Briefly, I have commented before on Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations (which should be titled "Clash of Common Sense"). On Memri.org, a great site you should visit if you’re concerned about perceptions and insights (not enough policymakers are when it gets down to the brass tacks), there is an interview worthwhile of watching. Dr. Wafa Sultan, speaking in Arabic and appearing on al-Jazeera goes after the Muslim clerics and political leaders who she believes distort the Koran. It’s not a clash of civilizations but a clash of modernity and "barbarism".
Category: Public Diplomacy
Rattle a snake, get bit by a snake – Kenyan Censorship
According to the Kenyan Broadcasting Corporation, the Kenyan government raided the offices of the newspaper the Standard. The government alleged some of the newspaper’s journalists were paid to run "fabricated" stories with the "intention to inciting ethnic hate and animosity leading to a breach of peace."
The BBC has more information, including a statement by Internal Security Minister John Michuki: "If you rattle a snake, you must be prepared to be bitten by it."
It seems likely the corruption was not of the journalists but of the government itself, according to the BBC. The claim by Information Minister Mutahi Kagwe of remaining "committed to the idel of press freedom and [the] promotion of responsible journalism" rings false by their actions.
Actions often speak far louder than words.
What type of development is possible under such a regime? The burning of newspapers just doesn’t portend good things in information sharing to raise all boats.
For more details see Kathryn Cramer here, Xeni here, and especially MentalAcrobatics here.
MentalAcrobatics has CCTV footage of the raid.
US Military practicing effective public diplomacy in Africa
The distinction that the military does not conduct public diplomacy — it practices public affairs — is disappearing by the day. A four country tour by Admiral Harry Ulrich,commander of US naval forces in Southern Europe and Africa, was more military-led diplomacy. Will there be follow up w/ civilian resources? State Department teams of public and cultural diplomats?
Continue reading “US Military practicing effective public diplomacy in Africa
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US “military infiltration into Africa”
The People’s Daily from China is an interesting resource. Definitely an item worth monitoring because of the alternative insight which is sometimes just that, an insight. Other times, just like any other source of news from any other agency or media outlet, it comes on a slant. From the opinion section of the People’s Daily Online comes this: U.S. steps up military infiltration into Africa. The piece starts w/ Rumsfeld’s recent trip to the Maghreb, hitting Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria.
Quote for the Month
“Apparently a lot of things have changed since the concept of the psychological warrior replaced that of the statesman and the propaganda trick replaced the simple truth.” Erik Sevareid in 1953, quoted in Richard Arndt’s First Resort of Kings.
Rumsfeld: Al Qaeda has better PR – Feb 17, 2006
News brief: Rumsfeld acknowledges the sad state of American public diplomacy. Of course, being Secretary of Defense, he focuses on DoD’s public affairs. More does need to be done and it is unfortunate that such a statement is coming from the Pentagon and not from State. We must lead with our non-military assets. See Rumsfeld: Al Qaeda has better PR – Feb 17, 2006.
The United States lags dangerously behind al Qaeda and other enemies in getting out information in the digital media age and must update its old-fashioned methods, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said Friday.
Cartoon News
A few links and thoughts on the Cartoon Riots. The EU Observer notes Europeans question the "provocation by the media". A 10 Feb 05 survey showed 55% of French believe printing the cartoons did not serve free speech. Meanwhile, English-language Pakistani newspaper Daily Times sees the furor as mostly an intra-Muslim issue. Something I wonder if others, who subscribe to the idea of an in progress Islamic "Reformation" would agree with. Stephen Schwartz of the Weekly Standard takes aim at this very point, laying some blame on Wahhabis. What is not frequently reported is a) the addition of inflamatory cartoons and b) the original cartoons were previously published in Egpyt Oct 05. This is ammunition on the Syria / Iran inspiration behind the riots, putting away, momentarily conflict w/ Saudi-sponsored Wahhabis?
Practicing Effective Public Diplomacy in Africa (or elsewhere)
Let’s say you’re charged with finding the path to partnership with a few dozen African countries that have resources you want and need. How would you approach the them to establish a relationship to establish a partnership? This might be especially important if you are locking for priority treatment or even to lockout a competitor. A blocking strategy would really entail developing a deep partnership of trust, or coercion. If you want to go with the trust route, believing that it will cost less in the long run (i.e. soft power vs hard power) it would make sense to establish and build trust and understanding. Perhaps even a spirit of mutual assistance since. A little give, a little take. Making governments and people comfortable with your overtures would require a coherent policy, right? What might that policy look like?
Relationships begin with dialogs. The goal is to build trust. Trust cannot be manufactured, it has to be earned. On a personal level now, how did you come to trust your best friend? Was a bond of trust "created" or did it evolve over time? It probably built up over time through actions by both you and the other person after some initial, perhaps small, amount of trust was placed in the both of you by the other. We build trust, we do not "create" trust. We can build and maintain trust just as we can "fritter" it away, to quote Martin Rose of the British Council.
So, in this hypothetical let me add something. Let’s say you’ve had a presence in the region for a few decades. Nearly fifty years ago you initiated a program to assist, convert really, the peoples and governments to your way of thinking. This established contacts in the region. It didn’t go over the way you really wanted, but it didn’t end up in flames either. The reasons for that original approach are now in the pages of history and the contacts have been maintained and in the last few years, you reactivated them to get to a new level. So, with the knowledge that you have at least some amount of trust built up with these countries. What would you do next?
You might consider documenting a policy to share with Africa. This would describe how important sincerity, friendship and equality are to you. It would also put you on a moral high ground when contrasted with other global players. It would emphasize your belief in the mutual benefit of economic and social development and cooperation, especially focusing on reciprocity and common prosperity. This would probably sound like a good, if not great, deal to the Africans, corrupt or not. There is something of a track record that leans toward the positive side, if not completely positive.
The idea of riches to be made in global economy might be appealing, or even just being heard when you suggest how you will help them strengthen their role in global institutions through coordination and support. Those are great words to use, in fact. Non-threatening, friendly, and reciprocal. All key in building trust and deepening ties.
This relationship you’re seeking to build upon and expand would cause each side to learn and develop. So you would suggest cultural, civic, and educational exchanges to deepen understanding and awareness of each other as you learn from each other and create a sustainable world. Well, you can hope for a sustainable world, which is what you want to try for, right? You do not want to pollute. You want a moral high ground, especially when considering the beautiful African continent. Perhaps you might suggest something to your friends on this? There is money to be made in eco-toursism, after all.
How about cooperation on resources, tourism (means $), debt reduction ($ — offering assistance with the global institutions), infrastructure (goods, people and tourists have to get around), agriculture ($ greater crop density and quality), education, media, consular affairs (helping in the international community, did I mention you’re a big country with pull?), disaster reduction, relief and humanitarian assistance, military training, police, courts, and more.
Sounds pretty fancy. Too much to lay out in a document, isn’t it? I mean, who would really go so far to do this? Africa does have all that oil, natural gas, and plenty of other fantastic resources, energy and otherwise.
Does it sound too fantastic if you have already been building prestige buildings on Africa? You’d offer the people the choice of a sports stadium or a government building. Most of the time they picked stadium, but once the bureaucrats got lucky and a government building was built. Africans might see the friendly side you’re trying to promote, right?
They might also see a friendly culture if you’re broadcasting the English language TV into Africa. That would be great, wouldn’t it? Let’s say you’re doing that already.
Does it sound like I’m trying to sell you a bridge or ocean front property (sorry, US-centric joke)? I’m not. The policy document I described exists and was published January 2006. China reportedly gets over a quarter of its oil from Africa, so it is not surprising it’s interested in building up and maintaining relations on the continent. In 2000, Beijing established the China-Africa Cooperation Forum (CACF) to promote trade and investment with 44 African countries. In 2003, Prime Minister Wen visited several oil-producing African states accompanied by Chinese oil executives, and President Hu toured Algeria, Egypt, and Gabon. China has been working closely with governments in the Gulf of Guinea, from Angola to Nigeria, as well as with the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Libya, Niger, and Sudan. (See Sep/Oct 2005 Foreign Affairs: China’s Global Hunt for Energy)
In mid-January 2006, China issued an African Policy Paper. The strategy China has laid out, besides being laid out open for all to see, should cause concern at State. This paper is divided into six parts:
1. Africa’s Position and Role
2. China’s Relations with Africa
3. China’s African Policy
4. Enhancing All-round Cooperation Between China and Africa
5. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation And Its Follow-up Actions
6. China’s Relations with African Regional Organizations
The document is easily available as html, making accessibility as universal as possible. The English is simple and straight forward, making it easy to read for those who first, or even second or third, language is not English. This document is public diplomacy at its finest. The Chinese are doing a bang-up job in the region. China’s connection with the public goes beyond building prestige buildings for the public. Offered the option of a sports stadium or government building, the public gets to chose, only once did a public group chose the government building. Television in the region is also becoming largely English language broadcast from China. In the culture war, the West, and the US specifically, is losing.
The most visible American presence in the area is a multinational military base on the Horn and corporate oil on the Gulf of Guinea. The rhetoric out of Washington is militaristic and focused on counter-insurgency (COIN) and counter-terrorism. Efforts at public diplomacy, economic and cultural connections are not heard when they are spoken at all. They are drowned out by louder actions and lousy follow through.
The African Policy Paper is quite impressive. It is a great piece of propaganda (in the pure sense) and a tremendous example of what public diplomacy can look like. Working from an equality in partnership, establishing two-way communication and understanding is done through exchanges and commitments to build trust through assistance in all sectors of the civil sector. Textbook.
With established relationships with nearly all the countries on the continent, including expanding cultural and economic ties, this policy could very easily be seen as likely steps the Chinese would fulfill. The Chinese are not perfect, despite the appearance of The Policy. Holes in both reality and the document will be discussed in a follow up post. As well as the importance of China in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.
The international military on the Horn is an effective fighting force working with some USAID elements, but where is the full frontal effort on public, cultural, and diplomacy diplomacy to build deep relationships and trust? Building schools, roads, economies, and social structures is the best way to prevent terrorism and to assure a resource supply that will be steady and sure. The Chinese seem to know that. Does the United States want to sit back and see if the plan works? Countering such a plan is just like countering and preventing terrorism: a long and steady effort. Will it happen? We’ll have to see, unfortunately, I doubt Las Vegas bookies will give me good odds on it.
Technorati Tags: Africa, Horn of Africa, QDR, Current Affairs,
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U.S. Underestimated Hamas’ Strength
Hamas’ victory in the Palestinian election is not surprising. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice answered her own question of "why nobody saw it coming" when she said we do "not have a good enough pulse." Professor Eytan Gilboa suggests the admitted underestimation misses the point. Professor Gilboa is right when he says the Hamas victory "reveals a major strategic deficiency in the American design for democracy in the Middle East." The bigger point, the underestimation, is how did Hamas become such an attractive alternative to the Palestinians? The validity and designs of Hamas is not the real issue but a manufactured consequence of inputs leading to the election.
Pentagon “roadmap” calls for “boundaries”…
Heads up on a report just acquired by FOIA by National Security Archive: Information Operations Roadmap. The National Security Archive headline describes it thus:
A secret Pentagon "roadmap" on war propaganda, personally approved by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in October 2003, calls for "boundaries" between information operations abroad and the news media at home, but provides for no such limits and claims that as long as the American public is not "targeted," any leakage of PSYOP to the American public does not matter.
Obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the National Security Archive at George Washington University and posted on the Web today, the 74-page "Information Operations Roadmap" admits that "information intended for foreign audiences, including public diplomacy and PSYOP, increasingly is consumed by our domestic audience and vice-versa," but argues that "the distinction between foreign and domestic audiences becomes more a question of USG [U.S. government] intent rather than information dissemination practices."
The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, amended in 1972 and 1998, prohibits the U.S. government from propagandizing the American public with information and psychological operations directed at foreign audiences; and several presidential directives, including Reagan’s NSD-77 in 1983, Clinton’s PDD-68 in 1999, and Bush’s NSPD-16 in July 2002 (the latter two still classified), have set up specific structures to carry out public diplomacy and information operations. These and other documents relating to U.S. PSYOP programs were posted today as part of a new Archive Electronic Breifing Book.
Several press accounts have referred to the 2003 Pentagon document but today’s posting is the first time the text has been publicly available. Sections of the document relating to computer network attack (CNA) and "offensive cyber operations" remain classified under black highlighting.
There is a lot to digest in this and related documents. Other priorities prevent me from diving deep right now, but I’ll return to this later.
UPDATE 1 Feb 06 See ZenPundit’s posting on same (but with a different title and 3 days after this post :).
Peacekeeping and Cultural Diplomacy – unofficial mil videos
After reading more on insurgent’s use of video propaganda in Iraq, I thought it might be interesting to look at a few bored soldier "home" movies… First, there is this video by those crazy Norwegians, filmed in Kosovo. It is a few years old now and is a great example of how not to conduct civil affairs… listen carefully to the lyrics. I don’t suppose the Joint Public Affairs Support Element would recommend this method of outreach. The Serbs were apparently not thrilled when they found out about this movie.
Somalia, Grenada, or rescuing Kuwait-ah; We screwed ya; Rwanda; Wished we coulda helped ya; Iraqi embargo, how it is we don’t know…."
Clearly this movie is a political statement. Which is not what this next movie is about at all. This one is about moral of the troops. WindsOfChange.net has the lyrics and info on a Royal Dragoon Guards video that crashed the Minstry of Defense servers. But the MoD wasn’t upset, but rather proud over the quality of the video, according to the BBC, spoofing "This is the Way to Armadillo" (26.2mb).
The UK Royal Navy apparently has its own video, Bohemian Rhapsody (12.9mb)…
Then there’s always the Japanese Maritime SDF recruiting video which doesn’t quite rank as high as the above flicks…
More fun is Born to Raise Hell which I’d hazard has a very different audience than the vids above. In fact, I know it does. The impact on cultural diplomacy of the BtRH video is, to understate it, a little different than Armadillo or Kosovo…
And then there’s the unmilitary but still fun video of the race across Manhattan…
McDonald’s, Google, and glocalization
Yesterday I overheard a discussion about comparing McDonald’s and Google and how their outreach to the international community differs. This is an interesting idea. How do two very prominent American companies operating in local spaces conduct cultural diplomacy? The more I thought about it, however, the more I thought this was a huge mismatch. It’s not quite as bad as say, apples and oranges. At least not on its face. So let’s say it is like apples and honeydew mellons.
Now I’m not very good at picking produce, so bear with my analogy. Let’s say Google is the apple, perhaps a granny smith apple. This is a fairly innocuous piece of fruit. Seemingly universal. Most people have seen an apple in the media, heard of one in books (Western imported books at least), or perhaps even tasted one of the hundreds (thousands?) of varieties. Google’s ability to morph into a local product is interesting. Note their recent launch of Google in Bangla (however, as of this writing, the Google logo is styled to promote Mozart’s birthday…doesn’t help my point here).
The apple is easily stuffed in a briefcase, satchel, pocket, or put on a teacher’s desk. Eating one is simple too. Just take a bite. Simple, lightweight, portable, inconspicuous.
McDonald’s is more like a honeydew melon. The physical presence creates an impact that constantly reminds. In France, for example, the food "purists" ("fundamentalists"?) decry the generification of food that the Golden Arches brings. McDonald’s is successful at glocalization. But here’s the rub. Like the honeydew, McDonald’s is not inconspicuous. In fact, it is very visible. It must be to compete with other restaurants and eating options. The French farmer’s, for example, are constantly reminded by the site of the arches on a building or in window. On a bag being carried by a customer. Trash on the side of the road or in a rubbish bin. McDonald’s impacts the prices of downstream goods as it buys up meat (from where?) and potatoes and lettuce and ketchup and on and on. Then there are trucks moving McDonald’s goods to the stores. The honeydew does not sit neatly in a satchel (at least not mine). The honeydew isn’t sitting in your desk drawer. The skin may feel like an apple (remember I’m not good at picking produce so if they don’t feel the same to you…), and if you squint your eyes, they look similar. Eating a honeydew is a far different experience requiring more involvement from the user than a quick nash of the teeth on fruit flesh.
If the unfortunate were to happen and somebody threw one of these at you, which would you rather not be hit with? Which might make a bigger impact?
Analyzing how Google reacts to local populations, how it engages in cultural diplomacy is such a different creature (fruit) than how McDonald’s does it. When looking at the impact, we need to fully understand the thing making the impact. We need to understand how it operates in the real world, who uses the good, who sees it, and how they see it, if it is seen at all. Perhaps it is only heard.
Just some meandering thoughts…
U.S. Rebuilding in Iraq Found to Fall Short
News brief on a story in the NYT tomorrow: U.S. Rebuilding in Iraq Found to Fall Short. Highlights:
Because of unforeseen security costs, haphazard planning and shifting priorities, the American-financed reconstruction program in Iraq will not complete scores of projects that were promised to help rebuild the country, a federal oversight agency reported yesterday….Only 49 of the 136 projects that were originally pledged to improve Iraq’s water and sanitation will be finished, with about 300 of an initial 425 projects to provide electricity, the report says….The planners of the rebuilding effort did not take into account hundreds of millions of dollars in administrative costs, and mostly did not realize that the United States would have to spend money to keep things like power plants and sewage treatment plants running once they had been built, the report says. That ultimately forced the United States to pare the list of projects to cover such expenses….Beyond the huge cost of protecting reconstruction projects, which the report says the planners did not foresee, billions of dollars were shifted from the rebuilding effort to things like training Iraqi police and guarding Iraq’s borders. The report, by the office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, adds that the overall rebuilding plan was also devised without a clear understanding of the decrepit state of Iraq’s infrastructure after decades of war, United Nations-imposed penalties and sheer neglect….The report was released only days after a separate audit of American financial practices in Iraq uncovered irregularities including millions of reconstruction dollars stuffed casually into footlockers and filing cabinets, an American soldier in the Philippines who gambled away cash belonging to Iraq, and three Iraqis who plunged to their deaths in a rebuilt hospital elevator that had been improperly certified as safe….But in contrast to that earlier audit, which focused on rebuilding projects financed by money from Iraqi oil proceeds and assets seized from Saddam Hussein’s regime, the latest report covers projects underwritten with American taxpayer money.
“Cronyism and Kickbacks”
Briefly, where did the money go? Cronyism and Kickbacks?
There is a ‘reconstruction gap’ in Iraq. According to the US Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR), ‘in the coming year, the amount of money needed by the Iraqi government to carry out the daily operations of its existing health, water, oil and electrical infrastructure, as well as to complete and sustain planned reconstruction projects, will outstrip the available revenue.’ The US General Accountability Office (GAO) told Congress that the Iraqis still need ‘additional training and preparation to operate and maintain the power plants, water and sewage treatment facilities, and healthcare centres . . . to ensure that the billions of dollars . . . already invested in Iraq’s infrastructure are not wasted’.
The sums are simple. Reconstruction will cost considerably more than originally imagined. The American administration has committed most of its funds. The Iraqis have neither the money nor the expertise to run the projects that have been completed. There’s little transparency or accountability. To judge from the audits published so far, at least $12 billion spent by the Americans and by the Iraqi interim and transitional governments has not been properly accounted for. Almost three years after the fall of Saddam, the GAO reports, ‘it is unclear how US efforts are helping the Iraqi people obtain clean water, reliable electricity or competent healthcare.’ The Bush administration has decided to provide no more reconstruction funds.
Army working dogs
News brief on Army dogs just because I want to. There could a public / cultural diplomacy connection — public affairs as the military calls it because the State conducts diplomacy — but I’m not looking into it.
The 67th Engineering Detachment adopted the program, began by the British Army, using dogs to find explosives and contraband almost three years ago. Most of the dogs are found in pounds or donated to the program. They undergo a training period of about three months before being placed with a handler…
Each dog is awarded rank in the Army system and receives special treatment by the system and their handler.
“The dogs are always one step higher in rank than their handler in case of abuse,” said Broda. “If a handler abuses the animal, he’s subject to UCMJ action. If I get promoted, she gets promoted as well.”
Interesting point on the rank of the dog…
G W Quote from 2005 Inaugural Address
"From the perspective of a single day…the issues and questions before our country are many. From the viewpoint of centuries, the questions that come to us are narrowed and few. Did our generation advance the cause of freedom? And did our character bring credit to that cause?"
–George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address, January 20, 2005
More on US Military as Public & Cultural Diplomats
Are we using our military resources appropriately? In Conflict-Post-Conflict (CPC) transitions, "securing the peace" is essential. As was seen in Iraq (and New Orleans), failing to provide adequate infrastructure, including personal (beyond personnel) security, for civil society results in a breakdown at the seams. Equatable with the war-peace seam of Barnett, it is nevertheless a widely known fundamental. It is even coded in the Laws of War as the Fourth Geneva Convention.
The US military found itself with sufficient resources to win the war but not win the peace. Besides Ambassador Bremer’s mea culpa, we can look at back at before the war and the conflict between General Shinseki and then-Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz. The military, trained in long views and case study analysis, comes up with a variety of inter-connected plans.
Looking at their human resources, the "cannon-cockers" were found to be available for secondary duty. Of course, after the major operations are done, the need for heavy (and field?) artillery diminishes, as we saw in Gunner Palace.
A note on vocabularly. "Civil-military relations" in the context below is not the same civil-military relations as I explore on this blog. Here, they are talking about civil affairs in the realm of civil operations, peace, rebuilding, etc.
This is an effective re-tasking of resources, especially in when MOOTW are more prevalent and operations will rely less on the big guns. As I have mentioned before, place the military in the lead for civil outreach (i.e. public diplomacy as the military is the representative of the State; and cultural diplomacy as the military is the American face and experience the locals get) may be problematic in the long run. The integration of civilian police and support structures into the post-conflict response is critical to remove the US = Military experience of the civilian population at the earliest possible time.
There are basic prerequisites to the transition, of course, including the establishment of basic and essential civilian security. Basic city services (water, electricty, sewage, and waste collection) each follow (probably in reverse order). The military is already working on the coordination team, JPASE.
I could continue on this, but that’s for another post…
From the Marine Corps Times 6 Dec 2005:
Artillery units will now take the lead on civil-military operations in
their respective Marine division.
Hagee directed the deputy commandant for combat development and
integration to establish a task force that will meet by month’s end to
coordinate integration of civil affairs military occupational
specialties with headquarters elements of artillery units to serve as
trainers and subject-matter experts.Currently, the Corps’ ability to conduct CMO is limited to the
expertise of its two Reserve civil affairs groups, staffed with only
about 150 Marines each.“If we’re going to do the things we think we’re going to be doing in
the future, the kinds of fights that we’re getting into, the kind of
stability operations … we need more civil affairs capability,” said
deputy commandant for plans, policy and operations, Lt. Gen. Jan Huly,
during an Oct. 19 interview.Corps policy makers have said artillery units are ideal for the CMO
mission because those operations occur only after the need for
artillery fire support has passed and because artillery units contain
the necessary communications and transportation equipment.
Public Diplomacy Quote
A quote courtesy of someone else: "Communications without intelligence is noise; Intelligence without communications is irrelevant." Gen Alfred. M. Gray, USMC
Public Diplomacy without awareness of the audience and the hearing the listening will generate is noise. Having the knowledge of how to win friends and influence people (i.e. win hearts and minds) but not acting on it is irrelevant.
Chavez’s public diplomacy: Playing to American Poor
First it was Citgo / Chavez offer to subsidize 25 million gallons of heating oil for 100,000 US households, now it is is Castro offering free eye care for US poor. The opportunity for both Chavez and Castro to exploit American (as in US) poor is an opportunity the Administration has not intercepted. Consider the news coverage of the Chavez / Citgo offer and consider the coverage the Castro offer will get. Pay attention to the response, both verbal and policy, by the Administration. What type of rejection will the Bush Administration give? The Chavez offer, followed by the "exposure" by Katrina, and then the Castro offer… how will the Administration counter the image that is being generated? The Chavez story was widely picked up in the US and elsewhere around the world. The Katrina story, without the benefit of a sophisticated Administration response, grew and festered (from the Bush POV) and demonstrated the Administration was out of touch (demonstrated by "Heck of a job" to Cherthoff’s unawares). The Castro story may or may not sprout legs (it just appeared today), but the image in Latin America of the US will not be improved by this mockery. Will Karen Hughes jump to the rescue? Doubtful, she’s still amazed at least one country is larger than hers.
More on expanding the US military’s public diplomacy capabilities
News brief: The US military has clearly signed off on communicating their story in the modern media environment. As part of the Transformation of the US military, the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has announced JPASE to set "the pace for joint military public affairs".
A still-developing group of joint public affairs professionals have helped to bring a constant flow of timely, accurate information from combatant commanders to news organizations that set up camp wherever American forces operate…
The speed of the Internet, cable news and other media all contribute to rapid shaping of public opinion of military operations. Armed forces public affairs personnel and their communication skills are indispensable to meeting this challenging information environment, according to military leaders.
Preventing misinformation and setting up media access while initial public impressions are forming has been a formidable challenge for the Department of Defense, until now…
In the past, public affairs planning largely involved pulling together individual practitioners from around DoD-an approach that consistently lengthened the spin-up time for a new operation.
The new JPASE concept provides a scalable cadre of experienced senior public affairs officers and non-commissioned officers, who are familiar with the various agencies in a joint operating area and provide media a full perspective of the operation in progress…
Also see Public Diplomacy section.
Technorati Tags: Public Diplomacy, Civil-Military, JPASE