Administration’s credibility. The impact being mostly constrained to McClellan himself. The credibility problem only becomes the White House’s problem when it hurts a certain level because, in point of fact, the Press Secretary is granted his own leeway.
In a Press Briefing 13 Oct 05 the Press Secretary attempted to dodge and twist questions and answers but the press was having less and less patience with it. Attempts to defer to DoD, sometimes allowed, were not. On 8 Nov 05, there was a long back and forth with a reporter asking for a clear yes or no answer with the Press Secretary dancing around.
The reality of his likely resignation is not his deteriorating (deteriorated?) relationship with the press, but the need to get a new lightening rod in the press room. The reporters give the Press Secretary a lot of freedom at the beginning of his shift, more so than they should but an understandable amount considering the relationship. A less distinct office would allow less time to "get up to speed", a disadvantage to any entity looking for distance between policy and message.