Category: Public Diplomacy

Communicating with the public

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

Sometimes understanding the difference between public diplomacy, public affairs and strategic communication can be challenging. This is especially true in the absence of accepted principles and practices. The result is confusion on the roles and responsibilities and misaligned titles.

The below quote is real and from a conversation I had a while ago about an setting up an event to communicate directly with the public, bypassing mainstream media. The person in question could not green light the event, because, as the person said,

I have to run it by public affairs because I don’t do public diplomacy.

To make this a hat trick, the speaker was a Director of Strategic Communication. Some readers will look at this and say, “huh?” while others will get it (and even say “OMG!”). The only way this could get more convoluted is by adding Information Operations or PSYOP to the sentence.

The purpose of this anecdote isn’t to mock the person in question but to highlight that we still have a way to go to get on track.

Defining Public Diplomacy

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 4 Comments

Previously, I offered a high level definition of public diplomacy. Below is a slightly modified:

Public diplomacy is the direct or indirect engagement of foreign publics in support of national security, political, cultural, and economic objectives.

Ok, so what about the following, more specific definition:

Public diplomacy involves understanding, influencing, developing relationships with and providing information to the general public and civic society abroad, in order to create a favorable environment for achieving national security, political, cultural and economic objectives

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Public Diplomacy and Smith-Mundt in the Asian Tribune

~ Matt Armstrong

From the Asian Tribune yesterday:

Sixty years ago, the elements of America’s national power – diplomacy, information, military, and economics – were retooled to meet an emerging threat. The National Security Act of 1947 and the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 were a direct response to a global ideological and military challenge posed by Communism.

Sound familiar? It should. The whole article was copied verbatim from this blog. Flattering, but give credit where credit’s due as requested under the Creative Commons License. I’ve asked they update their article with appropriate credit.

If they don’t know you won, did you?

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 4 Comments

The wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and elsewhere challenge the traditional conception of “victory.” What is victory when capturing the capital does not cause the population to succumb to your wishes, assuming of course there’s a central government to topple? This isn’t an issue in “traditional” conflicts, like World War I and II and even, to many, the Cold War. Or is it?

Nick Cull just returned from a trip to Russia to discuss public diplomacy at a Russian international relations university that “graduates 80% of Russian diplomats.” Not surprisingly, they talked about the end of the Cold War:

It became obvious that these students had not spent much time thinking about external determinants for the political changes of the late 1980s and early 1990s. For them the Soviet Union collapsed for its own internal reasons, unconnected to its foreign policy, defense, and rearmament decisions. When I pushed the case – mentioned that Americans believe they won the Cold War and merely debate which of their policy decisions provided the “winning blow” – they were surprised. They simply do not see the story in terms of America’s victory or Russia’s defeat. The model adopted by these students was more that the Soviet Union attempted to create an ideal system, entered into competition with the United States, the system failed, and the Soviet Union stepped back from the competition – rather like a tennis player bowing out with a stomach cramp. Their model clearly left the path open for Russia to return to the competition and resume play, but this was not their intent. They seemed genuinely worried by talk of a return to a Cold War and asked with some anxiety about the likely foreign policy of America’s next president. This mutual gap in perception is significant. Americans might do well to ask how victorious they really were if the defeated party does not acknowledge the loss.

See also:

Quoting History: Policies and Actions Must Anticipate Psychological Impact

~ Matt Armstrong

Six days after his inauguration, President Dwight D. Eisenhower established the Committee on International Information Activities, commonly referred to as the Jackson Committee because of its chairman William H. Jackson. The committee’s final report, submitted to the President June 1953, stated

We believe…that the Kremlin will avoid initiatives involving serious risk of general war, especially since it may hope to make additional gains by political warfare methods without such risk. …

Propaganda cannot be expected to be the determining factor in deciding major issues. The United States is judged less by what it says through official information outlets than by the actions and attitudes of the Government in international affairs and the actions and attitudes of its citizens and officials, abroad and at home. … The cold war cannot be won by words alone. What we do will continue to be vastly more important than what we say."

Eisenhower understood this completely. On several occasions he testified in Congress in support of the Smith-Mundt Bill. In 1952, as part of his foreign policy plank speech, presidential candidate Eisenhower had said much the same: “As a nation, everything we do and everything we fail to say or do will have its impact in other lands.”

In a National Security Council meeting to discuss the Jackson Committee’s report, Eisenhower stressed that the requirement to “make sure that the psychological factor in important Government actions was not overlooked" and that someone in the NSC would keep track of the “p-factor” of Government actions. The “p-factor” meaning psychological, propaganda, or persuasion.

Sources: Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad and The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989

Quoting History: the marginalization of public diplomacy

~ Matt Armstrong

From The New York Times, March 31, 1986.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz said today that ”we’re not going anywhere” in Soviet-American relations until Moscow and Washington agree to stop conducting their diplomacy in public. He called on both sides to resume regular, secret contacts. …

”We will get somewhere in our relationship with the Soviets when we’re able to have some discussions that are relatively quiet and direct,” he said. …

”I don’t say there isn’t always a public diplomacy aspect to this relationship, but there has to be more than that if we are going to get any place,” he said.

He said the Soviet side ”had started” the public exchange, which he found to be unproductive, but acknowledged that the White House had also fallen into the practice.

See also:

The Report of the 1967 United States Advisory Commission on Information

~ Matt Armstrong

The U.S. Advisory Commission on Information was one of two oversight commissions established by the Public Law 402, otherwise known as the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948. The other commission focused on cultural and educational exchange. Today, there is one commission, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, that does not have a legal obligation to produce annual reports and, according to Title 22, it “shall have no authority with respect to the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board or the United States National Commission for UNESCO.”
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Henry Loomis, former VOA Director, R.I.P.

~ Matt Armstrong

Mr. Henry Loomis, Director of the Voice of America from 1958 – 1965 passed away last week. From the The Washington Post’s obituary:

Mr. Loomis realized that English was becoming an international language and was eager for it to be more accessible to VOA’s international audience. He pushed for the development of Special English, for listeners learning the language. The news was delivered at a slower pace of nine lines a minute, spoken accurately, and with a vocabulary limited to 1,500 words.

Mr. Loomis quit as VOA director in 1965 after a falling-out with President Lyndon B. Johnson during the Vietnam War. Johnson demanded that VOA keep quiet about American planes flying over Laos. Believing that VOA had an obligation to report the news, Mr. Loomis resigned in protest.

Read the whole obit for a greater feel for the amazing life Mr. Loomis lived.

The Spectrum of War and Peace and the Role of Public Diplomacy

Spectrum of War and Peace (2008)
~ Matt Armstrong

I was on the wrap-up panel at the end of an unnamed conference a few months ago where I verbally presented the idea of a spectrum of war and peace as it related to the subject matter. Movement along this spectrum, as I described it, changes the appropriateness, and effectiveness, of different elements of power and methods engagement. But at no time, especially in today’s global information environment, global diasporas, and the relative increased power of individuals and non-state actors relative to states and state-actors, does the power of persuasion through information go away.

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Two Public diplomacy reports you probably haven’t read

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 2 Comments

Two reports I wanted to throw out into the wild for discussion. I’ll discuss in depth later.

Brand Sweden: The road to an updated image of Sweden abroad. I really enjoy speaking with Swedes about their public diplomacy. The Swedes really get the need to have a hub organizing that supports country-wide efforts. The chief of staff (strategy, evaluation, coordination etc.) at the Swedish Institute, a public agency (like the British Council or the Goethe Institute etc.) that is responsible for working with a huge part of Swedish public diplomacy as two titles, one in Swedish for Swedes (“Director of Coordination”) and the other in English for everybody else (“Director of Branding”). 

The Foreign Ministry also understands the importance of perceptions, both local and global. The FM gives media training, with reminders on wallet cards o all member of the Ministry. The cards reminds the reader to Respect the role of the journalist; Be helpful in providing information; Never lie; Take the time to check facts; Assume you are on the record; and Stay calm. The card also provides a Swedish phone number to contact the press service, including a number to call after hours. (I should scan mine and post it up.)

The Public Diplomacy Of Other Countries:Implications For The United States. This 1979 Government Accounting Office report looked at six countries – Britain, France, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, the People’s Republic of China, and the Soviet Union – and offered the following conclusions:

  • By comparison with allies and adversaries, the U.S. Government investment in this field is low.
  • The U.S. can improve impact and efficiency of overseas programs by further cultivating cooperation with its allies.
  • While leading allies and adversaries put heavy emphasis on teaching their languages to foreigners, the U. S. has neglected important opportunities in this field for more than a decade.
  • The present ban on the domestic availability of International Communication Agency products should be re-examined.
  • A periodic, public report and analysis of aims, content, and methods of Soviet propaganda in and concerning the United States would give the U.S. press and public new perspective on Soviet purposes.

Comments?

Making Diplomacy Public

~ Matt Armstrong

Continuing on the subject of defining public diplomacy, it’s important to recall that a key feature of international relations is and always has been the need for and ability of individuals to affect – and defend against – influence. Classic realpolitik authors from E.H. Carr, writing in The Twenty Years’ Crisis, and Hans Morgenthau, in Politics Among Nations, described the importance of public opinion and national morale in international relations.

Briefing 2.0 by Sean McCormack (see similar from the UK) and roundtable discussions by Under Secretary Jim Glassman are important to loop the public into the process. It can also spark an interest by the mainstream media, something the DOD Blogger Roundtable is rather proud of.

It is essential the public, both foreign and domestic, be realized as central to the enduring psychological struggle of minds and wills. They are not only the target the persuasion from information activities to cultural and educational exchanges, but the agents of influence themselves. As I wrote in the Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy,

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Defining Public Diplomacy: Preparing for a new Administration

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 8 Comments

What is public diplomacy? It can’t be everything otherwise it is nothing. Is it a dialogue or a monologue? It is based on the speaker, the means of engagement, or the targeted audience? Is “convening” discourse between, within or between foreign audiences public diplomacy? What about the content or force of the message? Is public diplomacy passive hoping to “win hearts” or can it be actively engaged in a psychological struggle to change minds and encourage the will to act in an audience? Does it have to be focused on physical security or can it apply to all elements of national security from economics to global health?

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Kristin Lord on DOD’s $300m “Public Diplomacy” push

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 2 Comments

The Brookings’ Kristin Lord asks why the DOD is getting resources for public diplomacy in the Christian Science Monitor:

Today’s public diplomats wear boots, not wingtips. Increasingly, the Defense Department is at the forefront of US efforts to engage public opinion overseas. While the State Department formally leads the effort, the Pentagon has more money and personnel to carry out the public diplomacy mission.

This trend is risky. The message foreign publics receive – not the message the US sends – changes when the Pentagon is the messenger. Putting our military, not civilians, at the forefront of US global communications undercuts the likelihood of success, distorts priorities, and undermines the effectiveness of US civilian agencies.

…

The Pentagon should play an important role in public diplomacy, but as a partner – not the principal. For its part, the Congress should give public diplomats the tools they need to do their jobs, and then hold them accountable.

Read the whole article here. The first line should sound familiar…

Tomorrow: Blogger Roundtable with Under Secretary Jim Glassman

~ Matt Armstrong

There’s another blogger conference call – “roundtable” – with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs tomorrow, Tuesday, 28 October 2008. The focus of the call will be on South America. Jim will probably discuss the public diplomacy / citizen diplomacy within Colombia against FARC.
The official invite:

You are cordially invited to call-in to an on-the-record blogger’s roundtable with Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs James K. Glassman on Tuesday, October 28, 2008, at 2 pm EST.  During the roundtable, Under Secretary Glassman will provide an update on public diplomacy efforts, with an emphasis on recent efforts and successes in combating terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere.

Should you wish to join, please RSVP to robertsgf@state.gov, by noon on Monday, October 27, and, if it’s your first roundtable with us,  please provide a link to your blog as well as a brief biography of yourself.  A link to U/S Glassman’s biography is attached.  Because we wish to facilitate a valuable discussion of the issues, we unfortunately need to limit the number of available callers, so please RSVP quickly, as callers will accommodated on a first-come, first served basis.

The number to call and the passcode to enter the conference will be provided to you upon receipt of your RSVP. Also, a transcript will be provided 24 hours after the roundtable.

Interested? The contact information is above.

Noteworthy

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 3 Comments

“An overview of the review team’s mission obtained by The Post says that including other government agencies and other nations in the planning will ‘mitigate the risk of over-militarization of efforts and the development of short-term solutions to long-term problems.’ … Another priority is to take a regional approach to the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including more robust diplomacy with neighbors and a regional economic development effort.” – from a Washington Post article by Ann Scott Tyson on General David Petraeus’s 100-day assessment of strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq.

“We also pride ourselves on our ability to move ahead of the sound of guns. If we can move ahead of the sound of guns, and prevent them, we’re all better off.” – SOCOM Commander Adm. Eric T. Olson quoted in the Los Angeles Times. SOCOM’s operating mantra of “by, with, and through” the indigenous population is how informational activities must also act.

“The United States’ current counterterrorism strategy lacks any efforts to break the terrorists’ ties to the communities that conceal them and the culture of martyrdom that inspires them.” Malcolm Nance in Foreign Policy (subscription req’d)

“As we’ve noted before, today’s jihadists don’t just use the Internet, occasionally.  ‘They don’t exist without the Web,’ says Naval Postgraduate School professor John Arquilla. Everything from recruiting to training to propaganda is handled online.” – Noah Shachtman at Wired. Twenty years+ ago is was “media is the oxygen of the terrorist.” Today, New Media and traditional media are the oxygen of the terrorist, the insurgent, the counterinsurgent, and the counterterrorist.

“A project at the University of Sao Paulo aims to overcome one of these hurdles by using the sun to power a self-contained wi-fi access point.” – BBC World Service. This is an ICT4D application that empower and engage poor communities in susceptible regions. See also Picking ICT Targets and ICT to Deny Sanctuary.

“When conducting HA missions, PSYOP is necessary for initiating and coordinating reliable communications among aid workers and with the local populace. … CA operations cannot succeed without winning “the hearts and minds” of the people, and PSYOP cannot succeed without CA support.” – short paper by Myrtle Vacirca-Quinn, M.D. Sternfeld and Luis Carlos Montalván at Small Wars Journal.

“German diplomats, for example, spend a year in a sort of Foreign Service boot camp and are expected to speak fluent French and English before being posted abroad. American diplomats typically get seven weeks—most of it spent learning rules and regulations, not economics or political science or history or even management skills—before they’re thrown into a consular job somewhere overseas.” Andrew Curry writing about the Foreign Service Officer Test in Foreign Policy. See also the report by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy.

“This is the imperative to rely far more on traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy and foreign aid delivered through civilian means to begin to repair America’s face and effectively conduct its business abroad.” – Pat Kushlis at WhirldView.

Last note: I have the Paret edition, how about you?

Operationalizing Public Diplomacy

~ Matt Armstrong

Operationalizing Public Diplomacy by Matt Armstrong, 14 October 2008, at Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy

In the 21st century, perceptions matter more than facts as “super-empowered” individuals wield technology and manipulate public opinion for their own purposes unburdened by the truth and unchecked by less adroit global powers as they seek support across borders. This chapter looks at the origins and purposes of modern U.S. public diplomacy as a means to engage foreign publics directly, bypassing their governments, in a struggle to support the peace and security of the United States. This diplomacy with publics, which included carrots and sticks similar to traditional diplomacy, was required to fight an unknown enemy that seemed to be everywhere and set on destroying the American way of life.

This chapter begins with a look back at the original purpose and function of public diplomacy borne out of the total war period of the early Cold War years. I then describe how public diplomacy transformed from an active and holistic engagement into a passive practice based on emotions as part of a U.S. re-election campaign. This is followed by two sections that form the heart of this chapter. The first is an overview of the importance of information in modern conflict and the second is recommendations to operationalize public diplomacy so that it sits between and informs both strategy and tactics. This chapter concludes with the assertion that this view of public diplomacy must be reinvigorated and made central in Information Age warfare where perceptions trump bullets.

Handbook of Public Diplomacy

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 8 Comments

imageThe Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy was published today. It’s out and discounted 8% at Amazon so get a jump on your Christmas shopping while they’re a bargain at $161.81 each. However, in an unprecedented move, Routledge is offering a handbook simultaneously in paperback available directly from Routledge here. 

The book is edited by Nancy Snow and Phil Taylor. Nancy is Associate Professor of Public Diplomacy in the S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communications at Syracuse University. She is Senior Research Fellow in the USC Center on Public Diplomacy. Phil is Professor of International Communications at the University of Leeds and acknowledged as one of the foremost authorities in propaganda history and public diplomacy. The book was published in affiliation with the USC Center on Public Diplomacy.

Seriously though, get or borrow a copy of this 400-page doorstop, there is some seriously good writing in it (mine excepted of course ;). Table of Contents after the fold.

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