On Deck

With the exception of a long phone call that reiterated the need for a civilian-based go-to hub for USG global engagement activities, I took the weekend off. Don’t get me wrong, I enjoy being a matchmaker connecting parties across USG, but this is what USG should have. More on that later. Here are two posts that are “on deck”:

  • re Chris Tomlinson’s AP article, Pentagon PR, my question is “so what?” Really, what’s the real point of the article that’s edited more like a vendetta than an investigative piece? It’s not entirely clear except that after Bush-Rumsfeld and Rice, what would you expect? On the sheer numbers, only 27,000 public communicators within the military? Check again, there are more like 3 million public communicators within the military. American public diplomacy does wear combat boots and the previous Administrators purposefully put the Pentagon, from Rumsfeld to uniformed officers, front and center in communicating to Americans.
  • re letting the Under Secretary position go empty. This is not the right time to let global engagement linger nor it is the right time to think a new entity will be authorized by Congress without a proven track record. Some seem to want the public diplomacy house to burn down, linger for a while, in the hopes something better will rise from the ashes. This “Public Diplomacy as a Phoenix” approach doesn’t sit well with me. It’s better to get the house in order and spin out (ECA, education and cultural exchanges etc) and spin up (information, direct engagement) with the right velocity.  On Pat Kushlis’s post, I disagree that the Under Secretary position is too low down the food chain to accomplish anything. The U/S is a four-star equivalent and not, if supported properly, too low. I agree with the issue of configuration, staffing, and funding and see rectification coming from a supportive Sec with an empowered U/S. It must be State that leads the interagency coordination and it must transform into a Department of State AND Non-State to vertically integrate with the rest of government. If this is not to happen, then we must remove the non-state engagement capabilities from DOD, USAID, DOT, DOC, etc., which is of course a laughable proposition.

Recommended reading: Rob’s Bridging the PD Discourse Gap: The Survey Group. Be sure to read the comments, including mine. (Arabic Media Shack should be on your blog reader.)

Also, Dr. Jack’s posts at Leavenworth titled The Spectrum of Conflict: A Doctrinal Disconnect highlights the Army’s FM 3-0 one dimensional “spectrum of conflict.” In response, re-submit my two-dimensional Spectrum of Conflict that I’ve since updated and turned upside down (literally, the visual should be a descent into war not a descent into peace) and enhanced.

And for something completely different… Animator vs. Animation

Defense changing to better Coordinate with State, but…

DoD to Better Coordinate Strategic Communication with State by Steve Corman

…Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has emerged as an unlikely champion for the State Department, which has traditionally competed with DoD for money and influence.  Over the last year or so he has called again and again for more funding for diplomatic efforts.

Defense is changing, but what about State?

Yes, we all want Defense to cede leadership and ownership of strategic communication and public diplomacy to State, including Defense. We know that American public diplomacy wears combat boots, from the militarization of foreign policy to dominating strategic communication to contractors. However, while Defense may try to push responsibility onto State, the reality remains that State must be capable of taking on responsibility. This includes having an informed and capable leadership. At its bare bones it it means having any leadership at all.

But we cannot forget the role of Congress in this required shift. State must gain the confidence of Congress before money and responsibility is transferred from Defense to State. This transfer will be at best zero-sum. It also means State must gain the confidence of other agencies as it necessarily becomes the hub organization for the United States Government and even the public in general. But one step at a time. 

To borrow (steal) Mike Doran’s analogy, there are a lot of plugs out there looking for a State socket. Steve describes the Defense plugs in the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review and Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, but there are a lot of others. 

Where then are State’s sockets? Who will manage them and who will tirelessly promote, defend, and develop them? 

See also:

As I approaches 0, ROI approaches infinity

Very briefly, here’s a mind-blower for you: As I (Investment) approaches 0 (zero), ROI (Return on Investment) approaches infinity. Ok, maybe it’s not such a revelation but the cost of broadcasting/narrowcasting activities are decreasing significantly, nearly to the virtually free cost to consume.

From Jim McGee at Fast Forward (a required reading blog):

At last week’s Blogwell 2 conference in Chicago, Lee Aase from the Mayo Clinic shared their efforts to use social media to continue to share the Clinic’s message with the existing extended community tightly and loosely surrounding them. The Mayo Clinic has built a worldwide reputation over the course of many decades. Fundamentally, that reputation is a function of word of mouth. That makes social media in all forms a natural fit for Mayo.

They are working across multiple fronts included a fan page on Facebook, multiple blogs, a YouTube channel, and Twitter. At the conference, Lee announced their most recent effort, Sharing Mayo Clinic, which is intended as a place to share people stories about the Clinic and to serve as a hub around which other social media efforts and coalesce.

i was struck by a number of things in Lee’s presentation and Mayo’s overall efforts. First and foremost was the value of simply diving in and learning from their experiences. Coupled with that was the additional leverage found in thinking systemically. The heart of their strategy here is to find and share the human stories connected to the Clinic every day. The technologies serve as multiple ways to get the story out and Lee and his team (which is much smaller than I would have predicted) are smart enough to not get in the way of those stories.

For example, although they are making extensive use of video in their storytelling, they are using the Flip Video Camcorder instead of a more complex (and intimidating) video set up. What they are learning is that the Flip provides good enough production values and doesn’t get in the way of the storytelling. I suspect that there’s more craft involved than Lee let on, but not so much that it is out of reach for any organization that’s willing to make a few mistakes in the early stages.

Lee closed with an intriguing observation about the value of Mayo’s investments in social media. Here’s how he put it:

As I approaches 0, ROI approaches infinity

I suspect that the average CFO would be a bit suspicious, but there’s an important point here. The financial investments in social media can start at zero and don’t need to get terribly far away. The real investments are in organizational time and attention and what Lee and others are demonstrating is that those costs are also readily manageable. Answering questions about ROI does not necessarily entail using a spreadsheet.

In other circles this is called asymmetric warfare and too often described as an unfair advantage agile and unencumbered insurgents and terrorists have over Big Government. No, it’s about realizing the requirements and advantages of the “now media” environment that affects the struggle for minds and wills. It can mean building passive support (community support for a local institution manifested as pride or social support of an action) or active support (voting for municipal bonds to picking up a weapon).

The dissemination and consumption of information is cheap but the impact is priceless.

Book: Threats in the Age of Obama

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Previously posted January 22; this post is updated with a new Amazon link.

Congratulations to real-life friend Mike Tanji on editing his first book. It is listed on Amazon here

From Mike’s introduction:

No author here has been a cabinet officer and none is likely to be one, which gives us a considerable amount of freedom. No one here has to face scrutiny on Capitol Hill, which makes our jobs much easier; but by the same token none of us are beholden to parties or institutions with ulterior motives, nor are we playing our cards in a fashion designed to net us comfortable situations. If you are on a mission to change the way government works, particularly in the national security arena, this is one of the few places where some independent thinking is to be found. It is with that in mind that we offer our view of some of the more pressing threats the Obama administration will have to deal with in these early days of the 21st century.

Author list and an excerpt from my chapter are below the fold.

Continue reading “Book: Threats in the Age of Obama

Public Diplomacy is not Public Relations

To say that the inauguration of President Barack Obama is an opportunity to change the trajectory of America’s global influence and leadership is an understatement. We are, in fact, at a pivotal course change potentially more impactful than any in our history. While it is widely acknowledged that our future course will be shaped by our new President’s words and his actions, the means to ensure and protect the impact of both remain unclear.

In his inaugural address, the President acknowledged the power of public opinion in the conduct and success of our global affairs as he recalled that the defense against communism relied on more than the hard power of the military. “Power alone,” the President said, “cannot protect us nor does it entitle us to do as we please.” The “sturdy alliances” that created and enhanced our security and prosperity were forged by successes in the struggle for minds and wills against a subversive enemy whose primary weapons were not bullets and bombs but ideas and false promises of the future. The United States responded to this “war of ideology” with what was then simply public affairs. There were the “fast” communications of radio broadcasts and movie and newspaper and magazine distribution and “slow” engagement that included cultural presentations and educational exchanges, all of which supported a smart foreign policy that foreign publics could understand, accept, and support.

But over time, the struggle for minds and wills was discounted and even ignored as we supported anybody who was the enemy of our enemy. There was a shift away from a foreign policy that could stand on its own. Foreign aid became a political weapon not a tool to engage people through capacity building and the development of prosperous societies but supporting governments as the struggle shifted from the people to state-against-state. The view from Washington was that our information activities no longer needed to assist foreign policy by promoting it and protecting it from the misinformation and distortions of our adversaries, but to change the subject or to sugar-coat unpopular activities.

The vainglorious policies of the early Bush Administration reflected the utter failure to understand battleground dominated by our adversaries, primarily but not exclusively Al-Qaeda. Our inability to re-adapt to the struggle for minds and wills left open the field to more adversaries blinded us to the importance of understanding solutions as fundamental as trash collection in counterinsurgency.

The derogative view of public opinion in international politics was reflected in the 2004 presidential election the mere suggestion that public opinion should be considered in the formulation of our foreign policy was decried as surrendering sovereignty. America’s “public diplomacy” was, until at least 2008, focused on changing the subject and hoping people would ignore today and focus on the future, both of which were unsurprising failures.

Today, we have an opportunity to reestablish public diplomacy as the tool of national security it must be. The promised sea-change in our foreign policy and the return of the United States to a position of global leadership will not come from deeds alone. What we say and what we do must be synchronized lest the gap between the two becomes exploited by our increasingly adroit adversaries even if what we do is right.

While our national security is dependent on shared goals and convictions with people around the world, we cannot rely on merely who we are and what we say we stand for. This is more than the intelligent use of power. It is about understanding the world around us. We must exercise on a global scale that fundamental principle of democratic leadership: understanding and marshaling public opinion. It is naïve to think that passive access to information about our actions will be the necessary catalyst for action. Likewise, we cannot rely on hard power to create a peaceful environment. Just as we cannot, nor could we ever, “kill our way to victory,” we cannot talk our way to peace.

Public diplomacy is not about changing public opinion unilaterally, but the proactive engagement of global audiences in support of a foreign policy that will stand alone and influence public opinion positively. Public diplomacy must be redefined not as a tool of simply promoting ideas and values but as a critical element of America’s national security based on the direct and indirect engagement of foreign publics, states, and nonstate actors.

It has been over seven years since Richard Holbrooke asked how “can a man in a cave out-communicate the world’s leading communications society” and yet Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates continues to ask essentially the same question. The shortcoming was, as Holbrooke said later in his 2001 editorial, the “apparent initial failure of our message and the inadequacy of our messengers.” The inadequacy of our messengers remains today as our global outreach remains underfunded, poorly structured and underutilized.

We can and should, as the President extolled in his inauguration speech, “do our business in the light of day.” The United States is uniquely positioned in the global struggle for minds and wills to let our foreign policies stand on their own as they will be, or rather should, just and right.

The President and Secretary of State must reform the State Department to be relevant in today’s global “now media” environment. Even “traditional diplomacy” has a strong public awareness and enlistment component. Working with the rest of Government and Congress to empower and equip its Public Diplomacy bureau, the revamped Global Engagement Bureau must coordinate interagency activities and inform everyone from policymakers in Washington to American media and the public to the people of the village of the President’s father in Kenya to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.

Bold leadership that understands, and can work with, the interagency and inter-tribal processes is necessary. Just as important is working with Congress for funding and tasking. The State Department must become a hub of innovation that implements, trains, and coordinates with the rest of the government. This path requires revamping the incentive structure, breaking from zero-tolerance of informational errors, introducing the military concept of “commander’s intent,” and educating, empowering, encouraging, and equipping all of the State Department of the “now” and ubiquitous global information environment.

If not State then who? It must be the State Department lest it become irrelevant tomorrow as it nearly is today. I wrote a book chapter in 2007 that opened with the sentence “American public diplomacy wears combat boots.” It was a statement of unfortunate fact. If we are to reverse this and have the State Department lead, a situation that the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and nearly everybody in the military who works in information operations and Psychological Operations wants, then the State Department must not look at public diplomacy as public relations but as a core mission of the Department. 

The power to engage global audiences is a national security imperative and must not be a mere tool of public relations. To ignore the critical components in the global struggle of minds and wills is to put our national security at risk. The “justness of our cause” must be aggressively and proactively positioned with the peoples around the world or we surrender the narrative of our actions and intentions to others.

See also:

Symposium Transcripts: (former) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Mike Doran

This PDF (72kb) is the second of six transcripts from the January 13, 2009, Smith-Mundt Symposium. This is the lunch time keynote by (former) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Mike Doran. His comments are followed by an active question and answer session. Audio for this part of the Symposium can be download here (1 hour and 3 minutes, 15mb). My comments will follow in a forthcoming report.

Excerpt is below the fold.

Continue reading “Symposium Transcripts: (former) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Mike Doran

Symposium Transcripts: Under Secretary Glassman’s keynote and my welcome

Transcripts for the January 13, 2009, Smith-Mundt Symposium will begin appearing online as I review them. Federal News Service did a superb job transcribing the 8.5 hours of audio so quickly.

The first transcript to be posted is that of my opening comments and the morning keynote by now-former Under Secretary of State Jim Glassman. A PDF of the transcript can be downloaded here (65kb PDF). Audio of the same can be downloaded here (54 minutes mp3, 13mb). The Under Secretary’s comments begin at the bottom of page 5 of the transcript and at the 13:45 mark of the audio.

Excerpt below the fold.

Continue reading “Symposium Transcripts: Under Secretary Glassman’s keynote and my welcome

Symposium Audio: Glassman and Doran Keynotes

Complete audio for the 2009 Smith-Mundt Symposium will be available soon. The transcript will be available in about two weeks. Below, however, are mp3’s for the two keynotes.

I think many will find both interesting and very worthwhile to listen to sooner than later. Without comment (yet):

Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Jim Glassman’s keynote and questions & answers begins 13:45 into the mp3 at the link below. The beginning nearly fourteen minutes is my introduction to the Symposium.

http://mountainrunner.us/symposium/audio/smithmundtsymposium-glassman-011309.mp3 (54 minutes total, 13mb)

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Support to Public Diplomacy, now Special Advisor at the State Department, Mike Doran’s keynote and questions & answers may be downloaded at the below link.

http://mountainrunner.us/symposium/audio/smithmundtsymposium-doran-011309.mp3 (1 hour and 3 minutes, 15mb)

InfoWarCon 2009

Briefly… ever want to talk to the authors of “Unrestricted Warfare”? InfoWarCon 2009 will be the place to do it.

InfowarCon 2009 is sure to be the premier Information Operations event of 2009! InfowarCon 2009 examines the numerous theoretical and practical changes and uses of IO/IW, Cyberwar, Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy techniques and experiences learned in Iraq, Afghanistan, China, and Georgia-Russia to predict the future of IO.

More details are after the fold.

Continue reading “InfoWarCon 2009

China isn’t a nail

Bill Gertz’s article in The Washington Times is a perfect example of the old saying that if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. From “China’s Pearls“:

A recently published U.S. military report identifies China as the most significant potential threat for the U.S. military in the future and discloses new details of what it describes as Beijing’s efforts to build political influence and military power along the strategic oil-shipping route from the Middle East to China — a so-called "string of pearls" strategy.

The report, "Joint Operating Environment 2008," was produced by the Norfolk-based U.S. Joint Forces Command. It lists China as the main emerging nation-state threat that U.S. forces could confront in a future conflict, along with potential threats from Russia, the Middle East and other places in Asia. It was made public Nov. 25. …

This type of article gets me going. China isn’t the "most significant potential threat for the U.S. military" but a "significant potential threat for the U.S." (I won’t get into whether they are the “most” anything). We are too focused on military threats and military responses, a focus both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs want to break.

Look at the big picture people. The struggle is global, not non-US, and its broad. it’s economic and political. Fighting “wars” in those two realms is not only cheaper but creates an enduring victory, unlike military action.

By the time the threat is kinetic, it’s too late. Until we get competent leadership in State (and elsewhere) to return State to a position of relevance, this type of reporting will simply continue. 

The hammer is telling us to buy more tools… let’s hope the right people get into position to start resourcing and reorganizing so the appropriate tools can be used.

See also:

Israel and the War of Perceptions

I’ve seen a good number of articles praising Israel’s handling of the war of perceptions in the media. In the offline critiques of Israel’s strategy and tactics by information experts there is much less congratulatory language. A close look at the praise reveals a self-licking ice cream cone or a limited understanding of the battlespace.

The following is an interesting assessment, and indictment, of Israel’s foray into the war of persuasion not generally discussed in the mainstream media.

Foreign minister Tzipi Livni, whose poor command of the English language may have been a factor in Israel’s agreeing to UN Security Council Resolution 1701 two and a half years ago, now has a blog. The text is in Hebrew only and most of the posts are videos of interviews with her on various television networks.

At YNet, Esti Applebaum-Polani argues that Israel’s biggest problem with public relations is a lack of fluent English speakers.

Hamas’ professional assistance is manifested through Arab experts who reside in Western countries and are used as commentators on foreign media outlets when needed (interestingly, Israel academic experts who live abroad are often opposed to the Israeli government’s policy.) The campaign is also reinforced by Arab politicians who were educated in the West or lived there for a long time and speak fluent English. In addition, there are the foreign correspondents who view the battle as one pitting David (Hamas) against Goliath (Israel,) because on television it always appears as though one side is strong and the other is weak.

Meanwhile, Palestinian spokespeople who reside in the West and speak fluent English resort to “sweet talk” on global television stations. …

You may have noticed over the past week that the IDF spokesperson’s office has gotten into the Internet – setting up a YouTube account (and then a LiveLeak account) and a blog. All of this is being done by the North American desk – an outfit that may not have existed two and a half years ago (they didn’t contact me if they did exist). …

Read the whole thing here.

Quoting History: Eisenhower on public opinion (1958)

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, July 31, 1958:

When there is a truly unified public opinion there is a tremendous power generated by our free people. Further, when that public opinion is based upon knowledge and real understanding of the issues involved, then this tremendous power can produce and sustain constructive action, almost without limit.

But the prerequisite for such strength, I repeat, is knowledge and understanding. An important element is such an understanding that purely military defenses, no matter how powerful, can never insure any nations security. Aggression that is political, psychological and economic can outflank military forces because of our failure to provide the necessary counter measures in those fields. …

Indeed, it is clear that there has not yet been created the determined, unified, aroused public opinion that would demand from the Congress the kind of support and action for these programs which must be carried out effectively, imaginatively and honestly if we are to preserve the peace and lead the world to a better life.

It is no coincidence that the active backers of the Smith-Mundt Act, passed just ten years prior to Eisenhower’s letter above, were peddlers of knowledge: Rep. Karl Mundt (R-SD) was a former school teacher and Assistant Secretary of State William Benton was the owner of the Encyclopædia Britannica (and proponent of The Great Books of the Western World).

It is also noteworthy that Eisenhower, like Secretary of Defense Gates today, knew victory stems from a broad engagement in the struggle for minds and wills. Total emphasis on violent extremism blinds us to the larger battles that are and will take place. Further, it limits our arsenal and even concept of persuasion.

Source: Mike Waller’s Public Diplomacy Reader.

Twitter in War

As Israeli obviously failed to heed the lessons of 2006 and the importance of a) shaping perceptions and b) countering adversarial information, they are exploring grassroots engagement in the struggle for minds in the current Gaza campaign:

NY Consulate Counts on Twitter: Israeli consulate uses social networking service as part of Gaza op PR campaign

Between 1-3 pm (EST) Tuesday, the Consulate General of Israel in New York will hold a live Citizen "Press" Conference on Twitter in order to directly answer the public’s questions regarding the current situation in Israel and Gaza in wake of the IDF’s operation in the Strip. …

Twitter users can take part in the Citizen "Press" Conference by going to: http://www.twitter.com/IsraelConsulate and directing their messages to @israelconsulate and including the tag #AskIsrael.

At <140 characters per exchange, how effective will this be?

See also:

Merging Public Affairs, PSYOP, IO

Briefly and without comment,

Press, "Psy Ops" to merge at NATO Afghan HQ-sources

29 Nov 2008 06:56:49 GMT

Source: Reuters

By Jon Hemming

KABUL, Nov 29 (Reuters) – The U.S. general commanding NATO forces in Afghanistan has ordered a merger of the office that releases news with "Psy Ops", which deals with propaganda, a move that goes against the alliance’s policy, three officials said.

The move has worried Washington’s European NATO allies — Germany has already threatened to pull out of media operations in Afghanistan — and the officials said it could undermine the credibility of information released to the public.

Seven years into the war against the Taliban, insurgent influence is spreading closer to the capital and Afghans are becoming increasingly disenchanted at the presence of some 65,000 foreign troops and the government of President Hamid Karzai.

Taliban militants, through their website, telephone text messages and frequent calls to reporters, are also gaining ground in the information war, analysts say.

U.S. General David McKiernan, the commander of 50,000 troops from more than 40 nations in NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), ordered the combination of the Public Affairs Office (PAO), Information Operations and Psy Ops (Psychological Operations) from Dec. 1, said a NATO official with detailed knowledge of the move.

The friction in the second paragraph is perhaps the most interesting. There is pressure to align the fences between the practices of PA, IO, and PSYOP. General McKiernan is doing what many want, and I know McKiernan’s PAO “gets it” as well.

Read the whole thing here.

Noteworthy

“The U.S. government needs to resurrect the nonviolent practice of "political warfare" and create an agency to manage it. … Mr. Obama’s administration could use as a model the British Political Warfare Executive, which rallied support for the Allied cause behind enemy lines during World War II, or the U.S. Information Agency, which helped network opponents of communism and undermine Moscow’s intellectual appeal during the Cold War.” – “Information Warfare Matters: We need to confront the jihadist ideology directly” by Christian Whiton and Kristofer Harrison, two State Department employees writing in Wall Street Journal Asia. This Op-Ed sounds a lot like the need to return to the fighting a psychological struggle for minds and wills with all means available. The authors are asking to return to core roots of what became known as public diplomacy. Makes the upcoming Smith-Mundt discussion even more timely. See also “Information Warfare and VOA” at the VOA blog.

  “Discussing Special Operations forces’ information role in the "war of ideas" with Islamist terrorists, Vickers said during an appearance at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy that the "themes you emphasize, how well they resonate, the distribution mechanisms, who’s giving the message" are important factors.” – Walter Pincus of The Washington Post writing about Defense Department Sustains Focus On ‘War of Ideas’ in Anti-Terrorism Efforts. This doesn’t concern me. Why? Because both Special Operations and Public Diplomats have the same basic mission: operate by, with, and through indigenous people to prevent conflict. Both communities also share a similar lack of visibility and constituency in Congress to protect funding streams. On the specific subject of the news and information websites, this isn’t really new: www.setimes.com, www.magharebia.com, etc.

“Let’s say we came up with four or five concepts of messages that we would want to send out. Potentially, those messages could even create second- and third-order effects. This guy does A, it causes this guy to do B. Well, tell me how you would rehearse prior to actually sending those messages out? How would you codify the potential impact of that message set before you sent it out?” – “Range Accelerates Information Operations Planning: Joint Management Office creates environment for exploring nonkinetic options” by Maryann Lawlor.

  “Once the coordinated attacks began, the terrorists were on their cell phones constantly. They used BlackBerries "to monitor international reaction to the atrocities, and to check on the police response via the internet…” – cited by Noah Shachtman in How Gadgets Helped Mumbai Attackers.

“Welcome to the age of celebrity terrorism.” cited by Andrew Exum at Abu Muqawama. Media is the oxygen of the terrorist. It is also the oxygen of the counterterrorist. We must be agile to negate and counter the attractiveness of terrorist, create alternatives from building local capacity to creating opportunities. Inability to function at speed in the global information environment will bring new meaning to the phrase the quick and the dead.  

“We can seldom match the speed of Taleban disinformation. but we can, in information terms, switch thebattle to ground of our own choosing….Information Operations must be at the heart of any counter-insurgency campaign, and the size, efficiency and prominenceof the relevant organisation ought to reflect this. … we need political leadership from Kabul of the information effort in Afghanistan.” – Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, Chief of the UK Defence Staff, at UK Defence Forum Defence Viewpoints blogsite.

“It took the Bush Administration seven years before, as enunciated by Undersecretary Jim Glassman, it recognized that public diplomacy is mainly about “them” (empowering mainstream Muslims to compete with and defeat radical Islamists) and not about “us” (harnessing our best researchers, pollsters, and marketeers to improve the American brand).” – Robert Satloff at Middle East Strategy at Harvard on Kristin Lord’s Voices of America: U.S. Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century

More on the Al-Qaeda slur

From Evan Kohlman at the Counterterrorism blog:

Global reactions to Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri’s controversial condemnation of U.S. President-Elect Barack Obama as a "House Slave" (or, alternatively, "House Negro") have begun to pour in — including via the top jihad web forums used by Al-Qaida to disseminate its propaganda. Though hardcore Al-Qaida supporters have predictably dismissed any criticism of Dr. al-Zawahiri and are fiercely backing his choice of words, there is a rather ironic (if not entirely unfamiliar) twist to this issue. After observing international press reporting on the incident, these same supporters are now bitterly attacking the media for its "unfair" pro-Obama bias and for deliberately "confusing" the meaning of al-Zawahiri’s message.

In related news, Zawahiri’s audio statement also appears to have created a palpable, tense confrontation between Al-Qaida and a significant cross-section of African-American Muslims. Several U.S.-based Muslim organizations immediately held press conferences or issued statements to strongly criticize al-Zawahiri and his manipulation of the words of the late Malcolm X. Conversely, these conferences and statements of response have not gone over well within the jihadi community, with some Arabic-speaking commentators issuing angry rants about the apparent treachery of American Muslims, including specifically the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). One Al-Qaida supporter cautioned his quarrelsome online colleagues, "Brothers, this does not apply to all American Muslims. Do not forget our brother [Adam] Yehiye Gadahn, a naturalized Muslim and U.S. citizen."

See also: