Operationalizing Public Diplomacy

Operationalizing Public Diplomacy by Matt Armstrong, 14 October 2008, at Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy

In the 21st century, perceptions matter more than facts as “super-empowered” individuals wield technology and manipulate public opinion for their own purposes unburdened by the truth and unchecked by less adroit global powers as they seek support across borders. This chapter looks at the origins and purposes of modern U.S. public diplomacy as a means to engage foreign publics directly, bypassing their governments, in a struggle to support the peace and security of the United States. This diplomacy with publics, which included carrots and sticks similar to traditional diplomacy, was required to fight an unknown enemy that seemed to be everywhere and set on destroying the American way of life.

This chapter begins with a look back at the original purpose and function of public diplomacy borne out of the total war period of the early Cold War years. I then describe how public diplomacy transformed from an active and holistic engagement into a passive practice based on emotions as part of a U.S. re-election campaign. This is followed by two sections that form the heart of this chapter. The first is an overview of the importance of information in modern conflict and the second is recommendations to operationalize public diplomacy so that it sits between and informs both strategy and tactics. This chapter concludes with the assertion that this view of public diplomacy must be reinvigorated and made central in Information Age warfare where perceptions trump bullets.

Handbook of Public Diplomacy

imageThe Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy was published today. It’s out and discounted 8% at Amazon so get a jump on your Christmas shopping while they’re a bargain at $161.81 each. However, in an unprecedented move, Routledge is offering a handbook simultaneously in paperback available directly from Routledge here

The book is edited by Nancy Snow and Phil Taylor. Nancy is Associate Professor of Public Diplomacy in the S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communications at Syracuse University. She is Senior Research Fellow in the USC Center on Public Diplomacy. Phil is Professor of International Communications at the University of Leeds and acknowledged as one of the foremost authorities in propaganda history and public diplomacy. The book was published in affiliation with the USC Center on Public Diplomacy.

Seriously though, get or borrow a copy of this 400-page doorstop, there is some seriously good writing in it (mine excepted of course ;). Table of Contents after the fold.

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Propagating emotional responses for supporting the cause

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Recommended reading: Lines and Colors’ post on Propaganda:

It’s commonly thought that “propaganda”, a technique of spreading misinformation, or slanted opinions, for the purpose of manipulating opinions, has been utilized primarily by oppressive regimes like Imperial and Nazi Germany in the early part of the 20th Century or the Soviet Union or Communist China in the latter part.

That in itself is a form of propaganda, which can be, and often is, utilized by Western democracies. Propaganda is simply a technique, not a set of values. It can just as easily be employed in a “good” cause as an “evil” one.

What distinguishes propaganda from information, aside from the fact that it is often disinformation, is that it is calculated to appeal to the emotions and circumvent rational judgment. One of the key features of propaganda is that it most often (almost always, in fact) taps into the power that images have to reach us on an unconscious level.

(h/t JB)

Realizing the value of Foreign Aid

The importance of foreign aid programs in building capacity, empowering foreign populations, and denying physical and ideological sanctuary to our adversaries is finally coming to the forefront. The militarization of America’s foreign policy is more than Defense leadership in informational engagement and propagating a comprehensive approach to stability operations, but in the management of foreign aid for development. As was noted in a conference call with LTG Caldwell this week, the percentage of the foreign aid budget the Defense Department manages has skyrocketed.

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Senator urges suspension of Iraq publicity contracts

Briefly, from CongressDaily:

Sen. Jim Webb, D-Va., on Thursday sent a letter to Defense Secretary Robert Gates asking him to suspend $300 million in contracts for civilians to produce pro-American news stories, entertainment programs and public service ads in Iraq until the Senate Armed Services Committee and the next administration review the contracts.

Webb’s letter follows a Washington Post story detailing the Pentagon’s decision to award four firms a combined $300 million for public information campaigns in Iraq.

“At a time when this country is facing such a grave economic crisis, and at a time when the government of Iraq now shows at least a $79 billion surplus from recent oil revenues, in my view it makes little sense for the U.S. Department of Defense to be spending hundreds of millions of dollars to propagandize the Iraqi people,” Webb wrote.

His letter underscores continued congressional concerns over military contracts for information operations. The fiscal 2009 defense authorization bill requires the next Defense secretary and president to submit a report to Congress on strategic communications and public diplomacy initiatives.

“The contracts being let seem to fly in the face of this clear statement of congressional concern,” Webb wrote.

While some details of the contract might benefit from additional review, Sen. Webb’s letter seems to indicate a failure to understand and appreciate the importance of information and perceptions to our national security, but also the cost effectiveness of informational (and cultural and educational) activities.

See also:

Admin question: can you sign in and vote on the blog?

There may be an issue with the new voting feature on the blog. The screenshots below are a) not signed in (note the color of the star…no visible hyperlink under vote), b) signed in (note the color of the star…no visible hyperlink), and after clicking on the “x Vote(s)” text (note the checkmark in the star…still no underline indicating a hyperlink).

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Can you go through the same sequence? I’ve heard from some that you can sign in but you cannot vote. I’ve tested this on IE 8, Firefox 3, and Google’s Chrome (my new favorite browser). One issue I have seen: after voting, the spinning dial icon that appears (or whatever it’s called) doesn’t go away until the page is refreshed and only then does the vote count increment.

Report: The “militarization” of diplomacy exists and is accelerating

The American Academy of Diplomacy came out with a critical and honest assessment of the militarization of America’s public diplomacy. The report emphasizes the lack of personnel, expertise, and overall resources to do its effectively do the job required. From the executive summary:

…our foreign affairs capacity is hobbled by a human capital crisis. We do not have enough people to meet our current responsibilities. Looking forward, requirements are expanding. Increased diplomatic needs in Iraq, Afghanistan and “the next” crisis area, as well as global challenges in finance, the environment, terrorism and other areas have not been supported by increased staffing. Those positions that do exist have vacancy rates approaching 15% at our Embassies and Consulates abroad and at the State Department in Washington, DC. USAID’s situation is even more dire. Today, significant portions of the nation’s foreign affairs business simply are not accomplished. The work migrates by default to the military that does have the necessary people and funding but neither sufficient experience nor knowledge. The “militarization” of diplomacy exists and is accelerating.

Currently the Secretary of State lacks the tools – people, competencies, authorities, programs and funding – to execute the President’s foreign policies. The status quo cannot continue without serious damage to our vital interests. We must invest on an urgent basis in our capabilities in the State Department, USAID, and related organizations to ensure we can meet our foreign policy and national security objectives. There must be enough diplomatic, public diplomacy, and foreign assistance professionals overseas and they cannot remain behind the walls of fortress embassies. They must be equipped and trained to be out, engaged with the populace and, where needed, working closely with the nation’s military forces to advance America’s interests and goals. This report provides a plan and a process to begin and carry forward the rebuilding of America’s foreign affairs capability.

Continue reading “Report: The “militarization” of diplomacy exists and is accelerating

Noteworthy

“The “militarization” of diplomacy exists and is accelerating.” – A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness from the American Academy of Diplomacy. (see also this post)

“The trends across the board are not going in the right direction. And I would anticipate next year would be a tougher year.” – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Adm. Mike Mullen, The New York Times.

“The announcement last week that the United States will relocate its London embassy from Grosvenor Square, in the heart of the British capital, to an out-of-the-way spot south of the River Thames may be good news for property developers, but should concern almost everyone else. The London move is the latest and most dramatic example of a worrying trend toward vastly scaling down American public diplomacy abroad, abandoning embassies that were once beacons of American culture and openness in favour of walled suburban fortresses.” – Globe and Mail, 6 October 2008 (h/t KAE)

“The New York Times’ Web site is getting more global, and IHT.com is going bye-bye.” – Forbes, 7 October 2008 (h/t KAE)

“There was no single silver bullet, but rather a multifaceted strategy crafted and carried out by those in Baghdad — not, despite recent claims, in Washington.” – Linda Robinson in the Washington Post (see also Tom Barnett)

“Whatever the final form it takes, the establishment of Africom is a good idea whose time has come — finally. The command’s emphasis on civil-military integration and a low-key operational profile is appropriate and well suited to its mission. We should wish it well.” – Bob Killebrew, Africom Stands-Up. (see also this post)

Event: New America Foundation conference on Al Qaeda 3.0 – with live webcast

The pace of “what’s next” conference is picking up. From the New America Foundation:

Al Qaeda 3.0
The ‘War on Terror’ After the Bush Administration
At Al Qaeda 3.0, leading policy makers, law enforcement officials, scholars and journalists from around the world will assess the current threat posed by al Qaeda and its affiliates to the United States, Europe, the Middle East and South Asia. The conference speakers will also explore what steps the next administration should take in combating al Qaeda and its affiliates both at home and abroad.

The event is tomorrow, Friday, October 10, 2008. Start: 8:45a ET, Finish: 5p ET.

The conference has an impressive list of panelists (bios): Frances Fragos Townsend, Bruce Hoffman, Steve Coll, Peter Bergen, Lawrence Wright, Daniel Kimmage, Nir Rosen, Brian Fishman, Mohammed Hafex, Thomas Hegghammer, Marc Sageman (no, Bruce and Marc are not on the same panel), and others.

Register here.

New Army Doctrine Places Stability Operations Equal to Military Combat Power

While military operations may neutralize immediate “kinetic” threats, enduring change comes from stabilizing the unstable and building capacity to self-govern where there is none. Security, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, and development are critical for ultimate democratization, but more importantly, for peace and security locally and globally. Without competent and comprehensive engagement in these areas of “soft power,” tactical “hard power” operations are simply a waste of time, money, and life.

This week the U.S. Army released a new field manual, FM 3-07 Stability Operations, to adapt the military to these requirements of the modern age. The manual “represents a milestone in Army doctrine,” writes LTG Bill Caldwell in the foreword.

It is a roadmap from conflict to peace, a practical guidebook for adaptive, creative leadership at a critical time in our history. It institutionalizes the hard-won lessons of the past while charting a path for tomorrow. This manual postures our military forces for the challenges of an uncertain future, an era of persistent conflict where the unflagging bravery of our Soldiers will continue to carry the banner of freedom, hope, and opportunity to the people of the world.

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FCC to Probe “Hidden Hand” Analysts

The Federal Communications Commission is looking into whether the Pentagon’s program to use and leverage retired officers as “message force multipliers.” David Barstow broke the story in The New York Times earlier this year. Today, writing in the Congressional Quarterly, John M. Donnelly’s reports the FCC launched a probe to “address congressional questions about a Pentagon program viewed by some lawmakers as propaganda.”

The FCC is looking into whether TV networks and certain on-air analysts broke the law by failing to disclose to viewers that the apparently independent analysts were in fact part of a Pentagon-funded information campaign, a spokesman for the commission said.

“What I can confirm is that the enforcement bureau at the FCC is looking into this matter, and I can confirm that they have sent letters in connection with it, seeking information,” the spokesman said late Tuesday, without elaborating on when the inquiry began or who its targets are.

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Admin: MountainRunner got a make-over

MountainRunner got a make-over. The fresh look and feel will make the site easier to use and the new features should help make MountainRunner your first stop for information on public diplomacy and strategic communication.

The “community features” of MovableType 4.2 will become more noticeable as I roll-out capabilities over the coming weeks. In the meantime, here is a short list of enhancements available now:

  • Login to make commenting easier and to access new and forthcoming features. With the update, some of bugs in commenting (signed in but not signed in is one I experienced) are gone.
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  • If you like a post, give it a vote to promote it. To vote, you have to register and sign in. Sorry, there is no thumbs down feature.
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  • There are certain key concepts to this blog. Now, instead of searching blog posts, one click will get you to the resource page on the subject.
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The new MountainRunner will incorporate the repository aspect of ConflictWiki (http://conflictwiki.org) that never got off the ground. Soon you’ll see a link on the right side for a new repository of reports and book lists on public diplomacy, strategic communication, information operations, etc.

ASIG_Logo One last item. On the left margin of the blog, you may also have noticed a new image. The logo is for my firm, Armstrong Strategic Insights Group (note the mountain; no runner though). For more, visit the still-developing site http://armstrongsig.com. Longer white papers will be published from ASIG with an accompanying post on the MountainRunner blog.

American Public Diplomacy Wears Combat Boots: the Pentagon’s $300 million to “engage and inspire”

American public diplomacy wears combat boots. Not only is the Pentagon in the critical last three feet of engagement virtually and in person with audiences around the globe, especially in contested areas, but it is the Defense Department that is putting up the money to expand public diplomacy. The Pentagon’s 3-year, $300 million contract for private companies to “engage and inspire” Iraqis to support U.S. objectives and the Iraqi government, described by Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus in the Washington Post, is more than an effort five years too late. It is one more shining example of the significant failure of the U.S. Government to come to grips with the present need and commit the resources necessary to engage in the Second Great War of Ideas that began in earnest nearly a decade ago.

Continue reading “American Public Diplomacy Wears Combat Boots: the Pentagon’s $300 million to “engage and inspire”

Noteworthy

Highlighted Blog: US Army Combined Arms Center. Pick your model, CAC or UK FCO, both are excellent. Be sure to check out CAC’s blog and user stats page.

“As my friend the late Sheriff Gene Darnell always told me, the best politics is doing a good job.” – Representative Ike Skelton, D-MO, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee discussing improving the interagency process but raising the point that the deeds speak louder than words.

“It is not every day that a young US Army officer has the opportunity to interact with a sitting head of state who has both lead a revolution and fought a counterinsurgency. CGSC students and faculty had just that chance on Friday when Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni visited the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.” – LTG Bill Caldwell sharing President Museveni’s five conditions and four phases for revolutionary war.

“[T]here is also increasingly broad recognition within the military that the expertise USAID brings with regard to providing effective and culturally-appropriate humanitarian assistance to foster long-term economic and political progress in the developing world will be decisive as the U.S. government strives to develop capabilities aimed at not only defeating ongoing insurgencies, but creating conditions in threatened nations that will be key to preempting future insurgencies.” – LTC David Menegon and Jeffrey Ashley, Ph.D., in Operational Design Prototype for USAID and DOD Synchronization: The Art of the Strategic Process for PRTs in Iraq.

Other

Use Google as if it were January 2001.

Congratulations to Chris Albon, blogger at War and Health, for completing his comprehensives.

Reconstruction and Stabilization Corps to be Enacted

Military operations may neutralize immediate kinetic threats and strategic communications may make promises, but enduring change comes from systemic overhauls that stabilize unstable regions. Security, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, and development are critical for stability and denial of sanctuary for violent extremism, terrorism, and insurgency. These are the real propaganda of deeds but without competent and comprehensive action in these areas, military and diplomatic actions are simply a waste of time, money, and life.

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Principles of Strategic Communication

This is Part I of two posts on describing “Strategic Communication.” Part II is here

In the coming months, reports and Congressional legislation will attempt to change how the United States communicates with the world. Called “public diplomacy” or “Strategic Communication,” the importance of this type engagement has finally come to the forefront of our national security debate, at least for those taking a serious look at the present and future. Irregular conflict, the present and future reality of war, is based not on our ability to “kill our way to victory” but to operate in a local and global information environment.

When there are no capitals to take or “hearts” to be “won,” real security comes through enduring engagement of local and global groups in a modern proxy struggle for minds and wills. Operating “by, with, and through” such groups not only extends our reach, but acts as a force multiplier against adversaries who elicit support in the global information environment for money, recruits, and sympathetic actions. Think Hamburg, Madrid, London, and Glasgow.

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A Theory of Strategic Communication: ‘like an orchestra producing harmony’

DOD OSD PA Theory of Strategic Communication: like an orchestra producing harmony

This is Part II of two posts on describing “Strategic Communication”. Part I is here.

In addition to the principles of strategic communication, the Defense Department developed the graphical representation of Strategic Communication show above.

Several points to raise with those new to this slide. The analogy of SC as an orchestra has at its middle, the conductor representing the collection of senior leaders, a music score as the SC plan, and an orchestra made up of various SC communities of practice and lines of operation

The “orchestra” can be reconfigured for the desired effect. It can become “strolling strings” or anything else as it reshaped, resized, and repurposed. The tempo, sound, etc. may vary, depending on the desired effect.

First, to me, it best represents a point rather than a dynamic model of action. The iterative process in the slide is controlled by the conductor in a discipline of message and action. This does not fit reality nor should it. Our engagement should not be and cannot be a constant, choreographed message and action stream. Operating in this way, even it was possible, create vulnerabilities in a dynamic environment with multiple, flexible actors.

In the ‘orchestra’ model, when a ‘musician’ hits a flat note, misses the cue entirely, or performs something not on the sheet, the error is prominent. A better analogy, if one must be made, is a jazz jam session. It puts the model into motion. The jazz jam would be a dynamic environment where bad notes don’t stand out as well; members loosely interact, they riff independently or off each other, while all are headed in the same direction. This provides for intentional and unintentional liberty, or deviations, not permitted in the orchestra model.

Second, it is essential to acknowledge the U.S. public and U.S. media are stakeholders and intended audiences, an apt phrase, as this slide does. They, like the allies, adversaries, and neutrals (a collection that includes “swing voters”) are targets of what we say, do, and fail to say and do. The adversary is very good at exploiting our “say-do gap”. We must become skilled in not only preventing this gap but at increasing awareness of the adversaries’ (plural) own shortcomings, which we are terrible at doing.

Third, the model implies a level of calibration that is difficult in a war of perceptions. Orchestra conductors aren’t known for taking feedback, but the graphical representation outweighs the need for an asterisk saying the conductor here will accept dynamic input.

More to come on this. In the meantime, please comment. 

You’re not winning if they don’t know it

War today is based more on perceptions than reality. We hear from the Government that Al-Qaeda is losing the Arab street, but does the street know this? From PIPA/WorldPublicOpinion.org:

The US’s ‘war on terror’ has failed to weaken its prime target al Qaeda, according to people in 22 out of 23 countries surveyed in a new poll for the BBC World Service.

On average only 22 per cent believe that al Qaeda has been weakened, while three in five believe that it has either had no effect (29%) or made al Qaeda stronger (30%).

… Countries with the largest numbers perceiving that the US ‘war on terror’ has strengthened al Qaeda include some with whom the US has quite friendly relations–France (48%), Mexico (48%), Italy (43%), Australia (41%) and the UK (40%). Countries most prone to believe that al Qaeda has been weakened include Kenya (58%), Egypt (44%), and Nigeria (37%).

If the people don’t know you’re winning, you’re not.

Event: AFRICOM and Beyond: The Future of U.S.-African Security and Defense Relations

From the American Enterprise Institute:

The October 1 operational launch of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), on the eve of a new American presidential administration, provides an unprecedented opportunity to reshape U.S. strategy toward Africa. Significant attention has been devoted to the structure and functions of AFRICOM–and to its strategic communications challenges. Less thought, however, has been given to identifying the core security interests that should guide U.S. strategy on the continent or to defining the new kinds of partnership with a more self-assured Africa that are most likely to advance those interests.

With its capacity for political as well as military engagement and for conflict prevention as well as traditional war-fighting, AFRICOM has the potential to serve as a model for future interagency security cooperation efforts abroad. But what AFRICOM does is more important than how the command is structured. What is the strategic rationale for increased U.S. security engagement with African countries? What are the emerging threats and challenges in Africa, and how should they be addressed? AEI’s Mauro De Lorenzo and Thomas Donnelly will host two panel discussions with African security experts to answer these and other questions.

When: Wednesday, October 1, 2008  10:30 AM – 1:30 PM

Where: Wohlstetter Conference Center, Twelfth Floor, AEI
1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

Register here.

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