Yesterday I overheard a discussion about comparing McDonald’s and Google and how their outreach to the international community differs. This is an interesting idea. How do two very prominent American companies operating in local spaces conduct cultural diplomacy? The more I thought about it, however, the more I thought this was a huge mismatch. It’s not quite as bad as say, apples and oranges. At least not on its face. So let’s say it is like apples and honeydew mellons.

Now I’m not very good at picking produce, so bear with my analogy. Let’s say Google is the apple, perhaps a granny smith apple. This is a fairly innocuous piece of fruit. Seemingly universal. Most people have seen an apple in the media, heard of one in books (Western imported books at least), or perhaps even tasted one of the hundreds (thousands?) of varieties. Google’s ability to morph into a local product is interesting. Note their recent launch of Google in Bangla (however, as of this writing, the Google logo is styled to promote Mozart’s birthday…doesn’t help my point here).

The apple is easily stuffed in a briefcase, satchel, pocket, or put on a teacher’s desk. Eating one is simple too. Just take a bite. Simple, lightweight, portable, inconspicuous.

McDonald’s is more like a honeydew melon. The physical presence creates an impact that constantly reminds. In France, for example, the food "purists" ("fundamentalists"?) decry the generification of food that the Golden Arches brings. McDonald’s is successful at glocalization. But here’s the rub. Like the honeydew, McDonald’s is not inconspicuous. In fact, it is very visible. It must be to compete with other restaurants and eating options. The French farmer’s, for example, are constantly reminded by the site of the arches on a building or in window. On a bag being carried by a customer. Trash on the side of the road or in a rubbish bin. McDonald’s impacts the prices of downstream goods as it buys up meat (from where?) and potatoes and lettuce and ketchup and on and on. Then there are trucks moving McDonald’s goods to the stores. The honeydew does not sit neatly in a satchel (at least not mine). The honeydew isn’t sitting in your desk drawer. The skin may feel like an apple (remember I’m not good at picking produce so if they don’t feel the same to you…), and if you squint your eyes, they look similar. Eating a honeydew is a far different experience requiring more involvement from the user than a quick nash of the teeth on fruit flesh.

If the unfortunate were to happen and somebody threw one of these at you, which would you rather not be hit with? Which might make a bigger impact?

Analyzing how Google reacts to local populations, how it engages in cultural diplomacy is such a different creature (fruit) than how McDonald’s does it. When looking at the impact, we need to fully understand the thing making the impact. We need to understand how it operates in the real world, who uses the good, who sees it, and how they see it, if it is seen at all. Perhaps it is only heard.

Just some meandering thoughts…

Briefly, where did the money go? Cronyism and Kickbacks?

There is a ‘reconstruction gap’ in Iraq. According to the US Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR), ‘in the coming year, the amount of money needed by the Iraqi government to carry out the daily operations of its existing health, water, oil and electrical infrastructure, as well as to complete and sustain planned reconstruction projects, will outstrip the available revenue.’ The US General Accountability Office (GAO) told Congress that the Iraqis still need ‘additional training and preparation to operate and maintain the power plants, water and sewage treatment facilities, and healthcare centres . . . to ensure that the billions of dollars . . . already invested in Iraq’s infrastructure are not wasted’.

The sums are simple. Reconstruction will cost considerably more than originally imagined. The American administration has committed most of its funds. The Iraqis have neither the money nor the expertise to run the projects that have been completed. There’s little transparency or accountability. To judge from the audits published so far, at least $12 billion spent by the Americans and by the Iraqi interim and transitional governments has not been properly accounted for. Almost three years after the fall of Saddam, the GAO reports, ‘it is unclear how US efforts are helping the Iraqi people obtain clean water, reliable electricity or competent healthcare.’ The Bush administration has decided to provide no more reconstruction funds.

News brief on Army dogs just because I want to. There could a public / cultural diplomacy connection — public affairs as the military calls it because the State conducts diplomacy — but I’m not looking into it.

The 67th Engineering Detachment adopted the program, began by the British Army, using dogs to find explosives and contraband almost three years ago. Most of the dogs are found in pounds or donated to the program. They undergo a training period of about three months before being placed with a handler…

Each dog is awarded rank in the Army system and receives special treatment by the system and their handler.

“The dogs are always one step higher in rank than their handler in case of abuse,” said Broda. “If a handler abuses the animal, he’s subject to UCMJ action. If I get promoted, she gets promoted as well.”

Interesting point on the rank of the dog…

"From the perspective of a single day…the issues and questions before our country are many.  From the viewpoint of centuries, the questions that come to us are narrowed and few.  Did our generation advance the cause of freedom?  And did our character bring credit to that cause?"

–George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address, January 20, 2005

Are we using our military resources appropriately? In Conflict-Post-Conflict (CPC) transitions, "securing the peace" is essential. As was seen in Iraq (and New Orleans), failing to provide adequate infrastructure, including personal (beyond personnel) security, for civil society results in a breakdown at the seams. Equatable with the war-peace seam of Barnett, it is nevertheless a widely known fundamental. It is even coded in the Laws of War as the Fourth Geneva Convention.

The US military found itself with sufficient resources to win the war but not win the peace. Besides Ambassador Bremer’s mea culpa, we can look at back at before the war and the conflict between General Shinseki and then-Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz. The military, trained in long views and case study analysis, comes up with a variety of inter-connected plans.

Looking at their human resources, the "cannon-cockers" were found to be available for secondary duty.  Of course, after the major operations are done, the need for heavy (and field?) artillery diminishes, as we saw in Gunner Palace.

A note on vocabularly. "Civil-military relations" in the context below is not the same civil-military relations as I explore on this blog. Here, they are talking about civil affairs in the realm of civil operations, peace, rebuilding, etc.

This is an effective re-tasking of resources, especially in when MOOTW are more prevalent and operations will rely less on the big guns. As I have mentioned before, place the military in the lead for civil outreach (i.e. public diplomacy as the military is the representative of the State; and cultural diplomacy as the military is the American face and experience the locals get) may be problematic in the long run. The integration of civilian police and support structures into the post-conflict response is critical to remove the US = Military experience of the civilian population at the earliest possible time.

There are basic prerequisites to the transition, of course, including the establishment of basic and essential civilian security. Basic city services (water, electricty, sewage, and waste collection) each follow (probably in reverse order). The military is already working on the coordination team, JPASE.

I could continue on this, but that’s for another post…

From the Marine Corps Times 6 Dec 2005:

Artillery units will now take the lead on civil-military operations in
their respective Marine division.
Hagee directed the deputy commandant for combat development and
integration to establish a task force that will meet by month’s end to
coordinate integration of civil affairs military occupational
specialties with headquarters elements of artillery units to serve as
trainers and subject-matter experts.

Currently, the Corps’ ability to conduct CMO is limited to the
expertise of its two Reserve civil affairs groups, staffed with only
about 150 Marines each.

“If we’re going to do the things we think we’re going to be doing in
the future, the kinds of fights that we’re getting into, the kind of
stability operations … we need more civil affairs capability,” said
deputy commandant for plans, policy and operations, Lt. Gen. Jan Huly,
during an Oct. 19 interview.

Corps policy makers have said artillery units are ideal for the CMO
mission because those operations occur only after the need for
artillery fire support has passed and because artillery units contain
the necessary communications and transportation equipment.