The Blogger Roundtable with Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs James Glassman concluded a short time ago. Before getting to the roundtable, I have to say it is nice to have an Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy that actually does what he promotes. From op-eds to intense interviews, this Under Secretary is not afraid of the media or of public engagement. With any luck, future Secretaries of State and Under Secretaries of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (or whatever it becomes transformed into it touched) will have the same realization that the Department of State must also be the Department of Non-State and put energy and resources into public engagement.
Category: Public Diplomacy
Event: Public Diplomacy and the War of Ideas: Agendas for the Next Administration
Marc Lynch saw the need for a discussion, so he organized one:
Public Diplomacy and the War of Ideas: Agendas for the Next Administration
George Washington University, September 30, 2008, from 2:00-3:30, Location TBA
Featuring
Hady Amr, Director, Brookings Doha Center and Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, and co-author (with Peter Singer) of Engaging the Muslim World: A Communication Strategy to Win the War of Ideas (Brookings, April 2007).Dr. Michael Doran, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Support to Public Diplomacy, U.S. Department of Defense; 2007 testimony on the war of ideas available here.
Kristin Lord, Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, and author of Public Diplomacy and the New Transatlantic Agenda (Brookings, August 2008)
Marc Lynch, George Washington University, co-director of Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communications and author of Voices of the New Arab Public
Marc notes the roster may expand and more details will be forthcoming. Save the date, however.
For Wed the 17th: Blogger Roundtable with Under Secretary James Glassman
Posting date changed to bump to the top of the page
Heads up: tomorrow there will be a blogger roundtable via conference call with Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs James Glassman. From State:
Under Secretary of State James K. Glassman will address attempts to curb extremist ideology in the Middle East, with particular emphasis on Iran, in a roundtable discussion with bloggers on September 17 at 1 p.m ET. Specifically, he will discuss his department’s overall efforts (and detail some recent programs) to reach out to young people, act as a facilitator of moderate voices, and work with the private sector to curb extremist ideology.
If you are interested in participating in this conference call, contact Glen Roberts at RobertsGF@state.gov.
Other topics to be discussed:
State Dept. seeks democracy videos: Government teams with media orgs on contest (Variety)
The U.S. State Dept. has revealed its latest diplomatic tool: user-generated content. At the U.N. on Monday, representatives revealed the Democracy Video Challenge, a government initiative co-sponsored with half a dozen high-profile media orgs including NBC Universal, the DGA and the MPAA.
The challenge in question will be to create a three-minute video completing the phrase “Democracy is…” in hopes of receiving a prize package that includes set visits, tickets to the Universal Studios L.A. theme park, and meetings with everyone from U.S. government officials to “new-media experts.”
Debating in the New Media: State Department dialogues with Ahmadinejad’s media advisor
America knows that bullets alone will not win this war (op-ed by the U/S in the UK’s The Independent)
Public diplomacy is, very simply, diplomacy aimed at publics, as opposed to officials. While some people associate it with marketing – with building a national brand – the truth is that public diplomacy, like official diplomacy and like military action, has as its mission the achievement of the national interest. Public diplomacy performs this mission by understanding, informing, engaging, and persuading foreign publics.
Event: Reforming U.S. Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Views from Congress
At the Brookings Institution next week:
On September 23, the Brookings Institution will host Senator Sam Brownback (R-Kan.) and Representative Adam Smith (D-Wash.) for a discussion on the future of U.S. public diplomacy and strategic communication. With increasing force and frequency, members of the United States Congress are calling for reforms to U.S. public diplomacy, strategy, organization and practice. These proposed reforms seek to improve U.S. relations with foreign societies, advance American interests abroad and counter extremist ideologies. Seven years after 9/11, the question remains: is the United States communicating effectively with foreign publics? Is it undermining support for extremist ideologies around the world?
For more information, and to register, go to the event’s website.
I’ll be at this event immediately after a 1.5 day seminar at the George C. Marshall Conference Center.
See also:
Debating in the New Media: State Department dialogues with Ahmadinejad’s media advisor
I haven’t had a lot of kind words for State’s Digital Outreach Team (note to McCain campaign, the image was there long before the RNC), but over a couple of weeks this summer, they successfully “outreached”. To who? Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s media advisor, Ali Akbar Javanfekr. The debate, which took place on Mr. Javanfekr’s personal blog, was printed in the Persian language newspaper “Iran” on Aug 27, 2008.
Read the transcript here. Below the fold is a fifth response from the Digital Outreach Team that is not in the transcript and not printed in “Iran.” This is how the State Department opens its description of the discussion:
Ali Akbar Javanfekr, the president’s adviser in media affairs has for some time been writing his views about different political and social topics in his personal weblog and even publishes tens of pro and opposing views with his own replies. The up-to-datedness of the blog’s topics and their correlation with the country’s current events has attracted the media to it in a way that not only the content of this blog but the views of supporters and critics of the government and the replies of the president’s adviser have become newsworthy and the print media and news sites have given these subjects special attention.
It is an interesting back and forth between an official representative of the United States, the Digital Outreach Team (DOT), and Javanfekr, speaking in his personal capacity and not as the media advisor to the president. Most remarkable is the extent of the discussion and that it was printed in this particular newspaper.
A few brief comments on the transcript.
DOT and Mr. Javanfekr go back forth on the economy, Iran Air 655, Dr. Mosadegh and other subjects. The DOT emphasizes the standard line that the Administration’s issue is not with the Iranian people but with the Iranian government, which Mr. Javanfekr does not accept. On Mosadegh, the DOT had this to say:
It’s interesting you speak of Dr. Mossadegh [“Ms. Madeline Albright the secretary of State of the Clinton administration showed rare bravery in accepting responsibility for some of USG’s past mistakes especially the coup against Dr. Mosadegh…”] to justify your view but fail to mention that the policies of the current leadership in Iran differs greatly from the political principles of Dr. Mossadegh. Using Dr. Mossadegh’s name when it is convenient for you and serves your cause could be interpreted as insincere. How many major landmarks in Iran are currently named after Dr. Mossadegh? I believe the answer to that question is zero. I am sure you remember when the name of Pahlavi Street was changed to Mossadegh Street after the revolution only to be changed again shortly after that.
While I don’t agree with the logic of many of Mr. Javanfekr’s arguments, I understand his with the DOT remaining faceless and names. At one point he says that “from now on refer to you as her Excellency Madam Rice, the distinguished US secretary of State unless you identify your position/standing at the US Department of State to the readers of this blog.” The response by DOT:
Thank you for the promotion but I am not the Secretary of State. I am a member of the Digital Outreach Team which is an entity within the US Department of State. Our goal is to establish communications and have a candid conversation with the people of Iran and answer questions about US foreign policy. But I think it’s better instead of focusing on personalities and job titles to focus on issues.
For me, this is a point for Mr. Javanfekr and indicative of a larger problem at State. Yes, the DOT is an “entity within the US Department of State”, but that does not mean the person, who obviously has authority to speak on behalf of the Department, and by extension the Government, should remain anonymous. This is another example of inhibiting the empowerment of the employees at State that does not fit with the requirements of the modern era, let alone the New Media environment. Signing the comments simply as DOT is just shy of anonymous. In the real world, the “meatspace”, would someone from the State Department not give his or her real name when debating an issue?
This is, to me, another example of the reticence of the Department of State from a necessary transformation into the Department of State and Non-State. Regardless, for now, read the transcript. I would appreciate your comments (hopefully comments are working again). DipNote authors have names. America.gov authors have names. State must think in terms of empowering ALL of its people.
Is America Equipped to Win a World-Wide Propaganda War?
"Is America now equipped to win a world-wide propaganda war" was the framing question for the interview debate on BBC’s HARDtalk last week between Stephen Sackur and Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Jim Glassman. The 23 minute discussion – online video is available – is unlike anything you’ll see in the United States, which is unfortunate. Imagine if this and future Administrations were subjected this level of intelligent debate that includes prep and no shouting? (Also, what if our presidents were subjected to the Prime Minister’s Questions?)
Briefly, the opening question – "do you see yourself as America’s Chief of Propaganda" – gave the Under Secretary the chance to redefine his role and the mission of public diplomacy as distinct from past Under Secretary’s. This led to a discussion based on comments by Price Floyd (see this article from Price that is similar to but not the one published in the British press Sackur was referring to). Price, formerly the director of media affairs at the State Department (and now director of external relations at CNAS), said quite accurately that good marketing can’t sell bad policies. The Under Secretary agreed that bad marketing doesn’t work but disagreed that "this" is a failed policy, which went to the essence of the responses in the debate. This represented a common underlying theme of the discussion as the interviewer frequently asked about the past and the present impact of past policies while the Under Secretary often responded with how America’s policies have evolved.
A few quotes from the Under Secretary:
- His job is to “put in place a an apparatus, a structure that will last beyond this administration.”
- “We live in a world where preaching to people doesn’t work very well.”
- “We’re in the persuasion business…better as a conveyor / facilitator to get people to talk about these issues…” [clearly to expose the holes in adversaries’ ideology]
- He is “head of the Interagency on the war of ideas.”
- In some countries “public diplomacy can do more than official diplomacy”
- When asked about Egypt, who receives $2b in US aid, the Under Secretary said that as head of the BBG, that his experiences with the Egyptian government were “not completely satisfactory” when trying (unsuccessfully) negotiating FM broadcasting of Radio Sawa.
- That this is a War on Islam is “flat out wrong" … this is "single biggest misconception”
- “Any responsible foreign policy must look at issues of stability”
- public diplomacy must expand beyond the traditional tools [paraphrase]
The militarization of public diplomacy through both the conduct of our foreign policy and the prominence of military public affairs was obviously central in the debate.
If you are interested in public diplomacy and strategic communication, this is a must see interview. What are your thoughts on the interview?
The big question: why hasn’t DipNote or America.gov linked to the Under Secretary’s interview? Here is a man with the best USG communication resources that continue to go underutilized.
Noteworthy
“The media policy for the Islamic State [of Iraq] is using exaggeration, to the extent of lying.” – one of a series of letters from Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda’s Number 2, to Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). See CNN.com.
“Even Zawahiri recognized that [al Qaeda in Iraq] has lost credibility in Iraq.” – General David Petraeus commenting on al-Zawahiri’s letters mentioned above. See The Long War Journal.
“28 million copies of the DVD [Obsession: Radical Islam’s War Against the West] are being distributed nationwide throughout September” “only being distributed in ‘swing’ election states.” A spokesman for the producer of the 2005 film “said the intent is not to sway voters’ opinions about the presidential candidates.” See Editor and Publisher’s blog.
“Vetting” Veep’s: Andrew Sullivan looks at Gov. Sarah Palin while Fabius Maximus goes after comments on Sen. Joe Biden’s gaffes.
“The [House Appropriations] committee believes that traditional U.S. military operations are not an appropriate response to most or many of the challenges facing Africa.” – the House Appropriations Committee on wanting to cut 80% of AFRICOM’s budget. See David Axe and a prior MountainRunner post on AFRICOM.
“Mexico has the second-largest number citing the US government as the perpetrator of 9/11 (30%, after Turkey at 36%). Only 33 percent name al Qaeda.” Results from the WorldPublicOpinion.org poll on who was behind 9/11.
“Over the last seven years, our policies have evolved” (Updated)
Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy Jim Glassman was on BBC Radio this morning. Listen to the short 5:33 interview in which he reiterates that likability is no longer the goal of U.S. public diplomacy. He notes that in our seven years since 9/11 that our policies have evolved and that out "standing of the U.S. in the world is important because it makes it easier for us to achieve our interests, but … improving our image is not an end itself." Public diplomacy must, as he says and as I’ve written, must expand beyond the traditional tools.
The return of the Public Diplomacy Press and Blog Review
After a seven month absence, John Brown’s much-missed Public Diplomacy Press and Blog Review returned today. Version 2.0 is available here. Welcome back, John. If you’re interested in public diplomacy, you need to subscribe to his review.
Noteworthy
“Asked about ‘globalization, especially the increasing connections of our economy with others around the world,’ majorities in six of the seven [Muslim] nations polled say that it is ‘mostly good’ for their country. Approval is highest among Egyptians and Nigerian Muslims (79% and 78% saying mostly good, respectively). Sixty-three percent of Azerbaijanis, 61 percent of both Iranians and Indonesians, and 58 percent of Palestinians see globalization as mostly good. While support in Turkey does not reach a majority, a plurality still calls globalization mostly good (39% to 28%). On average across all seven publics, 63 percent say that globalization is good for their own countries. Only 25 percent think it is mostly bad.” – PIPA/WorldPublicOpinion.org survey results.
“[Joseph] Nye, author of Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, said that recreating USIA would cost a new U.S. president political capital. Nye said that capital would be better invested in a White House coordinator and strategist for public diplomacy.” From the post Ideas Abound for Improving U.S. Public Diplomacy Effort: U.S. national security tied to success in public diplomacy at America.gov. Quoted in the post are me, Kathy Fitzpatrick, Joe Nye, and Nancy Snow.
“I also see technology attempting to solve a real and identified problem, but the new processes required are overly complex for the field. This complexity requires training to reach an acceptable level of operational effectiveness. Given the nature of the competing taskings and limited training time, this inevitably results in the reduction or elmination of other training.” Jedburgh in a discussion titled Techcentricity and today’s Armed Forces at the Small Wars Council. In the same thread, Sam Liles, who probably programs in Assembly, cracked the following (very bad and thus repeated here) joke: “There are 10 types of people in the world. Those who understand binary and those who don’t.” As we continue to explore technological advantages, we must not ignore the human in the loop and in front of the sensor.
“By comparison with both allies and adversaries, the U.S. Government investment in public diplomacy is low. In absolute terms, the United States is outspent by France and the Soviet Union and is nearly equaled by West Germany. … A comprehensive, periodic, published analysis of Soviet propaganda in the United States would tend to put Soviet purposes in clearer perspective. It would tend to make the American public and press less vulnerable to Soviet deception.” From a 1979 General Accounting Office (not Accountability) report titled “The Public Diplomacy of Other Countries: Implications for the United States.” So far, very little of the discussion on revising America’s public diplomacy outreach, informational or cultural and educational, has considered the long-considered goal, if imperfectly executed, of informing and inoculating the American public.
“Western leaders face two fronts in their stand-off with Russia over its use of force to re-draw borders in Europe: one is the Russian army on the ground. The other is a propaganda war.” From a BBC report titled Russia’s Propaganda War.
Ashraf Fouad, Smith-Mundt and Al-Hurra
In Losing Arab Hearts and Minds: The Coalition, Al Jazeera and Muslim Public Opinion (see review here), Steve Tatham interviewed Middle East media consultant Ashraf Fouad in 2004 on the creation of Al-Hurra, the U.S.-sponsored television station:
If you look at it from the positive side it is much needed and it is long overdue. They should get involved in the debate. But if you look at it from the negative side then it is unacceptable. How dare you come and air a channel like this to try and brainwash my people, when your law in the U.S. bans you from airing something like this in the U.S.? It is against the Constitution to broadcast a government channel in the States. How dare you say that we are sheep, and that you can show us this, but you can’t show it to the American people? …
While it’s not in the Constitution, the Smith-Mundt Act certainly does prevent Al-Hurra from being broadcast to the American public. Among the various reasons for revisiting Smith-Mundt, the perception it creates of our overseas broadcasts and the lack of transparency of the same is not a myth, even if the modern understanding for the purpose for the prohibition is.
See also:
- Rethinking Smith-Mundt: a look back at its purpose
- New Media and Persuasion, Mobilization, and Facilitation
- A book for the aspiring architect of USIA 2.0
- Rethinking Smith-Mundt: responding to Sharon Weinberger
- American Progress: Build a National Consensus on Development and Dump Smith-Mundt (follow up here)
- If Smith-Mundt really applied to the entire government…
- What would you do if you had six (or less) months to address the problems of U.S. Public Diplomacy?
- The actual wording of Public Law 402, aka the Smith-Mundt Act
- In-sourcing the Tools of National Power for Success and Security
- Synchronizing Information: The Importance of New Media in Conflict
- Not Afraid to Talk: our adversaries aren’t, why are we?
- Setting a new course for U.S. Public Diplomacy?
Book Review: Losing Arab Hearts and Minds by Steve Tatham
In the global information environment, the media influences public opinion and government policy around the world. It conveys to the public not only what the government is doing, but provides a feedback loop to the government through the coverage created by editors and reporters in response to their listeners, viewers, readers, and sponsors, whether advertisers or owners. Policies can no longer be presented to the public in the abstract as they are constantly measured against images on television, in the newspaper, and online, around the clock and around the world.
Reports on American Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication are filled with examples of how the United States failed to engage the Arab public since 9/11. These have come from the Defense Sciences Board, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, and numerous think tanks, and more will appear as we near the end of 2008 and the end of the Bush Administration. There are also several books on the subject, see below for more on these, however none closely examines the critical relationship between the U.S. Defense Department and the Arab media and public. There is one book that does explore this “last three feet” of engagement and you’ve probably never heard of it.
Losing Arab Hearts and Minds: The Coalition, Al Jazeera and Muslim Public Opinion is by Steve Tatham, a serving officer (now Commander) in the Royal Navy. He was the Royal Navy’s public spokesman in Iraq from 2002-2003 and is uniquely qualified to give an outsider’s “inside” view of the Coalition’s engagement with the Arab media, or rather their intentional non-engagement with Arab media.
Drawing on first hand experience and other resources, Steve carefully and thoroughly describes the media affairs of the Coalition, notably of the United States. He does so on a foundation he establishes in the first one hundred pages as he explores the biases of the Americans, the British, and the Arab world. This includes superb analysis of the public statements from the Bush Administration, the American media environment (including “The Fox Factor”), lessons learned from the 1991 Gulf War, and Hollywood influences. He also looks at the major Arab media and their evolution, America’s response, such as the creation of Al-Hurra, with a scholarly, yet conversational, examination. His insider’s view of operations at and the people running the Information Centers in Doha, Kuwait, and Bahrain amplifies the theme of the book: that the United States public affairs were focused almost exclusively on the American public.
The tactical maneuvering of ignoring the Arab media created substantial handicaps in our ability to get the word out. By excluding a critical link to the Arab public, the very people the President would claimed was the purpose for the invasion (“to bring democracy”), air time would be filled not by our information and explanations. The resulting information product would spiral down.
To exclude significant media who speak to major target audiences was a combination of naivete and even arrogance and was not restricted to the Arab media. Threaded through the book is the truth the United States, and the military in particular, has only recently begun to come to grips with: that perceptions matter more than intent and that operational activities must be formed and guided by the information they generate and not followed ad hoc by a communication plan. Steve quotes an Al Jazeera executive, who said
By merely disseminating a point of view the battle is not finished. It take more than information to convince public opinion of your good will towards the Arab world.
Steve does a superb job exploring the frustration, prejudice, and ignorance displayed by America toward the Arab media and Arab public opinion and how it undermined the engagement and understanding of a critical, if not the critical, audience in the global struggle for minds and wills. Losing Arab Hearts and Minds is required reading for those interested in Public Diplomacy, Strategic Communication, Information Operations, and general military-media engagement. The failure of the Coalition, and the United States Defense Department specifically, to engage the Arab media was lost the battle for ‘hearts and minds’ before it really began.
Related Reading:
- Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today by Marc Lynch (2006). Excellent source on the changes of and influences on the Arab public.
- Reporters on the Battlefield by Chris Paul and James J. Kim (2004). This RAND monograph examines the relationship between the U.S. military and the media
- American Encounters with Arabs: The "Soft Power" of U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East by Bill Rugh (2005).
- The Media and the War on Terrorism by Stephen Hess and Marvin Kalb (eds) (2003). This Brookings publication is a collection of roundtable sessions and interviews on the American media’s adoption of the government message.
Essential reading: the difference between public diplomacy and propaganda, by John Brown
John Brown, formerly of the Public Diplomacy Press and Blog Review, wrote a terrific short discussion of the differences between public diplomacy and propaganda. I recommend you read it.
At its best, public diplomacy:
- Provides a truthful, factual exposition and explication of a nation’s foreign policy and way of life to overseas audiences;
- Encourages international understanding;
- Listens and engages in dialogue;
- Objectively displays national achievements overseas, including in the arts.
At its worst, propaganda:
- Forces its messages on an audience, often by repetition and slogans;
- Demonizes elements of the outside world;
- Simplifies complex issues;
- Misrepresents the truth or deliberately lies.
Both public diplomacy and propaganda, at their best or their worst, can achieve credibility with their audiences. However, the best public diplomacy achieves credibility through careful presentation of fact and thoughtful argumentation, while the worst propaganda achieves credibility by falsification and sensationalism. As a rule, public diplomacy at its best, which appeals to the intellect, is believed in the long run, while propaganda at its worst, which inflames atavistic emotions, is believed only for short periods. The best public diplomacy convinces audiences that its content and purpose mesh, and that therefore it is honest; the worst propaganda leads audiences to believe that its contents do not reveal its true purpose, and that therefore it is dishonest.
Noteworthy
“…the people formerly known as the audience refused to behave like one. They brandished video cams, iPhones and recorders, doing their own documentation of what was under way.” David Carr in the New York Times.
“The goal is to bring down the walls of the convention and invite in an audience that’s as large as possible. Credentialing more bloggers opens up all sorts of new audiences.” Aaron Myers, the director of online communications for the Democratic National Convention Committee, quoted in the New York Times.
“…most notably 1946 to 1974, when a pervasive concern to combat and contain communism prompted an unprecedented yet uncoordinated array of initiatives by the federal government to export American culture as exemplary illustrations of what the free world had to offer Europe as well as developing nations.” Michael Kammen writing in the book The Arts of Democracy: Art, Public Culture, and the State, quoted by John Brown in his review of said book.
“During the Cold War, the transatlantic community understood that pulling allies closer, not just countering enemies, was a priority for public diplomacy.” Kristin Lord in Public Diplomacy and the New Transatlantic Agenda.
“Since the Russian invasion of Georgia there has been a lot of discussion about the media war and who won it. … But another aspect seems to have received a little less attention – namely the nature of the media’s coverage and how it differed from other wars.” Daniel Korski in the Future of War Reporting.
Defense Media Activity: centralizing information practice and understanding
From the Defense Media Activity website:
The Department of Defense (DoD) is undertaking an initiative designed to modernize and streamline media operations by consolidating military Service and DoD media components into a single, integrated and transformed organization, the Defense Media Activity (DMA).
It seems the Defense Department is finally realizing that it too needs a central coordinator of information. Very probably the leadership role will be on the order of what State Department’s Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs is supposed to be in the absence of a United States Information Agency (USIA) or its Director who was to sit at National Security Council meetings and be in the take-offs of policy.
There are too many information assets within the Defense Department, some on the right track, others not, but always fighting some kind of turf war. I won’t get started on the Air Force’s attempt to boot up Cybercommand. It’s one thing to have a hacker and counter-hacker team, but it’s another to claim information transmitted through a certain medium is your domain. Do we have a bureau to address information in newspapers and another for radio broadcasts? No…
Back to the DMA, interestingly it does not have a news feed or other means of staying in touch. Perhaps they’re waiting for the “energetic and imaginative executive” to lead them. See also Walter Pincus in the Washington Post on same.)
The War of Ideas: UK edition
The new Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Jim Glassman, reinvigorated the concept that the “War of Ideas” is central to our national security. It is, as he describes it, a field of battle whose purpose is to “use the tools of ideological engagement — words, deeds, and images — to create an environment hostile to violent extremism.” While admittedly the phrase isn’t perfect, as he acknowledges, it conveys purpose and mobilizes the Government for the struggle minds and wills.
How do you arm yourself for this struggle? You understand the adversary and its support systems. In the case of Al Qaeda, an organization that has arguably lost much of its central operational capabilities (although there are arguments it is rebuilding and gaining strength), you undermine the brand on which hopes and myths are based. To be effective, the message must reach all elements of societies in all corners. The key effort must be to separate the base from the group and to isolate the group. Creating questions in the support group and the ‘swing voters’ that the adversary cannot answer, has proven it cannot answer, reduces the moral, social, and financial support, not to mention their ability to recruit.
On this point, read The Guardian’s Britain’s secret propaganda war against al-Qaida:
The document also shows that Whitehall counter-terrorism experts intend to exploit new media websites and outlets with a proposal to "channel messages through volunteers in internet forums" as part of their campaign. …
The report, headed, Challenging violent extremist ideology through communications, says: "We are pushing this material to UK media channels, eg, a BBC radio programme exposing tensions between AQ leadership and supporters. And a restricted working group will communicate niche messages through media and non-media." …
The government campaign is based upon the premise that al-Qaida is waning worldwide and can appear vulnerable on issues such as declining popularity; its rejection by credible figures, especially religious ones, and details of atrocities.
The Whitehall propaganda unit is collecting material to target these vulnerabilities under three themes. They are that al-Qaida is losing support; "they are not heroes and don’t have answers; and that they harm you, your country and your livelihood".
Of course, this isn’t original. A certain element of the Defense Department has been working the angle of attacking Al-Qaeda’s brand for a year or more. What is new is that it’s in the public sphere.
Public Diplomacy tip: speak to audiences as if they were investors, because they are
From the interesting (and required) Hill and Knowlton blog, another tip for public diplomats (or global communicators) and those looking to revamp America’s global engagement.
Lots of hits on your [Investor Relations] website does not equate to IR success. It may just be your webmaster and employees hitting the site and inflating your stats.
Putting together an impressive IR presentation with lots of cool graphics does not equate to IR success. Cool graphics are no substitute for good performance and direct communication of your strategy.
Hosting an event and having lots of analysts and investors in the room does not equate to IR success – I hate to tell you this, but many of those guys in the room are probably there for the free lunch.
Meaningful and engaging communication with analysts, investors, and prospective investors – now that’s IR success.
This meaningful and engaging communication happens via telephone, email, one on one meeting, group meeting, quarterly earnings call, or blog interaction.
For some reason, many companies (especially small caps) don’t get this.
Yup, for some reason, people in general just don’t get this.
See also:
A new voice in the Smith-Mundt discussion
Briefly, if you are at all interested in the Smith-Mundt discussion with Sharon Weinberger, I recommend you check out two posts by Craig Hayden on the subject. First, Fearing a world without Smith-Mundt?
… Weinberger’s argument about propaganda is logically a slippery slope fallacy. There are no obvious reasons why a domestic information ministry would spring to existence after Smith-Mundt is scrapped. Why should it? As research has shown for decades, the U.S. press has shown little inclination to represent the rest of the world from a perspective other than U.S. policy-makers (this is supported by Bennett’s well-known “Indexing Hypothesis“). In fact, as Dan Hallin has shown, critical coverage only tends to arise when there is disagreement among policy-makers (see Piers Robinson’s piece on media and politics for a summary). We don’t have to be closet fans of Herman and Chomsky’s “Manufacturing Consent” to realize that the U.S. news media rarely strays from the government line. So what is there to fear from abandoning Smith-Mundt? …
Second, After Smith-Mundt: What next?
… I think what Matt is getting at is more than just exposing U.S. message strategy to academics and policy wonks. It’s about involvement in a larger process of policy awareness, feedback, and input with synergistic effects on outflow of U.S. messages to the rest of the world. Implicit in Matt’s rethinking of Smith-Mundt is an invitation for Americans into the process of crafting, conducting, and implementing public diplomacy. It’s putting the public back into public diplomacy. (Ok, that was cheesy).
This implicit expansion of the policy community, however, would be a fundamental shift in how policy is crafted and implemented in this country. Unlike domestic policy, the constituents for foreign policy (let alone public diplomacy) are less than obvious. Sure, we know generally that public opinion does matter to policy leaders, and that interest networks can shape policy construction. But foreign policy shaped by public opinion doesn’t necessarily make it democratic. And an open-sourced public diplomacy goes against historical trends in the domestic sources of U.S. foreign policy. …
Bookmark and subscribe to Craig and Shawn’s blog Intermap now.
From RAND’s Vision of the Future
Briefly, an alternative view from Philip Bobbit’s market-state from David Ronfeldt and Danielle Varda in RAND’s Issues over the Horizon:
…we predict the emergence of the “nexus-state” — something quite different from the traditional nation-state or recent notions of an approaching market-state or network-state. The nexus-state will integrate multiple modes of governance. It will be stronger than the nation-state but also more embedded and circumscribed. It will revolve around a new kind of administration in which officials remain concerned about what is happening in their offices but become increasingly oriented by the new sensory and sectoral networks into which they are plugged.
It’s not clear to me in what way the Nexus-State will be stronger than the nation-state. Commercial relationships are notoriously fickle, always looking for a better deal. Brand management is challenged not just by quality, but by quantity and price. Perhaps that’s why the market-state is dismissed in favor of the network hub model of collaboration and mutual awareness and understanding. Based on the description, it would seem the Nexus-State would be, by definition, a master of public diplomacy and global engagement.
The Nexus-State model seems at odds with Jerrold Green’s “issue” in the same publication: The Future of Diplomacy: Real Time or Real Estate
…with some imagination, many embassy-based functions could be effectively conducted on a need-to-be-in-situ basis. Of course, some diplomats will always be stationed overseas to handle particularly sensitive, specialized, or high-level tasks. But their number will be far fewer than today and their office spaces more practical, low key, and less vulnerable than are traditional embassies.
…Unfortunately, as currently configured, embassies are impediments to gaining these valuable insights because they seclude and “immunize” their personnel from local life rather than immersing them in it. As evidence, all citizens should experience first-hand the security gauntlet that places all American diplomatic legations virtually off limits to all but those who work in them. …
The security environment is one thing, how well the mission integrates with the local population is much more important. Perhaps instead of focusing on architecture, Green would do well to look at this report. I think that as we become more engaged, we’ll need a better presence, not a necessarily a smaller presence. Can anyone argue that any of our embassies are overstaffed? If anything, they are, with the exception of Baghdad, understaffed.
Today’s Recommended Reading on Public Diplomacy
Several recommendations for you on the subject of public diplomacy.
Check out and subscribe to Craig Hayden and Shawn Powers’ Intermap.org.
The Intermap website and blog presents news, opinions, and research on issues related to communication-centric foreign policy, public diplomacy, global media and news flows. More broadly, this site aims to investigate the intersections between communication, media studies and international relations scholarship that deal directly with how global controversies and politics are carried and sustained through media. We call this media argument: where media outlets, technologies, and tactics represent the symbolic and visual space for the contest of ideas between nations, citizens, non-state actors.
Recent posts:
- Recency
- What’s new about New Media and Persuasion? <—a response to my recent New Media post
- “The Myth of Moderate Islam.” Really?
Read David Steven’s June post The new public diplomacy and Afghanistan at the Global Dashboard.
… I believe there are three key interlocking problems:
- A lack of understanding. …
- A lack of interoperability. …
- A lack of understanding and interoperability translates into persistent strategic and tactical failings. …
The starting point for change is to:
- Accept that influence is now core currency for all arms of international relations – foreign policy, development assistance, and military operations.
- Build a common language and joint concepts across these disciplines – not just at a national level, but internationally, in order to allow the effective operation of multinational, multi-sectoral coalitions and networks.
However, the barriers to change are sizeable, while the knowledge to surmount them is fragmented across sectors and disciplines. The first battle for ‘hearts and minds’ therefore needs to be won in our own organisations – within governments, between governments, and between governments and a range of non-governmental organisations.
See Marc Tyrrell’s 3-part series a lengthy and very scholarly discussion on asymmetric conflict as a struggle for minds and wills
It is important to remember that the goal of warfare for many of the current groups is control over the interpretive framework of a population, not actual, physical control over the geographic area, that will flow inevitably from control over the framework and massive military costs. For many of these groups, kinetic operations, “violence”, is merely a means to an end that is shaped not by the logic of violence but, rather, by the logic of communications; a lesson learned from Vietnam where the insurgents lost almost all of the battles, but won the war.
Posts:
- Notes towards a theory of asymmetric conflict, part 1
- Notes towards a theory of asymmetric conflict, part 2
- Notes towards a theory of asymmetric conflict, part 3
Also, check out the latest addition to the blogosphere, Chasing the Flame. This is Samantha Powers’ project to “tell the story of the peace-maker Sergio Vieira de Mello and introduce audiences to the kind of conviction and insight that inspires movements.” That movement is to build a “movement for a smart U.S. foreign policy.”