Category: Smith-Mundt

Strengthening State by Making It More like Defense

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

AmericanDiplomacy.org has an interesting article by three students at the Joint Forces Staff College, LTC Shannon Caudill, USAF, MAJ Andrew Leonard, USA, and SgtMaj Richard Thresher (what, nobody from the Navy or a Coastie?), titled Interagency Leadership: The Case for Strengthening the Department of State.

In short, they argue State’s geographic focus should drop its early-20th (arguably late-19th) Century European view of the world and adopt the map of the Defense Department’s Combatant Commands.  The authors argue State “should be the pre-eminent diplomatic and interagency leader abroad, but it must be reorganized to become more relevant, robust, and effective.”  They also note Congress’s reticence to fully fund State… They also note Congress’s reticence to fully fund State (no, that’s not a typo, that’s history repeating itself). 

Their recommendation is a smart one.  In fact, CSIS would recognize it as a means to implement Smart Power:

DOS should create a Regional Chief of Mission (RCM), responsible for leading and synchronizing interagency capabilities to project the full range of national power elements. This diplomatic post would work in tandem with the geographic combatant commander and ensure a diplomatic face is planted on the region, not just a military one. It would also provide a regional leader for coordinating the non-military elements of national power and take the lead role in integrating interagency approaches to fulfill government objectives.

However, beyond the importance of having leadership that understands the importance and utility of the full range of national power, there are several structural issues at State that must be dealt with, arguably before the reorganization.  These include updating the personnel system, including increasing interagency billets, and increasing professional and academic education opportunities.  Changes to these would really put State on par with Defense and would facilitate State’s New Map (a book idea for somebody… may Tom’s fifth).  This would really strengthen State and complete the transformation the authors imply is necessary.

I recommend the essay. 

Strategic Miscommunication and Smith-Mundt

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

Briefly, Andrew Exum wrote a very good response over at the Guardian’s Comment is Free to the media’s recoil that some their analysts, who weren’t vetted, may have been influenced by a skilled influence operation to manage the perceptions of Americans of the war.  What a shock.  Isn’t that why the media is supposed to vet their analysts in the first place?  In the rush to get a face on the air, and keep him (any “hers”?) there, they skipped the background checks or simply ignored what came back.  I can understand the one-off, but this was systemic and ongoing. 

To my surprise, Smith-Mundt has not been recalled as often as I expected.  However, Andrew does highlight Smith-Mundt and its purpose of preventing the government from using information created for overseas broadcast from being used within our borders.  He makes the argument that “the most significant clause in the act remains a good one: propaganda cannot and should not be directed by government officials toward the people they represent.” 

If we, in fact, look back we’ll find something interesting.  Smith-Mundt intended, if implicitly and through behind the scenes handshakes, that propaganda designed for overseas broadcast to be shared with the people through the American media.   

There are two important aspects of Smith-Mundt to consider here.  First, one of the pillars of Smith-Mundt was preventing the U.S. government from bypassing the media in its conversations with the general public.  Various reasons were given, the most notable of which was the foreseen impact on the profits of newspaper and radio companies both large and small and the infringing on their First Amendment rights to speak.  The latter was directly related to concerns that the dominance of previous government agencies, the Committee for Public Information (President Wilson’s domestic propaganda office) and the Office of War Information (President Roosevelt’s domestic propaganda office), in speaking to the public would drown out private media, and oh yeah, alternative views. 

Second, Smith-Mundt’s prohibition was against direct dissemination of materials designed for overseas information campaigns by specific U.S. information and exchange agencies (i.e. VOA, later USIA, parts of the Department of Stateetc).  The media, scholars, the public, and Congress, were permitted to view and access the material.  It was not until 1972, 24 years after Smith-Mundt was enacted, were the limitation expanded to prohibit virtually all access and dissemination of information created for overseas use by the same agencies.  Also keep in mind that Smith-Mundt came out of the Foreign Relations / Foreign Affairs Committee in the Senate and House and not a domestic oversight committee, such as telecommunications. 

Propagandizing the American people was never off limits.  Just briefly, consider the monthly tests of air raid sirens, the now-campy warnings of communism and atomic warfare, deep cooperation between the military and Hollywood, and a slew of other campaigns of influence and persuasion undertaken by the government or by private parties on behalf of the government.  Those were intended for overseas consumption and weren’t created by government overseas broadcasters, so were fair game to be broadcast at home, in schools or through the media. 

In other words, Smith-Mundt is not, and never was, applicable and would not have prevented the “Hidden Hand.”  The generals were not sharing information designed for or intended for overseas consumption, they where not sharing information from State, and the government itself was not directly informing the public. 

This doesn’t make what they did excusable.  Far from it, as Andrew capably points out.  The biggest concern we should take-away from David Barstow’s Hidden Hand, is what Andrew closes with (and I mention here):

In the end, I was more heartened by the revelations about the Pentagon’s strategic communications programme than I was disgusted. What disgusted me, by contrast, was that while this well-oiled effort was underway in America, our strategic communications efforts in Iraq and the greater Middle East remained bumbling and inept.

In 2004, for example, when the US mistakenly and horrifically targeted a wedding party in Iraq, killing 40 innocent people, the spokesman in Iraq at the time lamely insisted that “bad people have parties too.”

Now that was something to get upset about.

The fact is, the United States and its allies have largely ceded the strategic communications battlefield to the insurgents and terrorists since 2001. If the Pentagon invested as much time and effort communicating to the audience of al-Jazeera as it does communicating to the audience of Fox News, more Americans soldiers in Iraq might be home by now.

See also:

Smith-Mundt: a symposium to discuss its purpose, intent, and impact (the symposium that isn’t likely)

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

Policy and strategy makers from all corners of America are finally realizing that the so-called “War on Terror” is a war of ideas – a war of information.  It is now accepted that cultural understanding and public opinion are equally as important as any bullet or any bomb.  Indeed, the ability of the United States to collect and disseminate information will be vital to the security of the nation for the foreseeable future.  Yet the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, an outdated Cold War relic designed to create an effective counter-propaganda capability through information activities and exchanges, to protect the American people from communist sympathizers (mostly within State), and to protect the American broadcast industry from government-funded competition, is hamstringing U.S. information capabilities.  It is one of the most influential laws affecting America’s ability to fight the War of Ideas, and it is not helping.  And yet, so few really understand this law, it’s purpose, their intent, or even worse, its real impact today.

The “little” matter of Pentagon Public Affairs “co-opting” media analysts has brought to the public sphere — once again — the issue of Smith-Mundt, whether realized it or not.  The amount of misinformation about legislation designed to counter misinformation, ah the irony, is enormous and reverberates through Congress, the Pentagon, and across the traditional and new media discussion spheres. 

Last year, John Brown, formerly of USC’s Public Diplomacy Press and Blog Review, and I began talking about putting together a conference in the sixtieth anniversary year of Smith-Mundt.  Six months ago, we began sending out a proposal for an academic conference to promote and discuss new scholarly research on the subject.  No takers so we changed the format to a more accessible symposium (with shorter lead time required for speakers… no longer would papers be required) and despite significant interest (most of the panels are tentatively filled and many have expressed interest in attending), we could not find an organization to fund our modest event. 

Continue reading “Smith-Mundt: a symposium to discuss its purpose, intent, and impact (the symposium that isn’t likely)
“ →

What’s Behind the Hidden Hand is the Real Story

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

David Barstow’s Behind the Analysts, the Hidden Hand story about the Pentagon’s manipulation of the media’s military analysts misses the point in the quest for sensationalism.  On the one hand, this is a story about leveraging a group to relay talking points, which sounds a lot like the White House Press Corps in general during a popular Administration, or a host of other media-government interactions, some of which Barstow mentions.  On the other, this highlights a selective view of domestic influence operations and a failure to look holistically at the importance of global perceptions in the Defense Department under former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. 

I won’t get into the first point, but will make a few comments here on the second.

First the obvious question: isn’t this a violation of Smith-Mundt, the law perceived as prohibiting the propagandizing of Americans by their government?  The short answer is no, it isn’t.  Smith-Mundt, which institionalized the Voice of America as well as cultural exchanges to counter adversarial messages, only covers activities by selective parts of the State Department, specifically those that communicate with audiences beyond our borders.  It doesn’t cover the Department of Defense, but Defense has self-imposed the restriction through a rule, not legislation by Congress or military doctrine.  BUT, Defense has liberally applied the concepts of Smith-Mundt, limiting information operations and PSYOP (see also here).

Much more important is that Public Affairs, that entity that informs without influencing, actively and effectively engaged in perception management on the home front while dismissing the real war of perceptions, the war of ideas of in Iraq and around the globe.  For me, this is a key point that reflects less on Tori Clarke and more on Rumsfeld. 

One last comment, this story makes Tori Clarke’s “outing” of the Office of Strategic Influence more interesting.  Fighting to protect her turf, she proved her skill at manipulation and disinformation at exposing an office that is the essence of public diplomacy and more specifically the United States Information Agency (which highlights the void created by an absent and/or hamstrung State Department that Defense moved into).  Between Clarke and Karl Rove, we could have built a formidable information capability to attack the enemy and their propaganda, which at times was increasingly attractive because of our failure to understand the power of perceptions and the impact of the “say-do gap.”  Too bad she couldn’t be better utilized for good to restructure our information assets from Public Affairs to Information Operations to PSYOP to Public Diplomacy (nothing should be read into the order). 

This deserve more treatment than I have time for here right now.  More later, either in this blog or elsewhere. 

See also (external links):

See also (internal):

The paper about the divide between Public Affairs / Information Operations you never read

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

In “Planning to Influence: A Commander’s Guide to the PA/IO Relationship“, United States Marine Corps Major Matt Morgan analyzes restraints on effective information activities within the Marines, but it speaks to the whole of Defense communications.  Adapted from the executive summary of his masters thesis at Marine Corps U., it is a must-read for anyone interested in the subject.  Matt couldn’t get it published when he wrote it two years ago so today it is posted here with his permission.

More than a decade of innovation in the global information environment has radically changed the way the world communicates, and our enemies have gained new advantage in building support for their causes and inciting hostility against us. While Marine Corps leaders have long understood the importance of information in the form of command, control, communications, and intelligence, it is only relatively recently that influence and perception have become widely recognized as critical factors in all aspects of military operations. Dealing with perception in operational design, however, is complex, and integrating influence into the Marine Corps Planning Process proves difficult. Complicating factors include a lack of naval doctrine on the conduct of information operations (IO) and policies that restrict collaboration between the primary activities dealing in the cognitive dimension of the information environment—that is, public affairs (PA) and psychological operations (PSYOP).

Who is MAJ Morgan?

Maj. Morgan is currently serving in Iraq as the Strategic Communication Policy Advisor to the Commanding General, Task Force 134, Detainee Operations. Additionally, he has served as Chief of National Media Outreach, MNF-I Strategic Effects, and was deployed in 2003 to the Horn of Africa as Public Affairs Officer for CJTF-HOA. Maj. Morgan is a graduate of Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the principal author of the United States Marine Corps Strategic Communication Plan.

When History Repeats: Troubles at VOA in 1946 are Remarkably Similar to the Troubles at VOA in 2008 (Updated)

~ Matt Armstrong

image Sixty-two years ago, Congress was so troubled by the operations of the Voice of America that it slashed the appropriation for the State Department’s Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs, known as OIC, in half.  At the time, not only were broadcasts of dubious quality hitting the airwaves (including many from private media contractors), but a lack of accountability of the personnel and content producers.  Congress was not questioning the act or need to propagandize, it was simply responding to the extremely poor quality and haphazard nature of U.S. efforts in light of communist inroads into Western public opinion.
Some Congressional Republicans feared a peacetime VOA would be bias towards a Democratic Administration.  Others thought the “whispers” from State in the war of contemporary war of ideas at the beginning of the Cold War were symptomatic of a larger problem of communist sympathizers within State, a problem made worse by a rash of spy scandals.  America’s information systems were ill and the cure was the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, formally known as Public Law 402: The United States Information and Educations Exchange Act of 1948.

In 2008, and again there’s trouble at VOA.  I have a copy of the five-page letter dated 4 April 2008 Senator Tom Coburn, MD, (R-KY) sent to Stephen Hadley, the National Security Advisor, detailing his issues with VOA’s Farsi broadcasts.  The Senator is troubled by not just the VOA but its oversight organization, the Broadcasting Board of Governors.  His three major concerns are:

  1. A lack of transparency in both VOA and BBG
  2. A lack of accountability in both VOA and BBG
  3. Absence of guidance and coordination from Key Policy-Making Agencies (State, Defense, Homeland Security, National Security Council, etc)

I agree with the essence of his arguments: we’re paying too much for services, the quality of staff and content is questionable, and there’s no accountability or transparency. Each of these, ironically, were foundational reasons for Smith-Mundt!  In other words, most of the Senators complaints are rooted in modern distortions of Smith-Mundt that institutionalized VOA to address the same problems sixty years ago.

Sixty years ago, Smith-Mundt imposed in-sourcing and citizenship requirements in the face of questions of loyalty and counter-productive broadcasts.  The absence of transparency can be traced to distorting and ill-conceived amendments to the Act in 1972 and 1985 that were contrary to the purpose of the act.  I could go on, but I won’t here (go here for more).

One interesting example, not related to Smith-Mundt, the Senator highlights is the VOA’s “terrorists are freedom fighters” policy posted on VOA’s blog (VOA’s blog would a) violated Smith-Mundt if they ever post any part of a transcript online and b) didn’t host it on a free service like blogspot).  The discussion of the use of the “t-word” is, well, interesting.  See for yourself.

In addition to long overdue reforms of BBG, the Senator wants to install three new governors (he doesn’t say who he wants to replace): Cliff May, Scott Carpenter, and Enders Wimbush.

However, while I agree with the Senator’s criticism of VOA, I suspect he wants to swing the pendulum too far to the other side.  Regardless, the cure from the doctor from Oklahoma is not holding up Jim Glassman’s nomination.  The position of Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy (and, by the way, for Public Affairs) should not remain empty any longer.

Instead, I urge the good Senator to instead convince his House colleagues (I understand from discussions last year that his colleagues in the Senate are already open to the idea) to revisit Smith-Mundt, especially the distorted modern perception that pervades not just our civilian information agencies but our military services as well.  This Act, the fix for similar complaints nearly exactly sixty years ago, is the root of most of his complaints.  Any promises the Senator extracts from the White House to satisfy his valid concerns laid out in his letter will be met, under current conditions, by artificial and false firewalls stemming from modern incorrect interpretations of Smith-Mundt.

Talking about the Principles of Smith-Mundt

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

I had hoped that my response to Marc Lynch’s challenge would spark a discussion on Smith-Mundt. It did. First, there was a request to fill in some details and do a cross-post. Now, Marc helps with his comments on my post.

Passed sixty years ago as Public Law 402, the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, the Smith-Mundt Act was to equip the U.S. in a contemporary “war of ideas” and address the danger poised “by the weapons of false propaganda and misinformation and the inability on the part of the United States to deal adequately with those weapons.” It is with some irony that the Act today is itself misunderstood and misrepresented. One might say Smith-Mundt needs, well, its own Smith-Mundt.

Continue reading “Talking about the Principles of Smith-Mundt
“ →

Not Afraid to Talk: our adversaries aren’t, why are we?

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 3 Comments

For an unabridged version of the below post, go here. Otherwise read on.

GWU professor Marc Lynch, perhaps more commonly known as Abu Aardvark, revealed the positions on public diplomacy of the current presidential candidates:

I came across something interesting while doing some research on public diplomacy for an unrelated project.  Since at least the 9/11 Commission Report, almost every foreign policy blueprint or platform has for better or for worse mentioned the need to fix American public diplomacy and to engage with the "war of ideas" in the Islamic world.   I expected all three remaining Presidential candidates to offer at least some boilerplate rhetoric on the theme.  What I found was different.

Marc highlighted the differences between the presidential candidates on what is arguably the most important and yet least understood element of our national security. At the end of his post, he challenged John Brown, Patricia Kushlis, and this blogger to offer our thoughts.  Patricia at Whirled View responded, as did John Brown and a few others. I suggest you read their responses.

Continue reading “Not Afraid to Talk: our adversaries aren’t, why are we?
“ →

Understanding the failure: what’s really wrong and why new agencies or doctrine won’t be enough to fix it

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

There is a serious problem with America’s communication abilities.  It isn’t just a problem of capacity, but constraints created by misunderstanding. 

Sixty years ago, the elements of America’s national power – diplomacy, information, military, and economics, or DIME – were retooled to meet an emerging threat with the National Security Act of 1947 and the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948. Like today, U.S. was engaged in a war of ideas and perceptions both globally and domestically, however the importance and impact of Smith-Mundt is ignored despite its influence, often negative, on every aspect of America’s informational arsenal. It is time to retool for the future fight.

Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s recent suggestion to recreate the United States Information Agency for the modern conflict really stirred things up. Setting the tone was Sharon Weinberger of Danger Room with a post that didn’t hide her disdain for the idea. Following her lead was Mike Nizza of the New York Times blog The Lede with a post that closed with “[d]efenders of Mr. Rumsfeld’s proposal have yet to emerge in the blogosphere.”

Then there was William Arkin’s post on WaPo lamenting that “Pentagon feels it is its responsibility to fill in a vacuum” of the war of ideas but doing so in ways that are “hopelessly confused.” But, as Arkin pleads it, it is not the job of the military to “wage the nation’s information wars.” True, but who else will do it, Mr. Arkin?

What is the real issue here? Steve Corman suggests we should be talking about a missing approach and not a missing tool.  He recalls that USIA relied on a field driven approach that understand the local audiences and shaped communication and discourse accordingly.  The independence of the agency was one thing — not a small thing — but how did its job was the key.

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, speaking this past weekend at CSIS, said the key problem preventing effective America participation in the war of ideas today is one of capacity.  It is certainly a problem, but it is not the only problem and it may not shape our abilities as much as the Smith-Mundt Act.

Continue reading “Understanding the failure: what’s really wrong and why new agencies or doctrine won’t be enough to fix it
“ →

What would you ask Jim Glassman? (Updated)

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 3 Comments

If you had the opportunity to ask a question of James Glassman at his upcoming Senate confirmation hearing as Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, what would it be?

My questions, below, are still in draft form, so feel free to hack, jack, and ridicule:

Today the United States is engaged in a war of ideas and perception. A war we are barely participating in. Sixty years ago, Public Law 402: The United States Information and Educations Exchange Act of 1948, commonly referred to as the Smith-Mundt Act was passed to formalize the institutions needed to fight the last war of ideology and understanding. Today, far removed from its original purpose and the crafters intent, Smith-Mundt is broadly interpreted to apply not just to certain elements of public diplomacy, specifically those of USIA and VOA, now both rolled into the Department of State, but to the operations of the Defense Department while at the same time ignoring other U.S. government communications for both overseas and domestic consumption.

The communications revolution of the 1940s that in part spurred Representative Karl Mundt (R-SD) and Senator Alexander Smith (R-NJ) still shapes our communication with the world. But the simple communications models of the 1940’s have been replaced by global networks of formal and informal media. Careful deliberation by both media and the consumers of media is gone. Today, perception too often trumps fact. By the time the truth comes out, the audience and media have moved on.

Question #1: Mr. Glassman, what are your thoughts on Smith-Mundt? Does it apply to the whole of the United States government? To a part or all of the State Department? What about the Defense Department or the President’s Press Secretary or other departments or agencies in the Executive and Legislative Branch? Are they covered under Smith-Mundt?

Smith-Mundt institutionalized the often recalled United States Information Agency. The Smith-Mundt committee made it clear the USIA must, to be effective, tell the truth; explain the motives of the United States; combat misrepresentation and distortion by our adversary; and aggressively interpret and support American foreign policy.

Question #2: Is it time to have another agency, insulated from the whims of the Oval Office and Congress to become a credible and trusted voice for news and information to replace the haphazard solutions put forth by various parts of the United States Government today?

When speaking with those who practice public diplomacy or strategic communications, the distinction is for another question, frequently heard is how conversations with foreign audiences are shaped more by how our own people will interpret the discussion than the listener standing in front of us.

Question #3: Given the way the media environment has evolved since Smith-Mundt was enacted, how realistic is it to think we can separate messages according to the audiences they’re supposed to influence (or not)?  Whoever you think the law applies to, doesn’t it give them an impossible assignment?  Should we just get rid of it or rewrite it to provide more realistic regulation, given modern media conditions?

These are wordy but I’ve listened to these confirmation hearings before and in that context, the above might actually be too brief ;). Post your questions and suggestions in the comments below or email me directly.

In the spirit of collaboration, the questions have been enhanced by a suggestion from Steve.

Update: Jim Glassman was confirmed 4 June 2008. The office was vacant for 172 days…

“Get Me the Defence Department, Entertainment Division!”

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 3 Comments

I didn’t come up with the title of this post. No, I stole it from a Canuck writing the Queen’s English. Besides enjoying the slight accuracy of title (I’m thinking of the Pentagon’s Hollywood liaison, a position a friend of mine is aiming for… a good use of his Ranger tab, don’t you think?), this bit caught my eye (as well as John Brown’s):

One of the problems that [RAND’s Enlisting Madison Avenue by Todd Helmus, Chris Paul, and Russell Glenn (see this post and this post)] aims to address is the military’s general failure to project a unified message about their product (euphemism=war) to their consumer (euphemism=foreign civilian). The book’s authors suggest more coordination between Public Affairs and Information Operations, but cites “legal barriers” as an obstacle. The book’s treatment of this issue is rather delicate, but it does cite the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act as one of these barriers. Here’s what the book says:

PSYOP suffers from additional barriers to successful shaping. First, Public Law 402, the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (the Smith-Mundt Act), prohibits DoD from targeting U.S. audiences. With the reach of the Internet and 24-hour news, however, many of the Pentagon’s information efforts can wind up in the U.S. media. Currently, PSYOP forces need to obtain the direct permission of the Secretary of Defense before distributing material on the Internet, even in a foreign language.

(On a side note, this is interesting because the book has a section dedicated to military use of blogs as a means of persuasion. The book notes that blogging, like word of mouth advertising, is an extremely credulous medium because the reader generally believes that the opinions are presented honestly, without ulterior motives.)

While the book was fairly cautious about this issue, there are other voices that are less so. The Mountain Runner, a blog with the subtitle, “Public diplomacy, unrestricted warfare, privatization of force, and civil-military relations”, has been a vocal opponent of the Smith-Mundt act, and has something of a following in the military community.

I have two big concerns about this. First, this law, though it seems very [important] to me, is very obscure, and it seems that the only people who really know about it are trying to get rid of it. Second, I wonder how such a law could even be enforced.

If a military is caught lying outright to its own people, presumably a law against propaganda could be enforced. But what’s tricky about public relations, or PYSOP, or propaganda, is that it’s often very hard to identify it as such. We’ve come a long way since reefer-mad red scares, and these early propaganda campaigns now seem ridiculous precisely because the persuasion industry has become so sophisticated. Operation Sterling Silver – the Canadian Forces’ grey cup stunt – is particularly brilliant from a PSYOP perspective because it makes no propositional assertions at all. It simply presents a series of images for the spectator, and these images resonate on a pre-rational, emotional level.

I am unaware of any Canadian law prohibiting the dissemination of domestic propaganda, and even if there is, Operation Sterling Silver obviously flew well below the radar.

Continue reading ““Get Me the Defence Department, Entertainment Division!”
“ →

Heritage on Smith-Mundt

~ Matt Armstrong

I read through Juliana Geran Pilon’s Smith-Mundt article and I agree with Kim Andrew Elliott’s assessment that it has little to do with Smith-Mundt (for background on Smith-Mundt, see my post at Small Wars Journal… part one and one-half is here, part II is forthcoming).

While her intentions are laudable, her examples miss the point and her arguments conflate description of action with the action itself. In the end, she ironically she seems to be making the same arguments that brought about Smith-Mundt in the first place.

Continue reading “Heritage on Smith-Mundt
“ →

Off the cuff: Part 1.5 of What the SecDef Didn’t Say

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 2 Comments

“Today, American public diplomacy wears combat boots.” This is how I started the post the Small Wars Journal that intentionally implied more than it stated. In an era when fewer Americans know a soldier, sailor, Marine, or airman, the global audience increasingly shapes their opinion by our armed forces. While this irony is seemingly lost on our chief diplomat, Condoleezza Rice, and our chief public diplomat, Karen Hughes, it fortunately isn’t lost on Mr. Gates. Also not lost on Mr. Gates is the importance of information in today’s struggle over minds and wills. As I’ve written elsewhere, increased information asymmetry decreases the fungibility of force. The recent U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Manual understands that, although it does not use these words to say so. What we need is less of a focus on precision-guided munitions and greater attention on precision-guided media.

Continue reading “Off the cuff: Part 1.5 of What the SecDef Didn’t Say
“ →

What the SecDef Didn’t Say at Kansas But Should Have (Updated)

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

Checkout my post on what Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates didn’t say in his Kansas State University speech.

Today, American public diplomacy wears combat boots. In the global media and the blogosphere, the military and its uniformed leaders shape the image of the United States. But that is not how it has always been. On the contrary, American public diplomacy was born out of the need to directly engage the global psyche and avoid direct martial engagement.

On November 26, 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, speaking at Kansas State University, recalled how the United States marshaled its national power at the beginning of the Cold War. Mr. Gates reminded his audience that sixty years ago the United States dramatically restructured itself in the face of a global threat and passed the National Security Act of 1947, created the United States Information Agency and the United States Agency for International Development, among other agencies and institutions. Key to the success of all of these was the timely creation and transmission of quality information, or truthful propaganda.

In his clarion call to revamp the current structures of government to meet modern threats, Mr. Gates sidestepped an obstacle that has been misinterpreted and misapplied over the last three decades: Public Law 402: United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, commonly known as the Smith-Mundt Act. Despite popular belief, the restrictions the Act is known for today were not designed or intended to be a prophylactic for sensitive American eyes and ears.

Read the whole thing at the Small Wars Journal.

Readings on Public Diplomacy, #1 (Updated)

~ Matt Armstrong

In just a couple of weeks and barring any last minute problems, a colleague (Yael Swerdlow) and I will be the first in the U.S. (the world?) to be earn a Masters in Public Diplomacy. So what does one do with such a unique, yet extremely timely, degree? Good question. That’s a very good question. Of course I’m actively looking now and I’m open for suggestions (or offers ;).

Partly because I’m being introspective and partly motivated by Abu Muqawama’s counterinsurgency book club, this is the first of an occasional series on books and resources (that may or may not have been used in my program) I found particularly useful. In the spirit of James Traub’s NYT Magazine article this weekend, this series kicks off with one of my recent favorites. 

totalcoldwarKenneth Osgood’s Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home And Abroad is a timely read on the original intents and purpose of what has been stripped and twisted into the public diplomacy we know today. Shaped by Charlotte Beers and Karen Hughes, public diplomacy as it is commonly understood today is a far cry from what it was. Osgood gets into the gritty details of why and how the whole of government approach toward the psychological struggle for minds and wills was developed. It was a Total War. 

While the National Security Act of 1947 was debated, revised, and subsequently passed, Public Law 402, otherwise known as the Smith-Mundt Act, was also being debated, modified, and then passed in the following year. A few years later, presidential candidate Dwight D. Eisenhower would attack President Truman for being soft in the ideological war. Experienced in PSYOP, Eisenhower knew the importance of the "psychological struggle over minds and wills" and included such in his speeches on foreign policy.

The former general was attacking President Harry S Truman for ignoring the grass roots, the battleground where the enemy was present. Truman, however, was set on engaging people through the international institutions he was busy promoting, such as the United Nations, NATO, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and even the Marshall Plan. We might call that soft power (although economics were explicitly excluded from Joseph Nye’s original definition of soft power). None of these "looked" like the public diplomacy we talk about today. In the struggle for minds and wills, these institutions effectively supported and enhanced the image and impact of the West, albeit in primarily in contested spaces that culturally similar.

In the 1950’s, to those paying attention, policy and propaganda were inextricably intertwined. Morganthau recognized the importance of national morale and the quality of diplomacy as the world struggle shifted from the arena of power to the arena of ideas and international persuasion. Osgood walks you through a time when Smith-Mundt was not about protecting the American public from the government, but about competing against a different threat than the traditional territorial threat. As Osgood puts it, the

primary threat was not that the Soviet Union would take territory through military force, but…capitalize on economic and social unrest, expanding its power through subversion and manipulation.

Understanding the history and evolution of public diplomacy is important when critiquing and suggesting changes to it today. Returning to history is important if we seek "causes, sources,and conditions of overt changes of patterns and structures in society" as well its systems.

Osgood’s book will give you a strong appreciation of what was public diplomacy before Edward Gullion coined the term (because, as Gullion put it, "propaganda was already taken"), as well as the creation of USIA and USAID. The neutered beauty contest we know today was both more vertical and horizontal, cutting across the whole of government and relied less on muscular approaches in contested spaces both abroad and in the home front. Back then, it wasn’t about "hearts" even if communism played on the hopes for a better life (sidenote: contrast with the hope of communism today with the fear peddled today by AQ). There was no love to be gained or earned, but respect and ideological attractiveness (probably the source of ‘love’). 

How we’ve traveled from that original path is for another post, however.

I strongly suggest most of this book for anyone interested in public diplomacy or strategic communications. My copy is full of flags and highlights.

Is a Blog a News Service? Smith-Mundt on DipNote (Update)

~ Matt Armstrong

No time for a deep analysis, so a superficial commentary will have to do. One of the more interesting aspects of Smith-Mundt was its opposition to a USG-owned news service in light of recent memory of not only Nazi Germany’s propaganda machine, but also of the Creel Commission, or Committee on Public Information (CPI). The prohibitions against internal propagandizing in Smith-Mundt focused on the point of dominating information channels to the public. Argued as First Amendment violations and as a potential infringement on the free press, Smith-Mundt prevented the USIA from becoming a domestic news service.

Today, there’s lots of discussion on the role of the New Media: the blogosphere. While there is some interactivity, blogs are alternative, and too often superior, news sources than traditional media.

Thus the question: is State’s new blog, when used to provide news or timely commentary or analysis, a modern equivalent of the Four Minute Men of the CPI?

This question isn’t too suggest that State should stop blogging. On the contrary, they should blog and, by the way, welcome to the 21st Century experts on Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy.

No, this is to suggest that the misplaced and overreaching application of Smith-Mundt is selective at State, and the rest of USG. If State were to be rigid on their application of Smith-Mundt, as they have overly been, then it is is easily argued their blog crosses the line into the realm of a news service and in competition with the press and is thus prohibited under Smith-Mundt.

What to do? First, remember what Smith-Mundt was intended to cover, allowing for perversions in later amendments to the Act, and stop over-applying it. Continued overly-broad application would mean the blog has to go. That’s bad, and wrong. Second, change or dismantle Smith-Mundt altogether. 

Update: Responding to a reader’s email, I want to emphasize that I don’t think the blog is covered by Smith-Mundt. As the reader points out, "pertains to activities funded primarily in [Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP)], not the [Bureau of Public Affairs (PA)], which is the source of the blog. … [Karen Hughes] can use PA resources to address a domestic audience without violating [Smith-Mundt]."

I know that, the reader knows that, but many don’t, including too many in USG. For example, I’m told Karen Hughes only recently learned DOD believes itself to be covered under Smith-Mundt, which it has for some time. The recent RAND report by new friends of MountainRunner captured this.

The purpose of this post and others like it is to emphasize that more people need to know and understand the purpose and limits of Smith-Mundt. There is more on this topic to come.

Smith-Mundt

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

Swedish Meatballs’s post on Smith-Mundt, with its rare quoting of Dave Grossman (perhaps SM was motivated by this post), shows how the Smith-Mundt Act has been distorted over the years to become something it was never intended to be. Because of this, as SM points out, Smith-Mundt needs to be drastically revised, or better, yet, ditched.

Forgotten is the purpose and focus of the Act. The Act focused on raising the quality of American information programs that was so dysfunctional as to actually aid the enemy (sound familiar?). Discussions about domestic broadcasting were focused on Free Speech and guaranteeing the government wouldn’t compete with rich domestic broadcasters.

Meatball One asks

Might an abolition of Smith-Mundt open the door to aggressive, intelligent, and creative methods for manufacturing a reformed and resilient Will among the homeland’s citizenry for the long and grinding wars we are told to expect and accept?

Current mythical “prohibitions” limiting the Defense Department are seemingly based on Defense moving into the realm of State and assuming its liabilities, but only partially. For example, for State to even discuss any literature or photos it is broadcasting overseas requires clearance, a series of hurdles Defense has not adopted.

Unlike today, there were memories of not only Hitler’s effective ownership and thus monopolizing broadcast mediums, but also of the Creel Committee (See ZenPundit for a short bit on Creel) in the United States. There was a strong public backlash against what was perceived as an attempt to manipulate domestic public opinion.

If the Executive Branch fully embraced the prohibition against propagandizing the domestic public, the roles of the President’s press secretary’s, including Tony Snow and Dana Perino, would have a very different role (perhaps their office would look and sound more like their United Kingdom’s counterpart… note the references to the PM and the “PMOS” and the overall failure to state the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman has his or her own identity or beliefs).

Meatball One closes his post with these two questions:

So what do you say, Bernays – any hidden costs? Is this where democracy ends or perhaps where democracy only truly can begin?

The answer: Yes and no to both. In part, Smith-Mundt included a response to Bernays’ activities thirty-five years earlier, namely the avoidance of active and direct domestic engagement, but not silencing the conversation or denying transparency. During the massive restructuring of the United States to counter the emerging ideological threat coming from all angles (remember the National Security Act of 1947 was passed during the two years of debate on Smith-Mundt), Smith-Mundt was to protect democracy, not from itself but from the outside. Protection inside was mainly for the broadcasters, which Benton vigorously and successfully courted the broadcasters and continued to do so afterward its passage in a period of increasingly rapid (relatively) news cycles and accessibility.

The Swede is right, something significant needs to be done with Smith-Mundt, but attempts at an outright dismissal will be met by a swift and emotional counter-reaction. What is necessary is a conversation on the topic to understand its purpose and intent.

See quotes on the Act or about the Act here and here.

Quoting history #4

~ Matt Armstrong

Following up on Republican statements on the need for Smith-Mundt, comes some Democrat voices from 1947, quoted in Shawn Parry-Giles’ Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda and the Cold War:

Predictably, much of the congressional opposition to the legalization of peacetime propaganda was grounded in the assumption that such an organization threatened the US free press system. Representative William Lemke (D-CT) questioned any governmental attempt to “compete” with private news stations, calling for financial support of short-wave stations and “those who blazed the trail with their own funds.” According to Lemke, “Any other procedure would be the rankest kind of injustice.” Congressman Hale Boggs (D-LA) also questioned the practice of placing the government in “competition with a free press,” reflecting the Russian practice of controlling the “radio and the press”.

It wasn’t just Democrats with this concern. A contemporary fight with the AP and UP against State fueled the debate.

…Congressman J. Edgar Chenoweth (R-CO) used the conflict between the State Department and the AP as evidence that a constitutional exigency existed over the government’s intrusion into the news business. Referring to the goals of the Smith-Mundt bill as “novel and extraordinary,” Chenoweth cited Kent Cooper, executive director of the AP, emphasizing the “abhorrence of the Government going into the news business,” an act that Cooper equated with “amending the Constitution.”

Quoting History #2

~ Matt Armstrong

Today…peace is endangered by the weapons of false propaganda and misinformation and the inability on the part of the United States to deal adequately with those weapons.

Truth can be a powerful weapon on behalf of peace. It is the firm belief of the Committee that HR 3342, with all the safeguards included in the bill, will constitute an important step in the right direction toward the adequate dissemination of the truth about America, our ideals, and our people.

and

…This work has been going on for 29 months in the State Department. The time has come when Congress should give the program its official sanction. Further delay in taking action will seriously embarrass the President and the Secretary of State in the conduct of foreign relations, since information in the modern world is an exceedingly important instrument of policy.

What’s the topic? Some readers may recognize HR 3342 as the resolution put forward by a Representative Karl Mundt, conservative republican from South Dakota who, before Pearl Harbor, was an ardent isolationist. While serving on the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), Mundt worked vigorously with Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ) to gain passage of what was officially known as Public Law 402: The United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948.

The above quotes are from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations recommending the Senate pass the bill, which it did without dissent (earlier, the House voted 272 to 97 in favor). It was signed into law by President Truman January 27, 1948, and later became known as the Smith-Mundt Act.

Cited in Robert William Pirsein’s The Voice of America : An History of the International Broadcasting Activities of the United States Government, 1940-1962, Dissertations in Broadcasting. New York: Arno Press, 1979.

Finally, a National Strategy on Public Diplomacy

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

I finally had a chance to go through the so-called “US National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication.” I’m not impressed. It might be better than nothing, but not much. Whatever Under Secretary of State Karen Hughes has been doing over the last several months; it certainly can’t be described as intelligent leadership over American public diplomacy and public affairs. This “new” plan reinforces this sad fact.

Continue reading “Finally, a National Strategy on Public Diplomacy “ →