Blogger’s Roundtable: “Defense Officials” talk about the China Report (Updated)

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 2 Comments

This morning was the Blogger’s Roundtable with "defense officials" to discuss DOD’s 2008 report on 2007 China.  The presenters attempted to set attribution to "defense officials".  I’ll honor that here (for now… pending the Roundtable posting), but that’s not the terms of the Roundtable.  This is a follow up to the previous post Winning Informatized Wars.

My quick observations:

The presenters stated clearly at the outset that the report should be read in the context of improving relations with China that are "across the board". 

The call was one of the most widely attended I’ve been on, including James Fallows, Mike Goldfarb, Jason Sigger, David Axe (wearing his Wired hat), Andy Lubin, and many others.  Hopefully they’ll all post on this as well.  Look for posts from them.

The issues raised in my previous post on the significant missing pieces were deflected with the response that Chinese asymmetric thinking is "broadly" addressed in the report.  The reality is "broadly" is super-high level discussion amounting to only a few paragraphs.  In saying that there is a "resurgence of the study of classic Chinese military figures Sun-tzu, Sun Pin, Wu Ch’i, and Shang Yang and their writings" is in the context of deception and not unrestricted warfare. 

Compare this to the much more detailed discussion of traditional warfighting elements and you have a report telling a certain story.  Like all communications, even objective just the facts communications, influence and persuade.  This report pressures the reader to fear a modernizing adversary.  That may be the correct thing to do, or it may not be, but what is concerning is the report’s selectivity. 

On the expeditionary capability, the response to my point that increased PKO participation was dismissed as China finally stepping up to fulfill its responsibilities as a Security Council member.  That there "may" (or was it "perhaps"?) be public outreach benefits eluded the presenters.  The fact that China has stated publicly on several occasions that they see PKO as a tool of public diplomacy was lost as was the experience of force projection (logistics, movement, public affairs, etc). 

I’ll post a link to the transcript when it is available.  Overall, the report misses the important elements of future conflict that will not start with bullets and bombs and may not ever get to kinetics. 

A holistic approach by China as part of its CNP (Comprehensive National Power, a variation on our DIME/MIDLIFE/DIMEFIL, but measured) sets the military not as a cylinder of excellence, but a component of national security.  The report, as written and presented, misses that entirely. 

UPDATE

Mike Goldfarb’s post on the call is up.  His gist:

When the DoD first started this outreach program, there was a great deal of criticism–the Pentagon was spoon feeding administration talking points to conservative bloggers, they said. Well, that was never quite the case, the Pentagon has allowed any and all bloggers to participate in these calls. The effect: today’s call was dominated by lefty bloggers explaining to the Pentagon why the United States shouldn’t concern itself with China’s build-up, and why Beijing’s bulking-up is entirely reasonable.

I suppose this is a better post than what he could have gotten from his question of whether DOD knew who would be on the Chinese side of a hotline between DC and Beijing.

Responding to Goldfarb, James Fallows posts his response.  His gist:

One big theme in this Pentagon report is a continuing "large" increase in Chinese military spending. Large "compared with what?" is the obvious question here — compared with U.S. spending and capability? (Explicitly not the subject of the study, "a Defense official" said.) Compared with their GDP? Compared with their limited previous levels? Compared with what it would take to invade Taiwan? With the concerns, interests, and capabilities of Russia — or Japan? And so on.

The other theme in the report was intention and "transparency." Intention: why are they spending more money? …

Winning Informatized Wars: The China Report

~ Matt Armstrong

Has anyone read the DOD’s 2007 report on China? Chapter Four begins with the following quote:

China pursues a three-step development strategy in modernizing its national defense . . . . The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third is to basically reach the strategic goal of building informatized armed forces and being capable of winning informatized wars by the mid-21st century.

Six pages later and the subsection "Information Warfare" has four paragraphs, including a long quote (p21). Granted, C4ISR is at times discussed within those six pages, but three discursive paragraphs on Chinese IW.

This seems to indicate the Chinese do not truly grasp asymmetric warfare, contrary to the report’s assertion (p13). Secrecy and Deception (p14) gets about the same number of words as IW.

Some find the report interesting for what it says.  I find it more interesting in what it does not say. 

First, does this report really reflect the extent of China’s grasp of "informatized" war?  Is informatized code for computer network operations and attack?  I just don’t buy it. 

Second, its odd that "unrestricted warfare" doesn’t appear once in this report?  Have the Chinese moved beyond Unrestricted Warfare?  I hope China doesn’t come up at next week’s Unrestricted Warfare symposium at JHU/APL.  That could be awkward…  

Third, is the exclusion of increased Chinese U.N. peacekeeping in the report (done, as stated publicly, including by the PM, as a tool of public diplomacy (links below) an oversight? Chinese PKO participation is an expeditionary education for China that is otherwise unavailable to them.  Seems to be a significant element in expanding Chinese military reach, capabilities, relationships, etc.

Fourth, the absence of the first three don’t jive with one of the two pillars on which the report says Chinese strategy is based: Comprehensive National Power (CNP).  CNP is much like the American concept of DIME (or MIDLIFE/DIMEFIL,etc, pick your anagram) with the significant exception that each element is measured in the Chinese model. 

This report says more about our mirroring the enemy than a real examination of a future adversary who actively examines our mistakes.  This is a good Cold War analysis, but this isn’t the Cold War. 

See previous posts:

Elvis and the Psychological Struggle

~ Matt Armstrong

Elvis nailed the elements of the psychological struggle for the minds and wills.  Without further comment now, read the chorus of A Little Less Conversation from the perspective of the audience you’re trying to convince:

A little less conversation, a little more action please
All this aggravation ain’t satisfactioning me
A little more bite and a little less bark
A little less fight and a little more spark
Close your mouth and open up your heart and baby satisfy me
Satisfy me baby

Quoting Elvis may be novel, but the need to synchronize (and find the right priority for) between the propaganda of deeds and the propaganda of words is not. 

The psychological struggle of today is unique only in the details

~ Matt Armstrong

The psychological struggle of today is unique only in the details.  The need to shape the perceptions of individuals did not materialize after 9/11 or after the Cold War.  Below are two quotes, a factoid, and then a third quote.  The first is from the period of the last great re-org of the American national security apparatus and the second by a man who helped, if indirectly, shape the culture of America’s information capabilities to our detriment today.  The third quote is perhaps the most interesting of the three.

Speaking in 1949, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs George V. Allen, later Director of USIA (1957-1960), said in speech at Duke University:

Propaganda on an immense scale is here to stay.  Technological advance may have made this as important to diplomacy as the invention of gunpowder to the military. … We still write diplomatic notes, but we try to reach directly into as many foreign homes as we can.  Every other major power is doing the same. … I am convinced that unless the United States continues to utilize this new method we shall be left at the post by other countries which are becoming skilled in the use of mass media.

New methods in government, like new discoveries in science, can be used for good or ill.  Direct radio contact with foreign individuals may be taken advantage of to proclaim falsehood as well as truth.  But the potentialities of the direct approach are very great in both directions, and we must understand and perfect the techniques to protect and advance our interests.

Further back, George Creel (see also Espionage Act of 1917) wrote in 1917:

Back of the firing line, back of the armies and navies, back of the great supply depots another struggle [was] waged with the same intensity, and with almost equal significance attaching to its victories and defeats.  It was the fight for the minds of men… and the battleline ran through every home in every country.

Separately (and not related to either of the above speakers), private cooperation in public diplomacy included filling the shelves of overseas libraries. 

Probably USIA’s most successful program of cooperation with private agencies has been with donated books…. Starting in 1963, an arrangement was worked out with the Post Office Department whereby books reaching the dead-letter office were made available for shipment overseas.  In 1964, 250,000 volumes came from this source.

Finally, Edward R. Murrow speaking to a Congressional committee in 1963 as Director of USIA, said his agency’s effectiveness, in spite of quotes from a North Vietnamese newspaper and a Chinese magazine that were similar to recent Iranian warnings to its people, was still very hard to measure:

No computer clicks, no cash register rings when a man changes his mind or opts for freedom. … And above all, it is what we do — not what we say — that has the greatest impact overseas.  USIA can explain, interpret, clarify, synthesize, and project, but we cannot change the unchangeable or do the undoable.  The United States of America cannot and should not try to please everyone on this planet; we have, and will always have, some policies that are unpalatable to some people.  We are, then, and properly so, prisoners of policy. … But given intelligent and effective American policies, supported by Congress and the American people, we can make an important contribution to the achievement of our objectives.  In my judgment, we are today making such a contribution.

See also

Lessons on Iraq From a Founding Father

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 3 Comments

Briefly, a good reminder of the importance of certain enduring truths by Brian O’Malley in a Washington Post op-ed:

What would George Washington do about Iraq? In a December Outlook essay, historian Joseph J. Ellis argued that it’s not possible to theorize exact answers because the "gap between the founders’ time and ours is non-negotiable, and any direct linkage between them and now is intellectually problematic." But Ellis also conceded that this position is "unacceptable to many of us, because it suggests that the past is an eternally lost world that has nothing to teach us."

History does hold lessons about today’s issues, and this is clear when considering Iraq and U.S. conduct in the war against terrorism. Consider the 1775-76 invasion of Canada, America’s first preemptive war, which ended just days before Congress ratified the Declaration of Independence.

Continue reading “Lessons on Iraq From a Founding Father
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Talking about OPSEC

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

OPSEC is an important topic in DOD when discussing blogs, but what about email?  Apparently not so much… from the the UK’s Telegraph:

A tourist information website promoting a small Suffolk town has had to shut down after it received a barrage of thousands of classified US military emails.

Sensitive information including future flight paths for US Presidential aircraft Air Force One, military strategy and passwords swamped Gary Sinnott’s email inbox after he established www.mildenhall.com, a site promoting the tiny town of Mildenhall where he lives, the Anglia Press Agency reports.

As well as Mr Sinnott and his neighbours, Mildenhall is home to a huge US Air Force base and its 2,500 servicemen and women, and the similarity in domain names has led to thousands of misdirected emails from Air Force personnel. Any mail sent to addresses ending @mildenhall.com would have ended up in Mr Sinnott’s mailbox.
Now military bosses have blocked all military email to the address, and persuaded him to close down his site to end the confusion. He is giving up ownership of the address next month.

Mr Sinnott said: "You wouldn’t believe some of the stuff that I have been receiving – I wonder if they ever had any security training. When I told the Americans they went mental. 

I got mis-sent e-mails right from the start in 2000 but even after I warned the base they just kept on coming. At one stage I was getting thousands of spam messages a week.  I was getting jokes and videos and some of the material was not very nice – people were sending stuff without checking the address.

"But then I began to receive military communications from all over the world – a lot containing very sensitive information."

Is this any more humorous considering the Air Force’s blog blocking?

New Media and the Air Force

~ Matt Armstrong

While the Army attempts to embrace New Media, the Air Force fears it.  News from their efforts to constrain the inputs to their knowledge workers:

Does the Air Force get it?  Did they not learn from the Army’s foray into blocking blogs?  Apparently not.  But then the Air Force sees a different future.

Continue reading “New Media and the Air Force
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Understanding Information Effects

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 2 Comments

From the ink-still-wet FM 3-0, the new manual everyone’s talking about that raises the importance of stabilization (and here) and information.  The introductory quote from Chapter 7, Information Superiority (culturally I understand the selection, but it conveys internally and externally the wrong thing):

Be first with the truth. Since Soldier actions speak louder than what [public affairs officers] say, we must be mindful of the impact our daily interactions with Iraqis have on global audiences via the news media. Commanders should communicate key messages down to the individual level, but, in general, leaders and Soldiers should be able to tell their stories unconstrained by overly prescriptive themes. When communicating, speed is critical—minutes and hours matter—and we should remember to communicate to local (Arabic/Iraqi) audiences first—U.S./global audience can follow. Tell the truth, stay in your lane, and get the message out fast. Be forthright and never allow enemy lies to stand unchallenged. Demand accuracy, adequate context, and proper characterization from the media.
Multinational Corps–Iraq
Counterinsurgency Guidance 2007

The manual makes great strides in shaping the future of information effects in American foreign policy, namely security policy.  Putting information on target will increasingly be more important than putting steel on target, especially when dealing with the asymmetric adversary that cannot – and does not need to – need match the military or economic power of the United States and her allies. 

Speaking with LTG Caldwell yesterday, I asked him about the cultural rifts between public affairs and other information teams.  This was his response:

…we had a discussion with[Army Public Affairs] in there about PA, its relationship to IO, how it all fits together, the importance of the fact that information engagement is what has to synchronize both public affairs and information operations. It is absolutely imperative that the two are working and aware of what the other one is doing. And they have been synchronized. And so it’s in the engagement area that we, in fact, are doing that. There is a clear difference and distinction: whereas public affairs is there to inform, information operations is there to influence foreign audiences. So there is a clear delineation between the two, but at the same time, it’s imperative that they are complementary with each other.

The manual does help in this regard.  But this is the Army’s doctrine and while it’s felt elsewhere, even in part written with collaboration of other services (excepting the Air Force?), it does not change the institutional divides. 

This manual makes strides in elevating both the importance of stabilization operations and the importance of perceptions.  The effectiveness of information campaigns today will more often dictate a victory than how well steel is put on a target. Putting information on target is more important when dealing with the asymmetric adversary that cannot – and does not need to – need match the military or economic power of the United States and her allies.

However, more must be done across the board. 

More later.

Good luck, Welcome Back, Hope we get it right this time, and condolences

~ Matt Armstrong

A quick mash-up of four posts…

First, following AM’s lead, Good Luck to Phil Carter who’s taking his NY bar exam this week. 

Second, Henrik, the Draconian Observer, returns to the blog after much offline writing and gives us an interesting link to a CRS report Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2007.

Third, Mark, der Pundit mit Zen, shares a Lexington Green post noting a RUSI report that "has the air of a call to arms reminiscent of Kennan’s X Article or the Iron Curtain speech."  I hope Kennan’s memo isn’t misinterpreted this time.  (Speaking of "with Zen", interesting headline: "Do you want fries with that Zen?")

Fourth, Lurch of Main and Central has died.  Lurch left his mark on this blog with his valuable observations, will be missed.  There are no details at the family’s request.

AFRICOM: DOA or in Need of Better Marketing? No and Yes. (Updated)

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 2 Comments

image Like Mark Twain’s "death" in 1897 (he died in 1910), reports of AFRICOM’s demise may be exaggerated.  Concerns that AFRICOM hasn’t been thought out or is unnecessary aren’t supported by the actions and statements of those charged with building this entity.  However, based on the poor marketing of AFRICOM, these concerns are not surprising.

I attended USC’s AFRICOM conference earlier this month and between panel discussions and offline conversations, I came away with a new appreciation (and hope) for the newest, and very different, command. 

This is not like the other Combatant Commands (one DOD representative said they dropped "Combatant" from the title, but depending on where you look, either all the commands include "Combatant" or none of the commands do).  Also unlike other commands, AFRICOM is "focused on prevention and not containment or fighting wars."  This is, as one speaker continued, is a "risk-laden experiment" that is like an Ironman with multidisciplinary requirements and always different demands (note: thank you for not saying it’s a marathon… once you’ve done one marathon, they’re easy, you can "fake" a marathon… Ironman triathlons are always unpredictable.).  The goal, he continued, was to "keep combat troops off the continent for 50 years" because the consensus was, once troops landed on Africa, it would be extremely difficult to take them off. 

Continue reading “AFRICOM: DOA or in Need of Better Marketing? No and Yes. (Updated)
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Food insecurity in Iraq

~ Matt Armstrong

Briefly, World Food Program’s report on food insecurity in Iraq came out yesterday.  See the details here.

Why are they food insecure?

Decades of conflict and economic sanctions have had serious effects on Iraqis. Their consequences have been rising unemployment, illiteracy and, for some families, the loss of wage earners. Iraq’s food insecurity is not simply due to a lack of production of sufficient food at the national level, but also a failure of livelihoods to guarantee access to sufficient food at the household level. The results of this study suggest that food insecurity in Iraq is a result of many chronic factors and their complicated interactions, amongst which are the following:

Weak infrastructure: as a result of conflict, which has destroyed much of Iraq’s infrastructure in many sectors. Water and sanitation in particular continue to undermine the community’s ability to recover. An estimated 22 percent in extremely poor districts are dependant on water tankers and vehicles as a main source of drinking water compared to 4 percent in the better-off districts. In addition 18 percent depend on streams, rivers and lakes for their water supplies in the poorer areas compared to 8 percent in the better-off districts.

What are the key elements of reconstruction and stabilization?  Not Big Army, but door to door neighborhood checks on electricity delivery, water availability, and trash pickup. 

See also:

Iraq Perceptions Not Wrong Just Out of Date

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 6 Comments

From Dipnote:

John Matel serves as Team Leader of the Al Asad Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team in Iraq.
Public perceptions of Iraq are not wrong; they are just out of date. Media coverage of Iraq has dropped in almost perfect correlation with progress made toward peace and stability. As a result, the picture persists from pre-surge 2006 but it is not 2006 anymore. It is post-surge in Anbar Province where a significantly more secure Iraq exists rebuilding, learning, governing, producing and starting to make huge strides along the road to prosperity.

Yes, and?  What are you going to do about it?  What can you do about perception overcoming fact?  Probably go on DoD’s Blogger Roundtable because, besides Dipnote, there really aren’t any channels for you to use to get your word out…

When riding a dead horse, you should dismount

~ Matt Armstrong

Infer what you wish from this shamelessly stolen borrowed set of options to the question: When riding a dead horse, what do you do?

1.Buy a stronger whip.

2.Assert “This is the way we always have ridden this horse.”

3.Arrange to visit other sites to benchmark how they ride dead horses.

4.Provide additional training to increase riding ability.

5.Outsource to private contractors to see if they can ride the dead horse cheaper.

6.Harness several dead horses together to increase the speed.

7.Declare that, as the dead horse does not have to be fed, it is less costly, carries lower overheads, and therefore contributes substantially more to the bottom line of the economy than do some other horses.

8.Commission a study to identify ways to improve dead horses through incremental enhancements, such as adding wheels.

9.Rewrite the expected performance requirements for all horses.

10.Promote the dead horse to a supervisory position.

Or, as Ted Knicker’s presentation on public diplomacy goes, follow tribal wisdom "passed on from generation to generation, [that] says that when you discover that you are riding a dead horse, the best strategy is to dismount."

Rethinking nationalism

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

A quick post spurred by a conversation today that hit on a topic of interest.

What is nationalism?  A way of grouping people together for a common purpose and common cause.  Nationalism as we typically understand it today is based on late 18th and 19th century ideas that, in the western Gramscian experience, shaped nations for the benefit of the state. 

To understand how to engage a foreign audience, it is important to understand their grammar.  In other words, what are the nouns and verbs they use and why.  Do they, make oblique (to us) references to landmark events?  If so, why?  Is the verb choice intentionally active or passive?  How do we navigate this "rugged" landscape? 

When looking at the "Arab Mindset", are there more reference points that might have common ground with our own?  Are some groups really vying for a new form of nationalism not based on how we in the west interpret it but yet conforming to the original conceivers of it.

Is the quote below a useful description of the nationalism some people seek?

A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.

Thoughts?

Not directly related, but interesting discussion:

By the way, Joseph Stalin wrote the above definition.