Chinese Peace Corps + Energy Exploitation

~ Matt Armstrong

In the spirit of challenges of securing energy sources and "hearts and minds" comes an article in the People’s Daily Online:

The 12 young volunteers from places such as Beijing, Sichuan and Yunnanwere going to Ethiopia in Africa to begin a six-month service work in
methane exploitation, Chinese-language teaching, physical education,
health care and information technology.

This Chinese Peace Corps is now in competition to win the hearts and minds with a Peace Corps perceived to be co-opted by the Defense Department. The long term goal for China is clearly cultural and technological imperialism as they seek to recreate a multi-polar world.

From the recent UNOCAL take-over attempt by CNOOC to competition for African energy resources, the Ethiopian service project is one of the many subtle salvos a patient China will fire.

Electronic Extortion

~ Matt Armstrong

I recently became hooked on the TV series 24. Unfortunately, through Netflix we were able to watch the three seasons prior to the one that just ended. The point is CTU’s (Counter Terrorism Unit) utilization of technology is impressive and indicative of where things can go. It also demonstrated the reliance on technology and also where things can go. Heavy reliance on technology for voting, combat, or security can easily lead to over-reliance. Once "over" happens, a weak link can be targeted.

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Stealth Ships

~ Matt Armstrong

The deployment of stealth technology on the sea, while still far from mature, is the next logical step in the evolution of warfare. Anti-terrorist and anti-criminal law enforcement and littoral combat operations against new and varied enemies are bringing new demands on ship technology.

The Swedes, conscious of their reliance on naval operations, are developing the Visby. Besides its own sensor avoiding abilities, it is designed to utilize unmanned vehicles for remote sensing.

Energy Efficient Warriors

~ Matt Armstrong

The debate is increasing over fuel demands on today’s high tech and gas hungry mobile military. The blurring of forward and rear areas has meant supply convoys hauling ammunition, spare parts, food, fuel, and other things are being hit hard. The largest component of these convoys is fuel. Fuel to power generators, trucks, tanks, and aircraft. Stepping around the question of increasing fuel efficiency of vehicles (<1mpg for M1A2 tanks?), what if soldiers had their own energy supplies? Hummers were hybrid?

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Alternative Taxonomy for PMCs?

~ Matt Armstrong

R. Stanton Scott revisits Thomas Adams article in Parameters (Summer 1999) with his categorization of PMCs, but there is more to the taxonomy than services offered. In his foundational article, Adams describes three types of mercenaries.

Heavily weighted, the term of "mercenary" has come to be associated with Executive Outcomes and Sandline. Mercenaries are typically cast as individualistic, Rambo soldiers of fortune. With large corporations such as NorthrupGrumman (Vinnell) and CSC (DynCorp) behind some of the more prolific private military companies, another, more fluid taxonomy was required than Adams’ three baskets.

P.W. Singer, in Corporate Warriors, uses a spear analogy to describe how far or near the firms are from "implementation" in combat. Singer maintains the three general types of Adams with his own terms: Military Provider Firms, Military Consultant Firms, and Military Support Firms. His "tip of the spear" typology allows for granular shifting along an axis towards or away service offerings.

The singular x-axis plotting is inadequate, however. It ignore a substantial descriptor of the firms that I believe is crucial when understanding their participation in the state vs non-state structure: location of headquarters.

The institutionalized system of state and non-state relationships is interconnected with limitations on the civilian leadership of the private military company. The location of the HQ grants or prohibits legal action by legalist states, thereby promoting various actions by the principals of the PMC.

For example, an operation such as Tim Spicer’s Sandline (now defunct), based off-shore from the United Kingdom, provided relief from potential legal actions. When investigating Sandline in the Sri Leone affair, found that even if they could take action against his corporation, they were limited because of its location. (See Private Military Companies: Options for Regulations). This holds true when attempting to put pressure on the HQ host government (see Annex B of previous).

On the y-axis would be three marks, just like the x-axis. These three would indicate the nature of the state and indicate the personality of the firm. The first mark would be a Western industrialized state such as the United States, Britain, Germany, etc. These states have deeply ingrained civil-military relationships (or civil-society-military, but that’s a different discussion) and institutionalized legal and financial systems (sticks and carrots).

The second bucket would be weak states without the distinct civil-military relations and more permiable institutions. These would include Belarus, Israel, or others. Israel is an interesting inclusion mostly because of its military with too much control of the political process and willingness to provide services to those who will pay (also known as the "biting the hand that feds syndrome").

The last mark would be HQ’s in the outlaw states such as Afghanistan or North Korea. This is not to say NK has a PMC, but such a "corporate" entity would be by definition not independent and would be the tool of the state. These would either be better classified as pirates or state

This two dimensional plotting lends itself to the accountability question, to be discussed soon.

PMC publicity getting more negative

~ Matt Armstrong

The friction between soldiers of the state and contract soldiers issimilar to that of information technology departments over
a decade ago. The difference between stuff of Dilbert cartoons and Marines vs Zapata Engineering is neither Dogbert nor Ratbert carry an M4.

Just as the airline industry was poaching US Air Force pilots in the seventies and eighties, the private military companies have been not so quietly doing the same today. From a USA Today article (courtesy Military.com):

Experienced
military explosives specialists can earn $250,000 a year or more
working for the private companies. In the military, an enlisted man
with 10 years’ experience can make more than $46,000.

The article goes further to mention the heat between contractors and soldiers working together. This problem is going to get worse before it gets better.

Rove leak is just part of larger scandal

~ Matt Armstrong

From: Rove leak is just part of larger scandal from CSMonitor.com:

Let me remind you that the underlying issue in the Karl Rove controversy is not a leak, but a war and how America was misled into that war.

We Americans so quickly lose perspective and history of even a recent and ongoing debate. Bush and his closest advisors should receive the Reagan Teflon Award for their ability to avoid realities and resist hooks and ropes that would bring down others.

Humvee Alternatives

~ Matt Armstrong

A NYTimes report, republished on CorpWatch, reports how the Marine Corps loves the Cougar,a vehicle designed to take the impact of a mine with inexpensive damage
and no casualties. "Drop your purse, it’s not a Hummer" is the manufacturer’s statement for those wanting to compare the Humvee with  this beast. Should we get these vehicle into the field, and if so, how quickly can we? Should Force Protection’s other vehicle, the Buffalo, also be considered and acquired for a battlefield without forward or rear areas?

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Strategic Scapegoating?

~ Matt Armstrong

William Lind’s website d-n-i.net is anextraordinary source of knowledge and analysis I strongly recommend be a part
of any reading list focusing on the future of conflict. William S. Lind writes
a column on this site which is valuable in its content and as a topic for
conversation considering the wide audience it reaches.

21 June 2005 column I found
his closing statement troubling…

Our
failure is strategic, not tactical, and it can only be remedied by a change in
strategic objective. Instead of trying to remake Afghanistan, we need to
redefine our strategic objective to accept that country as it is, always has
been and always will be: a poor, primitive and faction-ridden place, dependent
on poppy cultivation and proud of its strict Islamic traditions.

In
other words, we have to accept that the Afghanistan we have is as good as it is
going to get. Once we do that, we open the door to a steady reduction in our presence
there and the reduction of Afghan affairs to matters of local importance only.
That, and only that, is a realistic strategic objective in Afghanistan.

The statement that Afghanistan “always has been and always
will be…poor, primitive, [etc]” is a failure to appreciate its history and the
failure of the “strategic objective” itself. It is a hard argument to make that
Iraq did not distract from the American and international communities
commitment to rebuild Afghanistan.

While the UN and NATO did move in to augment and replace
American troops, the political will and economic engines to drive development
and provide viable and realistic alternatives to poppy farming failed to
materialize. Strategic economic solutions are being built, but as in Iraq, fundamental
security has failed to materialize. This is not because of an overwhelming
insurgency against the liberators but because of disillusionment and
intimidation of the liberated.

It seems Mr. Lind appreciates Thomas P. M. Barnett’s Pentagon’s
New Map. While Mr. Barnett provides a convenient explanation for the current
world situation, complex historical and local causes are misrepresented, not
given their true value, or are simply ignored. Mr. Lind falls into the same
trap by failing to connect the past to the present.

The strategic objective should have been to create a
successful federal state out of Afghanistan. The objective should have included
security and market reforms to raise the stakes of individuals, and not of
warlords, to achieve a successful transition. This includes micro-credits,
appropriately modernized agricultural practices, an effective transportation
system (only parts of which are barely coming online now), and restoration of
the education system.

If a towel is going to be thrown in, let’s make sure we know
the real reason why and not create scapegoats. Blaming the failure of strategic objectives is avoiding responsibility for either an errorneous objective or erroneous implementation. I firmly believe it was the failure of appropriate follow through that has led to the present loss of objectives. While not fatal, significant setbacks need to be corrected before moving on to where we could have been if the eye was not taken off the ball.

Peacekeeping Accountability and Private Military Companies

~ Matt Armstrong

Conventional wisdom has been going away from general war for a while now. Low-intensity warfare impacting all four networks of power (economic, political, religious / ideology, and military / violence) will be the dominant form of conflict. In this age of instant communication, increasing diasporas, and short travel times, conflict even in remote regions have some trickle-down effect on the US. Kofi Annan, writing in Foreign Affairs, in discussing his proposed changes to the UN Security Council acknowledges the clear and present dangers of ignoring challenges in the periphery. Thomas P. M. Barnett is apparently making a living, at least in part, on the actual and perceived division between the ‘core’, ‘periphery’, and ‘non-integrating’ gap in his new map.

Continue reading “Peacekeeping Accountability and Private Military Companies
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USMC vs PMC

~ Matt Armstrong

What happens when you put two military forces within close proximity with each other, do not integrate C2, or otherwise share IFF resources? Is it called friendly fire when a US military force fires upon a US corporate force?

The Marine Corps Times, Boston.com, and NPR have raised the profile of an incident last month where US Marines halted a private military force comprised of US and Iraqi citizens…

Marines with Regimental Combat Team 8 detained 19 civilian contract
workers in Fallujah, Iraq, in late May after the contractors were seen
firing from their vehicles on Marine positions and Iraqi vehicles,
according to a Corps press release.

The Marine Corps times is the only news outlet I reviewd that included
the reference the governing rule of law for private security forces, Memorandum 17 issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority in its last days (also stored here since the CPA website may be offline after 30 June 2005).

Private security companies in Iraq are regulated under Memorandum 17, a rule enacted
under the Coalition Provisional Authority that requires them to
register with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Trade and
be free of a criminal record or terrorist ties. The memorandum also
spells out a “code of conduct” that stipulates that when contractors
use their weapons, they must “fire only aimed shots, fire with due
regard to innocent bystanders [and] immediately report [the] incident
and request assistance.”

The company involved, Zapata Engineering, put out a statement on 9 June 2005 disagreeing with the Marine’s account of being fired upon or witnessing Zapata’s men firing from their vehicles.

On Saturday, May 28, 2005, Zapata Engeineering employees were engaged in a routine convoy in Northern Iraq. Marine Corps personnel in a nearby outpost intercepted the convoy team. Citing
security concerns, the Marines escorted the convoy without incident to
Camp Fallujah for questioning. Convoy personnel cooperated fully with
the Marines’ requests. Prior to this date, we had safely completed
hundreds of similar convoy missions in Iraq.

The fact Zapata Engineering was engaged on a US Army Corps of Engineers contract is important in how this could play out. Memo 17 requires registration and provides certain limitations ("primary role of PMC is deterrence") and constraints ("liable under applicable criminal and civil codes") but enforcement requires the backing of the US government.

The UK House of Commons issued a report in 2002 identifying the US as having the most
extensive regulatory regime, partially as a result of attempts to control weapons
technology and partially as a result of the American legalist tradition. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) of 1986 has a significantly high threshold and limited functional oversight. A functioning bilateral Status of Forces agreement (CPA’s Order 91, also available here, is a related problem here)  would be indicative of a functioning government capable of upholding its contractual obligations.

The US Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) of 2000, along with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), apply to persons who are employed by or accompanying the armed forces outside the
United States or who are members of the armed forces and subject to UCMJ and
who are not a national or resident of the nation in which the crime occurred.
The punishment for committing the new crime is that which would have been
imposed under federal law had the crime been committed in the United States. However, Zapata’s forces were not accompanying US armed forces and MEJA has no teeth and has never been used.

There is always the humanitarian law bucket. The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) of 1789 and the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 1991 rely heavily on expensive prosecutions within the US. Zapata, if they were to press charges, would likely not have the financial resources or the strong case.

The most likely resolution of this situation is the US government threatening (with the potential to follow through) to terminate the contract with Zapata.

This incident is clearly a harbinger of things to come. What happens when things go more wrong? See a detailed timeline of the Belarus mercenaries conducting (possibly) extracurricular services for the Ivory Coast / Cote d’Ivorie November 2004. The retaliation by the French was severe and then promptly silenced by the same. This was likely due to their desire to limit foreign interest in their (re)colonial intervention.

When outsourcing fails you

~ Matt Armstrong

Microsoft’s South Korean MSN site, apparently very popular, more so than the US version, is operated by a third party. This vendor apparently did not patch their servers hosting MSN Korea, allowing for the malicious code to be inserted. On the technical side, disconcerting is the (currently) unknown (or not made public) duration the malicious code was operating.

Source: CNN.com – Microsoft:MSN site hacked in South Korea – Jun 2, 2005.

Microsoft acknowledges that hackers booby-trapped its MSN Web site in South Korea to steal passwords from visitors.

Continue reading “When outsourcing fails you
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Remote Sensing

~ Matt Armstrong

Remote-control and remote-sensing warfare is advancing each day. Add to my previous post on remote cameras this nugget of information:

These ‘rocks’ … will be sent from an aircraft and will detect enemies by ‘listening’ to them from 20 to 30 meters. These sensors should be operational within 18 months and they should be cheap enough to leave them on the battlefield after they completed their tasks.

Source: Roland Piquepaille and DefenseTech

Closing and reducing the sensor-to-shoot window is but one element here, other dimensions are intelligence and security. Similar to the acoustic nets for submarines, these can be a force multipliers for recon and perimeter sentries, among other applications. We need to be cautious not to rely too heavily on technology to provide us the answer whether to shoot or not. The new asymmetric enemy will foil the best technology. We need to keep humans in the loop to give the human interpretation.

 

Criminal Funding of Terrorism Continues

~ Matt Armstrong

Terrorist groups have frequently relied on criminal acts to fund their operations. The short-lived era of state-sponsored terrorism has apparently ended with the latest wave of globalization. Terrorist organisations are forcibly less dependent on state or Wahhabite funds, depending on the cause and benefactor. Pecuniary resources are, of course, necessary to further any operation and as Bruce Hoffman notes, "terrorist campaign[s] [are] like a shark in water: it must keep moving forward…or die."

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Ignoring history doesn’t change it

~ Matt Armstrong

From: ABC News: U.S. Brochure Drops Arms-Control Deals.

The brochure…lists milestones in arms control since the 1980s, while touting reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. But the timeline omits a pivotal agreement, the 1996 treaty to ban nuclear tests, a pact negotiated by the Clinton administration and ratified by 121 nations but now rejected under President Bush.

I don’t have time to comment yet, will add to this later, but this seems a bit revisionist. It is one thing to disagree and debate with valid (your perception may vary) arguments, but to ignore something with the hopes people will forget and move along? So many anecdotes, so little time.

Make Law(fare) Not War(fare)

~ Matt Armstrong

From: INTEL DUMP – Bring ’em on.

New Army War College journal piece says we should be worried about our enemies fighting us in our courts — I say "lawfare" is vastly preferable to "warfare".

An excellent article from a must-read site.

Remote (far and near) monitoring advances

~ Matt Armstrong

Looking for some remote monitoring? Two really cool options: the Mini Unattended Ground Imager (MUGI) and Eye Ball R1.

First, the MUGI from Defense Tech: Buried Cameras for Hidden Foes. This neat device includes such hot features as a laser marker to "close the sensor-to-shooter cycle", the ability to leave physically unattended for long cycles, and of course, remote control. The notion of this forward air traffic controller is slick, but the in-place knowledge is still lacking, for those considering peppering the operational theatres with these. However, what if next to the fake rock hiding the camera in say an urban environment, there was a Batman-style cave garage for an RC car to go zooming in for a better look?

Now for the Eye Ball… Think of a bowling ball. Think of hurling it down stairs, through a hole, into a cave and you’ve got the new Eye Ball R1. Put the ball anywhere, even on a remote controlled car which the article mentions may have already been done.

Eye Ball R1’s omni-directional camera can rotate at 4 rpm until a
target is identified, and then give the operator a 55-degree horizontal
and 41-degree vertical field of view, as well as near-infrared (IR)
spectrum night vision capability for low-light deployment/night
operations.

BALL? STRIKE!: Throwable Spy Camera System.

The value, besides being able to know what is around the corner or in the room, is the future intersection of RC mobility, remote observation, lethal/non-lethal force, and communication toward those little spider things from Minority Report.

Guides to Britain, Iraq (for WWII GIs but also for today)

~ Matt Armstrong

Before returning from a term at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, a friend gave me a book a great little book: Instructions for American Servicemen in Britain 1942. This was issued to American GIs headed for the to-be-UK and is full of great little bits. Here are but a few of them:

  • "The British have theatres and movies (which they call "cinemas") as we do. But the great place of recreation is the "pub".
  • The English language didn’t spread across the oceans and over the mountains and jungles and swamps of the world because these people were panty-waists.
  • [The] British [are] reserved, not unfriendly.
  • It is always impolite to criticize your hosts; it is militarily stupid to criticize your allies.

This is a fun read that is appropriate to anybody traveling there even today. While I was trying to find the equivalent book on the French, which I remember was not as kind as the one above, I found this: A Short Guide to Iraq. Issued by the US War and Navy Departments servicemen (did any women go there?) going to Iraq to defend the oil fields. It is amazing how timeless this book is. You can read the whole thing here.

I never did find the French book, which I did see online two or three years ago. Maybe some French hackers took it offline.