Tag: public diplomacy

Open-Thread is still open, and what about USIA 2.0, USAID, and more

~ Matt Armstrong

Just thinking out loud…

There is still an open-thread on who will be or should be in the next Administration, so please add a comment with your thoughts or email me directly. I find it interesting that while there’s a fair amount of talk about a USIA 2.0, or as I call it, the Department of Non-State (details forthcoming), nobody’s suggested a person to lead it. Perhaps they’re assuming the entire PD apparatus will be ripped from State, leaving DOS absolutely no effective means of international engagement? Will the same disruption happen at DOD or will they continue to own direct engagement? And if separating PD and PD-like functions from State is intended to create a more independent, arms-length from policy apparatus, then what about the tactical requirements that the arms-length Dept of Non-State can’t and won’t fulfill?

Further, there have been some smart comments on the need for the U.S. to improve its foreign aid. What do we do with USAID? If we’re looking at the British Council as one, or part of one, model for the DNS, then what about the U.K. Department for International Development? Our national security is dependent on more than informational and cultural and education activities, it is dependent on capacity-building. Too few recall or know that America’s public diplomacy was borne out of a reconstruction and development paradigm. The dramatic uptick in volume and intensity of Communist propaganda against the Marshall Plan (which built on a previous increase against the Truman Plan) pushed Congress and the President to move the languishing Smith-Mundt Bill into law. There’s a reason insurgents target reconstruction and new construction projects. Our security requires addressing grinding poverty and disillusionment in regions that are fertile breeding grounds for extremists, terrorists, and insurgents.  Security will come from understanding and correcting these conditions and local perceptions that permits violent extremism, insurgency, and terrorism to take hold and propagate. So, any thoughts on who a Secretary of Development might be? Would this person be within DNS, equal to DNS?

Boyd and Information Operations

~ Matt Armstrong

From Air University at Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base:

In the midst of the Korean War in the 1950s, an American fighter pilot developed a revolutionary concept that changed tactical, operational and strategic war planning.

Based on his tactical dogfighting experience with North Korean MiGs, Col. John Boyd coined the term OODA (observe, orient, decide and act) Loop, which stresses the importance of collecting, interpreting and reacting to battlefield information faster than the enemy in order to maintain a strategic advantage.

More than 35 Airmen and civilians from installations worldwide converged at Maxwell Air Force Base’s Curtis LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education Aug. 11 through 15 to learn how the OODA Loop and other key concepts apply in information operations.

… “The goal is to give students introductory knowledge of information operations in accordance with Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5,” [course instructor Capt. Ernest McLamb] said.

During the week-long course, students discussed electronic warfare, influence operations and network warfare in the air, space and cyberspace domains. To top things off, students put their new-found knowledge to the test with an exercise simulating an information operations cell within an air operations center. Students like Master Sgt. Michael Brogan were split into three groups to plan an information operations campaign including key concepts such as public affairs strategic communication, network and electronic warfare, and military deception.
“I have a much better understanding how public affairs supports combatant commanders and what we bring to the fight” …

While the graphic is cool (credit: SSgt Jason Lake, author of the above article), it conveys the absolutely wrong image of IO. No doubt unintentional, but note that public affairs is furthest from the foreground.

On the subject of John Boyd, see The John Boyd Roundtable: Debating Science, Strategy, and War edited by Mark Safranski, with a foreword by Tom Barnett. My copy came yesterday; review to come.

(h/t Sam)

Blogger Roundtable with Under Secretary Glassman (Updated with links and transcript)

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 2 Comments

The Blogger Roundtable with Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs James Glassman concluded a short time ago. Before getting to the roundtable, I have to say it is nice to have an Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy that actually does what he promotes. From op-eds to intense interviews, this Under Secretary is not afraid of the media or of public engagement. With any luck, future Secretaries of State and Under Secretaries of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (or whatever it becomes transformed into it touched) will have the same realization that the Department of State must also be the Department of Non-State and put energy and resources into public engagement.

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For Wed the 17th: Blogger Roundtable with Under Secretary James Glassman

~ Matt Armstrong

Posting date changed to bump to the top of the page

Heads up: tomorrow there will be a blogger roundtable via conference call with Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs James Glassman. From State:

Under Secretary of State James K. Glassman will address attempts to curb extremist ideology in the Middle East, with particular emphasis on Iran, in a roundtable discussion with bloggers on September 17 at 1 p.m ET. Specifically, he will discuss his department’s overall efforts (and detail some recent programs) to reach out to young people, act as a facilitator of moderate voices, and work with the private sector to curb extremist ideology.

If you are interested in participating in this conference call, contact Glen Roberts at RobertsGF@state.gov.

Other topics to be discussed:

State Dept. seeks democracy videos: Government teams with media orgs on contest (Variety)

The U.S. State Dept. has revealed its latest diplomatic tool: user-generated content. At the U.N. on Monday, representatives revealed the Democracy Video Challenge, a government initiative co-sponsored with half a dozen high-profile media orgs including NBC Universal, the DGA and the MPAA.

The challenge in question will be to create a three-minute video completing the phrase “Democracy is…” in hopes of receiving a prize package that includes set visits, tickets to the Universal Studios L.A. theme park, and meetings with everyone from U.S. government officials to “new-media experts.”

Debating in the New Media: State Department dialogues with Ahmadinejad’s media advisor

 America knows that bullets alone will not win this war (op-ed by the U/S in the UK’s The Independent)

Public diplomacy is, very simply, diplomacy aimed at publics, as opposed to officials. While some people associate it with marketing – with building a national brand – the truth is that public diplomacy, like official diplomacy and like military action, has as its mission the achievement of the national interest. Public diplomacy performs this mission by understanding, informing, engaging, and persuading foreign publics.

 Is America Equipped to Win a World-Wide Propaganda War?

Event: Reforming U.S. Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Views from Congress

~ Matt Armstrong

At the Brookings Institution next week:

On September 23, the Brookings Institution will host Senator Sam Brownback (R-Kan.) and Representative Adam Smith (D-Wash.) for a discussion on the future of U.S. public diplomacy and strategic communication. With increasing force and frequency, members of the United States Congress are calling for reforms to U.S. public diplomacy, strategy, organization and practice. These proposed reforms seek to improve U.S. relations with foreign societies, advance American interests abroad and counter extremist ideologies. Seven years after 9/11, the question remains: is the United States communicating effectively with foreign publics? Is it undermining support for extremist ideologies around the world?

For more information, and to register, go to the event’s website.

I’ll be at this event immediately after a 1.5 day seminar at the George C. Marshall Conference Center.

See also:

Debating in the New Media: State Department dialogues with Ahmadinejad’s media advisor

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

I haven’t had a lot of kind words for State’s Digital Outreach Team (note to McCain campaign, the image was there long before the RNC), but over a couple of weeks this summer, they successfully “outreached”. To who? Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s media advisor, Ali Akbar Javanfekr. The debate, which took place on Mr. Javanfekr’s personal blog, was printed in the Persian language newspaper “Iran” on Aug 27, 2008.

Read the transcript here. Below the fold is a fifth response from the Digital Outreach Team that is not in the transcript and not printed in “Iran.” This is how the State Department opens its description of the discussion:

Ali Akbar Javanfekr, the president’s adviser in media affairs has for some time been writing his views about different political and social topics in his personal weblog and even publishes tens of pro and opposing views with his own replies. The up-to-datedness of the blog’s topics and their correlation with the country’s current events has attracted the media to it in a way that not only the content of this blog but the views of supporters and critics of the government and the replies of the president’s adviser have become newsworthy and the print media and news sites have given these subjects special attention.

It is an interesting back and forth between an official representative of the United States, the Digital Outreach Team (DOT), and Javanfekr, speaking in his personal capacity and not as the media advisor to the president. Most remarkable is the extent of the discussion and that it was printed in this particular newspaper.

A few brief comments on the transcript.

DOT and Mr. Javanfekr go back forth on the economy, Iran Air 655, Dr. Mosadegh and other subjects. The DOT emphasizes the standard line that the Administration’s issue is not with the Iranian people but with the Iranian government, which Mr. Javanfekr does not accept. On Mosadegh, the DOT had this to say:

It’s interesting you speak of Dr. Mossadegh [“Ms. Madeline Albright the secretary of State of the Clinton administration showed rare bravery in accepting responsibility for some of USG’s past mistakes especially the coup against Dr. Mosadegh…”] to justify your view but fail to mention that the policies of the current leadership in Iran differs greatly from the political principles of Dr. Mossadegh. Using Dr. Mossadegh’s name when it is convenient for you and serves your cause could be interpreted as insincere. How many major landmarks in Iran are currently named after Dr. Mossadegh? I believe the answer to that question is zero. I am sure you remember when the name of Pahlavi Street was changed to Mossadegh Street after the revolution only to be changed again shortly after that.

While I don’t agree with the logic of many of Mr. Javanfekr’s arguments, I understand his with the DOT remaining faceless and names. At one point he says that “from now on refer to you as her Excellency Madam Rice, the distinguished US secretary of State unless you identify your position/standing at the US Department of State to the readers of this blog.” The response by DOT:

Thank you for the promotion but I am not the Secretary of State. I am a member of the Digital Outreach Team which is an entity within the US Department of State. Our goal is to establish communications and have a candid conversation with the people of Iran and answer questions about US foreign policy. But I think it’s better instead of focusing on personalities and job titles to focus on issues.

For me, this is a point for Mr. Javanfekr and indicative of a larger problem at State. Yes, the DOT is an “entity within the US Department of State”, but that does not mean the person, who obviously has authority to speak on behalf of the Department, and by extension the Government, should remain anonymous. This is another example of inhibiting the empowerment of the employees at State that does not fit with the requirements of the modern era, let alone the New Media environment. Signing the comments simply as DOT is just shy of anonymous. In the real world, the “meatspace”, would someone from the State Department not give his or her real name when debating an issue?

This is, to me, another example of the reticence of the Department of State from a necessary transformation into the Department of State and Non-State. Regardless, for now, read the transcript. I would appreciate your comments (hopefully comments are working again). DipNote authors have names. America.gov authors have names. State must think in terms of empowering ALL of its people.

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Is America Equipped to Win a World-Wide Propaganda War?

~ Matt Armstrong

"Is America now equipped to win a world-wide propaganda war" was the framing question for the interview debate on BBC’s HARDtalk last week between Stephen Sackur and Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Jim Glassman. The 23 minute discussion – online video is available – is unlike anything you’ll see in the United States, which is unfortunate. Imagine if this and future Administrations were subjected this level of intelligent debate that includes prep and no shouting? (Also, what if our presidents were subjected to the Prime Minister’s Questions?)

Briefly, the opening question – "do you see yourself as America’s Chief of Propaganda" – gave the Under Secretary the chance to redefine his role and the mission of public diplomacy as distinct from past Under Secretary’s. This led to a discussion based on comments by Price Floyd (see this article from Price that is similar to but not the one published in the British press Sackur was referring to). Price, formerly the director of media affairs at the State Department (and now director of external relations at CNAS), said quite accurately that good marketing can’t sell bad policies. The Under Secretary agreed that bad marketing doesn’t work but disagreed that "this" is a failed policy, which went to the essence of the responses in the debate. This represented a common underlying theme of the discussion as the interviewer frequently asked about the past and the present impact of past policies while the Under Secretary often responded with how America’s policies have evolved.

A few quotes from the Under Secretary:

  • His job is to “put in place a an apparatus, a structure that will last beyond this administration.”
  • “We live in a world where preaching to people doesn’t work very well.”
  • “We’re in the persuasion business…better as a conveyor / facilitator to get people to talk about these issues…” [clearly to expose the holes in adversaries’ ideology]
  • He is “head of the Interagency on the war of ideas.”
  • In some countries “public diplomacy can do more than official diplomacy”
  • When asked about Egypt, who receives $2b in US aid, the Under Secretary said that as head of the BBG, that his experiences with the Egyptian government were “not completely satisfactory” when trying (unsuccessfully) negotiating FM broadcasting of Radio Sawa.
  • That this is a War on Islam is “flat out wrong" … this is "single biggest misconception”
  • “Any responsible foreign policy must look at issues of stability”
  • public diplomacy must expand beyond the traditional tools [paraphrase]

The militarization of public diplomacy through both the conduct of our foreign policy and the prominence of military public affairs was obviously central in the debate.

If you are interested in public diplomacy and strategic communication, this is a must see interview. What are your thoughts on the interview? 

The big question: why hasn’t DipNote or America.gov linked to the Under Secretary’s interview? Here is a man with the best USG communication resources that continue to go underutilized.

Wanted: Islamic Religious Specialist for COIN and IO

~ Matt Armstrong

Walter Pincus writes in The Washington Post about Bagram’s expansion:

Bagram has become a central location for holding detainees picked up in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Similar to its activities in Iraq, the U.S. military has begun hiring intelligence contractors, many with military experience, to screen those captured to determine whether they should be held as enemy combatants. This month, the military advertised for an “Islamic religious specialist” to support “counterinsurgency and information operations” in the Bagram prison.

That person’s job would be to “deliver Islamic religious services for enemy combatants detained” with the facility and also “act as a linguist/interpreter in emergency situations,” according to the statement of work attached to the contract solicitation.

I hope the military, or their contractor, reads Task Force 134’s Strategic Communication Plan…

For our purposes as the counterinsurgent force, we will consider it an absolute imperative that our actions are fully congruent with the ideals that we promote. There can be no “gap” between what we say and what we do.

Beyond reading the plan, will they follow the requirement of working by, with,and through locally legitimate and trusted resources?

See also:

Noteworthy

~ Matt Armstrong

“Asked about ‘globalization, especially the increasing connections of our economy with others around the world,’ majorities in six of the seven [Muslim] nations polled say that it is ‘mostly good’ for their country. Approval is highest among Egyptians and Nigerian Muslims (79% and 78% saying mostly good, respectively). Sixty-three percent of Azerbaijanis, 61 percent of both Iranians and Indonesians, and 58 percent of Palestinians see globalization as mostly good. While support in Turkey does not reach a majority, a plurality still calls globalization mostly good (39% to 28%). On average across all seven publics, 63 percent say that globalization is good for their own countries. Only 25 percent think it is mostly bad.” – PIPA/WorldPublicOpinion.org survey results.

“[Joseph] Nye, author of Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, said that recreating USIA would cost a new U.S. president political capital. Nye said that capital would be better invested in a White House coordinator and strategist for public diplomacy.” From the post Ideas Abound for Improving U.S. Public Diplomacy Effort: U.S. national security tied to success in public diplomacy at America.gov. Quoted in the post are me, Kathy Fitzpatrick, Joe Nye, and Nancy Snow.

“I also see technology attempting to solve a real and identified problem, but the new processes required are overly complex for the field. This complexity requires training to reach an acceptable level of operational effectiveness. Given the nature of the competing taskings and limited training time, this inevitably results in the reduction or elmination of other training.” Jedburgh in a discussion titled Techcentricity and today’s Armed Forces at the Small Wars Council. In the same thread, Sam Liles, who probably programs in Assembly, cracked the following (very bad and thus repeated here) joke: “There are 10 types of people in the world. Those who understand binary and those who don’t.” As we continue to explore technological advantages, we must not ignore the human in the loop and in front of the sensor.

“By comparison with both allies and adversaries, the U.S. Government investment in public diplomacy is low. In absolute terms, the United States is outspent by France and the Soviet Union and is nearly equaled by West Germany. … A comprehensive, periodic, published analysis of Soviet propaganda in the United States would tend to put Soviet purposes in clearer perspective. It would tend to make the American public and press less vulnerable to Soviet deception.” From a 1979 General Accounting Office (not Accountability) report titled “The Public Diplomacy of Other Countries: Implications for the United States.” So far, very little of the discussion on revising America’s public diplomacy outreach, informational or cultural and educational, has considered the long-considered goal, if imperfectly executed, of informing and inoculating the American public.

“Western leaders face two fronts in their stand-off with Russia over its use of force to re-draw borders in Europe: one is the Russian army on the ground. The other is a propaganda war.” From a BBC report titled Russia’s Propaganda War.

Ashraf Fouad, Smith-Mundt and Al-Hurra

~ Matt Armstrong

In Losing Arab Hearts and Minds: The Coalition, Al Jazeera and Muslim Public Opinion (see review here), Steve Tatham interviewed Middle East media consultant Ashraf Fouad in 2004 on the creation of Al-Hurra, the U.S.-sponsored television station:

If you look at it from the positive side it is much needed and it is long overdue. They should get involved in the debate. But if you look at it from the negative side then it is unacceptable. How dare you come and air a channel like this to try and brainwash my people, when your law in the U.S. bans you from airing something like this in the U.S.? It is against the Constitution to broadcast a government channel in the States. How dare you say that we are sheep, and that you can show us this, but you can’t show it to the American people? …

While it’s not in the Constitution, the Smith-Mundt Act certainly does prevent Al-Hurra from being broadcast to the American public. Among the various reasons for revisiting Smith-Mundt, the perception it creates of our overseas broadcasts and the lack of transparency of the same is not a myth, even if the modern understanding for the purpose for the prohibition is.

See also:

Public Diplomacy tip: speak to audiences as if they were investors, because they are

~ Matt Armstrong

From the interesting (and required) Hill and Knowlton blog, another tip for public diplomats (or global communicators) and those looking to revamp America’s global engagement.

Lots of hits on your [Investor Relations] website does not equate to IR success.  It may just be your webmaster and employees hitting the site and inflating your stats.

Putting together an impressive IR presentation with lots of cool graphics does not equate to IR success.  Cool graphics are no substitute for good performance and direct communication of your strategy.

Hosting an event and having lots of analysts and investors in the room does not equate to IR success – I hate to tell you this, but many of those guys in the room are probably there for the free lunch.

Meaningful and engaging communication with analysts, investors, and prospective investors – now that’s IR success.

This meaningful and engaging communication happens via telephone, email, one on one meeting, group meeting, quarterly earnings call, or blog interaction.

For some reason, many companies (especially small caps) don’t get this.

Yup, for some reason, people in general just don’t get this.

See also:

Richard Barrett’s Al-Qaida’s Strengths and Vulnerabilities

~ Matt Armstrong

As the United States concludes the seventh year of what has been described as a Global War on Terror and the Long War, too many are still too far from understanding the true nature of the adversaries strengths and sources of power. The overdrawn focus on a tactic, terrorism, has ignored the basic attractiveness to the adversaries cause, whether Al Qaeda, Hamas, or Hezbollah.

Success will be measured not in dissuasion in the use of a tactic, but in the principles of the act the tactic symbolizes. The general aggregation of the many adversaries does not serve the purpose of effective engagement but potentially blinds us to the required solutions that, to put it in political term, will separate the adversary from their base. In the short term, success is not a binary condition of win or lose, but a constantly evolving struggle as the adversary adapts to survive and compete.

This has been packaged as a “War of Ideas.” In his first speech as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Jim Glassman described this “War” central to our national security whose purpose to “use the tools of ideological engagement — words, deeds, and images — to create an environment hostile to violent extremism.” Many people, he noted, do not like this term, especially the practitioners. (My suggestion is the time tested “struggle for minds and wills”, but it doesn’t roll off the tongue as “War of Ideas” even if it’s more appropriate.)

The term is one thing, the concepts it represents is another. Richard Barrett’s concise report Seven Years After 9/11: Al-Qaida’s Strengths and Vulnerabilities (PDF, 15pp) describes the primary target of the War of Ideas. Exploring the strengths and vulnerabilities, Barrett arrives at a containment and strangulation solution based not on kinetic engagement supported by information, but informational engagement supported by smart kinetics.

Where Al-Qaida succeeds is in providing a framework for individuals to express their opposition to whatever it is they oppose, even if the roots of their anger lie in issues completely unknown and uninteresting to the Al-Qaida leadership. Al-Qaida manages to offer its supporters a sense of belonging and importance by taking personal or local grievances and setting them in a global context. … Its opponents should therefore avoid intentionally or unintentionally saying or doing anything that appears to support its claims, from the use of terms to describe Al-Qaida to the introduction of policies that would appear to confirm its argument that the Muslim world is under attack.

Recognising the self-destructive nature of the movement, the international community should help Al-Qaida suffer from its internal contradictions and lack of coherence; it is not well-organised, nor particularly effective, and depends greatly on its ability to exploit events through effective propaganda. That propaganda relies greatly on media that are available to all sides. A free debate, whether on the Internet or elsewhere, is likely to weaken Al-Qaida, particularly as its skill lies more in spreading propaganda in set piece films,
videos or audio tapes, rather than in the interactive, consumer led form that has come to dominate the web.

Most importantly, the international community must continue to prevent by all means possible the opportunity for Al-Qaida leaders to connect in person with their supporters. The best ways to prevent this is to keep the leaders concerned about their own security and to keep them pinned down in the remote areas of the Afghan/Pakistan border and allow them to suffer the fate of all other outsiders who have attempted to establish themselves in the region.

As Under Secretary Jim Glassman noted, the Al Qaeda ideology contains the seeds of its destruction. It’s time we nurtured those seeds.

See also:

Today’s Recommended Reading on Public Diplomacy

~ Matt Armstrong

Several recommendations for you on the subject of public diplomacy.

Check out and subscribe to Craig Hayden and Shawn Powers’ Intermap.org.

The Intermap website and blog presents news, opinions, and research on issues related to communication-centric foreign policy, public diplomacy, global media and news flows. More broadly, this site aims to investigate the intersections between communication, media studies and international relations scholarship that deal directly with how global controversies and politics are carried and sustained through media. We call this media argument: where media outlets, technologies, and tactics represent the symbolic and visual space for the contest of ideas between nations, citizens, non-state actors.

Recent posts:

Read David Steven’s June post The new public diplomacy and Afghanistan at the Global Dashboard.

… I believe there are three key interlocking problems:

  • A lack of understanding. …
  • A lack of interoperability. …
  • A lack of understanding and interoperability translates into persistent strategic and tactical failings. …

The starting point for change is to:

  • Accept that influence is now core currency for all arms of international relations – foreign policy, development assistance, and military operations.
  • Build a common language and joint concepts across these disciplines – not just at a national level, but internationally, in order to allow the effective operation of multinational, multi-sectoral coalitions and networks.

However, the barriers to change are sizeable, while the knowledge to surmount them is fragmented across sectors and disciplines. The first battle for ‘hearts and minds’ therefore needs to be won in our own organisations – within governments, between governments, and between governments and a range of non-governmental organisations.

See Marc Tyrrell’s 3-part series a lengthy and very scholarly discussion on asymmetric conflict as a struggle for minds and wills

It is important to remember that the goal of warfare for many of the current groups is control over the interpretive framework of a population, not actual, physical control over the geographic area, that will flow inevitably from control over the framework and massive military costs. For many of these groups, kinetic operations, “violence”, is merely a means to an end that is shaped not by the logic of violence but, rather, by the logic of communications; a lesson learned from Vietnam where the insurgents lost almost all of the battles, but won the war.

Posts:

Also, check out the latest addition to the blogosphere, Chasing the Flame. This is Samantha Powers’ project to “tell the story of the peace-maker Sergio Vieira de Mello and introduce audiences to the kind of conviction and insight that inspires movements.” That movement is to build a “movement for a smart U.S. foreign policy.” 

Rethinking Smith-Mundt: responding to Sharon Weinberger

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 4 Comments

I appreciate Sharon Weinberger’s thoughtful three-part response at Wired’s Danger Room (Part I, Part II, Part III) to my interim paper “Rethinking Smith-Mundt” over at Small Wars Journal. Several points in her impassioned response deserve attention. However, to begin, it is important to understand that researching and writing “Rethinking Smith-Mundt” was more than an “esoteric” pursuit. Derisively labeling our adversaries exploitation of information as “asymmetric conflict” as if it was something unfair, we clung to our guns as it were as we continued to imagine a bureaucratically controlled global environment (more on asymmetry here). However, even as the Russians roll into Ossetia and Sarkozy recreates the part of Chamberlain, the Russians have not neglected the power of information to affect foreign public opinion. They have used cyber-warfare to block access to Georgian information while actively propagating Russian messages and images.

The fact of the matter is we have just begun to realize that the comfortable world we, as Americans, grew accustomed to since the late-1960’s and early 1970’s, is gone. The global information environment, with its satellite communications, 24/7 news, text messaging, and immediate access to video and images has substantially reduced the autonomy of leaders provided by the raw, supreme power of militaries provided over the last four decades. With few exceptions, war is no longer war among leaders but among the people and between the people. Small groups now have an amplified voice and strategic reach to run the show. Increased communications skills of our adversaries better leverage the digital age, as well as the analog age’s culturally attuned rumors, has changed the objective of war. Whether restricting access to information through cyber-warfare, inserting distortions into the information ecosystem with distortions, the purpose of conflict has become not to destroy the enemy while preserving oneself, but a contest “in spirit, will, and intelligence on a silent battlefield.” Conflict through bullets or economies is transformed as “attitude warfare” or “perception warfare.” It is now organized processes of persuasion.

The U.S. Government, consultancies, and the presidential candidates are all finally realizing the tremendous value of information and the informational effects of policy and actions. While bureaucratic inertia has prevented systemic changes for years, this may be changing. There are several major reports, and a couple of pieces of draft bills, that look to revamp America’s architecture of engagement (think variations on USIA 2.0). Virtually any discussion on restructuring America’s informational engagement with the world includes at least one (almost always) erroneous statement on Smith-Mundt. “Rethinking Smith-Mundt” was written with this in mind.

As described in “Rethinking Smith-Mundt,” the Act was written and debated during a time when “hot war” was unlikely between the major powers, a time before “Us” and “Them” were firmly established. But this was not the Cold War so many invoke today (it was not 1968) with massive military power at the ready and missiles aimed at the other’s capitals. Economies were not substantially linked and the key threat was not invasion but subversion. As our Ambassador to Russia said in 1946, the most important “fact in the field of foreign policy today…is the fact the Russians have declared psychological war on the United States, all over the world.” It was, he continued, “a war of ideology and a fight unto the death.” The struggle for authority and relevance had shifted from the arena of power to the arena of ideas and international persuasion.

However, Sharon’s impassioned critiques of my recommendations are based not on the lessons learned from the past, of a holistic approach to informational activities based on truth. Her comments are based on a selective, band-aid approach to the modern beauty contest known as public diplomacy today. I know we both agree that what is called “public diplomacy” today is broken. Many believe the term itself has become so burdened to be nearly as radioactive as “propaganda.” Even the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy rebuked the State Department for not tasking its public diplomacy officers with “public diplomacy.” Sharon experienced this and the failure of the bureaucracy to even comprehend “public diplomacy” during her brief stint as a Foreign Service Officer.

For a high-level thematic response to Sharon’s posts, see Steve Corman’s Real vs. False Distinctions in Rethinking Smith-Mundt. As Steve notes, Sharon is concerned about an “anything goes atmosphere.” I share this concern, which is why I want oversight and transparency, two elements previously central to the Act (related: 1948 Brookings report). TO be honest, “Rethinking Smith-Mundt” was less about modern recommendations than about dispelling myths about the Act. It was more about finding (surprising) common ground with history for today’s policy makers and report writers. The similarities between past and present were implicit as I didn’t want to bang the reader on the head in an already long and dense read. With that, below I go into more detail to respond to two of Sharon’s more significant of assertions.

Continue reading “Rethinking Smith-Mundt: responding to Sharon Weinberger
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Trusting the media? A new report from Pew Research

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

Briefly, from Editor & Publisher:

The results of the new Pew Survey on News Consumption (taken every two years and released this afternoon) suggest that viewers of the “fake news” programs "The Daily Show"and "The Colbert Report" are more knowledgeable about current events (as judged by three test questions) than watchers of “real” cable news shows hosted by Lou Dobbs, Bill O’Reilly and Larry King, among others — as well as average consumers of NBC, ABC, Fox News, CNN, C-SPAN and daily newspapers.

From Pew Research, Key News Audiences Now Blend Online and Traditional Sources:

The public continues to express skepticism about what they see, hear and read in the media. No major news outlet – whether broadcast or cable, print or online – stands out as particularly credible.

There has been little change in public perceptions of the credibility of most major news organizations between 2006 and 2008. Over the last 10 years, however, virtually every news organization or program has seen its credibility marks decline.

In 1998, for example, 42% of those who could rate CNN gave it the highest rating for credibility (four on a scale from one to four). That fell to 28% in 2006, and remains low in the current survey (30%). Credibility ratings for several other television news organizations – including the three major broadcast news outlets – also have declined since 1998. Comparable percentages say they can believe all or most of what NBC News (24%), ABC News (24%) and CBS News (22%) report (based on those who can rate those organizations).

Credibility ratings for the Fox News Channel have remained largely stable in recent years. Currently, 23% say they can believe all or most of what they hear from Fox, down slightly from 2006 and 2004 (25%).

About a quarter (27%) who can rate NPR give it the highest credibility rating, up five points since 2006. NPR is viewed as somewhat more credible today than in 1998 (27% vs. 19%). The credibility ratings for local TV news also have gone up a bit since the last media consumption survey (from 23% to 28%). But a decade ago, 34% said what they saw and heard on their local TV news was highly credible.

On Jon Stewart and Rush:

Regular viewers of The Colbert Report with Stephen Colbert and The Daily Show with Jon Stewart are much more liberal than the public at large. More than a third of Colbert’s regular viewers (36%) describe their political views as liberal and 45% of regular Daily Show viewers say they are liberal. The audiences for these two shows are roughly equal in size; 19% watch The Colbert Report regularly or sometimes while 23% watch The Daily Show.

Despite the ideological bent of many of these talk show audiences, majorities of the shows’ viewers say they prefer to get political news from sources that don’t have a particular political point of view rather than sources that share their point of view. Rush Limbaugh’s regular listeners are among the most likely to say they prefer sources that share their point of view – 37% express this view while 53% say they prefer news sources that don’t have a particular point of view. Similarly, 37% of Larry King’s regular audience prefers sources that share their political views. Stephen Colbert’s viewers are among the least likely to seek out sources that reflect their political views. Only 15% of regular viewers of The Colbert Report say they prefer news sources that share their point of view, while 79% say they prefer sources without a political point of view.

Check put the whole report here.

Unasked in NYT’s “photography as a weapon”: does the media have an obligation to check its facts?

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 2 Comments

Relying on the mainstream media to debunk foreign propaganda is increasingly difficult. Errol Morris, writing on the New York Times opinion blog, discusses the Photoshopped Iranian missile launch. This case, like an increasing number, was caught by “New Media” effectively acting as an “Old Media” watchdog. While many papers issued retractions after the catch, the impression was set. The clarifications that rarely, if ever, received the same front-page treatment as the error they were correcting may not have been noticed.

Twenty years ago, Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman noted that changes in the media were changing the information landscape in the United States. The increased concentration of media ownership changed the motive from a duty to inform the public to one of profit and an increased dependency on outside sources from the government, corporations, or “elite” experts for analysis. The recent Pew Research report shows that twenty years later the trend is worse as media has further retreated from the realm foreign affairs.

The result is easy manipulation of domestic by foreign and domestic communicators. The photography as a weapon discussion is aspect of this. Another is the Pentagon Pundits (aka “Hidden Hand”) scandal where substantial blame properly rests on the media as forewarned by Chomsky, although they have deflected much of what they’re due. (On this subject, see also this post.)

Outside the scope of this post is how do you reconcile the trashing of transparency and truth by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Victoria Clarke who both orchestrated the leveraging the military analysts and “outed” the Office of Strategic Influence to protect her turf. Her skill at manipulation and disinformation in exposing an office that was essentially a public diplomacy office within the Pentagon (no, the place it should be, but it was 2001 and State is just now stepping up in 2008, so cut some slack) had no place in strategic communication, public diplomacy, or public affairs. Clarke manipulation highlights the failure of the media to investigate and understand the news it covers.

Read the discussion at the New York Times.

Also, for the truly interested, I suggest Robert Entman’s Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy.

WaPo: When American Public Diplomacy Wears Combat Boots, we waste money and opportunities

~ Matt Armstrong

Dana Hedgpeth at the Washington Post describes U.S. public diplomacy as it used to be, except the context is today, in Iraq, and instead of USIA officers, it’s the American military. Instead of cultural or public affairs funding, it’s the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. The purpose of CERP is to fund “short-term, small-scale urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction.”

Army documents show that $48,000 was spent on 6,000 pairs of children’s shoes; an additional $50,000 bought 625 sheep for people described in records as "starving poor locals" in a Baghdad neighborhood. Soldiers ordered $100,000 worth of dolls and $500,000 in action figures made to look like Iraqi Security Forces. About $14,250 was spent on "I Love Iraq" T-shirts. More than $75,000 sent a delegation to a women’s and civil rights conference in Cairo. And $12,800 was spent for two pools to cool bears and tigers at Zawra Park Zoo in Baghdad.

In truth, the news story highlights a significant problem when American public diplomacy wears combat boots.

Continue reading “WaPo: When American Public Diplomacy Wears Combat Boots, we waste money and opportunities
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Follow up on American Public Diplomacy Wears Combat Boots

~ Matt Armstrong

The struggle today is not a struggle against a tactic, but for the minds and wills of groups and individuals around the world. This is not a “battle” to be won or lost, but a continuing struggle to create resistance against threats to America’s national interests and security.

The importance of communicating in the modern environment is critical. It requires informational activities that disregards often quaint notions of state borders, including our own. We lament the ability of a guy in a cave to out-communicate the United States, but the group that was a virtual unknown in 1998 faced little opposition in the information war. We lost that fight as much, possibly more than, Al-Qaeda won it. We are in an era when the value brute force is severely diminished. Increasingly, the pen, or keyboard and camera-phone, is mightier than the gun.

However, like it or not, American public diplomacy still wears combat boots. The military does not like it and neither does the State Department. The Defense Department should not be, as I wrote yesterday, America’s ambassadors to the world. This is especially ironic considering fewer American’s know someone in uniform.

Yesterday I commented on the reality of America’s international engagement. In doing so, I shifted the blame from the Defense Department to the leadership of the State Department as well as on to the Congress. Only recently has the State Department, for example, begun to push to increase the size of the Foreign Service Officer corps. The most visible pressure, however, continues to come not from the State Department, but from the Defense Department.

It should not be a surprise that over the last seven years, the Secretaries of Defense have seemingly fielded more questions about the resurrection of USIA than the Secretaries of State, or the Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy for that matter.

While “War of Ideas” is not entirely accurate, it is appropriate considering where we are today. The term will die by January 2009, but by then, forward momentum will have been achieved. Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy Jim Glassman is playing the right game to influence U.S. policy makers. The unfortunate phrase does not further militarize America’s foreign policy, it simply reflects an existing condition.

Below, without additional comment, are some key quotes from last week’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on “Defining the Military’s Role Towards Foreign Policy” that reinforces both points.

Continue reading “Follow up on American Public Diplomacy Wears Combat Boots
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American Public Diplomacy Wears Combat Boots, it’s wrong but it’s true

~ Matt Armstrong

Last week the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing with the subject Defining the Military’s Role Towards Foreign Policy. The purpose was to explore, in Senator Joseph Biden’s (D-Del) words, “an important trend affecting this country…the expanding role of the military in U.S. foreign policy.” He went to say that “there has been a migration of functions and authorities from U.S. civilian agencies to the Department of Defense.”

Today, American public diplomacy, its international communications with the world, wears combat boots. The Secretaries of Defense have used their podium to communicate not only to the American public but to the world far more effectively than the Secretaries of State since 9/11. At a time when fewer Americans know someone in uniform, it is increasingly the U.S. military that is in the critical “last three feet” of engagement with foreign publics in the most unstable lands. Around the world, images of combat boots and “digicams” (the new “digital camouflage”) lead while cameras don’t seem to find the civilians. Maybe it’s because there are so few there.

Continue reading “American Public Diplomacy Wears Combat Boots, it’s wrong but it’s true “ →

Openness & Government: a guest post by Shane Deichman

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

In the spirit of engaging and informing the American public and government transparency, Shane Deichman of Wizard of Oz and deep thinker on S&T sent along this post on Openness & Government. Be sure to check out his posts on the June 2008 DHS S&T Conference.

Guest post by Shane Deichman, Wizards of Oz:

“One of the major opportunities for enhancing the effectiveness of our national scientific and technical effort and the efficiency of Government management of research and development lies in the improvement of our ability to communicate information about current research efforts and the results of past efforts.”

– President John F. Kennedy’s opening statement in the “Weinberg Report” (10-January-1963, emphasis added)

In the early 1960s, President Kennedy charged his Science Advisory Committee (chaired by Dr. Jerome Wiesner, Special Assistant to the President on Science and Technology) to charter a panel to review federal information management policies and practices. The “Panel on Science Information” was chaired by Dr. Alvin M. Weinberg, Director of Oak Ridge National Lab (ORNL). ORNL is the site of the world’s first operational nuclear reactor (the Graphite Reactor, where the “pile” from the University of Chicago was moved during World War II to validate the “breeder reactor” concept) and a key national laboratory.

According to ORNL: The First 50 Years (chapter 5), the Laboratory’s role as a storehouse of scientific information is traced to Dr. Weinberg’s panel and its attempt to address the “information explosion” of the time. The panel’s report, “Science, Government, and Information: The Responsibilities of the Technical Community and the Government in the Transfer of Information” (informally known as “The Weinberg Report”), provided the impetus for the formation of a number of scientific information centers, including roughly a dozen at ORNL.

Matt Armstrong has used this ‘blog as a bully pulpit to educate us all on Public Law 402, United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, aka the “Smith-Mundt Act”. In particular, the Act’s principles were listed by the House committee that recommended H.R. 3342, the resolution that became the Smith-Mundt Act:

  • Tell the truth.
  • Explain the motives of the United States.
  • Bolster morale and extend hope.
  • Give a true and convincing picture of American life, methods and ideals.
  • Combat misrepresentation and distortion.
  • Aggressively interpret and support American foreign policy.

President Kennedy’s vision was consistent with these principles, and a key question asked by Dr. Weinberg’s panel was “How should Government agencies deal with information, other than its own reports, that is relevant to its mission?” In “Part 4: SUGGESTIONS: THE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES”, the Weinberg Report says:

1. “The Federal Government … must maintain an effective internal communication system; and it must see that an effective overall communication system is maintained”, and …

2. “Since information is part of research, Government must assume responsibilities even toward those parts of the non-Government system that do not overlap with its own, simply because Government has assumed such heavy responsibilities toward research.”

NASA and the Atomic Energy Commission were acknowledged by Dr. Weinberg as excelling in this area, interpreting their responsibilities quite broadly, and being proactive in providing full-fledged information services (not just a “document repository”) for enabling access to information. The AEC’s culture of openly sharing information is still evident today in the Department of Energy’s “Office of Scientific and Technical Information” (OSTI) in Oak Ridge – the nation’s central repository of scientific information stored in easily searchable databases (including Science.gov, ScienceAccelerator.gov and WorldWideScience.org). [BTW: OSTI is located on the first street in the nation named after a website, “Science.Gov Way”, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.]

At the other extreme, the Department of Defense was singled out in the Weinberg Report for having an information agency (Armed Services Technical Information Agency [ASTIA], predecessor of today’s Defense Technical Information Center [DTIC]) that only handled internal reports and internal information retrieval requests.

Dr. Weinberg’s panel concluded that the growth of science and technology requires the help of all technical people, not just information specialists, and the help of all Government agencies with investments in science and technology. While the Weinberg Report has no explicit references to Smith-Mundt, the spirit and intent of the Act are evident: all those involved in R&D were implored to become “information-minded” and to devote more of their resources to information dissemination – wise words that Matt has echoed on MountainRunner.

Shane is also the blogger increasingly pictured drinking with fellow bloggers.