Author: Matt Armstrong

Book Review: Insurgents, Terrorists, And Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 2 Comments

Insurgents, Terrorists, And Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat is a very useful contribution to the growing body of literature of modern conflict. While the subtitle of the book suggests a tempo-centric view of the Now, the book’s purpose is really to demonstrate the value of anthropological analysis of the irregular warriors we are facing today. Unlike “modern” states who might employ irregular tactics, the authors look at the societal and cultural interactions specific in warrior societies, or “martial races” (a term indifferent to ethnicity), and their resulting organizing principles. This is done to satisfy Sun Tzu’s admonition to “Know the enemy” which we do not. The absence of this knowledge, in simple terms, means we not only don’t know or understand why or how the enemy fights but we don’t even know how defeat or subordination, perhaps a better word, is defined by the enemy or conforms to their belief system. Afterall, both victory and defeat must be acknowledged by all sides.

Continue reading “Book Review: Insurgents, Terrorists, And Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat
“ →

Paying for war

~ Matt Armstrong

The Defense Contract Audit Agency reported to Waxman’s Oversight Committee this week that nearly 18% of the $57 billion audited so far was wasted. This figure, nearly $10 billion now, is likely to increase before it’s all over.

The three top auditors overseeing work in Iraq told a House committee their review of $57 billion in Iraq contracts found that Defense and State department officials condoned or allowed repeated work delays, bloated expenses and payments for shoddy work or work never done.

More than one in six dollars charged by U.S. contractors were questionable or unsupported, nearly triple the amount of waste the Government Accountability Office estimated last fall.

”There is no accountability,” said David M. Walker, who heads the auditing arm of Congress. ”Organizations charged with overseeing contracts are not held accountable. Contractors are not held accountable. The individuals responsible are not held accountable.”

Imagine how many more soldiers could have been hired? Well, at 2001 figures, 14,285,000 soldiers. That’s simply silly because between 2001 and 2006, the cost to recruit 10,000 soldiers went up $500,000, so as of last year this money could only have brought in 8,333,000.

What about taking just the current waste and applying it to soldiers’ pay, improving (or funding) the VA?

Or how about just providing our guys with essential equipment?

The Army and Marine Corps are $5 billion short of what they require in fiscal year 2008 to acquire a fleet of armored vehicles designed to provide better protection against roadside bombs — the scourge of U.S. forces in Iraq — than the current fleet of humvees.

The two services have spelled out this “unfunded requirement” to Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA), ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, who asked all of the service chiefs to inform Congress of where more money is required.

The Army and Marine Corps — which are shouldering the lion’s share of the work in Iraq and Afghanistan and suffering the largest proportion of casualties from roadside bombs — indicated in separate responses to Hunter that their No. 1 unfunded procurement need is for substantial sums to acquire thousands of Mine Resistant Ambush Protection Vehicles.

Specifically, the Army says it needs $2.25 billion and the Marine Corps says it needs $2.8 billion. Put together, the two sums would pay for a fleet of approximately 5,000 vehicles optimized to protect passengers from the devastating effects of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

What do you think would be different if the work not done or done exceptionally poorly years ago (it’s almost pathetic to “years ago”) was properly and efficiently completed?

Testing a new look

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 5 Comments

As I procrastinate, I’m testing a new look for the blog. In addition to the change in colors, the front page has gone to a 3-column format, some back pages will be moved to 3-column, and some elements on the pages will be shifted around. Let me know if you like it or hate it.

Book Review: Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations Under Stress

~ Matt Armstrong

Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations Under Stress is an outstanding book providing a real and practical look at American civil-military relations. Charles Stevenson comes to this book with the experience of two decades on the staff of four US Senators and as a professor fo the National War College. Unlike other authors on the subject, he puts significant ink in the beginning on the fact the “US Constitution was framed by men distrustful of standing armies and any concentrated power.” The product of this mistrust is evident in the established relationships, by Constutition and by practice, between the three institutions (Executive, Legislative, and military). There is an ongoing struggle where the military seeks autonomy and resources and offers professionalism and loyal subordination (per the Constitution) while the two political branches struggle, as the Framers intended, to make policies. The US military is “cross-pressured by its two masters and…often feels compelled to turn to one for relief from the other.” In the current national security crisis, this book is important reading to really understand the role of the military, the impact of Rumsfeld and the Generals Revolt, Congerssional debates and resolutions, and more.

Continue reading “Book Review: Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations Under Stress
“ →

Update on Halliburton/KBR/Blackwater relationship

~ Matt Armstrong

From David Phinney:

ROUGH DRAFT: From the time four men were killed in streets of Fallujah on March 31, 2004 until yesterday, the U.S. Army couldn’t determine if, in fact, Halliburton/KBR had broken its multi-billion-dollar contract agreement by allowing a private security company to guard a subcontractor’s convoy

Then suddenly, one day before a Congressional hearing on the events surrounding the killing and burning of four private security contractors — the Army figured it all out.

Halliburton/KBR had violated the sweeping contract to provide support services to the Army in Iraq, we learned at the hearing.

According to the LogCAP contract — now clocking about $16 billion in receipts — Halliburton/KBR agreed to always use military support for its security unless otherwise approved by the combatant commander. Halliburton had no approval.
Continue reading “Update on Halliburton/KBR/Blackwater relationship
“ →

The Army just confirmed what everybody knew

~ Matt Armstrong

An Army undersecretary testified September 2006 that Blackwater did not provide protective services to Halliburton or KBR. Well, everyone pretty much knew the name Blackwater and their role after four of their guys were massacred in Fallujah in 2004 in an event that possibly changed the personality of the conflict (see Pelton’s Licensed to Kill for an excellent forensic analysis of what happened; Thomas Ricks’ Fiasco sheds additional light on the impact of the response).

Well, now the Army finally figured out that yes indeed Blackwater was subcontracted to provide security.

Continue reading “The Army just confirmed what everybody knew
“ →

AFRICOM news

~ Matt Armstrong

Draconian Observations was paying attention SecDef Gates talking tothe Senate Armed Services Committee today. From Gates:

“The president has decided to stand up a new unified combatant command, Africa Command, to oversee security, cooperation, building partnership capability, defense support to nonmilitary missions, and, if directed, military operations on the African continent,” Gates said. This command will enable us to have a more effective and integrated approach than the current arrangement of dividing Africa between Central Command and European Command, an outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War.”

While you’re reading the Scandinavian’s other comments, check out Armchair Generalist’s players card on the combatant commands. He’ll have to add a slot soon for AFRICOM.

I’ve gotta run.

Blackwater and Christmas Eve

~ Matt Armstrong

I recommend reading David Phinney’s blog because I’m betting he’s going to have some juicy stuff appearing in the near future as hearings on PMCs in Iraq kick off later this week.

If you’re interested in the Christmas Eve shooting, I made a brief and quiet mention of it in my commentary on the UCMJ changes January 3rd:

It is folly to say the reason contractors haven’t been prosecuted for things ranging from the so-called ‘Aegis Trophy Video’ to [a] possibly killing an Iraqi Presidential Guard in the International Zone on Christmas Eve is because Iraq is a “contingency operation.”

Just a note on this, my sources gave me some good information before then, which I followed up on, including with a query to CENTCOM via phone and email. At first CENTCOM thought it was non-sense but when I provided some additional detail their public affairs liaison stopped responding to my email. This and others will be interesting test cases indeed.

Posing the question: Is the SysAdmin Constitutional?

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 5 Comments

Dan of tdaxp reframed a question of legitimacy of the Marines the Volokh Conspiracy posed last week. Volokh suggested that since the Marine Corps “is more like armies” that perhaps it should be treated as the US Constitution treats the US Army and thus not considered an element of the US Navy. Dan extends this to question whether the Tom Barnett’s SysAdmin theory is then unconstitutional. I felt it was necessary to respond with history and facts.

I had originally posted what was surely a brilliant response in Dan’s comments, only to have it lost to cyberspace. Thinking again about this, I decided to post the response here because there are other more important areas that should be probed when discussing the answer to V & D’s questions. Be warned, this is a long post.

Continue reading “Posing the question: Is the SysAdmin Constitutional?
“ →

Miscellany

~ Matt Armstrong

Return of the grab bag post:

Update on the US Embassy in Baghdad

~ Matt Armstrong

Read David Phinney’s post on the US Embassy in Baghdad. I just don’t see this amazing fortress, built with imported labor, unable to go online unless real victory is achieved, and even then I suspect victory won’t be achieved unless this Crusader Castle is converted, subdivided, or otherwise transformed. But then, we really have very little idea what’s up with this property. BTW- Phinney is about the only real resource for info on this.

Can’t fight without the right equipment

~ Matt Armstrong

Not only is the Army suffering manpower problems, creating issues at CONUS bases, hindering knowledge creation and transfer, wearing down its equipment, and not providing known and necessary pre-deployment training, but now the DoD’s own Inspector General issued a report last week stating failures to provide proper equipment to our soldiers.

Continue reading “Can’t fight without the right equipment
“ →

IISS on complex irregular warfare: the West is Failing

~ Matt Armstrong

Appropriately, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) released their 2007 Military Balance:

The IISS in the 2007 Military Balance again analyses the challenges of complex irregular warfare, this time assessing the psychological component. Our judgement is that military planning procedures need to incorporate so called ‘influence activities’ as an integral part of pre-deployment preparation for complex warfare missions. Without this deeper perception of the mission environment, operations will lack the necessary ingredient for long-term success.

Continue reading “IISS on complex irregular warfare: the West is Failing
“ →

Institutional Culture Clash preventing culture understanding

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 3 Comments

This isn’t what you think it is. It’s about institutional culture clashes manifested as conflicts between anthropologists and a “scholarly” rejection of “military dominance in the field”. In April 2005, Montgomery McFate wrote an article for Military Review titled Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: the Strange Story of their Curious Relationship in which she wrote about past use of anthropologists in COIN. Some selected excerpts from this article:

Continue reading “Institutional Culture Clash preventing culture understanding
“ →

More on the CCR, this time from Max Boot

~ Matt Armstrong

The Civilian Reserve Corps has gotten pitched in public again with Max Boot writing about it in today’s Los Angeles Times:

As for the Civilian Reserve Corps, the administration has no detailed plans to recruit, train or deploy abroad the kind of experts we need in such fields as law, finance, sanitation and balloting. Nor does it have the money. Odds are that this bright idea will suffer the same fate as another plan devised by the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, which asked for $100 million from Congress for contingency planning last year and got zip.

Ideally (a key word here), CCR will be more than the ill-fated S/CRS ever was. Picking up on Barnett, Boot suggests a Department of Peace built from a new USAID and a new US Information Agency. I love that last bit, not because I disagree, but I find it increasingly humorous that talk about recreating and reempowering USIA come not from State (although old USIA hands say the same, they seem to have largely been sidelined) but from DoD & the defense establishment. In other words, it’s the hard power guys calling for USIA and improving communications while the “soft power” folks under SecState Rice are… well, what are they doing (and here)?

See Opposed Systems Design comments on Max Boot here and my previous observations on the CCR proposal here.

Discussing Smart Power

~ Matt Armstrong

There is a new blog in town: SmartPowerBlog.org. The concept of Smart Power is the dynamic and active blending of hard and soft power to achieve an outcome that is not possible otherwise. This concept is discussed frequently, but the term Smart Power is new. Smart Power could be like a stereo equalizer with independent sliders adjusting this way and that way with the listener hearing just the right thing.

From the introductory post on SmartPowerBlog.org:

What Is Smart Power?
Smart power is the exercise of hard power and soft power in complementary ways that advances the goals of an entity. Usually those entities are national governments, but other levels of government and non-governmental actors also wield both, and seek smart power to achieve their goals….

Why Smart Power Now?
There are two reasons to hold a serious conversation about ‘smart power’ now. First, and most obviously, the failures of the war in Iraq and the efforts to combat terrorism have provoked across the political spectrum, in the United States and around the world, an intense and widespread debate about how best to balance the power to coerce and the power to persuade.

Second, beyond the conjunctural provocations of Iraq and counter-terrorism, there may be a more fundamental reason to pay attention to soft power’s intersections with hard power….Networks flourish, especially as democracy diffuses through once-authoritarian lands and people seek new outlets for their new-found empowerment.

Washington Times book review: public diplomacy in the “Global War on Terror”

~ Matt Armstrong

Losing Hearts and MindsJoshua Sinai reviews Losing Hearts and Minds?: Public Diplomacy and Strategic Influence in the Age of Terror in the Washington Times this week. It’s interesting, and a good sign, that from within the defense establishment (the book’s author is a professor at the Naval War College and was previously with the National Security Council) and presumably somebody more aware of the value of hard power, should come out and speak to the need for and value of soft power. What would be nice is to have somebody on the soft power side come over and say the same thing about the need for and value of hard power.

Continue reading “Washington Times book review: public diplomacy in the “Global War on Terror”
“ →

TV: DHS and Contractors

~ Matt Armstrong

Armchair Generalists commentary on Michael Chertoff recent statement reminded me of a recently rebroadcast episode of Numb3rs. In this episode, a DHS chief is running scripted large counterterrorism drills in Los Angeles but a drill is infiltrated and the drill’s “cast” are gassed (non-lethal) to prove a point. The chief is adamant about continuing, saying similar things as Chertoff. Ultimately, the guys pulling off the attacks (there are other incidents) are former US SF tiger teams with a vendetta against the chief. Why? Because the chief was a contractor in Iraq in charge of base security, which was also penetrated and SF lives were lost as a result.

Nice commentary on both DHS “posturing” and contractors in one episode.