Author: Matt Armstrong

A bigger problem than Blackwater: DynCorp (Updated)

~ Matt Armstrong

You want a bigger and deeper problem than Blackwater? Consider DynCorp, a much larger private military firm "providing" a range of services that impact Iraqis and the U.S. mission in far greater ways than Blackwater. From David Phinney:

The State Department so badly managed a $1.2 billion contract for Iraqi police training that it can’t tell what it got for the money spent, a new report says.

Because of disarray in invoices and records on the project — and because the government is trying to recoup money paid inappropriately to contractor DynCorp International, LLC — auditors have temporarily suspended their effort to review the contract’s implementation, said Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Stuart W. Bowen Jr.

Maybe investigators should look into DynCorp’s relationship with its prime subcontractor, Corporate Bank, aka, The Sandi Group, aka, TSG.

See: Marking Up the Reconstruction

You could play the What If? that Blackwater’s profile (and profits) wouldn’t be what it was if DynCorp (and others) had done their part in training the police, building the infrastructure, and creating jobs for Iraqis as they had been charged with doing.

Oh, and by the way, when the U.S. sends police on U.N. peacekeeping missions, they aren’t employed by the U.S. Nope, they’re DynCorp-paid cops. Blackwater? They’re just the whipping boy for the emotional. Blackwater is small change compared to DynCorp.

Also see Phinney’s more recent post on State’s IG here.

Update: see the NY Times article on State contracting.

See also:

Automation not a factor in ‘Robotic rampage’?

~ Matt Armstrong

From New Scientist Tech:

A female soldier tried to free the shell, but another shell was accidentally fired, causing some rounds in the gun’s two near-full ammunition magazines to explode. The gun began firing again and swung in a circle, leaving nine soldiers dead and eleven wounded.

Blogs and other online news sources have suggested the incident may be due to software problems, highlighting the danger of automated weapon systems. But Jim O’Halloran of defence publication Jane’s Land-Based Air Defence says the incident is more likely the result of a simple mechanical failure.

Interesting, this emphasizes my point that the presence of automation has the power to changes the debate over an incident, which is in the survey.

Good news: it’s not just us fighting al-Qaeda

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

Over at the Long War Journal is a bit of good news.

The divisions between al Qaeda and their erstwhile Sunni allies in the insurgency intensified over the weekend as the Islamic Army of Iraq and the terror group battled in Khannasa, just south of the city of Baghdad near Salman Pak. Over 60 were reported killed in the three day battle, which occurred after al Qaeda kidnapped a leader of the insurgent group.

Al Qaeda continues to overstep its boundaries and kills, kidnaps, and coerces Sunni insurgent groups for failing to follow its rules. “The attacks took place in the past few days after terrorists from al-Qaeda kidnapped the head of the Islamic Army in Madain, Wahid Arzuqi,” Adnkronos reported. “Various witnesses said Arzuqi was kidnapped after receiving various threats, in particular a fierce verbal attack in a meeting organized with other Iraqi guerillas. Tensions between al Qaeda and the rival militant organization have reportedly been ignited in recent weeks after the deaths of several members of the Islamic Army in Samarra, Kirkuk and al-Duluiya.”

I hope we’re helping deepen this fissure.

The new black for the stylish soldier or insurgent?

~ Matt Armstrong

Just two, three years ago, the big talk was 5.11s. Seems there’s a new black now. From Noah, Care Bear Body Armor:

By now, you’ve probably seen — and are so totally over — the Hello Kitty AK-47.  Luckily, the genius gals at GlamGuns.com ("combin[ing] the girliness of glamor with the practicality of military expertise") have a whole lot more hardware up their frilly, sequined sleeves.  Like a carbine, festooned with My Little Pony.  And a claymore mine, inspired by Martha Stewart.  But I think this cuter-than-cuter piece of protective gear is my favorite item in the GlamGuns arsenal:Carebeararmor

Not sure how to categorize this post. Cultural Warfare? Public Diplomacy? Military Diplomacy?

Recent links to MountainRunner

~ Matt Armstrong

It’s been a big 10 days of links to MountainRunner. Lots of links to my recent posts on robots in war.

Noah Shachtman at Danger Room linked to Robot kills 9, injuries 14, which was picked up by Boing Boing, and many, many others.

Andrew Sullivan of The Atlantic, Madisonian, linked to Implementation of ethical controls on robots.

CANinKandahar linked to DOD Approved Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan.

Josh Foust at A Second Hand Conjecture linked to The real Diplomacy of Deeds and Congress continues to screw up its priorities and we still don’t get privatization issue.

PR Watch picked up my article in GOOD Magazine and linked to MountainRunner, as did ZenPundit and Noah.

Both Andrew Sullivan (big shout out to Sullivan, Thanks for the links!) and Small Wars Journal (same to you Dave!) linked Revising History.

And, Kent’s Imperative linked to both Noting DipNote’s Noteworthiness (Updated) and A role model for DipNote? 

Thanks for the links everyone.

NATO acks 21st Century info war, says time to copy Taliban’s PD strategy

~ Matt Armstrong

Briefly, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer moves NATO into the struggle of minds and wills in the Information Age. During a conference titled "Public Diplomacy in NATO-led Operations" (thanks Henrik), SecGen Scheffer was almost out of the box considering NATO and out in front of the U.S. in many ways:

…three basic facts that I think are clear to us all:

First, that we need to speak clearly and effectively to our public and Parliaments, not just to explain what we do, but to succeed at what we do.

Second, that the information environment has changed profoundly from what it was just ten years ago – not just in terms of technology, but speed, access, audience and in fact who is generating news.

Unfortunately, the third fact is that we in NATO are not doing nearly well enough at communicating in this new information environment. And we are paying a price for it, not least over Afghanistan.

The whole speech is smart and should be required reading for those interested in the role of public diplomacy in national security and information operations in general. Video is here.

Continue reading “NATO acks 21st Century info war, says time to copy Taliban’s PD strategy
“ →

“Left of boom” example

~ Matt Armstrong

From Blackfive:

Afghan Citizens Attack Taliban While Planting IED

Ghazni Province: Coalition Forces discovered a Taliban weapon cache yesterday in Ghazni. While Coalition Forces were investigating the cache, a group of Afghans nearby saw Taliban insurgents digging in the road leading to the cache and promptly attacked the Taliban.

And…

The Taliban fled leaving behind a half buried anti-tank mine in the road.

DOD official orders head count of private security guards

~ Matt Armstrong

From Federal Computer Week, the guy in charge of paying for things wants to know what he’s paying for.

John Young, acting undersecretary of Defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, has launched a comprehensive head count of private security contractors working for the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In a Sept. 28 memo, Young gave Defense Department officials until Nov. 1 to record personal, contract and detailed deployment information on all private security contractors and translators working in those two countries.

The sad thing is, many of us have been saying this is required for years. Think they’ll start putting contractors through CRC (CONUS Replacement Center) again? Doubt it, this is the chief bean counter. But depending on the distribution of his findings, maybe ground commanders will know who the heck is near them. More hopeful is that Mr. Young might connect ground commanders with the contract weenies so when there’s friction with a contractor a screw can be turned (which of course relies on real pain being felt and not offset by a larger contract elsewhere which as been the norm)?

Understanding culture

~ Matt Armstrong

Found in Ethan Zuckerman’s post on a "Dialog With/In Islam":

[Sarah Joseph, editor of Emel Magazine, an alternative British Muslim magazine] shows us a campaign for washing powder that was hugely successful in the UK, but went over like a lead balloon with Muslims. It’s a series of three images – a green sock, a washing machine and a white sock. “It didn’t work well in the Arab world, because Arabs lead right to left!” she tells us.

Ya think? What about those versatile enough to read left to right? You don’t think there’s any symbolism of the green (the color of Islam) disappearing? (Or perhaps it’s just a foot issue.)

Unintended Consequences of Armed Robots in Modern Conflict

~ Matt Armstrong

There is more on the robot killing in South Africa.

A South African robotic cannon went out of control, killing nine, “immediately after technicians had finished repairing the weapon,” the Mail & Guardian reports.

In light of this event, as well as Ron Arkin’s “ethical controls” on robots, and that I’m returning to the subject to finish a report, I re-opened a survey on unmanned systems in conflict, primarily ground vehicles. The survey is expanded with the addition of a few questions left out of the earlier iteration. If you filled out the survey before, you might be able to edit your previous answers.

Click here for an informal survey on unmanned warfare, your participation is appreciated. If you have already taken the survey, provided your haven’t cleared the cookie, you should be able to pick up the survey from where you left off. No, this isn’t the proper way to do a survey, but this is an informal query. The results will be included in a report I am completing on the subject (an early and rough draft presented earlier).

The draft findings so far, many of which you’ll find are in direct opposition to Ron Arkin “ethical controls” report above, are:

1. Robots reduce the perceived cost of war and may result in increased kinetic action to defend the national interest. Robots may be used like President Clinton’s lobbed cruise missiles against Afghanistan and Sudan. They also be used to facilitate a more expeditionary foreign policy with less public and Congressional oversight. To some, the value of private security contractors will pale in comparison to that of robots.

2. Robots may reduce local perceptions of US commitment and valuation of the mission. If the US isn’t willing to risk our own soldiers, do we value our people more than local lives? Is the mission not important enough to sacrifice our lives?

3. Robots reduce or remove the human from the last three feet of engagement and with it opportunities to build trust and understanding, as well as gain local intel and get a “feel” for the street (mapping the human terrain). There’s a reason why urban US police departments put cops on foot patrol and bikes. There is an analogy here with the difference of armored Humvees / MRAPs and Jeeps: the latter forces a connection / dialogue with locals. FM3-24 highlights the problem of too much defensive posturing. In American run detention centers in Iraq, General Stone noted the importance of skilled human contact with prisoners and not a sterilized warehouse run by robots replacing untrained personnel. Noteworthy is this anecdotal measurement of engaging “hearts and minds.”

4. Robots continue the trend of increasing the physical distance between killer and killed. Even if the robot is teleoperated, the operator will not have the nuances in the environment. The robot may not know when not to engage or when to disengage. The psychological cost of killing will decrease and targets will continue to be dehumanized.

5. Technological failures, or induced failures (i.e. hacking), would result in more negative press as the US continues to “hide behind” technology. Errors or accidents would likely be described by USG communications in a way that satisfies the US domestic audience. Before the South African robot-cannon, other examples high profile accidental killing of civilians, ostensibly by technology, including the KAL 007 and Iran Air 655 (USS Vincennes), both of which are notable for the different public diplomacy/communications strategies employed to address the particular incident.

6. Robot rules of engagement are being designed around Western / Machiavellian Laws of War (see Arkin’s report on ethical controls). This lawyer-on-lawyer based on facts and is ignorant of perceptions generated from actions. This perfect world model may become more a liability than asset in 21st Century Warfare. This is not to say that a more permissive environment should be created, but that the Machiavellian model of the end justifies the means creates too permissive of an environment to the detriment of the mission. The “new” U.S. Counterinsurgency manual notes the same when it says too much force as well as too much defensive posturing may be counterproductive. 

Others discuss the future of MRAPs

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 2 Comments

Briefly, with very little comment for lack of time, a few months ago, a Jon Grinspan wrote this in American Heritage magazine:

Yet the Humvee’s biggest drawback may actually be the false sense of security it imparts. American troops, many military theorists now argue, are too removed in their vehicles, fighting for Iraqi hearts and minds with a drive-through mentality. The open-air jeep meant that soldiers could, and had to, interact with the people of occupied nations; the closed, air-conditioned Humvee has only isolated American forces from Iraqis. This is even more of a problem with the MRAP, which offers only small, armored windows to peek out of. Though the tactics of the current surge seek to get troops out of their vehicles more often, many politicians involved in the debate over Humvees assume—perhaps erroneously—that more armor means more safety and success.

Today, Noah Shachtman at Danger Room quoted from a Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments report (pdf):

Counterintuitively, it may also be that a better way to reduce overall US casualties is to have personnel operate outside their vehicles. Successful counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, in particular, require close contact with the local population to provide them with security and to develop a working knowledge of the local environment that, together, produces the intelligence necessary to defeat an insurgent enemy force. This approach is similar to law enforcement techniques that emphasize policemen “walking the beat” in a neighborhood as opposed to merely driving through it in a squad car. Simply put, commanders may have to risk some casualties in the near term, by having their troops dismount, in order to develop the secure environment that yields the intelligence that will reduce the insurgent threat—and US casualties—over the longer term. Given this approach, which is consistent with the military’s new COIN doctrine, the MRAP—at least in this situation—may send the wrong message to troops in the field…

It is very likely we will see similar post facto discussions with unmanned ground systems.

See also:

Implementation of ethical controls on robots

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 2 Comments

Dr. Ron Arkin, who runs the Mobile Robot Lab at the Georgia Institute of Technology, released his report “Governing the Lethal Behavior“.

This article provides the basis, motivation, theory, and design recommendations for the implementation of an ethical control and reasoning system potentially suitable for constraining lethal actions in an autonomous robotic system so that they fall within the bounds prescribed by the Laws of War and Rules of Engagement. It is based upon extensions to existing deliberative/reactive autonomous robotic architectures, and includes recommendations for (1) post facto suppression of unethical behavior, (2) behavioral design that incorporates ethical constraints from the onset, (3) the use of affective functions as an adaptive component in the event of unethical action, and (4) a mechanism in support of identifying and advising operators regarding the ultimate responsibility for the deployment of such a system.

Ron and I have discussed his report and have agreed to disagree. I encourage you to the report if you’re at all interested in this stuff.

Our disagreement mostly hinges on his mid-19th – mid-20th Century view of war, i.e. Lawfare or industrial age warfare based on rules of war. To Ron, justifications matter and have time to be discussed. To me, perceptions matter more than fact and an engagement model based on the Laws of War might actually create too permissive of an environment. The era of Lawfare is passed.

To me, the fungibility of force decreases as the asymmetry of perception management increases (some might call that “controlling the narrative”).

For more on our points of disagreement, see this post.

If you participated in my survey on the subject, which I will be expanding, you’ll see I have a very different approach based on 21st Century Struggles for Minds and Wills where the facts matter little, if at all, and perceptions can turn the tide.

Interesting metric on (not) engaging hearts and minds

~ Matt Armstrong

Newsweek has an interesting story on that gives anecdotal evidence on the gap between the occupied and occupiers. From the outset, the US built self-contained bases (unlike the British) and limited contact with the population (as is the case with delayed US Embassy in Baghdad). The result was links to the population were denied, except in very few cases.

This is not just a different kind of war, it’s also a different kind of American military than existed 40 or 50 years ago—one that may talk about engaging hearts and minds, but spends many of its resources trying to keep them at a distance. The insistent demands of “force protection” and the insidious efficiency of the insurgents’ bombs and booby traps have isolated the American soldier from the population he or she was once tasked to liberate. We may not lament the lack of bars, dance halls and whorehouses for today’s troops. But in Iraq there’s hardly any human contact at all that isn’t at the point of a gun.

Robot kills 9, injuries 14

~ Matt Armstrong

The South African National Defence force is asking whether a software glitch in an automated anti-aircraft cannon killed 9 and injured 14.

Mangope told The Star that it “is assumed that there was a mechanical problem, which led to the accident. The gun, which was fully loaded, did not fire as it normally should have,” he said. “It appears as though the gun, which is computerised, jammed before there was some sort of explosion, and then it opened fire uncontrollably, killing and injuring the soldiers.”

…in the 1990s the defence force’s acquisitions agency, Armscor, allocated project money on a year-by-year basis, meaning programmes were often rushed. “It would not surprise me if major shortcuts were taken in the qualification of the upgrades. A system like that should never fail to the dangerous mode [rather to the safe mode], except if it was a shoddy design or a shoddy modification.

The real Diplomacy of Deeds

~ Matt Armstrong

Actions speak louder than words. Not only do you learn that growing up, but it’s reinforced in your daily life. You trust particular stores not because of their ads, but because of their product and their treatment of you (ok, maybe just one or the other). You trust friends, colleagues and bosses not because they say they have your back or your best interest in mind, but because they show it.

Continue reading “The real Diplomacy of Deeds
“ →

People’s diplomacy

~ Matt Armstrong ~ 1 Comment

From the New York Times, a story about a grassroots propagandist:

Unlike Mr. bin Laden, the blogger was not operating from a remote location. It turns out he is a 21-year-old American named Samir Khan who produces his blog from his parents’ home in North Carolina, where he serves as a kind of Western relay station for the multimedia productions of violent Islamic groups.

Filed under public diplomacy… foreign thought brought in from the "outside" and broadcast internally, if coordinated or not.

Question: is this kid like late-1940’s U.S. communist "sympathizers" standing on their soap box?

See also

FPRI CivMil conference… watch it if you can

~ Matt Armstrong

Due to circumstances, I haven’t been able to watch much of the FPRI webcast, but what I did catch was great. It has just resumed after the lunch break, but I’ll unfortunately be on the road/in & out of meetings, but I’ll watch what I can. Again, if you think on or discuss how the current wars are being fought and staffed, you are interested in civil-military relations whether you realize it or not. You are therefore someone who should watch this webcast and the upcoming keynote from Rep. Ike Skelton (D-MO).