Book Review: A Bloody Business: America’s War Zone Contractors and the Occupation of Iraq

An element of private military companies is the rediscovered opportunity to join “the fight” without joining a public military organization. Reasons for taking the private route include being too old, too unfit, short-term goals (i.e. quick money, <1yr commitment, the experience, etc), flexibility of choice, or any number of other reasons. The fact is private military companies providing security, logistics, and other services in and around the modern battlespace is re-democratizing war.

Looking at the private military industry operating in Iraq, in A Bloody Business Colonel Schumacher reviews many of its varied components beyond the almost cliche private security details (the shooters). From construction to trucking to training and even the security contractors, the author profiles elements of the private military industry as under-appreciated, undervalued, and, in many of his examples, highly patriotic.

This is a book heavy on cheerleading for the private contractors as individuals without spending too much time on the question of the appropriateness of the industry. These men and women do not get the same insurance, logistic support, fire support, medical support, or equipment the public armed forces receive. In return, they get the opportunity to serve at their leisure, higher pay, and little recognition. This book attempts to correct the latter as “[n]either a glorification nor a cheap shot-riddled exposé”, as the back of the dust cover describes it.

Indeed, most of the reviews on Amazon and other sites echo this sentiment: “…the incredible amount of dangers they face, often times it is more than money which motivates them. For the majority of the contractors, it is their chance to serve their country” and “[t]hey are no less patriotic, no less courageous, than people in the military.”

Colonel Schumacher glosses over the issues behind the tremendous increase in using private military companies in the last decade. He largely attributes the availability of skilled security resources as a result of “Up-or-Out” policies, but this is a narrow reading of reality. There is more there than that, especially military downsizing etc but like most of the political arguments, Schumacher oversimplifies to spend less time on the intellectual analysis (and long-term realities) and more on the daily realities of the contractor.

Interesting is his observation of the multicultural and multiethnic make up of PMCs, which reminded me of the democratic and ethnically blind pirates of the 17th Century as described in Benerson Little’s excellent book, The Sea Rover’s Practice (reviewed here previously). The comparison is not meant to suggest a similarity between pirates and private military companies beyond the organizational and motivational parallels between these non-state forces that operate with paradigms different from the societies they come from. One example is a more democratized operation that includes dropping the discrimination found in their contemporary societies — if they are operating on the same team or ship that is.

When Schumacher does explore the raison d’etre of PMCs use, he has both hits and misses. One "hit" is when he writes: “[b]ecause contract operations do not get the visibility that military operations do, the true cost, in terms of lives and impact on US foreign policy is disguised. As a concerned public, we need to be far more aware and informed about where, when, and how the United States employs these firm.”

However at the same time he misses the point by just including barely a page in his 262 page book on the political realities, but yet frequently returns to the point of the under-appreciated and under-supported contractor and their value. The latter is clearly the point he wants to make and does not want to delve into the politics behind their use like most other books on the subject. This is somewhat refreshing to a reader new to the subject but the human story should not outweigh the concern we the public should have over their deployment. The focus of the book is clearly to tell the story of the “unsung hero”. Schumacher makes no attempt to connect private military contractors with the evolution of war, which isn’t his purpose anyways.

That all said, the book really is a good read and good on first person (almost whole chapters are told by the participant with only setup by Schumacher) accounts. The focus on non-shooters is almost refreshing. At times reading like a novel, it is a quick read.

I was once asked for a reading list that included first-person accounts of private military companies in action. Just a few months ago, I was pressed to provide anything, but I’d include this on a reading list for another — non-academic — perspective.

2006 Naval S&T Partnership Conference

Next week — July 31 to August 3 — MountainRunner will be blogging from the Naval Science and Technology Partnership Conference in Washington, DC.

What is this conference?

Presented by the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) with technical support from the Office of Naval Research, the 2006 Naval S&T Partnership Conference is the successor to, and builds upon the success of, the six annual partnership conferences previously presented by ONR.  The 2006 Naval S&T Partnership Conference will provide key insight into the Navy & Marine Corps drive to enable revolutionary naval operational concepts that meet the challenges of the 21st century through strategic investment in S&T research.  The Conference will inform government, industry and academia of the direction, emphasis, and scope of the Department of the Navy’s investment in science and technology research, and how companies and universities can do business with the Naval Research Enterprise.

A number of blogs were inviting, including obviously MountainRunner. We will be credentialed as media in an experiment for the conference. In return, the conference simply requests we report (blog) on the conference. This may seem different, and it is, but it is certainly inline with a growing awareness of the Internet (see Defense Science Boards’ research into the value of Google, blogs, and other Net resources). I’ll post which blogs actually show when I get there next week (the confirmed list right now is short so the blog-exclusive press availability with the Chief of Naval Research may be closer to a one-on-one interview).

Here are the highlights of the conference, direct from its preliminary agenda:

  • Hear from the senior leadership of the Department of the Navy, the Office of Naval Research, and the Naval Research Enterprise
  • Gain an understanding of partnership opportunities for industry and academia, and learn how to do business with ONR and the Naval Research Enterprise
  • Get key insights into the Power and Energy challenges and opportunities facing the Navy and Marine Corps in the 21st Century
  • Meet one-on-one with Program Managers from ONR and across the Naval Research Enterprise, including Naval Laboratories and Warfare Centers
  • Learn how to participate in the challenge to creative innovative solutions to meet Fleet and Force requirements in the Future Naval Capabilities (FNC) and Innovative Naval Prototypes (INP) programs.
  • See and discuss innovative technologies from Industry, National and Federal Labs, and Academia in the Conference Exhibit Hall.

The Conference is being extremely helpful in facilitating additional interviews with the Office of Naval Research. Topics I’m looking to discuss and investigate further with ONR includes programs similar to the USS Emory S. Land reach out to Africa recently (blogged here previously and other public diplomacy programs), building strategic relationships ("partnership capacity" as defined in the QDR), thoughts on the Core-Gap & Barnett, and of course piracy. Of course those are just a few things I hope to ask and discuss, but we’ll see what actually transpires after reality sets in.

By the way, "science" is stretched beyond technology if you look at the ONR Science and Technology Departments, which include at the top level: Expeditionary Warfare and Combating Terrorism; Command, Control Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR); Ocean Battlespace Sensing; Sea Warfare and Weapons; Warfighter Performance Department; Naval Air Warfare and Weapons; and Office of Transition.

Any questions or topics you’d like to have asked or looked into, let me know. I’m open for suggestions, leads, etc.

More to come…

Defense Science Board to Study Impact of Google, Blogs, et al

Briefly, Defense Science Board to Study Impact of Google, Blogs, et. al. (defense acquisition, defence purchasing, military procurement):

The "blogosphere" has experienced 6000% growth since 2003, played a role in both reporting and aid coordination in the wake of terror attacks and disasters, and even birthed a whole genre called "MilBlogs" that are often penned by soldiers in the field. Which may explain why the Defense Science Board will conduct a study this summer on the military implications of Internet search engines, online journals and blogs.

Kenneth Krieg, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics and a former Defense Science Board member, requested the study on "Information Management for Net-Centric Operations" to help evaluate the implications of the information network boom. "’Googling’ and ‘blogging’ are making their way into military operations at all levels," Krieg wrote. "But the full implications of this revolution are as yet unknown, and we have no clear direction and defined doctrine." Krieg called access to information and collaboration among those who play a role in these missions "the lifeblood of military and civil-military operations."

Last comments re TdF

Since I posted something about the comeback ride of Landis and didn’t follow up with the joy of his victory, let me wrap up the Tour de France (TdF) postings with two things.

First, it is interesting the press, notably the French press, is referring to Landis as a ‘champion’ (versus Lance Armstrong as a ‘winner’) and is generally heaping praise on him. It really isn’t too much of surprise considering the friction between L’Equipe, and the French media in general, and Armstrong. However, I’m sure something else in the equation is Phonak isn’t an American team…

Second, is this news from Eurosport.com (a channel you should watch the Tour, World Cup, and any other serious sporting event on instead of OLN / Versus or ESPN… the coverage is far superior):

Jan Ullrich is reportedly in talks with Discovery Channel after it emerged that the German will have one last pop at Tour de France glory. Ullrich was fired by his team T-Mobile last Friday following his implication in the recent Spanish doping scandal ‘Operacion Puerto’.

Where’s Vino? With Kloden without a contract but apparently with offers from other teams, will 2005’s T-Mobile be reconstituted on 2007 Discovery? Can the personalities mesh? I’ll leave that discussion to the experts in the field as my Calfee is simply collecting dust…

Warning signal as Army recruiting standards fall

The need for the Army to lower its standards to allow in recruits who otherwise would have been rejected set the Army on bad trajectory. It was possible, of course nothing would come of it as these now-acceptable kids would be reformed by the Army. Indications of the types of kids they were bringing, or seeking to, was seen in the decision to allow previously prohibited inked necks and hands (while interestingly at the same time the People’s Liberation Army restricted its tattoo policy).

Continue reading “Warning signal as Army recruiting standards fall

A question of retention in the Army

Excerpted from a New York Times editorial back on June 28, 2005: The Not-So-Long Gray Line:

”I feel like politicians have created a difficult situation for us,” he told me. ”I know I’m going to be coming back here about a year from now. I want to get married. I want to have a life. But I feel like if I get out when my commitment is up, who’s going to be coming here in my place? I feel this obligation to see it through, but everybody over here knows we’re just targets. Sooner or later, your luck’s going to run out.”

At the time, he was commanding three vehicle convoys a day down a treacherous road to pick up hot food for his troops from the civilian contractors who never left their company’s ”dining facility” about five miles away. He walked daily patrols through the old city of Mosul, a hotbed of insurgent activity that erupted in violence after the 101st left it last year. The Army will need this lieutenant 20 years from now when he could be a colonel, or 30 years from now when he could have four stars on his collar. But I doubt he will be in uniform long enough to make captain.

Quoting Sneakers

60031755I’m probably one of the last people to see the 1992 movie "Sneakers", but I just did and found two fascinating and prescient quotes worth repeating here.

First, Redford to the NSA: You’re the guys I hear breathing on the other end of my phone.
NSA: No, that’s the FBI. We’re not chartered for domestic surveillance.

Second and more importantly: "It’s a war out there, a world war. It’s all about information…"

This is the killer quote of the movie. The guy who said it, a computer hacker with PlayTronic as his front, was likely thinking in terms of Future Combat System awareness of the "where" in battlespace and not the real bullseye of information of the "who" and the "why".

Anyways…

NYT Letter to the Editor: Training Foreign Armies

Ten days after an editorial appeard in the New York Times on June 12 (see below or link on NYT here) suggested a reduced role by State granting (and managing) foreign aid, the Pentagon responded. Today, two Secretaries of Defense co-signed a rebuttal: Training Foreign Armies

To the Editor:

Re "In Foreign Territory" (editorial, June 12), about the training and equipping of foreign militaries:

You
argue that Congress "should at least mandate that the programs financed
by the Pentagon conform to the same democratic and human rights
standards that apply when they are run by the State Department." We
agree.

Section 1206 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization
Act states that "the authority may not be used to provide any type of
assistance that is otherwise prohibited by any provision of law," and
that all programs incorporate "elements that promote observance of and
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and respect for
legitimate civilian authority within that country."

You contend
that this legislation "marks the continuation of a dangerous shift in
responsibilities" from the State Department to the Defense Department.
Not only do both departments jointly develop 1206 programs, but the
secretaries of state and defense must also both approve them. The law
enables the two departments to maximize their capabilities to address
war-on-terrorism challenges.

Michael Coulter
Jeb Nadaner
Washington, June 16, 2006
The writers are deputy assistant secretaries of state and defense, respectively.

   
Here’s the detail from the Editorial that’s their primary bug:

Traditionally, the authority to train and equip foreign forces was the
territory of the State Department… [U]nder law, Congress requires the State Department to
verify that a government meets certain standards of rights and
democracy before it can receive assistance. But no such restrictions
impede the Defense Department, and the danger is more than theoretical.

It is already clear, as the editorial comments, that American foreign policy is increasingly militarized but what the editorial ignores and the Pentagonn alludes to is the role of the Executive. The Executive Branch "owns" both State and Defense. Defense has seen an increase in responsibility and issue ownership since 9/11, a fact MountainRunner has been commenting on for a while…

Continue reading “NYT Letter to the Editor: Training Foreign Armies

PSYOPS propaganda goes mainstream

Briefly, from mparent7777 (hat tip to John Brown):

From the website for"Strategic Communication Laboratories":

Homeland Security

The last 5 years have seen a flurry of Homeland Security scenarios enacted
and re-enacted on the streets of our cities. What if there is a biological
attack, or the detonation of multiple explosive devices? Many of these simulated
scenarios are excellent planning exercises for the emergency services and
security forces.

However, a major flaw has emerged in many of the scenarios – the
unmanageability of civilians. They do not behave as they are supposed to.
When a virus hits a city, civilians do not line up for vaccination:
they run for the hills. When terrorists are looking for a target, it is the
predictability of civilian behaviour that makes the terrorists’ job easier.
What if there was a way to control civilian behaviour when it counts?

Offering niche specialties as
"psychological warfare," "public diplomacy," and "influence operations," Strategic Communication Laboratories deserves a deeper look. This isn’t the Lincoln Group…

GAO Faults Pentagon Oversight

Briefly from the: Washington Post:

The Defense Department may not have enough staff to adequately monitor the performance of contractors hired to build and run weapons programs, according to a report by the Government Accountability Office. The Pentagon’s workforce devoted to weapons acquisition and oversight declined by 38 percent, to 60,000, from 1989 to 2002, the GAO said. The workforce remained steady even as contract obligations reached $270 billion in 2005, up from about $130 billion in 2000, the agency said. "Increased demands on the acquisition workforce have led to vulnerabilities in contract pricing and competition and in the selection of the most appropriate contracting techniques," according to the report, which was requested as part of this year’s defense budget to assess the Pentagon’s vulnerability to fraud, waste and abuse.

From the perspective of certain offices, it is not too inconvienent to allow poor oversight. This isn’t really surprising however. In 2003, the GAO faulted the Pentagon  for not developing plans to replace civilians in wartime, as prescribed by the DOD itself in 1990.

The need for civilian contractors to assist the military is clearly established, albeit unfortunately. Increasing dependence from outsourcing food and laundry services to logistics to has led to outright subing out for boots on the ground in the form of the private security contractors in Iraq today (and lest we forget wings in the air with the "pilots" of the larger UAVs now carrying weapons). Failing oversight is convienent when obfuscation of projected military power is politically necessitated.

What is the cost of the Iraq War? The cost to the US military is significant and not quantifiable in dollars…

CBC’s review of Shadow Company

GoogleVideo has CBC "The Hour" review of Shadow Company. The interviewer starts off with the standard "guns are cool" and sterotypical "mercenary" spiel. He misses the point pretty much throughout the interview, but the producer must’ve understood as the interview clips from the movie are well-chosen. While the interviewer didn’t, the clip of Robert Young Pelton set the tone of the purpose of the movie with expected eloquence: "[from the Coalition of the Willing it became the] Coalition of the Billing, which means that the coalition partners that have pulled out are being replaced by private security."

We asked by on CBC, Nick Bicanic shares his motivation for making the movie, which included the Fallujah incident with the Blackwater contractors (earlier commented on here). Specifically, Nick keyed on the American military response to the deaths and mutilation of the American civilians and not military personnel. (Not said was the decision to delay the Marine response was made at the "highest levels".) The severe and significant military response had lasting impact and seemingly more on par of a counter-attack than a punitative response to an attack on civilians.

The seperation we think we achieve by privatizing force — not US Armed Forces, Government, or OGA personnel but civilians — is clearly not accepted by others. Shadow Company notably has an interview with an insurgent saying the Fallujah ambush (against Blackwater) was an attack on the CIA.

Foreign policy by proxy? Clearly. The US government think there’s at worse a relationship with an agent through contracting by by the US government or private corporation (notably as part of Reconstruction). However, others (generally those outside the US government, US media, and US public) see a direct relationship and thus an attack on either is an attack against America.

Recruiting Dilemma

A six year old Pentagon document on Recruiting and Retention (also available here), written before the Global War on Terror, reflects a reality more pronounced today:

Fewer Americans have military experience than ever before. With a smaller force serving at fewer bases, there are increasingly fewer Americans who have direct experience with our military. Fewer people know someone who serves–or has served–in uniform. The transition from the draft to an all-volunteer force in the early 1970s also decreased broad military experience, knowledge, and understanding. Today, fewer elected officials, journalists, teachers, business owners, and employers have experienced military service.

Has this disengagement allowed a more expeditionary attitude and how much has it contributed to the use of private military companies?

Iraqis don’t admit they work at the US Embassy

This was interesting: Memo: Fear rules at Baghdad embassy.

A recent cable to the State Department from the U.S. embassy in Baghdad outlines a litany of fears and misery among Iraqi employees at the American diplomatic mission that threaten “objectivity, civility, and logic” among workers.

The collection of anecdotes from Iraqi workers in an undisclosed office in the embassy paints an extraordinarily bleak picture of life in the capital, where local employees do not dare reveal where they work, even to family members, for fear of retribution…

Let’s hope once the mission is accomplished in Iraq… no wait… well, when the new fortress / bubble is built, I’m sure there will be space for all.

Quote on the US Foreign Policy

"The Americans have run away again" — former-SADF (South African Defence Force) soldier in Afghanistan (who will remain anonymous as he’s serving with a private security company possibly in contravention to SA law).

Despite recalling "the facts as we knew them", the reality on the ground is a shifting foreign policy, and with it (foreign) public trust, does matter. While the Administration and Republican in Congress decry the Democratic proposals to "cut-and-run" and how that will send the wrong message, the message has already been sent in Afghanistan.

Prior to putting Afghanistan in the "win" column, focus, American and international, was shifted to Iraq. Put in the place of Afghani’s, and now Iraqis in light of the deterioriating situation there of our own allowance, one would choose a path of future security even it is not desirable. David Galula, in his book Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era), noted the very same when he wrote of examples in the early 1950’s. For example:

In July, 1954, during the Korean War, the aNationalists decided to make a raid on the mainland of China… The Communist garrison was made up of a regular battalion plus a thousand-man militia. The latter, the Nationalists thought, would put up no real fight. Indeed, every piece of available intelligence indicated that the population was thoroughly fed up with the Communists… The [Nationalist paratroopers] were virtually annihiliated. The militia fought like devils. How could they act otherwise when they knew that the Nationalist action was just a raid?