Exploiting the holes in the bubble: understanding Smith-Mundt’s barriers

~ Matt Armstrong

Last week, Pat Kushlis of Whirled View asked if the Internet made Smith-Mundt moot.  To which, Kim Andrew Elliott responded that short-wave penetrated the apparent bubble of Smith-Mundt’s prohibition against domestic dissemination of Voice of America broadcasts.  VOA programs frequently received call-ins to its radio shows from Americans and didn’t hesitate to put them on the air. 

It is important to recall that our modern interpretation of Smith-Mundt as an overarching prophylactic protecting Americans from Government propaganda was not its primary purpose.  On the contrary, arguments of the 1940s and 1950s indicate minor transgressions of a Government news service, which VOA was, into the American domestic sphere was acceptable to those who sought to improve America’s “whisper”.  The impact to commercial media, from CBS to mom and pop operations, was small enough to not be competition and to not risk undermining the U.S. government with messages sympathetic to America’s adversaries, the two pillars of the prohibition on domestic dissemination.  

Smith-Mundt is not made moot by the Internet.  It was already moot with the rise of global media.  Further, it is arguable that Smith-Mundt was intended to disappear once American media was capable of broadcasting globally, a reality that is now decades old. 

Our unique law, not one other industrialized democracy has a similar law, implies our government lies to overseas audiences (for it can only tell the truth to Americans) and also prevents the U.S. government from explaining its own taxpayers what it does overseas (or telling others for fear the message seeps into the U.S.). 

More important are the modern information barriers attributed to Smith-Mundt and the root causes of Smith-Mundt.  A thoughtful analysis results in a dichotomy.  The former demand dumping the Act while the latter requires updating it to fix our contemporary communications (strategy and message) with the world, which was the purpose of the Act in the first place.  Neither fix would address domestic influence operations by the U.S. government, nor should either address such.  This is dealt with in other legislation and more importantly, by elected officials and their political appointees. 

Focusing exclusively on America’s ability to put out information and counter misinformation for foreign audiences ignores the real tools of shaping public opinion to the detriment of our ability to participate in the modern struggle.  If one’s goal is to protect the American public from influence by its government, then such an effort must address and start with inward-facing activities such as the purpose and practical function of the President’s Press Secretary to Administration officials appearing on Sunday news programs to postcards from the IRS indicating a forthcoming check to the Air Force and Navy speaking directly to the public to explain their relevance (the Air Force with its cyber-push and the Navy’s touring universities). 

The holes are there and information seeps in, but not all of it.  Yet at the same time, other information is blocked for fear of influencing, intentionally or not (usually not), Americans, regardless of truth.  The Internet amplifies the issue, making the law that much more silly.  It also demonstrates the need for a new law that facilitates America’s counter-misinformation capability, just as Smith-Mundt did sixty years ago this year. 

There are holes, but they are the gaps in our capabilities that Smith-Mundt’s foremost purpose was to fill, not the tertiary prohibition that became the sole purpose of the Act in our modern interpretation. 

See also:

Kim Andrew Elliott on Senator Coburn’s letter to Stephen Hadley

~ Matt Armstrong

And another voice joins in.  Very briefly, see Kim’s response to the letter from Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) sent to Stephen Hadley I posted earlier this month. 

Senator Coburn calls for U.S. international broadcasting to be used for “democracy promotion” in Iran. Democracy involves the people making choices about their nations. Those choices are informed by a free press. Yet Senator Coburn mocks the concept of international broadcasting citing multiple points of view to “let the Iranians decide for themselves.”
     Instead, Senator Coburn writes: “The U.S. taxpayers should not subsidize content presenting a balance between the truh and the regime’s malicious propaganda. U.S. broadcasts should be the balance by the regime and others.” In other words, U.S. international broadcasting should be all pro-U.S., all anti-Tehran regime, sort of like Radio Moscow in reverse. …
     And so Senator Coburn’s sustained tirade against U.S. international broadcasting has entertainment value. Here is the champion of fiscal responsibility advocating an international broadcasting strategy that would be an absolute, utter, complete waste of the taxpayers’ money.

See also:

Recommended Reading

~ Matt Armstrong

Plowing through books and interviewing folks on the phone, so no verbosity tonight. 

Pat Kushlis at Whirled View: Smith-Mundt is a Moot Case – Except It’s Not.  That reminds me of an incomplete post I have titled “Websites you’re not supposed to see”… 

Also at Whirled View, Pat Sharpe comments on the decision to build a golf course next to the Green Zone: Let Them Eat Golf Balls

Next week (13 May 2008), COL H.R. McMaster is at AEI: After the Iraqi Offensive: An Address by Colonel H. R. McMaster

Marc Lynch drew my attention to a recent report worth reading: Matthew Levitt and Michael Jacobson, WINEP, Highlighting Al-Qaeda’s Bankrupt Ideology.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies has a free report titled America’s Expensive Defense.  From the conclusion:

Whatever the short-term outcome, the DoD will need in a broader review to provide greater vision and detail about the long-term strategy and missions of the military than it has to date. Questions going to the heart of defence planning would need to be addressed, leading to a determination about whether such a large and expensive military can be justified. These questions would include: how central are counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction missions to the future of defence planning? What is the nature of the threat and what is the correct role of the military, as opposed to other tools of statecraft, to cope with it? What is the US strategy for dealing with the broader issue of failed and fragile states, and what is the proper role for military forces in coping with that challenge? To what extent should forces be shaped around potential future challenges from a resurgent Russia, a rising China, and regional powers such as Iran? What assets does the military bring to bear in dealing with other challenges to the international system, such as global poverty, governance, health, international crime, proliferation and climate change?

And to close with something humorous: I received an email from somebody at VOA asking if I was aware of their unofficial blog the other week.  In jest, I replied asking whether it was illegal for them to email me and inform me of this because of Smith-Mundt.  I haven’t heard back…

Headlines and Links

~ Matt Armstrong

Nominated but not confirmed Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Jim Glassman will speak at Heritage on May 15, 2008.  This will be his first public speech since becoming the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors last June and while focused on his BBG job, surely he’ll talk about public diplomacy. 

Read Peter W. Singer’s How To Be All That You Can Be: A Look At The Pentagon’s Five Step Plan For Making Iron Man Real

Back in January, FOX News interviewed some SIGMA at a DHS S&T event in Los Angeles.  The interview is online…

Colleague Shawn Powers is co-principal investigator of the Al-Jazeera English Research Project.  Congrats on the funding from the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation. 

CSIS’s PCR Project passes along a Washington Quarterly graphical representation of 2002 and 2007 Pew Research polls (still with me?) of the decline in favorable opinions of the U.S.

Afghanistan: Americans have the wristwatches, but who has the time?

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

Two suggested reads on Afghanistan.  First, read John Mackinlay’s The Taliban’s Propaganda of the Deed Strategy.  In this post King’s College’s Insurgency Research Group blog, Mackinlay recognizes that the Taliban has learned the value of media (citing a to-be-published paper by Steve Tatham) and, his dominant theme, admonishes the media for accepting the propaganda. 

The [National Day attack] demonstrates a classic propaganda of the deed partnership in which the insurgents with growing skill select a media-significant target and with witless incomprehension international reporters beam the most sensationally damning images of the event around the world so as to deliver the worst possible interpretation. There is no need for a Taliban subtext or even a photo caption, the images speak powerfully for themselves sending messages of a stricken regime put to flight in their gilded uniforms by the daring fighters of the Taliban.

Mackinlay concludes with questions:

Why not explain the propaganda context of their images or better still embargo the use of all images when reporting a sensational terrorist incident, including the endless resuscitation of images of previous attacks? But short-termism and golden–goose-egg syndrome ensure that no ambitious editor will forgo immediate profit to prevent the emergence of a regime in which their own function would be banned.

Continue reading “Afghanistan: Americans have the wristwatches, but who has the time?
“ →

Administrative note: now open for anonymous comments

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

image CAPTCHA, those little hard to read letters and numbers used to prevent comment spam, is now enabled on this blog.  So you may comment as a registered user through the blog (the MovableType option), TypeKey, OpenID, LiveJournal, VOX, and now anonymously.  CAPTCHA only appears for users in the last group, anonymous. 

Just so you know, all comments are immediately posted on the website, including the anonymously written comments. 

Have a good weekend / hope you had a good weekend.

U.S. Public Diplomacy Update: nothing new to report

~ Matt Armstrong

Nothing's new in PD, move along

It is the beginning of May 2008 and according to the Department of State’s office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy, the office has done nothing interesting since 31 December 2007.  That’s nice.

You really can’t blame State, though.  A new boss went through the nomination hearings (quickly and quietly), but his confirmation has been held up by Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK).

A question for Senator Coburn: in your opinion, are we really better off without an Undersecretary of Public Diplomacy (and Public Affairs) than with Jim Glassman?  While Jim won’t be able to do much substantial work in the short time left (made shorter by the Senator’s hold on Jim’s confirmation), he will be able to set up the next Administration, and next Undersecretary, for success, which is critical to the national security of this country.  With it unclear whether a Republican or Democrat will be in the Oval Office, isn’t it prudent to make your mark now when you can, rather than wait until you’re in the opposition?  Regardless of your view of Jim Glassman, is keeping the office vacant really in America’s best interest?

Coburn-Hadley_2008On why the Senator from Oklahoma continues to block Jim Glassman’s confirmation, read his letter to National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley that I referred to in this earlier post.  

See also:

Book Review: Information Operations: Doctrine and Practice

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 2 Comments

image

The United States is unquestioningly involved in a global struggle for the minds and wills of men and women.  The fundamental weapon in this struggle is information.  Informing the people, fueling ideology, suggesting tactics, fostering perceptions, and deception is information in action.  Giving information context is critical, without context, it is as useful as a bullet on the ground.  If you don’t pick it up and use it, someone else will to your detriment.  It is also useful to hide or deny the existence of the bullet. 

As New Media changes the notion of power, influence, and access, success and failure in modern conflict increasingly relies on adaptability to and in the global information environment.  Over the last several years, we’ve seen the U.S. military make tremendous strides and become, as necessity has required, a learning organization.  The can be seen in significant changes in doctrine, from Counterinsurgency Manual (FM 3-24) to the Operations Manual (FM 3-0).  Both address the effects of information with an entire chapter (unfortunately) named “Information Superiority”.

Whether modern military operations are kinetic (things going boom) or not (humanitarian assistance), there is a need to manage and disseminate information to inform and influence.  This is done either through the Public Affairs or somebody else.  Collectively, that “somebody” else is Information Operations, or IO.  Understanding what IO is, and perhaps more importantly what it is not, has been challenging for those not practicing it (but even then, there’s some confusion). 

Over the last several years, only a few military monographs of note have explored the role and purpose of IO.  As far as text or reference books, only Leigh Armistead’s edited work is the only substantial post-9/11 resource.  There’s a new book that incorporates the lessons and evolutions of the last several years

Dr. Christopher Paul’s Information Operations–Doctrine and Practice: A Reference Handbook is a necessary update to IO literature.  It is setup and reads like, just as the title states, a reference handbook focused on military IO.  Chris, a social scientist, methodologically pulls together relevant doctrine, pertinent works, historical examples, and provides analysis, challenges, and tensions of and between the elements of IO.  

In analyzing the elements of IO, Chris is guided by three major themes.  The first is integrating IO with higher (and broader) spanning the whole of the U.S. government.  Second, recasting IO’s five core capabilities — psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), operational security (OPSEC), electronic warfare (EW), and computer network operations (CNO) — into two pillars, one based on systems and the other on content.  And third is the tension between “black” and “white” information. 

There is nothing inherently controversial in the book.  Although some may take exception with (absolutely correct) statements like “Counterpropaganda features prominently in PSYOP doctrine, but it is also part of the public affairs portfolio.”  And, he continues,”It isn’t clear who has the lead.” 

To most practitioners, there may be nothing new, but Chris has done a tremendous service in bringing together and discussing all the elements of IO.  If you have Armistead’s fine book on your shelf, this book replaces it with new discussions and analysis on the transformations that have occurred over the last several years, including Defense Support for Public Diplomacy, Blogs and OPSEC, civil-military operations, the tension with Public Affairs, among others.

If you are studying, or simply interested in, military information operations, then this is a required resource that puts it all in one place with details not found in any other book or paper.   

Recommending terminology: DHS and NCTC docs are available

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

The Investigative Project on Terrorism has the original Department of Homeland Security and National Counter Terrorism Center documents encouraging changing the terminology in the “War on Terror.” 

Here’s the DHS report, dated January 2008: Terminology to Define the Terrorists: Recommendations from American Muslims (searchable PDF, 5.5mb).

Here’s the NCTC report is an executive summary of the DHS report above, dated 14 March 2008: Words that Work and Words that Don’t: A Guide for Counterterrorism Communication (searchable PDF, 1.4mb).

A long time ago I had a boss tell me something, pay attention to the listening you’re creating.  These recommendations follow that same dictum.  It’s not what you say, but what they hear that matters. 

I have only skimmed them, so no deep remarks now except that to repeat these are long overdo.  haven’t read them yet, so no remarks I haven’t had a chance to read yet.  I am, as always, interested in your observations and comments.

H/T Counterterrorism Blog

A time to be flip: Psychology of the Spectacle, Sputnik in the Post-9/11 Era

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

Laika, the world's first space traveler, aboard the Sputnik II space capsule before her November 1957 launch into death and immortality. (Credit: AP)Very briefly, say it isn’t so:

Hollywood and our office of civil defense fed this fear. Montages in Sputnik Mania attest to the proliferation of apocalypse films, and clips from government advertisements include messages recommending that individuals build shelters and build them right [away].

I thought we never propagandized our own… never… Smith-Mundt made sure of that, right?  Didn’t it? 

On a serious note, read from the Global Media Project:

When the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, “the first man made object ever to leave the atmosphere and successfully orbit the earth” on October 4th 1954, America reacted with fervor (Sputknikmania.com). It was the height of the cold war and this bold display of Soviet strength struck terror in the hearts of political and military strategists who saw in the rocket “an intercontinental ballistic missile that could potentially carry a nuclear bomb.” On the Monday following Sputnik’s launch, “political and military leaders appeared in print, on the radio and on TV, telling [the American people] that Sputnik was a threat to [their] security [and] that it was launched as an aggressive attack.” Sputnik, they said, was “the first shot in a cold war that could quickly become very hot” (Sputnik Mania).

Missing is the impact of the “CNN Effect” (yes, CNN didn’t exist and yes, I agree the “Effect” in our time is less than advertised, but you get the point…): the leadership initially felt the launch was a non-issue.  It was only after pressure from the media and Congress did the propagandizing begin.

(h/t Tim at Ubiwar)

Interesting: Modeling Crowd Behavior

~ Matt Armstrong

Briefly, Arizona State University’s School of Geographical Sciences has an interesting tool to model crowd behavior.  This has interesting use in other areas. 

There are two adaptations to this that I’d find most cool.  Change the information input (car bomb / explosion causing the stampede) to be more subtle and over time (i.e. information and misinformation campaigns).  Track physical and ideological movement.  I know of some work in this space already, but this could build upon them. 

Second, use these environments to test human interfaces with unmanned systems, both autonomous the teleoperated (remote controlled).  That, to my knowledge, has not been done.  I talked to some folks about doing this last year….

American Public Diplomacy Wears Combat Boots

~ Matt Armstrong

image “American Public Diplomacy wears combat boots” is the opening sentence in my forthcoming chapter (written last year)in the yet to be released Public Diplomacy Handbook, co-edited by Nancy Snow and Phil Taylor.  Recent “revelations” have reinforced this point and highlight a systemic problem with how the State and Defense Departments can and do approach information activities.  And no, this isn’t about Barstow’s Hidden Hand.

The USA Today’s Peter Eisler wrote about several Defense Department news sites that have been up for a while.  Triggering this appears to be that CENTCOM has finally joined EUCOM and AFRICOM in sponsoring targeted news services in the languages of the target geography.  Other commands will follow suit as part of the Trans-Regional Web Initiative. 

Despite the protests of some, which I’ll get into below, this is neither illegal or unethical.  It is, however, indicative of a greater systemic problem within the U.S. government problem. 

In the past, as requirements dictated, a radio station, newspaper, or language service to enhance an existing outlet was stood up when a new audience needed to be included (or USIA personnel were tasked for what is seemingly now a quaint notion of a human interface).  Back in the day when there was a real ideological / information war going on (i.e. before detente), this was done through various radio services, USIA and, in some way part, the State Department. 

These sites are (likely) run from as Public Affairs functions and are thus dedicated to “news” and “facts”.  There may be, and hopefully is, input from the Information Operations folks to help narratives, which Eisler indicates is happening through the request and selection of articles to be posted.  The sites focus on themes — “promoting democracy, security, good government and the rule of law” — and do little on the creation of narratives, which is most obviously done through the editorial pages, which these sites do not have. 

Today, as this blog has oft, and not singularly, said, State’s inability, or limited ability, to participate in the war of information creates a void the Defense Department has been forced to fill.  This isn’t just an issue of resources, but the result of bureaucratic culture and structure limits.  In State, the Public Affairs mandate is to “help Americans understand the importance of foreign affairs”, thus making Public Diplomacy own such an effort.  Both State’s Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy are under a singular individual, who yet to be confirmed.  What about the Broadcasting Board of Governors?  Hardly.  RFE/RL?  No, for a variety of good reasons, they’re not configured to snap-on new services or to do so in this manner.  No, USIA used to provide this capability to the U.S., but no longer.  In the absence to counter misinformation and overt propaganda, truth news services are going online by Defense. 

The criticism the USA Today article is based on the provenance of these sites.  The transparent concerns are mired in concerns that Defense is sponsoring these sites more than anything. 

Journalism groups say the sites are deceptive and easily could be mistaken for independent news.

“This is about trying to control the message, either by bypassing the media or putting your version of the message out before others (and) … there’s a heavy responsibility to let people know where you’re coming from,” says Amy Mitchell, deputy director at the Project for Excellence in Journalism. A disclosure on a separate page “isn’t something most people coming to the site are likely to see.”

Ms. Mitchell’s issue hinges on her first point.  The media’s fear that they’ll be bypassed and not have the ability to control a message is deep.  It is, to her, the traditional media’s responsibility to disseminate its version of the news.  Is it clear where Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty or Fox News is “coming from” without a history of reading?  Where is the About page indicating the mission of Fox News anyway?

As for the other criticism,  

The websites suggest a pattern of Pentagon efforts to promote its agenda by disseminating information through what appear to be independent outlets, says Marvin Kalb, a fellow at Harvard University’s Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy.

I’m not exactly sure what the Pentagon’s agenda is, but this does suggest a pattern that of needs that are not being fulfilled by any other organization, needs that used to be addressed by an ability the United States, through a variety of machinations, deemed unnecessary. 

My criticism of the sites is that they aren’t focused enough.  Sites that support multiple languages for multiple audiences frequently, as they should, re-order (emphasize & de-emphasize) the information as the audiences likely have different interests and priorities.  For example, look at how the headlines change at the French Foreign Ministry’s website based on the selected language (language options — French, English, German, Spanish, Arabic, and Chinese — are available in the top-left of the page). 

As the military further entrenches itself as our public diplomats, despite its protests,  and an increasing number of the world’s population shapes their opinion of the United States through the actions of soldiers, sailors, Marines, and Secretaries of Defense in new and traditional media,  it makes sense that they would sponsor news services.  They shouldn’t, and they’ll probably be the first to admit it, but who else will do it? 

Another chance to raise Smith-Mundt: Is the State Department and President Bush “legitimizing” the actions of the enemy by continuing to use “jihadi”?

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 5 Comments

Briefly, you probably already know that the State Department approved the change in terminology recommended by the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), which in turn was based on a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) report, “Terminology to Define the Terrorists: Recommendations from American Muslims.” 

Yesterday, Jeffrey Imm, at Counterterrorism Blog, notes the State Department Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, released this week, wasn’t updated to reflect the new lexicon. 

…it is apparent that these new guidelines are not being reflected in the State Department annual terrorist report and in comments from President Bush.

In the April 2008 State Department Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 released today, anyone can clearly see the use of the terms “jihad”, “jihadist”, “jihadi”, “mujahedin / mujahadin”, “caliphate”, “Islamist” — as nouns describing enemy terrorist activity and ideology (not just in the titles of Jihadist groups’ names).

Such usage can been easily found in the Microsoft Word version of the State Department report:
– “jihad”: pages 63, 75, 81, 107, 126, 127, 174, 187, 272
– “jihadi(s)”: pages 10, 93, 94, 103, 107, 122
– “jihadist”: pages 116, 117, 120, 121
– “Islamist”: pages 17, 52, 62, 75, 87, 93, 95, 122, 188, 271, 291

These references are clearly describing State Department counterterrorist analyst descriptions of enemy terrorist individuals, activity, and ideology. For example, such phrases in the annual State Department terror report as: “promoting jihad and recruiting potential suicide bombers” (p. 75), “a recruitment network for foreign jihadis” (p. 93), “recruiting jihadists to fight” (p. 117), “numerous cells dedicated to sending Jihadi fighters” (p. 122), “AQ leadership has called for jihad against UN forces” (p. 174) — don’t sound like a view of “jihad” as a “spiritual struggle”.

Moreover, in President Bush’s April 28 press conference, he referred to the enemy as “jihadists” – to an assembled press corps that never asked him a single question about the remark.

In last week’s reported NCTC memorandum and DHS report on the proper terminology in describing the enemy, the NCTC is quoted stating that “[n]ever use the terms ‘jihadist’ or ‘mujahedeen’ in conversation to describe the terrorists…calling our enemies ‘jihadis’ and their movement a global ‘jihad’ unintentionally legitimizes their actions.” As described in last week’s article on this subject, I pointed out that this viewpoint challenges many of the key passages in the 9/11 Commission Report.

This raises a (humorous) question that Imm asks:

Does the NCTC and DHS now think that the State Department and President Bush are “legitimizing” the actions of the enemy by using such terms?

Why is this humorous?  A motivating factor behind Smith-Mundt was the fear that the State Department would undermine the President and the United States by being too soft or even sympathetic to the enemy propaganda.  Between this example, which is somewhat excusable for reasons of the bureaucracy but still should have been prevented, and Senator Tom Coburn preventing the confirmation of Jim Glassman as Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, is it any wonder we need to revisit Smith-Mundt?  So much of what brought about the Act sixty years ago is repeating itself today.

I recommend reading Jeffrey Imm’s whole post, The Continuing Debate Over “Jihadists” As The Enemy, that includes a discussion on why nouns and verbs are so important.  See also Jim Giurard’s post on the same here.

UPDATE: For the original DHS docs, see this post (h/t CT Blog).

(H/T Steve at COMOPS)

GOOOOOOD MORNING IRAQ! Engaging the people with more than foot patrols, on the air in Iraq

~ Matt Armstrong

Radio Station coverage in Iraq Noah Schachtman at Danger Room has a brief post on the transformation of a unit from traditional warfighting to being effective at counterinsurgency.  I’ll be brief as well, but not as brief as Noah, who gives the heads on an Army Times article ‘Our unit is the transformation’: Unexpected mission leads battalion to be a constant presence on the streets of Tikrit.

The second caller of the day sounded drunk. He demanded to know why the Americans had not built new schools or hospitals.

Turns out, he also was blind.

he began losing his sight five years earlier and couldn’t find a doctor.

“Now I can’t see a camel,” he told Lt. Col. Rick Rhyne, who was sitting in a cramped radio studio along with an interpreter and the show’s host, a gregarious fellow known only as Mr. Lebanon.

The blind caller blamed his failed eyesight on the U.S. presence. Rhyne, commander of the 1st Special Troops Battalion, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, told the caller about the new construction and other activities coalition forces had provided that were aimed at improving lives of the locals.

The article gives some good examples of the value of personal contact and the product of building trust at the tactical level.

There is payback on the morale of our forces as well:

Pfc. Ellis Branch, also a member of the engineer unit, actually wants to be in the city.

“I like it a lot better. I can’t stand sitting in one truck for more than 10 hours up and down [Main Supply Route] Tampa,” he said. “Being boots on ground feels like you’re accomplishing something.”

One last comment: a dollar says LTC Rhyne won’t, even if scheduled, appear at the DoD Blogger’s Roundtable. 

Subtitle for this post: America’s public diplomacy wears combat boots…

Book Review: Imperial Life in the Emerald City by Gerry Loftus

~ Matt Armstrong

Imperial LifeGerry Loftus, the Avuncular American, reviews Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone at USC’s Center on Public Diplomacy’s blog.

As we mark the fifth anniversary of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it is worth revisiting that first year of the U.S. occupation.  The Green Zone of Chandrasekaran’s title has come to symbolize the entire Iraq venture, the enclave where America tried to graft its national narrative and institutions onto a Middle Eastern society, and then was surprised at the transplant’s rejection.  In the immediate aftermath of the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s statue, it is a time of striking images and—in some corners of the neoconservative world—heady dreams of remaking the Middle East in America’s mold.  It’s the world of the Coalition Provisional Authority or CPA, under “viceroy,” “proconsul,” “presidential envoy,” or simply, as his official title said, Administrator L. Paul “Jerry” Bremer.

Enter this world with Rajiv Chandrasekaran and prepare to… laugh.  You know you shouldn’t, but some of his vignettes on the heights of hubris on the Tigris are so outrageously funny that you might weep.  As you should, for the absurd tragicomedy of life in the Green Zone is rendered here as nowhere else.  Funny but never flippant, Chandrasekaran was The Washington Post Baghdad Bureau Chief before, during, and after the invasion.

Read the whole thing at either the USC CPD blog blog or at Gerry’s blog.  Also at Gerry’s blog are some additional comments posted almost exactly five years after Amb. L. Paul Bremer was selected for his position in Iraq.

Worth Reading

~ Matt Armstrong

Too much on the plate, but some links worth your time to read Wednesday morning (or whenever)

For background to both of the above, you should know about Abu Yahya al-Libi, the AQ wannabe leader who authored the points on slide 10 Marc highlights.  So, for more recommended reading:

And related to that, we have a lexicon shift finally happening in the U.S. 

Changing topics, back to the Hidden Hand story:

I’m surprised nobody commented on Effects-Based Public Affairs (possibly related) or that IO begins when Law/Policy prevents PA from engaging. 

Forthcoming: a review of Chris Paul’s book.

That’s it for now.

Strengthening State by Making It More like Defense

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

AmericanDiplomacy.org has an interesting article by three students at the Joint Forces Staff College, LTC Shannon Caudill, USAF, MAJ Andrew Leonard, USA, and SgtMaj Richard Thresher (what, nobody from the Navy or a Coastie?), titled Interagency Leadership: The Case for Strengthening the Department of State.

In short, they argue State’s geographic focus should drop its early-20th (arguably late-19th) Century European view of the world and adopt the map of the Defense Department’s Combatant Commands.  The authors argue State “should be the pre-eminent diplomatic and interagency leader abroad, but it must be reorganized to become more relevant, robust, and effective.”  They also note Congress’s reticence to fully fund State… They also note Congress’s reticence to fully fund State (no, that’s not a typo, that’s history repeating itself). 

Their recommendation is a smart one.  In fact, CSIS would recognize it as a means to implement Smart Power:

DOS should create a Regional Chief of Mission (RCM), responsible for leading and synchronizing interagency capabilities to project the full range of national power elements. This diplomatic post would work in tandem with the geographic combatant commander and ensure a diplomatic face is planted on the region, not just a military one. It would also provide a regional leader for coordinating the non-military elements of national power and take the lead role in integrating interagency approaches to fulfill government objectives.

However, beyond the importance of having leadership that understands the importance and utility of the full range of national power, there are several structural issues at State that must be dealt with, arguably before the reorganization.  These include updating the personnel system, including increasing interagency billets, and increasing professional and academic education opportunities.  Changes to these would really put State on par with Defense and would facilitate State’s New Map (a book idea for somebody… may Tom’s fifth).  This would really strengthen State and complete the transformation the authors imply is necessary.

I recommend the essay. 

Arab jails: a synonym for torture and repression? Or is that an exaggeration?

~ Matt Armstrong

That was the topic of today’s (29 April 2008) al-Jazeera show The Opposite Direction according to Arab Media Shack.  However, stay tuned to AMS because GrandMasta Splash decided to watch football, er, soccer instead of watching al-Jazeera for us in the U.S. who a) don’t get satellite (it’s unAmerican to broadcast AJ in the U.S. dontchaknow) and/or b) don’t know Arabic.  Thankfully, AMS does watch and know Arabic…

In case you missed it: McMaster on NPR and Boyd on NUMB3RS

~ Matt Armstrong

On Monday’s All Things Considered, Tom Bowman interviewed COL H.R. McMaster.  If you’ve been paying attention there was nothing new, well, other than H.R. getting some great publicity (and perhaps a few book sales):

U.S. Army Col. H.R. McMaster has been credited with critical thinking and combat commands that have helped shape some successes in Iraq. Now he’s being tapped for a new, and perhaps more difficult, job: making Iraqi ministries run efficiently.

And on Friday, CBS TV’s FBI show NUMB3RS tried to solve a case using OODA loop analysis.  I wasn’t so impressed by their employment of the OODA framework (actually I wasn’t at all) but I was impressed by how they avoided saying Boyd’s name…

One more thing: SIGMA may be on FOX News Wednesday (29 April 2008). 

Worth Reading (fixed link)

~ Matt Armstrong

Briefly, a few links worth reading as you start your Monday…