Category: Public Diplomacy

Report: The “militarization” of diplomacy exists and is accelerating

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 3 Comments

The American Academy of Diplomacy came out with a critical and honest assessment of the militarization of America’s public diplomacy. The report emphasizes the lack of personnel, expertise, and overall resources to do its effectively do the job required. From the executive summary:

…our foreign affairs capacity is hobbled by a human capital crisis. We do not have enough people to meet our current responsibilities. Looking forward, requirements are expanding. Increased diplomatic needs in Iraq, Afghanistan and “the next” crisis area, as well as global challenges in finance, the environment, terrorism and other areas have not been supported by increased staffing. Those positions that do exist have vacancy rates approaching 15% at our Embassies and Consulates abroad and at the State Department in Washington, DC. USAID’s situation is even more dire. Today, significant portions of the nation’s foreign affairs business simply are not accomplished. The work migrates by default to the military that does have the necessary people and funding but neither sufficient experience nor knowledge. The “militarization” of diplomacy exists and is accelerating.

Currently the Secretary of State lacks the tools – people, competencies, authorities, programs and funding – to execute the President’s foreign policies. The status quo cannot continue without serious damage to our vital interests. We must invest on an urgent basis in our capabilities in the State Department, USAID, and related organizations to ensure we can meet our foreign policy and national security objectives. There must be enough diplomatic, public diplomacy, and foreign assistance professionals overseas and they cannot remain behind the walls of fortress embassies. They must be equipped and trained to be out, engaged with the populace and, where needed, working closely with the nation’s military forces to advance America’s interests and goals. This report provides a plan and a process to begin and carry forward the rebuilding of America’s foreign affairs capability.

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Noteworthy

~ Matt Armstrong

“The “militarization” of diplomacy exists and is accelerating.” – A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness from the American Academy of Diplomacy. (see also this post)

“The trends across the board are not going in the right direction. And I would anticipate next year would be a tougher year.” – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Adm. Mike Mullen, The New York Times.

“The announcement last week that the United States will relocate its London embassy from Grosvenor Square, in the heart of the British capital, to an out-of-the-way spot south of the River Thames may be good news for property developers, but should concern almost everyone else. The London move is the latest and most dramatic example of a worrying trend toward vastly scaling down American public diplomacy abroad, abandoning embassies that were once beacons of American culture and openness in favour of walled suburban fortresses.” – Globe and Mail, 6 October 2008 (h/t KAE)

“The New York Times’ Web site is getting more global, and IHT.com is going bye-bye.” – Forbes, 7 October 2008 (h/t KAE)

“There was no single silver bullet, but rather a multifaceted strategy crafted and carried out by those in Baghdad — not, despite recent claims, in Washington.” – Linda Robinson in the Washington Post (see also Tom Barnett)

“Whatever the final form it takes, the establishment of Africom is a good idea whose time has come — finally. The command’s emphasis on civil-military integration and a low-key operational profile is appropriate and well suited to its mission. We should wish it well.” – Bob Killebrew, Africom Stands-Up. (see also this post)

New Army Doctrine Places Stability Operations Equal to Military Combat Power

~ Matt Armstrong

While military operations may neutralize immediate “kinetic” threats, enduring change comes from stabilizing the unstable and building capacity to self-govern where there is none. Security, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, and development are critical for ultimate democratization, but more importantly, for peace and security locally and globally. Without competent and comprehensive engagement in these areas of “soft power,” tactical “hard power” operations are simply a waste of time, money, and life.

This week the U.S. Army released a new field manual, FM 3-07 Stability Operations, to adapt the military to these requirements of the modern age. The manual “represents a milestone in Army doctrine,” writes LTG Bill Caldwell in the foreword.

It is a roadmap from conflict to peace, a practical guidebook for adaptive, creative leadership at a critical time in our history. It institutionalizes the hard-won lessons of the past while charting a path for tomorrow. This manual postures our military forces for the challenges of an uncertain future, an era of persistent conflict where the unflagging bravery of our Soldiers will continue to carry the banner of freedom, hope, and opportunity to the people of the world.

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American Public Diplomacy Wears Combat Boots: the Pentagon’s $300 million to “engage and inspire”

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 4 Comments

American public diplomacy wears combat boots. Not only is the Pentagon in the critical last three feet of engagement virtually and in person with audiences around the globe, especially in contested areas, but it is the Defense Department that is putting up the money to expand public diplomacy. The Pentagon’s 3-year, $300 million contract for private companies to “engage and inspire” Iraqis to support U.S. objectives and the Iraqi government, described by Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus in the Washington Post, is more than an effort five years too late. It is one more shining example of the significant failure of the U.S. Government to come to grips with the present need and commit the resources necessary to engage in the Second Great War of Ideas that began in earnest nearly a decade ago.

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Principles of Strategic Communication

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 8 Comments

This is Part I of two posts on describing “Strategic Communication.” Part II is here. 

In the coming months, reports and Congressional legislation will attempt to change how the United States communicates with the world. Called “public diplomacy” or “Strategic Communication,” the importance of this type engagement has finally come to the forefront of our national security debate, at least for those taking a serious look at the present and future. Irregular conflict, the present and future reality of war, is based not on our ability to “kill our way to victory” but to operate in a local and global information environment.

When there are no capitals to take or “hearts” to be “won,” real security comes through enduring engagement of local and global groups in a modern proxy struggle for minds and wills. Operating “by, with, and through” such groups not only extends our reach, but acts as a force multiplier against adversaries who elicit support in the global information environment for money, recruits, and sympathetic actions. Think Hamburg, Madrid, London, and Glasgow.

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A Theory of Strategic Communication: ‘like an orchestra producing harmony’

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment
DOD OSD PA Theory of Strategic Communication: like an orchestra producing harmony

This is Part II of two posts on describing “Strategic Communication”. Part I is here.

In addition to the principles of strategic communication, the Defense Department developed the graphical representation of Strategic Communication show above.

Several points to raise with those new to this slide. The analogy of SC as an orchestra has at its middle, the conductor representing the collection of senior leaders, a music score as the SC plan, and an orchestra made up of various SC communities of practice and lines of operation

The “orchestra” can be reconfigured for the desired effect. It can become “strolling strings” or anything else as it reshaped, resized, and repurposed. The tempo, sound, etc. may vary, depending on the desired effect.

First, to me, it best represents a point rather than a dynamic model of action. The iterative process in the slide is controlled by the conductor in a discipline of message and action. This does not fit reality nor should it. Our engagement should not be and cannot be a constant, choreographed message and action stream. Operating in this way, even it was possible, create vulnerabilities in a dynamic environment with multiple, flexible actors.

In the ‘orchestra’ model, when a ‘musician’ hits a flat note, misses the cue entirely, or performs something not on the sheet, the error is prominent. A better analogy, if one must be made, is a jazz jam session. It puts the model into motion. The jazz jam would be a dynamic environment where bad notes don’t stand out as well; members loosely interact, they riff independently or off each other, while all are headed in the same direction. This provides for intentional and unintentional liberty, or deviations, not permitted in the orchestra model.

Second, it is essential to acknowledge the U.S. public and U.S. media are stakeholders and intended audiences, an apt phrase, as this slide does. They, like the allies, adversaries, and neutrals (a collection that includes “swing voters”) are targets of what we say, do, and fail to say and do. The adversary is very good at exploiting our “say-do gap”. We must become skilled in not only preventing this gap but at increasing awareness of the adversaries’ (plural) own shortcomings, which we are terrible at doing.

Third, the model implies a level of calibration that is difficult in a war of perceptions. Orchestra conductors aren’t known for taking feedback, but the graphical representation outweighs the need for an asterisk saying the conductor here will accept dynamic input.

More to come on this. In the meantime, please comment. 

Event: AFRICOM and Beyond: The Future of U.S.-African Security and Defense Relations

~ Matt Armstrong

From the American Enterprise Institute:

The October 1 operational launch of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), on the eve of a new American presidential administration, provides an unprecedented opportunity to reshape U.S. strategy toward Africa. Significant attention has been devoted to the structure and functions of AFRICOM–and to its strategic communications challenges. Less thought, however, has been given to identifying the core security interests that should guide U.S. strategy on the continent or to defining the new kinds of partnership with a more self-assured Africa that are most likely to advance those interests.

With its capacity for political as well as military engagement and for conflict prevention as well as traditional war-fighting, AFRICOM has the potential to serve as a model for future interagency security cooperation efforts abroad. But what AFRICOM does is more important than how the command is structured. What is the strategic rationale for increased U.S. security engagement with African countries? What are the emerging threats and challenges in Africa, and how should they be addressed? AEI’s Mauro De Lorenzo and Thomas Donnelly will host two panel discussions with African security experts to answer these and other questions.

When: Wednesday, October 1, 2008  10:30 AM – 1:30 PM

Where: Wohlstetter Conference Center, Twelfth Floor, AEI
1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

Register here.

See also:

Event: Under Secretary James K. Glassman to Speak at National Press Club Oct. 3

~ Matt Armstrong

From the NPC:

James. K. Glassman, under secretary of State for public diplomacy and public affairs, will speak at a luncheon on Friday, Oct. 3, on “The New Age of Public Diplomacy.”

Since taking up his position in June, following confirmation by the U.S. Senate, Glassman has been leading the government’s efforts to win a war of ideas to combat violent extremism, and his speech will outline his views on how best to achieve this goal.

Blogging on Public Diplomacy: the UK in the USA

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 6 Comments

I have been pushing for our  overseas embassies blog, conduct blogger roundtables similar to the Under Secretary’s Blogger Roundtable that was based on a format established by the DOD Blogger Roundtable. And while I was told it is happening in the EUR bureau, I never heard the details.

All the while, the Brits have been doing it here. Andy Pryce, First Secretary Public Affairs Washington (gasp, Public Affairs is Public Diplomacy??), drew my attention to a plethora of FCO blogs around the world. There are parallels here to DipNote, the State Department’s public affairs blog, such as both are published by the respective foreign ministries and both include multiple voices. I think DipNote is doing well and has come along way, but it might look at the FCO effort for tips (including dumping the dark background).

As far as the current (as of this writing) post titled The Importance of Being Credible, I think Nick Cull’s seven steps are missing a tremendously important step (disclosure: I studied under Nick for my Master in Public Diplomacy): understanding. Yes, you must listen, pay attention to the implications of a “say-do” gap, realize you’re operating in a global information environment, etc. But unless you understand what you’re hearing when you listen and the what the target and non-target audiences are hearing when you speak and act, everything else crumbles. This is perhaps the greatest vector that public diplomacy is “not about you” but about them. Especially today, it is not “us versus them” but “them versus them”.

Check out Andy Pryce’s blog and poke around the Foreign Commonwealth Office’s other UK in the USA blogs.

The Brownback Bill: S.3546 to Establish the National Center for Strategic Communication

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 5 Comments

Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) this week introduced S.3546 titled “The Strategic Communications Act of 2008.” The Senator knows the bill will not be passed in this Congress and feels more discussion on the subject matter is required. His bill is, in part, intended to provoke that discourse.

The National Center for Strategic Communication is largely based on the National Counter Terrorism Center model. The bill recognizes that the current system is flawed and needs to be fixed. Driving this bill are concerns over the present-day quality of broadcasting, concerns over the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and a general failure of the public diplomacy apparatus to function effectively since 9/11. To the delight of many I know, this bill nukes the BBG.

The bill, as presented (but prior to receiving its number), is available here (Adobe Acrobat 6 or later is required). I (and others) are interested in your thoughts on the bill.

What follows are some of the concerns I have raised in off-the-record and constructive and relevant meetings (e.g. beyond the Brookings event). The problems are such that I do not support this bill in its present form.

It emphasizes the “us versus them” construct as it focuses on who we are and not the increasingly important struggle between foreign audiences. “Us versus them” is extremely important here at home but “them versus them” is more important beyond our shores.

It only focuses on a specific group, using a word, “Islamist”, that is indistinguishable to most of the globe from general Muslims. Equally, if not more important, this singular focus does not establish a comprehensive ability to participate in future informaticized wars, conflicts, and struggles. It is very likely the next “war” will be information-based without bullets or bombs, or with those “kinetics” in complete support to the information activities of the adversary, be it state or non-state. The focus in this bill does little to prepare the United States for a broader struggle.

The director has limited reach into other USG thinking, planning, and personnel. Personnel concurrence, agreements on the selection of personnel, is absent and budgetary oversight is limited to this new silo of excellence. A possible solution is a 1206-style budget model.

Public diplomacy is ripped out of the State Department, effectively making it only a Department of State when the central criticism is it must be acting as a Department of Non-State and engaging publics. Most “traditional” diplomacy is conducted in public to pressure and create awareness in foes, allies (ours and theirs), “swing voters”, and our own public. By removing public diplomacy, the proactive, engaging, narrative and context-based practices of public diplomacy are torn from the Department. What is left is public affairs that largely operates reactively, by press release sans context, and largely under the theory that one can and must inform without influence.

Public diplomacy and strategic communication elsewhere in USG remains untouched even as it is ripped from State. The advisory panel is inadequate. The military, ironically, operates completely opposite from the American public. Whereas John Q. Public looks at the law as a guidance of what cannot be done, the military constantly refers to the law (and strategy documents) to see what they can do. There must be a channel established to permit and even encourage, but not necessarily legislate (which is what they want to avoid), the military to use the NCSC.

The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy was intentionally left untouched. This bill must push for revised criteria for USACPD membership. The original Commission’s were filled with professionals with experiences in media, persuasion, and communication. In fact, the original Commissions were “blue ribbon” panels presenting public reports to Congress that were critical critiques aimed at improving operations and effectiveness every six months.

The necessary professionalism in international engagement is not addressed. A motivator behind this bill was VOA Iran broadcasts and arguments that feature selection was based on objectivity. The bill must focus on professionalism. VOA staff, BBG staff, etc are by and large a very professional bunch. A major purpose of the Smith-Mundt Act was to make permit America’s international broadcasting to raise the level of professionalism because, while well-intentioned, the quality was at times poor and the messages possibly counter-productive.

A link to capacity-building is required. Foreign audiences often need to see and receive capacity-building to appreciate the “them versus them” discourse. They need development assistance, electricity, etc. To counterinsurgency experts, it comes as no surprise that Smith-Mundt, the information and counter-misinformation act, was passed largely in response to enemy activity against a major capacity and educational program, the Marshall Plan.

Private media support should be expanded as domestic media, especially, pulls back from international coverage. The Smith-Mundt Act legislated that private media be used whenever possible. The Informational Media Guarantee, a supplement to the Smith-Mundt Act put into the Marshall Plan, helped get U.S. media products, from newspapers to Disney films, overseas. This should be expanded.

The principles of the bill should be focused less on specifics, and on broader common ground. Some suggested language to be included is here.

While there are several parts of the bill that concern me, one pleases me. The Brownback bill removes the distortions to the Smith-Mundt Act in 1972 and 1985 by eliminating the prohibition against domestic dissemination. See specifically Sec 4(c)2 of the bill, or page 5, line 5: “by striking subsection (a)”. Subsection (a) of 22 USC 1461 reads:

(a) Dissemination of information abroad The Secretary is authorized, when he finds it appropriate, to provide for the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the United States, its people, and its policies, through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information media, and through information centers and instructors abroad.

Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any such information (other than “Problems of Communism” and the “English Teaching Forum” which may be sold by the Government Printing Office) shall not be disseminated within the United States, its territories, or possessions, but, on request, shall be available in the English language at the Department of State, at all reasonable times following its release as information abroad, for examination only by representatives of United States press associations, newspapers, magazines, radio systems, and stations, and by research students and scholars, and, on request, shall be made available for examination only to Members of Congress.

The bill does, however, offer a definition of “strategic communication” (note: most refer to the concept in the singular “communication” and not the form in this bill):

The term “strategic communications” means engaging foreign audiences through coordinated and truthful communications programs that create, preserve, or strengthen conditions favorable to the advancement of the national interests of the United States.

As for an external to State Department entity doing America’s public diplomacy, that’s for another post but suffice it to say that some outreach must remain within the functional departments while becoming increasingly cooperative and engaged in the interagency process. What is missing in everything to date is a functional rethinking of what public diplomacy and strategic communication really mean. Without understanding the needs and requirements, how can we build the systems?

Enough by me on this right now. What are your thoughts?

National Defense Authorization Act and Strategic Communication, Propaganda, and the SCMB

~ Matt Armstrong

The defense authorization conference report passed last night with provisions related to Strategic Communication, referred to as Public Diplomacy by some tribes, but not all. The following comes from the Joint Explanatory Statement to accompany S. 3001, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.

Reports on strategic communication and public diplomacy activities of the Federal Government (sec. 1055)

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1074) that would require the President to submit to Congress a report on a comprehensive interagency strategy for public diplomacy and strategic communication efforts for the Federal Government.

The Senate bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement includes the House provision with a clarifying amendment. We note that numerous studies from independent commissions, the Government Accountability Office, and the Defense Science Board have indicated a lack of clearly articulated strategic goals for the Federal Government’s efforts at strategic communication and public diplomacy. Taken as a whole, these studies point to deficiencies in the U.S. approach to this mission that have not been adequately addressed by previous strategies, or by any other official government initiative. For example, these studies indicate that the Federal Government’s approach to strategic communication and public diplomacy has not been effective enough at garnering greater participation from the private sector, academic institutions or other non-governmental organizations. We commend the establishment of the Global Strategic Engagement Center at the Department of State, but note that its role within a whole-of-government approach to strategic communication and public diplomacy still needs to be further clarified.

“Strategic communication and public diplomacy”… the NDAA conference report didn’t, and wouldn’t, define either. To some, PD is a subset of SC. To others (including me), they are synonymous as everything we say and do, as well as what we fail to say and do, has an effect. I this the fissure between the two is based largely on the modern perception of public diplomacy based on the last few decades of beauty contests rather than the full spectrum psychological struggle for minds and will that preceded and has more relevance to our requirements today than the engagement model of the 1980’s.

Back to the NDAA, Rep. Paul Hodes’s (D-NH) broad brush and knee-jerk reaction needs, thankfully, clarification, but it’s not adequate.

Prohibitions relating to propaganda (sec. 1056)

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1075) that would prohibit the use of Department of Defense funds for propaganda purposes not specifically authorized by law. The Senate bill contained no similar provision. The agreement includes the House provision with a clarifying amendment. We intend the term "publicity or propaganda", as used in the provision, to have the meaning given to such term in decisions of the Government Accountability Office on this subject.

The Strategic Communication Management Board was not adopted.

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1031) that would require the Secretary of Defense to establish a Strategic Communication Management Board to provide interdepartmental and interagency coordination for Department of Defense strategic communication efforts.

The Senate bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement does not contain the provision.

While the SCMB didn’t make it, permission to establish an advisory panel to improve coordination between DOD, DOS, and USAID did.

Standing advisory panel on improving coordination among the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the United States Agency for International Development on matters of national security (sec. 1054)

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1071) that would require the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to jointly establish an advisory panel to review the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the USAID on matters of national security and make recommendations to improve collaboration and coordination.

The Senate bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement contains the House provision with an amendment allowing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Administrator of the USAID to jointly establish an advisory panel to advise on ways to improve coordination among the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and USAID on matters relating to national security, including reviewing their respective roles and responsibilities.

Side note: the report also prohibits contractors from interrogating detainees. 

New: Assistant Secretary of State for International Information Programs (IIP)

~ Matt Armstrong

And so it begins… A new post has been established at the State Department: Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP). The President nominated Mike Doran, currently Deputy Assistant Secretary for Support to Public Diplomacy at Defense, for this new position. The elevation of the leadership of IIP will undoubtedly strengthen the bureau, even if Mike doesn’t get confirmed. Some think he will, others, well, not so much. Regardless, this is a positive step for IIP. Also, congratulations to Mike, although I doubt he’s rethinking his commute quite yet.

Interestingly, it comes the day after the Brownback bill was introduced in the Senate. This bill, which is intended to provoke discussion (it has) rips out all of Public Diplomacy, eliminates the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy job (the language of the bill, number forthcoming, doesn’t indicate the if an Under Secretary is reconstituted for Public Affairs or a lesser position is to be created), repeals the Smith-Mundt provision preventing domestic dissemination, defines Strategic Communication and its goals, creates a National Center for Strategic Communication (NCSC) based largely on the National Center for Counter Terrorism (NCTC), among other things. 

Put on your seatbelts, these last few months may get bumpy…

More to come on all the above. The announcement from the White House is below the fold.

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Understanding Public Diplomacy

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 6 Comments

When talking about Public Diplomacy, what definition do you use? What’s your understanding of the concept of Public Diplomacy, or Strategic Communication while we’re thinking about this? While I’m still working on a concise phrase, here are some thoughts from others on Public Diplomacy.

The purpose of public diplomacy is to “promote the better understanding of the United States among the peoples of the world and to strengthen cooperative international relations.”

How you do this is by making “known what our motives are, what our actions have been and what we have done to assist peoples outside our borders.” It is important to do this because “it is very hard for us here at home to comprehend the degree with which we are not comprehended and the degree with which we are misrepresented.”

Why you do this is because “real security, in contrast to the relative security of armaments, could develop only from understanding and mutual comprehension.”

Perhaps a tactic is Under Secretary Jim Glassman’s concept of a “convener of discussions,” for example, because “truth can be a powerful weapon on behalf of peace.”

The goals for public diplomacy efforts could be

  • Tell the truth.
  • Explain the motives of the United States.
  • Bolster morale and extend hope.
  • Give a true and convincing picture of American life, methods and ideals.
  • Combat misrepresentation and distortion.
  • Aggressively interpret and support American foreign policy. 

Do these sound good? I think the quotes and list are spot on. We’re trying to rediscover how to interact with non-state actors, and to influence or even undermine state or non-state actors through people-centric engagement, when we’ve gone through this before. As the discussions heat up around undoing the “unilateral disarmament” of our “arsenal of persuasion,” it is important to know that at one time we had a Department of Non-State: it was called the United States Information Agency, which, incidentally, was created five years after the above were written or spoken and nearly two decades before ‘public diplomacy’ was coined.

The sources for the above, in order of appearance, are below the fold.

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Public diplomats: positive and grim

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 3 Comments

Quick post as I am still in DC. Didn’t go to the below Senate hearing, almost did, but opted for the Brookings event with Senator Brownback and Rep. Adam Smith instead of the below Senate hearing. That choice allowed for a follow on meeting at Jury’s over Guinness and pretzels (not with the Senator or Congressman).

GovExec.com’s Kellie Lunney reports below on a hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, The Federal Workforce and the District of Columbia. The hearing was spurred by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy report earlier this year. Dirksen room 342 must have been a fun place to be (not).

"On the public diplomacy side, there is some positive news, but it’s a grim picture overall," Amb. Scott DeLisi, director of career development and assignments in State’s Bureau of Human Resources, said before a Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs subcommittee. …

The Foreign Service overall is short at least 1,000 officers "just to fill the jobs we have," DeLisi said. DeLisi, who spent most of his career in the field and assumed his current post just a year ago, called the situation "frightening." Even with those slots filled, many officers are not getting the training they need to be successful overseas, he noted, adding that the agency also would benefit from the creation of additional positions. "We need more [officers] in China, India, parts of Africa, the Middle East and parts of Indonesia," he said.

There’s more to this, of course, but it’s good to get more attention on the huge lack of resources for State. Tell me, where’s the senior leadership hammering Congress to actually commit itself to both allocating money and resources to State? Secretary Gates does not count. State’s leadership, with Congressional support, must push for not just more $$ for hiring FSO’s, but programming flexibility, hiring FSN’s, a training float (hear about this? seeking details), etc.

Prepared statements for the hearing can be found here.

Smart power is the effective use of economics and development, diplomacy, force, and truthful information

~ Matt Armstrong

One in a series of quick posts compiled from the plane, in other words, a quick run through the ‘to review / comment’ pile… 

From Thom Shanker in the New York Times, The Secretary of Defense, not State,

…challenged Western powers on Friday to avoid past mistakes of lurching between excessive military resolve and excessive restraint, as the world faces threats from a resurgent Russia, violent Islamic extremism and rogue leaders seeking nuclear arms. … He suggested that Europe and the United States help rebuild Georgia and, at the same time, put the Kremlin’s desired membership in global economic organizations on hold until Russian leaders return to acceptable behavior.

The Spectacle of War: Insurgent video propaganda and Western response

~ Matt Armstrong

One in a series of quick posts compiled from the plane, in other words, a quick run through the ‘to review / comment’ pile… 

A brief reminder of Andrew Exum’s, the man formerly behind the curtain at Abu Muquwama, May 2008 article The Spectacle of War: Insurgent video propaganda and Western response:

Until recently, complains U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, one of the authors of its new counter-insurgency field manual adopted in 2006, information operations was a field of battle completely abandoned to the enemy. The U.S. knew only how to engage the enemy in physical battle – it had no plan to exploit or explain such operations in the public sphere. When U.S. forces clashed with the Taliban in Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban contacted Arabic-language satellite channels immediately following the clash to make claims of civilian casualties and, in short, spin the battle in their favor. The U.S. public relations officers, by contrast, valued caution over timeliness and often waited days before issuing a statement confirming or denying the casualties.

What is worse, from the perspective of the U.S. military is that while the ponderous American defense bureaucracy has been slow off the mark, the enemy – the insurgent groups against which the U.S. has fought in both Iraq and Afghanistan – have proved more than proficient at the art of propaganda, media manipulation and shaping the way operations and events are perceived by enemy, friendly and neutral populations.

In the same way, though the U.S. and its allies talk of the "comprehensive approach," it is more often than not groups like Hizbullah and Jaish al-Mahdi who best understand military operations as part of a combined effort incorporating "political, military, diplomatic, economic and strategic communication" efforts.

To a large degree, though, the U.S. military cannot be blamed for being caught off-guard by their enemy’s sophistication in managing the way battles and campaigns are perceived. In the past two decades, insurgent, terrorist, and guerrilla groups in the Middle East have grown exponentially more sophisticated in the way they use the media available to them in order to affect the way battles are perceived.

Steve Tatham’s book is a must read for a detailed look into the DOD-media relationship.

To an even larger degree, the U.S. Government can be blamed for being caught off-guard by the enemy’s sophisticated incorporation of political, sociological, cultural, and informational efforts. This is notably true of the State Department that has been even slower and more resistant to change than the Defense Department. “Too many” report from just 9/11 have told Congress, White House, and the State Department something needs to change.

The Defense Department has made remarkable progress in shaking off past ideological and structural constraints of “traditional” war where somebody else handles the “PR” into a population-centric engagement. Opponents to the wholesale shift to counterinsurgency, such as MacGregor and Gentile, ignore the realities that public opinion matters today and tomorrow, just as they did in the great example of “traditional” war: World War II. In fact, today and tomorrow they matter more with broader and deeper informational and physical connectivity. But why has the Defense Department been able to make this change and State has not, with the very notable exception of the still-new Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy Jim Glassman?

For three reasons: resources, resources, and world view. The State Department does not have the personnel capacity to permit its people to rotate through professional education. Nor does it have a substantial educational infrastructure. Compare both to the Defense Department’s relatively incredible amount of time to spend at the U.S. Army War College, the Naval War College, National Defense University, Command and Staff College, Air University, Marine Corps U, not to vast number of peer-reviewed publications… it’s no surprise the Defense Department has adapted to an era of non-state actors that includes individuals as well as organizations.

The State Department’s world view has largely, with again the notable exception of the dynamic “new” ideas from Under Secretary Glassman, remained fixed on states when it should have been on states and non-states. More to come on this.

Open-Thread is still open, and what about USIA 2.0, USAID, and more

~ Matt Armstrong

Just thinking out loud…

There is still an open-thread on who will be or should be in the next Administration, so please add a comment with your thoughts or email me directly. I find it interesting that while there’s a fair amount of talk about a USIA 2.0, or as I call it, the Department of Non-State (details forthcoming), nobody’s suggested a person to lead it. Perhaps they’re assuming the entire PD apparatus will be ripped from State, leaving DOS absolutely no effective means of international engagement? Will the same disruption happen at DOD or will they continue to own direct engagement? And if separating PD and PD-like functions from State is intended to create a more independent, arms-length from policy apparatus, then what about the tactical requirements that the arms-length Dept of Non-State can’t and won’t fulfill?

Further, there have been some smart comments on the need for the U.S. to improve its foreign aid. What do we do with USAID? If we’re looking at the British Council as one, or part of one, model for the DNS, then what about the U.K. Department for International Development? Our national security is dependent on more than informational and cultural and education activities, it is dependent on capacity-building. Too few recall or know that America’s public diplomacy was borne out of a reconstruction and development paradigm. The dramatic uptick in volume and intensity of Communist propaganda against the Marshall Plan (which built on a previous increase against the Truman Plan) pushed Congress and the President to move the languishing Smith-Mundt Bill into law. There’s a reason insurgents target reconstruction and new construction projects. Our security requires addressing grinding poverty and disillusionment in regions that are fertile breeding grounds for extremists, terrorists, and insurgents.  Security will come from understanding and correcting these conditions and local perceptions that permits violent extremism, insurgency, and terrorism to take hold and propagate. So, any thoughts on who a Secretary of Development might be? Would this person be within DNS, equal to DNS?

Noteworthy

~ Matt Armstrong

“Our ‘don’t hate me because I’m beautiful’ message isn’t working either.  Like Jim Glassman says, it’s not about us, it’s about them.  The sooner we recognize that, the better.” – Angela Trethewey and Joe Faina in talking about Sen. Lieberman’s Not-So-Straight Talk on Public Diplomacy

“One of the problems with Open Source research is that most of it is farmed out to contractor [companies], who are just using it as unclassified work for people who are in the process of getting their clearance.  This is one of the reasons contractors will NEVER contribute to the field of Open Source.  Their analysts pick up some skills but then are ripped out of there to serve on a higher-paying contract, once they get cleared.  This brain drain is a huge problem.” – Open Source Spy Looks for Upgrade by Noah Shachtman

“The decline of the U.S. military’s acquisitions workforce, and the resulting reliance on private contractors to perform oversight on weapons program, is ‘going to be sooner or latter one of the biggest stories of the military complex in this half of the century,’ according to one longtime defense industry professional.” – Pentagon Weapons-Buying: ‘Dumb as a Bag of $600 Hammers’ by David Axe

“Hackers knocked out Al Qaeda’s online means of communication, thus preventing them from posting anything to commemorate the anniversary.” – Hindustan Times (h/t MT)

Online Symposium at CTLab: Social Science in War starts next week (22 September 2008)

“Google is talking about moving some of their data centers offshore, which in their mind apparently means at sea. … The ‘water-based data centres’ would use wave energy to power and cool their computers, reducing Google’s costs. Their offshore status would also mean the company would no longer have to pay property taxes on its data centres, which are sited across the world, including in Britain.” – Google Going Offshore? by Galrahn (see also Google and Am FP)

“Despite almost seven years of fighting, the administration has still not clearly articulated a strategy and has starved the effort of resources. … Good tactics and more troops are not a substitute for a strategy – and in fact can significantly raise the cost of a bad strategy. Both candidates need to explain the strategy that justifies such a commitment.” – The Good War? by T.X. Hammes